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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the relationship of textuality - reading/writing processes (literacy) 
and products (text) - to war. The central argument is, that the origin and systematic 
elaboration of war is linked to the development of particular writing systems, such that the 
former can neither come into existence, nor persist, independently of the latter. Taking 
alphabetic writing systems as a test case, I claim that the complex, contestable and very 
nearly counterintuitive nature of the mooted relationship makes it uniquely amenable - 
despite sociology's prior neglect of both topic areas - to sociological analysis; and requires 
the formulation of a new analytical tool - herein designated the proxy principle - to render it 
sensible. 
The proxy principle is located within ongoing debates about the impact of literacy on entities 
called "real people", and the relative importance of text(s) in a "real world". Such debates 
can be traced to at least the 5th Century BC in Plato's Phaedrus, but gain in force, variety and 
significance under conditions of modernity. In contemporary debates, writing and the written 
are typically depicted as either [a] beneficial or harmful to "real people"; [b] necessary, 
supplementary or irrelevant to the "real world"; or [c] in deconstructionist arguments, the 
"real world" itself, beyond which nothing exists. Conversely, my proposition maintains that 
the purpose of reading/writing is the construction of surrogate people and an alternative 
world - proxies - that are generated from, co-exist with and eventually dominate both 
conceptions of and activity in the non-textual world. 
The emphasis throughout is on the impact and consequences of a move of communicated 
meaning from incorporation to inscription: increases in the extent and intensity of war 
constitute one such consequence. 
The analysis of this relationship is diachronic (equating changes in reading and writing 
with changes in civil/military organisation and the science and art of war) and synchronic 
(highlighting durability of structure), and operates on 5 levels, ranging from the macro-
(global), through mega, meso, and mini to micro- (individual) levels. A typology relating 
specific communicative modes and technologies (Oral-Alphabetic-Scribal-Print-Informatic) 
to particular forms of warfare ("primitive"-Imperialist-Holy-Total-Pure) grounds initial 
sections of the thesis, which then proceeds to the provision of empirical examples 
displaying degrees of consistency and reproduction of the process over time and space. In 
conclusion, instances of the operation of the 'war/text' axis in late-20th century contexts are 
presented to test the hypothesis for validity and predictive capacity. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION. 
1.1: The Argument 
The following thesis argues for a relationship between two social phenomena: a 
particular communicative mode - reading and writing - and war, a specific form of 
organized conflict. I argue that the introduction of, and qualitative and quantitative 
increases in, reading/writing processes (literacy) and products (multiple forms of 
text) intensify and extend war-readiness (propensity), actual warmaking 
(prosecution) and the shaping of (post-war) outcomes. Characterising each 
phenomenon as a key factor in societal formation and social change, I contend for 
both a systemic conjunction (interplay over time and space) and a structural 
homology (constitutive sameness of form) between the two object-domains. 
I call this interplay a war/text axis: the structural factor that allows for the mutual 
coterminous development of reading/writing and war is designated the proxy 
principle. 
The core of the argument is that in conditions of modernity and its derivatives (the 
pre-, proto- and post-modern), reading and writing are constitutive of both the 
sociological and the social: that is, the 'world' that sociology analyses and that its 
subject-matter inhabits, is primarily an artefact of text. This is posed in 
contradistinction to three alternative views: the first sees reading/writing processes 
and products as pervasive, so thoroughly integrated into the contemporary world 
that they can be taken for granted, perceived as normative and thus not a fit subject 
for separate analysis; the second sees textual structures and literacy activities as 
either insignificant, properly the province of other non-sociological disciplines, or 
an adjunct to some conception of the "real" world. 
Contrarily, my position is that an analytically-separable 'quasi-world' of the 
written co-exists with this non-textual entity, and forms the sociological object of 
investigation. 
1. 
This grounding premise similarly distances the argument from the third opposed 
contention, the deconstructionist assertion - found in the work of theorists such as 
Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida - that apart from the enscripted there is no "real 
world" to be had (ii n 'y a pas de hors-texte). The idea of coexistence opposes this 
axiom as much as it stands against the alternatives of reading/writing as seamlessly 
ubiquitous, or text-as-supplement. It also sets the agenda for the thesis: given the 
mooted conceptual separation into textual and non-textual 'worlds', typically both 
located in the same time and space, what is the relationship of each to each? 
This emphasis on relationship, the interaction between the textual and the non-
textual, is precisely what casts reading and writing as a fit subject for sociology. To 
delineate the connection(s), a singular mode of analysis - the proxy principle - is 
forwarded. At the epistemological level, and in direct response to Galtung's (1981) 
question 'literacy for what?', this principle states that the prime purpose of reading 
and writing - the essential function of 'functional literacy' and the consequent 
importance attached to it - is the creation of surrogate selves (proxies) and a 
surrogate environment (a textual world) within which these proxies operate. 
Expressed differently: this text-generated universe and its textually-defined 
denizens constitute an ontological domain ('culture') distinct from but concomitant 
with the universe of ecological and biological constraints and pre-givens ('nature'). 
Put in yet another form: what the proxy principle provides is, on the one hand, a tool 
for investigating the ways in which reading and writing constitute a comprehension 
and control of the world outside the range of [i] direct sensory experience and WI 
other sensemaking media; on the other, how persons become what is written by 
and/or about them. 
This final formulation suggests that reading and writing are more than simply one-
in-a-range of representational methods; that, amongst an array of sign-systems and 
communicative modes - oral, gestural, pictorial - which extend the range of human 
knowledge out past the point of the experiential, the textual dominates. This 
inference is deliberate. Reading/writing is intrinsically linked with the conferring 
of power in both its senses, ie, of hegemony ('power over') and autonomy ('power to'). 
In maintaining this I draw on both Foucault's general conception of power as 
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productive (1980: 118), Robinson's more specific claim, that any consideration of 
literacy entails an 'ethnography of power' as a starting-point (1990: 159), and the 
observation of Freire & Macedo that 'literacy becomes a meaningful construct to the 
degree that it is viewed as a set of practices that functions to either empower or 
disempower people' (1987: 141). 
My position is thus somewhat at odds with that of K. S. Goodman when, speaking to 
the relationship between reading/writing and power, he holds that literacy 
'...does not in itself produce power. It does not in itself change values, 
aspirations, power relationships, cultures and world views. Literacy is 
necessary but not sufficient. It is a concomitant of economic, political, social and 
cultural changes' (cited in Mayor & Pugh, 1987: 401). 
Preserved in this statement is the idea of reading and writing as contingent. 
Contrarily, I seek to demonstrate that several central social processes are 
instantiated - brought into being by, maintained through, not possible without - 
particular forms of writing. Some, not all, phenomena: which processes rely on 
reading/writing as an independent variable is a case-by-case matter for empirical 
investigation. Under this circumstance, I outline a significant social phenomenon - a 
test case - which only occurs in societies with writing. That phenomenon is war. 
Sociology has consistently tended to underplay or neglect the primary social 
significance of war and/or reading and writing. The elaboration of the grounding 
proposition highlights and explains this neglect, and fills a gap within the 
literature. It also critiques two dominant approaches evident on the relatively 
rare occasions when the discipline engages with either subject. The first holds 
that the tyvo topic areas are unrelated. The second works off the premise that if a 
linkage exists, it moves in the opposite direction - that is, high degrees of 
individual literacy and a fully-developed literate culture are fundamental to a 
civilizational complex, and such a complex is essentially peaceful. Opposing such 
an approach, I take reading and writing as a necessary but not sufficient condition 
of war. 
3. 
1.2: Definitions  
1.2.1: Reading, writing and text. 
Herein, reading and writing (or the compound 'reading/writing') is the baseline term 
from which text, following Ricouer, is initially defined as 'any discourse fixed by 
writing': a broader and higher-level structure is created by the 'relation of text to 
text...[which] engenders the quasi world of literature' (1991: 106, 109). I use literacy 
throughout to designate textual praxis (in the bilateral Marxian sense of the word, 
with theory and practice as mutually constitutive), as the activities by which text is 
produced (written) and apprehended (read). With regard to specific terminology 
within this broad framework, I adopt throughout the usage set out in Thwaites, 
Davis & Mules (1994; Appendix A to this chapter)'. 
Further: my use of the term reading/writing is to be understood as, in the first 
instance, a mark-making endeavour, at once the process and product of inscription. 
This departs from conceptions of writing as (i) chiefly or solely an alternative 
representation of sound units, or (ii) "thought" rendered visible. Any unexamined 
conjunction of this sort fails on four levels: by discounting or demoting an assortment of 
non-alphabetic writing systems (cuneiform, hieroglyphic, ideogrammatic), setting up 
both an analytical ('grammatocentric') and a geopolitical (Eurocentric) bias; second, 
it rules out of court the contention (associated with but not exclusive to Derrida's 
deconstructionist thesis), that writing precedes speech, and language springs from 
making marks and talking about themf thirdly, it consistently casts writing as a 
dependent variable, and blurs the very real independences and distinctions between 
This list gives designations for the following 46 terms: culture; sign; referential, metalingual and 
formal functions; addresser/sender; addressee/receiver; conative, expressive and phatic 
functions (functions of address); contextual functions; signifier/signified/signification; 
paroleflangue; syntagm; paradigm; metaphor; metonym/metonymy; connotations/denotations; 
myths; genre; narration/narrative/narrators/narratees; plot; story; events; closure; institution; 
discourse; embodiment; realism; redundancy; ideology; hegemony; habitus; dispositions; and 
capital. 
2 More subtly, Derrida's principal translator gives an example of the same sort of reversal 
within writing, in the way a preface precedes a text, but is typically composed after the writing 
of the text to which it refers (Spivak, in Derrida, 1976: ix-xiii). 
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utterance and writine and finally, it diverts attention from the materiality of 
writing, thereby limiting the scope of empirical analysis and fostering a tendency to 
"see through/beneath/behind" rather than "look directly at" the artefact. 
This view of writing as essentially inscription rather than simple transcription, and 
the commitment to "looking directly", necessarily entails a consideration of the 
technologies of writing. Here, I draw partly from those analysts who characterise 
literacy as a 'technology of the intellect' (Ong, 1982; Wagner, 1983: 5; Bhola, 1984: 
22-23; Goody, 1986: 151; Finnegan, 1988: 12-44; De Caste11 & Luke, 1989), but more from 
those who more literally cast particular writing technologies as agencies of social 
change. This includes the machinery of what is written with - whether that be the 
goose-quill, the mass-produced machined steel-nib pen (Howard, 1985) or the 
printing press (Eisenstein, 1968; Marshall, 1983: 12; Heath, in De Caste11 et al, 
1986:16) - as well as what is written on, - stone, papyrus, parchment, paper (Innis, 
1950; 1951). 
As central to the form taken by such inscribed artefacts are the locales in which they 
are stored and preserved - the thrust of Popper's placement of the library at the 
heart of western civilization's 'high' culture (1972: 107-08), and the impetus for 
extensive and readily-accessible data archives on the more mundane plane of 
information. This latter involves analysis of documents at the micro-level, as both 
guarantors of personal identity and as linkage-mechanisms to the archival record: at 
issue is not only how some sort of "identity" is indicated (in a second-order sense) by 
such writings, but how these writings actually produce such identities - and constitute 
(make possible) the number and types of relationship to which such identities are 
subject. 
In finer-grained detail and more particularly, consideration is given to the notion of 
3  Frank Smith (1983: 81-88) deals with these misconceptions ('myths') when noting that 
writing is not just concretised speech . (which, 'once uttered, can rarely be revised...writing can 
be reflected upon, altered and even erased at will', further maintaining that the 'first great and 
unique potential of writng' is that 'it gives the writer power to manipulate time' - pace Omar 
Kayam's "moving finger"). Nor is it simple one-to-one thought transferral ('writing can create 
ideas and experiences on paper which could never exist in the mind and possibly not in the 
, 'real world" either...thoughts are created in the act of writing'). The fuller implications of this 
latter insight will become evident as the thesis proceeds. 
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the impact of assorted writing technologies on the body, both in terms of physical 
disposition (a particular instance of Foucault's dressage) and physiological 
transformation - impacts on the eye, the brain, or (suppression of) the voice. 
Goldberg's case-study (1990) on the 'transforming' of the human hand into a writing 
implement during the English Renaissance is also apposite here, and an indication of 
the tradition in back of this approach can be found in the following anonymous 
colophon accompanying the Silos Beatus, from thel2th Century AD: 
'The labour of the writer is the refreshment of the reader. The one depletes 
the body, the other advances the mind.. .If you do not know how to write you 
will consider it no hardship, but if you want a detailed account of it let me tell 
you that the work is heavy: it makes the eyes misty, bows the back, crushes 
the ribs and belly, brings pain to the kidneys, and makes the body ache all 
over. Therefore, 0 Reader, turn the leaves gently and keep your fingers away 
from the letters, for as the hailstorm ruins the harvest of the land, so does the 
unserviceable reader destroy the book and the writing...' 
Equal in importance to the machinery of production (technologies) is the constitution 
of the mechanism of transmission. Consonant with the approach taken to writing 
technology, this involves concepts as diverse as the cybernetically-based modelling 
of assorted communications theorists (overview in Ruben, 1984: 40-71) and Poster's 
later (1990) theory of the 'Mode of Information'. Combining these elements of 
technology and transmission, I take on board Kittler's concept of the 
aufschreibesysteme - 'systems of writing down' or 'notation systems' - as delineated 
by that author's translators and editors: 
'A notation system or, as we have chosen to translate, a discourse network 
has the exterior character - the outsideness - of a technology. In Kittler's 
view, such technologies are not mere instruments with which "man" 
produces his meanings; they cannot be grounded in a philosophical 
anthropology. Rather, they set the framework within which something 
like "meaning", indeed, something like "man", can become possible at all' 
(1990: xii). 
Finally, and as inferred from this last conception, I consider the part writing plays in 
the composition of aggregates, with a specific focus on the creation of bodies politic. 
The individual bodies modified by reading and writing, and concomitant identities 
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conferred through text(s), are bundled together into larger entities, in each of which 
the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This makes possible reference to such 
groupings in the abstract - the family, the corporation, the society, the city, the 
military, the public (or any similarly appropriate designation). Here, I concentrate 
upon one such mega-level formation - the State - an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 
1991) sustained by invented traditions (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1992), conceiving of 
these inventions and imaginings as primarily products of text. 
This focus is ongoing and has a long heritage within the State itself, and in the 
advanced states of the developed west - and increasingly among the relatively less-
developed polities that comprise "the rest" of the world - the importance and 
survival of the written word is a persistent issue of no small concern. The inception of 
high modernity in the late-18th and throughout the 19th-century was a period 
which in Europe gave birth to principles of universal education, a print-based mass 
media and consequently an entity called the reading public, and when the word 
'literacy' itself was invented (Mann, 1983: 209) in order 'to express the achievement 
and possession of what were increasingly seen as general and necessary skills' 
(Williams, 1989: 188). The period was also characterised by debates about the 
nature and dissemination of these "general and necessary skills" and attempts to 
estimate their sociopolitical and economic impacts. 
Such debates usually broke down into the holding of one of three positions: the 
spread of literacy lauded as emancipatory, as represented by the convictions of John 
Stuart Mill when endorsing his father's belief that 
'all would be gained if the whole population were taught to read, if all sorts of 
opinions were allowed to be addressed to them by word and in writing, and if by 
means of the suffrage they could nominate a legislature to give effect to the 
opinions they adopted' (quoted in Hoyles, 1977: 28), 
a view contradicted by a position most succinctly expressed in the mid-18th century 
by L. R. De La Chalotais, whose Essay on National Education noted ominously that 
'...even the working people want to study....and after a poor education that 
teaches them only to despise their fathers' profession they turn to the cloisters 
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and join the clerics; they take posts as officers of the law; they often become 
persons harmful to society...It is recognised that under a good administration 
the classes of men that live on the labour of others must not be too numerous; 
they must be limited to the essential minimum' (cited in Cipolla,1969: 100, 
emphases added). 
Taking a stance at odds with these statements of exposure to and mastery of literate 
culture as alternatively beneficial or dangerous, the liberal middle-class Victorian 
social and educational reformer W. B. Hodgson concluded, in an 1867 address to the 
Social Science Association in Belfast, that either of these mooted outcomes were at 
least overdrawn. His own take on the phenomenon roundly criticised firstly "threat-
to-social-order" assessments, opening by noting a widespread familiarity 
'...with the statistical tables about criminals, and the proportion among them 
of those who can read and write well, imperfectly, or not at all. Crime, we are 
told, flourishes most rankly among the last, less among the second, and least 
among the first. What, then, is the natural inference from such statements? Of 
course, diminish the ignorance and you diminish the crime. But the ignorance of 
what? Of course, of reading and writing. Ignorance of reading and writing is 
productive of, or accompanied by, a great amount of crime. Knowledge of 
reading and writing will, therefore, diminish crime! There may be fallacies 
more palpable than this; there can be few more gross or serious' (Hodgson, [1867] 
1986: 385). 
He then weighed in against Millsian-type text-based progress-through-education 
arguments as basically reductionist, to the point where even 
'attempts to teach science are often marred by confounding it with literary or 
verbal knowledge. Nature is treated on the system of the Eton Latin Grammar 
[...] In this aspect, how pregnant with meaning is the title, "Grammar 
School",.. .what a petrefaction is this term of the whole cast of opinion, which 
viewed all instruction as an affair of books and words! What a record it 
preserves of the habit of regarding even Science as a knowledge less of things 
than of what men have written about things, and of the style in which they 
have written![...] We, or our survivors, will then look back with a smile, not of 
contempt or pride, but of joy and pity, on the time when there was so great a 
pother about so small a matter as reading and writing' ([1867] 1986: 388, 390, 
393). 
Contrary to this prediction, the present century has seen an increase in, rather than 
a diminution of, Hodgson's 'pother': his 'survivors' and successors have moreover 
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wrung new variants on the initial debates. Amongst 20th-century analysts, the view 
of literacy as necessary and emancipatory (eg Tuman, 1987: 138; Leake, 1987: 37; 
Griswold, 1987: 30-31) still contends with the reading/writing-as-
harmful/exploitative position (eg Levi-Strauss, 1961: 292; Lefebvre, 1971: 152; 
Rockhill, 1987: 157). In Appendix B, I map out the terrain of these competing 
ideologies with reference to - and substantive variations on - H. S. Bhola's (1984) 
comprehensive model of literacy impacts. In the final instance, however, both sets 
of claims are exaggerated, and I share the assessment of critics such as Graff, 
skeptical towards views that 'have assigned to literacy's acquisition a truly 
daunting number of cognitive, affective, behavioural and attitudinal effects' (1982: 
13-15) or Enzensberger's Hodgson-like evaluation, that 
'Every third inhabitant of our planet gets by without the arts of reading and 
writing. ..it could only occur to us - that is, a tiny minority of people who read 
and write - to consider people who are not in the habit of doing so, to be a tiny 
minority. This displays an ignorance which I do not find acceptable. ..It was the 
great intellectuals of the eighteenth century who...believed that the 
immaturity of the people was due not only to its political suppression and 
economic exploitation but also to ignorance. Later generations have drawn the 
conclusion from these premises that the ability to read and write is an essential 
part of a dignified human existence. In the course of time, admittedly, this 
influential idea was subject to a series of noteworthy reinterpretations...' (1992: 
36-37). 
Some of these reinterpretations involve mere extensions of concern, prompting 
endorsements of reading and writing from highly-placed public figures - future 
English kings (Prince Charles), former US-presidential first ladies (Barbara Bush), 
world religious leaders (Pope John Paul II) - and large-scale commitment of symbolic 
and material resource to the dissemination of reading/writing skills, such as the 
Experimental World Literacy Program of 1975, or the UN-sponsored designation of 
1990 as an International Literacy Year. Expressed negatively, the flipside of such 
statements and endeavours proclaimed that lack of access to - or erosion and decline 
in - measurable literacy skills constituted a series of "grammar panics" or regular 
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"crises",4 the net effect of which is to discount people(s) from full participation in 
contemporary social life. That latter phrase was equated with a series of cognitive 
processes peculiar to modem rational attitudes, individuality, improved health, 
rural innovation, educationally-based work-placement, industrialisation and 
techno-scientific progress, gender-equity, political and economic freedom, all 
variously cited as dependent on effective transmission and reception of 
alphanumeric abilities. Thus, viewed from this perspective, a lack or loss of these 
skills was and is claimed to be a form of social pathology requiring remedial 
treatment. 5 
Running in tandem with these themes, and taking the post-World War II era as the 
beginning point of an advanced or "late" modernity, a cluster of newer revisionist 
theoretical concerns unsettled any fixed notions of the indispensability of written 
matter to this same contemporaneity. A 'de-schooling movement' questioned both 
the efficacy and the ideology of book-learning in the schoolroom under conditions of 
universal and typically compulsory education (Illich, 1974; P. Goodman, 1977). At 
4 Symptomatic of such "crises" were a bevy of works published in the 1970s and early '80s as an 
offshoot of concerns expressed within the fields of general (as well as socio- and psycho-) 
linguistics, education, semiotics, media theory and communication studies, the latter specifying a 
textual and/or literacy crisis as a localised instance of a more general 'crisis of culture' (Hall, 
1977: 1-7; Grossberg, 1979). Typical works of this period included items with titles such as: 
'Reading - is there such a thing?' (McBride, 1970); 'The death of avant-garde literature' (Fiedler, 
1971); 'Is print dying?' (Bagdikian, 1971: 182-205); 'Do books matter?' (Baumfield, 1973); 'Is 
literacy passé?' (Ong, 1974); 'Is literacy really declining?' (Douglas, 1976); 'The death of the 
author' (Barthes, 1977); 'What is an author?' (Foucault, 1988 [orig. 1977]); 'After the book?' 
(Steiner, 1978: 186-203); 'The future of reading books' (Barzun, 1978); 'The decline of literacy' 
(Copperman, 1980b); 'The death of the printed word' (Evans, 1980: 103-109); and 'What future 
for the book?' (Leeson, 1985: 181-188). The most systematic analysis of the constituents of a 
"literacy crisis" remains that of Coe (1986): Wright Mills (1959: 217-18) directly weds these 
general concerns to his discipline in his seemingly offhand observation that '[i]t has in fact been 
said with authority that there is "a serious crisis in literacy" - a crisis in which social scientists 
are very much involved.' On sociology as itself in a condition of 'chronic crisis', the most 
exhaustive review remains that of Merton (in Blau, 1976: 21-52). 
5 Significantly, this modem equation of illiteracy and illness is the obverse of the 14th-century 
view of Petrarch when he sees writing itself as a sick pandemic condition: 'Is it true that this 
disease of writing...is...incurable, and...contagious as well?...Within our memory, it was rare 
enough for people to write verses. But now there is no one who does not write them; few indeed 
write anything else. Some think that the fault, so far as our contemporaries are concerned, is 
largely mine. I have heard this from many, but I solemnly declare, as I hope sometime to be granted 
immunity from other ills of the soul - for I look for none from this - that I am now at last suddenly 
awakened for the first time by warning signs to a consciousness that this may perhaps be true; 
while intent only upon my own welfare, I may have been unwittingly injuring, at the same time, 
myself and others' (Francesco Petrarca, 1352, cited in Ross & McLaughlin, 1968: 120). 
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higher levels of abstraction and generality, the work of Marshall McLuhan (1967; 
1971) proposed the actual (or imminent) death of print, the disappearance of 
reading and writing as a valid communicative mode in the contemporary age of the 
'global village', and an end to the era of the "Gutenberg Galaxy" in Western history 
as alternative media, primarily television, antedate and supercede writing. 
From a separate but related set of perspectives, the rise of new information 
technologies ("the IT revolution") threw up a set of assessments initially claiming 
that electronic audiovisual media - principally computerization - had created a 
situation wherein 'the book as we know it, and as our ancestors created and 
cherished it' is doomed to 'a slow but steady slide into oblivion' (Evans, 1979: 105). 
The situation of the book-as-artefact and institutions dedicated to its preservation - 
"traditional" libraries, schools, publishing-houses - was effectively diagnosed as 
dead or dying: this led logically to a demotion of literacy (Meyrowitz, 1985: 328) 
and a corresponding future orientation where reading and writing 'will become an 
obsolete skill' (Comberg, in Compaine, 1983: 129). Finally, from another quarter 
came the notion of a shift from modernity into a putative 'post-'modern, a shift 
grounded in rethinking all aspects - the 'grammatocentric' privileging of the 
'signified', the 'meta-narrative', the 'lisible' and the 'author(ial)' - at the heart of 
a modem literate culture now seen, from this perspective, as defunct. 
The definition of reading, writing and text provided above aims at both bringing 
closer together and sorting out these incommensurate perspectives. It constitutes an 
attempt to wed the insights of a reflexive (but typically obscurantist) 'post-
structuralist' approach to textuality with the more "traditional" empirical concerns 
of an un(der)developed sociology of literacy. The resultant merger - a "sociography" 
- is then applied to the field of war, as defined below. 
1.2.2: War 
War is a subset of a larger category of conflict. What distinguishes war from other 
forms of conflict is not the degree of violence itself, but that this violence is [i] 
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collective, involving two or more societal groups 6 ; [ii] organized in that the fighting 
involved is pre-planned, exercised within the bounds of a recognisable pattern, and 
terminates at an agreed cut-off point'; and [iii] legitimate, insofar as hostilities are 
rule-bound and subject to a particular normative order8 . The intensity of the conflict 
experience under wartime conditions, for combatants and non-combatants alike, 
obscures the fact that resort to war rests on a base of rationality: "rationality" in the 
Weberian senses of both value-derived (Wertrational) and means-ends 
(Zweckrational) formulations and practices. War involves both the principled 
exertion of will and commitment to a worldview on the one hand, and the ruthless 
exercise of a calculative method on the other: reading/writing as both alphanumeric 
capacity and cultural artefact, is at once fundamental to, the visible index of, and the 
means of apprehending and describing, this rationality. Consequently, I argue for the 
prime causal influence of reading and writing in the construction and conduct of war. 
This involves both a shift in conventional perspectives and a significant re-
definition of terms. The initial change of focus involves a move from the biological - 
an inherently violent human nature responding instinctually to various ecological 
pressures - to the sociocultural: thus in terms of physical biology, the emphasis is 
6 The extended operational definition adopted by the LORANOW (Long-Range Analysis of 
War) project is taken here as a point of departure: 'War (a "war event") is an occurrence of 
purposive, collective, lethal violence between two or more social groups pursuing contrasting 
political goals which results in fatalities, with at least one belligerent group organized under the 
command of authoritative leadership' (Cioffi-Revilla, 1991: 605). Also incorporated into my 
own definition is the CoW (Correlates of War) index of lethality, whereby 'a military conflict 
qualifies as a war only if it results in at least 1000 battle deaths' and a 'nation qualifies as a 
belligerent if it suffers at least 100 casualties' (Weede, 1984: 654). 
7 This aspect is perhaps most tellingly illustrated in Coffey's finding (cited in Hardin, 1969: 268- 
69), that, with one exception (Paraguay, in the War of the Triple Alliance, 1865-70), no modern 
nation has ever continued a war past the point where five per cent of its population has been lost 
- a finding reiterated by Tilly (1993: 68), who, in claiming the twentieth century 'as the most 
bellicose in human history', still places war casualties in that 'most bellicose' period at 46 per 
thousand, well within the five per cent limit. 
8 Such that the incidents often depicted as representative - those in art, eg, portrayed in Goya's 
Disasters of War lithographs, as in life ( a My Lai massacre, the Holocaust) - are so far from 
exemplary as to come under the heading of war crimes. That what is illegitimate and punishable 
is often more honoured in the breach than the observance does not negate the principle per se. 
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away from species-distinct innate aggressive drives' (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1979) or a 
'territorial imperative' (Ardrey, 1966), and more towards Richard Dawkins' (1976; 
1982) concept of the meme as a cultural analogue to the replicating gene as the 
biological base-unit of inheritance. As elaborated in Chapter 4, the existence of non-
warring societies, however relatively few in number (Otterbein, 1989), and 
historical periods of peace, however qualified and of relatively short duration 
(Melko, 1973), is testimony against views of a humanity physiologically "hard-
wired" for belligerence. 
Neither, by the same logic, do purely economic factors - the forcible acquisition of 
resources such as land, labour, raw materials - constitute a sufficient foundational 
explanation for the cause(s) of war. This is not to deny that economic factors figure in 
the decision to initiate war, that degrees of prosperity or indigence influence the 
capacity to wage war, and that war outcomes alter the material circumstances of 
both victors and the defeated at the cessation of hostilities. But to elevate such 
factors to foundational status both blurs cause and effect, and ignores the fact that 
stated motives for going to war are so seldom based on or justified by appeals to 
plunder. An assertion that materially-acquisitive motives inevitably underly all 
such rationales implies a heavy reliance either on an overcommitment to veiled 
ideology and false consciousness, or the adoption of an overly cynical view of an 
invariant "human nature". A more germane view is provided in the analogous 
account of Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (trans. 
Parsons, 1970: 17, 20) of neither the impulsive pursuit of gain nor the acquiring of 
fiscal booty as inherent in the 'spirit of capitalism'. In an analogous sense, although 
war entails both, neither plunder nor uninhibited violence constitute the essence of 
war. 
Coming to grips with this "essence" - the deep structure of war - is not furthered by 
(and reflects back on) an importation into the problem of essentialist accounts of the 
naturally belligerent and/or self-interested human animal: or more properly 
9An important subset of or variant on this perspective - war as a distinctly or overwhelmingly 
masculine activity - forms the basis of a number of studies (eg, Patton & Poole [eds], 1985; 
Theweleit, 1987 and 1989; McCarthy, 1994). These are retained to the degree that they involve 
the sociocultural construction of gender, rejected to the degree that they rest solely on 
testosterone-driven impulses or other forms of an exclusively male disposition towards violence. 
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"animals", since war is a group activity. A key issue for investigation is what kind 
of groupings are most prone to such an enterprise, and for what reason(s). I argue that 
the most bellicose societies, those in which war is practised most extensively and at 
the highest pitch of intensity, is the nation-state. 
As with reading and writing, extant social scientific approaches to war are sites of 
essential contestation. This field - in sociology a minor, second-order, and largely 
neglected subdisciplinary specialty - is characterised by a series of fundamental 
disagreements and misconceptions. Chief amongst these are the tendencies to 
identify war with unbridled violence; to cast war as a universal human constant (in 
its strongest form, with a root cause located in a genetic predispositon to bellicosity 
noted above); and to correlate diminution of war with the advance of civilization - 
the latter conceived of as a peaceful condition under which war represents a sporadic 
reversion to barbarism. The advent, refinement and spread of modernity is further 
associated, in such views, with a domestically-pacified and globally 
in(ter)dependent nation-state as the dominant political form. The structural division 
of states internally into civil and military sectors, and the requirements of actively 
cooperative coexistence within an international system of states, combine to cast the 
resort to offensive formal conflict as the province of rogue states typically governed 
by sociopathic (if not psychopathic) regimes. The control and potential end to the 
scourge of war depends externally on the bringing to heel of such regimes by the 
forceful intervention of more powerful (coalitions of) enlightened states, and the 
internal reconstitution of offending rogue states by democratic governments committed 
to co-operation and civilizational principles. 
Under such conditions, as this scenario approaches actuality, the legitimate resort to 
formal conflict as a problem-solving mechanism is rendered less necessary: the armed 
forces charged with implementing this solution gradually become peacekeeping 
rather than warmaking entities, and societies move through demilitarization into 
post-military conditions as the necessity for war recedes and eventually disappears. 
Opposing this general model is an alternative conception that holds the State-as-
entity, embedded in a system of states, as itself a cause of, rather than a panacea for, 
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the prosecution of war. Here, the primal human condition is seen as basically pacific, 
a noble savagery: the foundation and development of the State - typecast as 
rapacious, hegemonic and competitive - disrupts this initial condition. Historically, 
encounters between etatist and non-state societies are characterised by violence, and 
in general result in overwhelmingly one-sided outcomes - the marginalisation, 
enslavement and/or elimination of the latter by the former. States are founded on 
and maintain their position of dominance militarily, by resort to war and the 
establishment of a permanent armed forces potential which subsequently serves as 
both deterrent and threat. 
In this scenario, war is tied to state-interest and increases over time: either in the 
form of exponentially more violent head-to-head confrontation between dominant 
states (singly or in alliance); by 'proxy' wars fought by clients of such dominant 
states; by the jockeying for either survival or a more advantageous position within 
the world-system by small states emulating the pattern of bellicosity of their more 
powerful forerunners; or by the destabilisation of regimes deemed hostile to the 
political and economic interests of the dominant states. 
These opposed contentions are pervasive, attract significant allegiance and are 
grounded in long-standing traditions within the social sciences. Supporters of the 
first position supply quantitative data purporting to show that in terms of intensity, 
extent, frequency, mobilization of manpower, and risk of dying in war, pre- or non-
state societies are more bellicose than their etatist successors and neighbours (eg, 
Keeley, 1994; Denton, 1995). Moreover, grounding their contention in Kant's seminal 
1795 essay On Perpetual Peace, contemporary analysts have also claimed that a 
permanent non-warring condition is reliant on the establishment and maintenance of 
particular types of political regimes - variously tagged "republican", "liberal", 
"libertarian", "free", and/or "democratic" - that rarely or never engage in war 
against each other. This central tenet attracts a remarkable degree of unanimity: 
Francis Fukayama has recently reiterated his earlier (1992: 263) support in the 
popular press when saying that 'the correlation between the degree of consolidation 
of liberal democratic institutions and inter-democratic peace would seem to be one of 
the few non-trivial generalisations one can make about world politics' (1998: 26). 
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Suganami cites, among other supporters (Babst 1972; Chan 1984; Doyle 1983, 1986; 
Garnham 1986; Levy 1989; Maoz & Abdolali 1989; Ray 1993; Rummel 1985; Small & 
Singer 1976), Russett, that this 'research result is extremely robust' to the point 
where when subjected to a battery of examinative techniques 'the relative rarity of 
conflict between democracies still holds up'; and Suganami himself notes that 
'convincing counter-examples are few or perhaps non-existent' (1996: 101). 
Conversely, adherents to the opposed paradigm draw from sources such as 
Clausewitz's famous dictum of war as politics 'by other means', Weber's core 
characterisation of the state as claimant to 'the legitimate monopoly of control of 
the means of violence', and what Victor Lee Burke refers to as the Tilly-Giddens 
principle, which regards 'the primacy of warlike behaviour as a central engine in 
the rise of the Western states' (1997: 12) - or in Tilly's own pithier assessment (cited 
in Karsten, 1994: 494), 'war made the State, and the State made war'. Those holding 
to this latter position likewise deploy a range of statistical data (eg, Sorokin, [1937] 
1970; Wright, 1943 [1968]) which demonstrates a rising incidence of war through 
history and culminates in what urban theorist Paul Virilio (interviewed by 
Zurbrugg, 1996) calls a 20th-century 'slaughterhouse', the present 'century of hyper-
violence'. Samuel Huntington's recent theses on an upcoming 'clash of civilizations' 
(1993; 1997) is heir to this tradition, and carries its predictions of civilization-
bearing states in macro-level conflict into the impending millenium. 
Proponents of both views therefore, while diametrically opposed as to the nature of 
the connection between the state and war, agree that a tie exists. I endorse this 
notion of a conjunction, and conceive of the state as a tripartite entity - a specific and 
mutually reinforcing blend of the material, the martial (warring practices that 
determine the state's size, shape, constitution and longevity) and the mythical (a 
state-ethos brought into being and sustained by an infrastructure of reading/writing 
and texts). 
16. 
1.3: Topic Linkage: the War/Text Axis.  
An assortment of literatures provide suggestive indicators as to the conjunction 
between reading /writing and war contended for in this thesis. Such 'hints' include 
the coincidental layout of the pictures facing page 166 of the English-language 
Penguin paperback edition of Foucault's Discipline and Punish (1991), with the 
upper panel depicting a medal struck to commemorate "Louis )UV's first army 
review" in 1666, and the lower an engraving taken from an eighteenth-century 
handwriting manual, detailing the correct way of holding a pen and the seating 
posture to assume when writing; the Levi-Straussian claim of writing going 'hand in 
hand with the extension of military service' (1961: 293); Quincy Wright's marginal 
observation that the 'first effect of literacy.. .was to make people more vulnerable 
to propaganda' ([1942]1965: 180-181, emphasis added); Beaumont & Edmonds stress 
on the historically unprecedented mid-1960's 'sense of the imminence of violence 
and war', brought on by 'the wars of expanding literacy, technology, ideology and 
population which began to burgeon in the third quarter' of the present century (1974: 
x, emphasis added); or McLuhan's claim that the introduction of writing meant 
'power and authority and control of military structures at a distance. ..The 
easier alphabet and the light, cheap, transportable papyrus together 
effected the transfer of power from the priestly to the military class. All this 
is implied in the myth about Cadmus and the dragon's teeth, including the 
fall of the city states, the rise of empires and military bureaucracies' (1967: 
92, 93). 
This is more than merely coincidental. The modern era as apogee of civilisation, 
particularly in its 20th century incarnation, is characterised by two features: the 
high significance allocated to both mass and functional literacy (and an arguably 
higher incidence of both than in prior historical epochs), and an increase in 
instances, intensity and duration of war. On another level - the metaphorical - 
public discourse is peppered with recurrent references to literacy "campaigns" and 
"strategies", "waging war" on illiteracy and ignorance (see, eg, the formats in ICAE, 
1979; Bhola, 1984); efforts to 'make people literate' slip easily into allusions to 
armed struggle (Barnett, 1967: 15; R. Harrison, 1973: 2); and reading and writing is 
cast as weaponry in an intellectual arsenal, as in Hoyle's characterisation of 
literacy as a 'two-edged sword' (1977: 29), or Brecht's admonition to the starving 
(cited in Giroux, 1988: 74) to 'grab hold of the book: its a weapon'. Since the 
pioneering work of Lakoff (1992; 1995; Lakoff & Johnson,1996) has recast metaphor 
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itself as central to, rather than an 'optional extra' in, communicable cognitive 
processes, the possibility arises that the texture of the social (proxy) object is 
metaphoric in this stronger sense. 
More substantively and stated at its broadest, qualitative and quantitative 
increases in literacy rates consistently correspond to combat-readiness and increased 
instances of inter and intra-state warfare, however measured: the armed forces are 
historically a vanguard in the identification and systematic elimination of 
illiteracy; strategies, tactics, logistics, and the structure and training of the armed 
services themselves come to be shaped and defined in documentary terms (manuals); 
citizenship is certified through documentation, and citizenship in extremis rests on 
the potential capacity to fight, kill and die for increasingly abstract national 
causes typically conveyed through text; military fitness of personnel at induction 
level comes to be assessed through testing procedures determining the 
alphanumerical abilities of potential recruits; morale and propaganda take on a 
predominantly scriptable character; the 'enemy' is objectified/dehumanised and 
ideologically and geographically distanced via the medium of a grammatocentric 
technology; and the outbreak, conduct and conclusion of war is formally mediated 
through the making and breaking of written declarations, protocols and conventions 
- treaty, alliance, truce and armistice - instantiated by entities holding a monopoly 
on violence (nation-states) which are themselves typically the product of archived 
commemoration, shifting cartographies and written constitutions. 
Earlier (p. 5 above), I referred to analysts characterising literacy as a 'technology of 
the intellect'. The present mirk endorses this premise, perhaps in a more literal 
sense than its original exponents intended. In general technologies are either boosted 
by, congruent with or actually developed for application in combat: several recent 
communicative technologies - the electronic mass media, computerisation, 
informatics, 'virtual reality' - are specific examples of this tendency. My claim is 
that the origin and development of alphabetic writing systems are an earlier 
instance of the same trend. 
What specifically connects reading/writing and warfare? The claim is that the 
evolution of both phenomena display underlying - if uneven - lines of development, 
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and exhibit a structural homology. To support and clarify this hypothesis, I develop 
a theoretical model in order to expose this structure, to capture and specify these 
linkages, and to track their variance over time. 
This model is expressed as a cause-effect typology, joining together 7 levels or 
themes. Firstly, ideal-types of societies are classified according to their respective 
forms of [1] military organization, [2] rationale for engaging in war, and [3] combat 
mode - how these societies fight, and with what technologies (weaponry). Next - 
and centrally - I present a categorisation of [4] the predominant communicative mode 
of each societal type, emphasising the relevant society's engagement with 
technologies of reading/writing. This connects to an assessment of [5] the type and 
"level(s)" of literacy pertaining within the society; [6] the way in which each 
society is classified by others - from the outside - politically, economically and in 
terms of its proximity to modernity and 'civilization' on the basis of its engagement 
with literate culture and type(s) of literacy; and [7] how authorised knowledge is 
acquired and passed on in each society - where (the educational locus) and by who 
(the agents of transmission). 
The model - and the succeeding discussion of its core components (sections 2, 4 and 5) 
and affiliated subsets (1, 3, 6 and 7) - is as follows: 
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[3] 
Simulation/Heroics 
'Manual' [I] 
Heroics/Tactics 
Manual [II] 
Tactics/Strategy 
Mechanical 
Strategy/Logistics 
Explosive 
Figure 1.1: The War/Text Axis 
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At the core of this typology is Archer's (1985) appropriation of the model of structure-
agency interplays (termed morphogenesis) first proposed by Walter Buckley in 1967. 
Working from within the perspective of General Systems Theory - and, in Archer's 
account, in contrast with and in a form superior to Giddens' structuration concept - 
Buckley ties structure/agency and builds temporality into processes of social change in 
the following manner: 
Figure 1.2: Morphogenesis - Basic Model 
STRUCTURE 
T (time) I 
ACTION 
T2 	  T3 
STRUCTURAL ELABORATION 
14 
(Source: Archer, 1985: 58-88, adapted from Buckley, 1967) 
Here, any given activity intervenes in a predetermined and ongoing (social) structure 
existing at a designated point in time (originating at a clearly or fuzzily-delineated i 
Ti): the specified activity occurs at a later date (between T2 and T3), altering to a 
greater or lesser extent the overall configuration of the original structure. The 
interweave becomes, in and over time, the new structure, ie, T4 becomes the "new" Ti. 
This morphogenetic model is robust in its own right, and salient to present concerns in 
several respects: in the first place, it aims at specifying the exact relationship 
between structure and agency, and it relies strongly on social context, stressing that - 
although structure necessarily precedes agency - no action occurs in a vacuum; 
secondly, it resonates with a wide range of diverse (and sometimes opposed) bodies 
of theory, such that it contains echoes of (eg) Durkheim's belief in the survival of a 
conscience collective (however obscured under conditions of organic solidarity), the 
constructionist approach of Actor-Network theory's 'bits and pieces' in explaining 
social order, and Guattari's post-structuralist idea - applied strikingly to the rise 
and spread of Fascism (1977: 87-98) - of 'new' social forms arising from the 
reinvigoration of the shattered remnants of former structural arrangements, laying in 
wait to be reworked into a new 'machinic assemblage'; and thirdly, the very form of 
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the typology invites empirical testing, and calls for application to specific 
phenomena. m 
The initial step in the building of a morphogenetically-based typology centres on the 
introduction of writing into - and the subsequent status acquired by granunatocentric 
technologies and processes within - assorted "types" of societies through time. These 
societal "types" are ranged along an initially unspecified time-dimension, and are 
classified around an axis of the modem. In the process, the Bucldey/Archer model 
has been slightly modified in two ways - splitting the 'action' line (T2--->T3) in two 
to accomodate the historical distance between medieval and Classical eras, and 
extending T4 past any firmly elaborated structure to focus on both the speculative 
nature of the 'post'modern and the increased emphasis on future-orientation under 
conditions of contemporaneity. This procedure generates a 5-fold schema: 
Figure 1.3: Morphogenesis - Extended Model 
T1 ORAL CULTURE 
ALPHABETIC WRITING 
SCRIBAL LITERATURE 	 0°- T3 
PRINT TECHNOLOGY 	100 T4 
INFORMATIC MEDIA-0" Tn... 
ANCIENT 
LITERACY 
(Protomodem) 
RESTRICTED 
LITERACY 
(Premodem) 
MASS 
LITERACY 
(Modem) 
HYPERLITERACY 
("Post"modem) 
. Linked to the last point, Archer's own suggestive 'test case' of the power of the morphogenetic 
model is the Cuban literacy campaign of the post-Batista era beginning in the late-1950s. 
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T2 
NON-
LITERACY 
(A-modem) 
This basal typology involves an evolutionary sequence, consonant with standard 
historical treatments of both writing (eg, Gelb, 1952; Diringer, 1962; Jean, 1992) and 
warfare (eg Montgomery of Alamein, 1968; Keegan, 1993). It needs stressing that such 
a construction should not be confused with the notion of strict unilinearity; still less 
with an ideology of 'progress' from states of relative ignorance to states of relative 
enlightenment!' The evolution displayed follows Carneiro (1975: discussion at 834- 
35) in showing temporal moves from both earlier to later epochs, and simplicity to 
complexity (in the sense of additives that peak at the point of mutation). 
Each stage draws from its predecessor(s) and in the process of so doing actually 
(re)constructs them. It thus resembles Poster's patterning in his 'Mode of Information' 
theory, where stages 'may be tentatively designated as follows: face-to-face, orally 
mediated exchange; written exchanges mediated by print; and electronically 
mediated exchange.... the stages are not "real", not "found" in the documents of each 
epoch, but imposed by the theory as a necessary step in the process of attaining 
knowledge. In this sense the stages are not sequential but coterminous in the present. 
They are not consecutive also since elements of each are at least implicit in the 
others' (1990: 6). It fits even more closely with a complex of what, from a Marxian 
perspective, Murray & Wengraf (1983: 185-188) refer to as "Historic Communications 
Systems" (HCS), within which one mode tends to dominate the others. Under these 
terms, a "communications revolution" may be viewed not as a replacement of prior 
forms, but a displacement of dominance. 
This point is perhaps best clarified by Bagdikian's (non-Marxist) claim that print is 
neither 'dead nor dying', but is rather 'being forced to make a place in the family of 
human communications for a new way of transferring information and emotion, the 
electronic reproduction of scenes and sensations. The new medium is disrupting and 
even revolutionary, but it leaves the alphabet and document still indispensable to 
the efficient use of eye and brain and to the demands of human rationality' (1971: 
205). Ithiel de Sola Pool reinforces such a view in his earlier observation that 
This resonates with Adorno's claim (cited in Shanks & Tilley, 1987: 134), that IrtIo universal 
history leads from savagery to civilization, but there is one that leads from the slingshot to the 
hydrogen bomb'. 
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Imlodern means of communication seldom replace the previously existing 
means. Television has not eliminated radio; radio has not destroyed the 
printed book; the invention of print has not stopped us from writing letters by 
pen and ink; and teaching people to be literate does not make them any less 
inclined to converse. Each new mode of communication is superimposed on the 
old. It may take over certain functions, but other functions are retained by the 
former mode' (1966: 100). 
The final step in the construction of the master typology at Figure 1.1 involves a 
larger leap. Extending the logic of supplementing the horizontals of morphogenesis 
with a series of vertical axes, the dominant HCS (historic communication system)/ 
MoI (mode of information) of each societal "type" is conjoined with the mode of 
warfare undertaken by each societal "type". 12 The adjunctive HCS/MoI and its 
affinal HWS (historical war system)/MoW (mode of warfare) are each 
accompanied by two further subsidiary levels which align the stages with the 
extensions of the work of exemplary theorists in the respective fields, and provide 
fuller details of the core elements constituting each configuration: 
[1] The top line of the typology draws from Andrzejewski's classification of 
forms of military organization (1954: 119-23). The bracketed initials are measurable 
degrees of 3 factors: M/m is the military participation ratio, or percentage of a 
given population under arms; S/s stands for level(s) of subordination, the formal 
command and control structure, in each type; and C/c = the estimable degree of 
cohesion or solidarity between the constituent parts of the organization. Block 
capitals show high scores on the respective factors, lower-case letters indicate the 
12 Thus following the conceptions of Clausewitz, in reference to 'the nature of states and 
societies as they are determined by their times and prevailing conditions...The semi-barbarous 
Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords and trading cities of the Middle Ages, 
eighteenth-century kings and the rulers and peoples of the nineteenth century - all conducted war 
in their own particular way, using different methods and pursuing different aims [...] Our purpose 
was not to assign, in passing, a handful of principles of warfare to each period. We wanted to 
show how every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions and its own peculiar 
preconceptions. Each period, therefore, would have held to its own theory of war, even if the 
urge had always and universally existed to work things out on scientific principles' (On War, 
VIII, 6B, 586, 593; cited in Gat, 1991: 189): 
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opposite. The category headings represent compound words constructed from 
corporate military forces 'most nearly approaching the logical extreme': thus, 
Masaic is shorthand for the constituent features of both independently-settled east 
European Cossack settlements and East African Masai tribes, and the less-cohesive 
Tallenic the 'Tallensi tribes, the Trekboers in South Africa, and the North 
American frontiersmen'; Homoic warfare is characteristic of 'Sparta and some other 
Dorian conquest states' - and given its "ranking" (msC) is also suggestive of the 
idealisation of this form of fighting in the Homeric epics (consistent with the 
wrath - ie, insubordination - of Achilles) and war as in principle an exclusively 
masculine actitvity (instanced by Spartan sex-segregated social structure and the 
discipline of the barracks as total institution); Ritterian and Mortazic military 
organization correspond to feudalism and absolute monarchies, the former typified 
by the German Raubritters, India's Radjput states and the Polish kingdom of the 
Middle Ages, the latter by 'Egypt under the early Ramesides, the Abassid 
Caliphate in its early days, [or] Prussia before Stein'; and assorted societies, 
scattered across space and time but with the uniting characteristic of their status as 
mega-states - 'European participants in the two World Wars, the Ch'in kingdom in 
China, the Old Kingdom of Ancient Egypt' - engage in warfare termed Neferic  
(1954: 122). 
The final category - the  'impossible' - occupies a particularly significant place in my 
own typology, and none at all in Andrzejewski's formulation. In as much as it connects 
to the 'post'modern - neither a generally-circulating notion in the 1950s when 
Andrzejewski was writing, and with the important exception of C. Wright Mills 
(1959), similarly not sociological currency - this is understandable. Moreover, what 
Mann describes as the 'dominant pacific transnational sociology' paradigm, and the 
relative optimism (or controlled Cold War pessimism) of the post-WW II era, 
declared 'hot' war virtually "impossible" between nations with the highest 
military capability: yet war continues. The retention of the 'impossible' category is 
analytically necessary, even if for no other reason than that its characteristics 
(MSc/mSc) are testament primarily to Andrzejewski's inability to 
disentangle/conceive of high degrees of subordination in the absence of cohesion. 
Even in a physicalist sense, this indivisibility is open to question; and under the 
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terms of the proxy principle, what is cohered with - the strength imparted by a 
fictional (or even anomic) cohesion - is a central issue, as is subordination to the 
unclear, unworthy, or clearly lost cause, or the demonstrably mythical institution to 
which the group or individual is subordinate(d). 
Part [2] of the typology is a presentation of war-types stretched across an 
evolutionary (time-phased) grid. In need of more prefatory explanation is the 
accompanying sequence [3]: the top line of each pair refers to movement in the ways 
that wars are principally fought; the bottom to the prime technologies deployed, 
usually for the first time, in each warring phase. The evolving technological 
dimension is taken from Hogg (1968), with the chief variant consisting of the 
division of the 'manual' category into two phases. Of primary import is the advance 
in destructive capacity in every period, and the equivalent sense of distance between 
both combatant and weapon deployed, and combatant-weapon-target/intended 
victim(s). For the scheme in the top line: the category of simulation in the first 
instance enunciates the "ritualised gesticulation" employed in particular societies 
for dealing with conflict resolution aimed at preventing war, minimising both actual 
large-scale loss of life and the consequences of potential escalation. Through a 
process of retrodiction, such behaviour is re-classified by other groups - societies 
with writing - as "primitive war", and analysis of the most effective fighting 
(proto-warring) tactics employed by the "primitives" becomes the basis for 
irregular, quasi-legitimate combat modes (terrorism, guerilla warfare) carried out 
by "non-primitive" collectivities. The shading off from these simulations into 
heroics is typified by the 'duel of champions' common to both the primal and the 
ancient world, enshrined in representative individual confrontations of the Iliad, 
c, 
the Mahabarata, the Epic of Gilgamesh or the David/Goliath episode in the Old 
Testament (1 Samuel ch. 17: verses 1-11, 40-54). The sequence tactics-> strategy-> 
logistics familiar to standard military theory (for an overview, see Gat, 1989, 1992; 
De Lancia, 1991) also represents a series of shifts typical of other modernising 
processes: concrete to abstract, empirical to theoretical, specific to general. Relative 
to the devaluation (or 'reining in') of heroics, it bears similarities to Weber's shift 
from charismatic to rational-legal dominance: moreover, each move broadens the 
scope of the number of factors needing to be taken into account in successful war- 
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prosecution; extends the range of participants in war well beyond those involved in 
actual on-ground combat; applies the insights of military theory to non-military 
spheres; necessitates the education of all levels of soldiery; and, as in its paired 
evolution-of-weaponry sequence, incorporates both extensiveness and distanciation 
processes while intensifying the direct impact of war on ever-larger populations. In 
the final stage of the sequence, the second appearance of simulation principally 
means five things: the recurrence (or perseverance) of quasi-wars in the "primitive" 
sense (displays of force as either 'stand-in' for conflict, or deterrence); 'small' or 
'proxy' wars (Duller, 1981) where the "real" belligerents operate off-stage or behind 
the scenes; military semiotics, dress (and dressage), technologies and language 
transferred to civilian contexts; the development of the Kriegsspiel (war-game) and 
battlefield scenario to the point where such exercises are undertaken (a) in the 
absence of "real" combatrreal"enemies, or (b) prior to subsequent applications; and 
lastly, in the general sense of 'simulation' as conceived by Baudrillard (1983) 
preceding or substituting for a referent in "reality". 
The thinking behind the core segments [4] and [5] of the typology are outlined above: 
section [6] complements the relevant formations, and places them beside a 
particular histori(ographi)cal sequence. In the tripartite scheme, the top and 
bottom lines draw from Holland's reading of the typology of ideal-type social forms 
deployed by Deleuze & Guattari (1977: 139-262; the addition of the "permanent 
revolution" to the 3 original DeleuzoGuattarian categories - 'sauvages, barbares, 
civilises' - is Holland's own, and the intervening "slavery" designation is my 
further extension). The Roman numeral (I or i) represents the first appearance of the 
relevant phenomenon, "II" or "ii" its reappearance in a variant form. The bracketed 
accompaniments represent the relative distribution/ concentration of political 
power (X or -X) and economic determinism (Y or -Y) accruing to each societal type. 
'Coding', both raw and in its "de-", "re-" and "over-" refinements, refers to 
distorting operations carried out on a code, best thought of as a fixed symbolic order 
of conduct, belief and meaning, or in Massumi's more extensive definition, a 'pattern 
of repeated acts...A code is always of a "milieu", or relatively stable, often 
statistical mixing of elements...A code is the same as a "form" ' (1992: 51). 
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The bottom line of the sequence ties `schizoanalysis' - a sensemaking operation of 
the hyperliterate condition peopled by Deleuze's 'dividuals' (1990: 3) - to Derrida's 
grammatology, which deals with the nature of writing itself in terms of its 
relationship to language and the history of thought. In his alternative 
'deconstructionist' (mis?)reading of key texts valorising speech, the range of what 
counts as "writing" is considerably broadened to incorporate an indefinite number of 
physical marking systems (variously labelled 'writing before the letter', -graph, - 
gram, or, as in line 2 of the sixth sequence, archi-ecriture rarche-writing'], the 
trace) that are not only formally disconnected from but actually precede a phonic 
system and facilitate logical thought. My own variance with the strict terms of 
deconstruction have been outlined previously (in the Abstract, and on pp. 2 and 8): 
the rationale for serving it up "raw" here is both an instance of 'deconstructing' the 
deconstructionist perspective by placing it in any evolutionary sequence at all, and 
its particular fit in such a sequence. The timeline displayed is a Marxian theory of 
history, and like Deleuze & Guattari, the founder of deconstruction now claims a 
particular allegiance to Marx (Derrida, 1994). 
The middle line of section [6] represents the dominant types, purposes and ideologies 
of writing in each period:  Funclit relates to the application of literacy techniques by, 
and in the interests of, power formations. The epistemic base of Funclit in instance II 
is constituted by information theory and a view of reading/writing as a branch of 
cybernetics. Liberacy is the opposite, reading/writing acquisition as a progressive 
measure; negatively expressed, liberation from "ignorance" and injustice caused by or 
associated with illiteracy, which is categorised as a curable 'pathology'. Massolit is 
akin to mass literacy, the actual or desirable distribution of alphabetic skills across 
the majority (or ideally all) of a population; on another level, the reduction of most 
or all of a populace to a data set amenable to documentation (typically supplied by 
the populace itself) and measurement. Montagism - derived from the bookburning 
protagonist's name in Bradbury's novel Fahrenheit 451 - is advocacy of the 
devaluation, restriction or abolition of literacy and textual artefacts: the chief 
characteristic of those opposed to the status, dissemination and centrality of reading 
and writing within a particular society or Society/societies in general. Finally, 
section [7] specifies the prime educational locus, and identifies the chief agents of 
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transmission for the relevant communicative modes in each era. 
What binds warfare and textuality together is more than simple coincidence, 
historical congruence or an elective affinity. At base, each phenomenon represents an 
instance of the operation of the proxy principle." As stated, in sociological terms 
writing is centrally about identity-formation instantiated by the production of 
multiple textual selves (proxies). At all levels of aggregation (micro to macro) the 
inability or unwillingness to produce textual selves results in a demarcation of types 
such that the position of the non-scriptable (oral culture, the illiterate individual) 
is disadvantaged relative to the lettered: inscripted (textual) selves take 
precedence over/determine the social conduct and treatment of physical (bodily or 
"skin-bounded") selves. In terms of group formation - the bundling together of 
individuals reaching its most advanced stage in the institution of the State - writing 
and the written constitute the substance of imagined communities and the processes 
that sustain them (invisible technologies, invented traditions and assessable 
futures), rendering these, in a special sense, concrete, and subject to analysis. 
1.4: Reiteration 
As suggested in several elements of Figure 1.1, and as will be detailed in the 
following chapters, this analysis combines a selective use of the very old - a suitably 
modified evolutionary schema - with the relatively very new - principally the re-
definitions of what constitutes reading and writing in the theorising of post-
structuralism. The thesis concurs with the latter in problematising the relationship 
between speech and text: the taken-for-granted notions that fact always and ever 
13 	. This basic commonality has a long heritage. A study by Wiethoff exposes 'Machiavelli 's debt 
to the classically humane ideal of the warrior-orator' (1978: 304) in the compositional aspects of 
his Art of War[1521], noting that 'Machiavelli's continual references to the close, practical 
relationship between words and deeds, or laws and arms, indicate his intention to give 
deliberative rhetorical form to the Renaissance deeds of men. Further, Machiavelli's 
preoccupation with martial concerns specifies his regard for the classical concept of virtue, a 
virtue to be found in the union of wisdom and eloquence. As his translator notes, the achievement 
of Machiavellian virtue in a union of political eloquence and martial wisdom "would be an 
exceedingly difficult and rare accomplishment unless a single style or mode of activity were 
common to both" ' (1978: 311-12, emphasis added). The translation of spoken eloquence into 
written rhetoric - the union of armas y lettras - is registered by Machiavelli's observation in 
section XII of The Prince (translated/edited Bull, 1983: 78) that Charles, king of France, was 
able to conquer Italy col gesso, 'with a piece of chalk'. 
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precedes and produces fiction, talk is thought made audible, and writing simply the 
spoken word made visible, are all limited (and limiting), historically/ 
geographically specific, and reversible in principle. Therefore, while rejecting the 
deconstructionist 'strong program', that 'there is nothing beyond the text', as 
overdrawn, a 'weak(er)' version of the premise is preserved. The corporeal "what" 
lying beyond the text must be eliminated, or modified and subjugated to 
grammatocentric imperatives - the fixity of meaning, standardisation, abstraction, 
legibility, second-order knowledge and stratification that comes with a social order 
based on writing. 
War is literally the physical manifestation of such imperatives, and a special case 
of conflict, distinctive in that the central element of war is not violence, but 
rationality: so far is war from the mere expression of violence that several 
commentators (notably Huizinga, 1972: 9-30; Stone, 1977: 77-80; Elias, in Keane, 
1988: 177-98) are in agreement that the State's monopoly of the right to wage war 
involves the diminution of (non-state sanctioned) interpersonal violence and the risk 
of (unauthorised/criminal) assault. The institutional locus for war is the State: the 
original formation of the State is an artefact of writing conjoined with territorial 
conquest and the institution of the military assembly, and the evolution/refinement 
of the State-form broadly moves through 3 stages of restraints on organised violence, 
limiting its exercise initially to adult males; intermediately to a specialist (semi-) 
autonomous elite warrior caste; and eventually to a State-organised and controlled 
military. Civilianisation, demilitarised and/or post-military societies come to be 
an eventuality only in situations where civil society has been effectively "ordered" - 
ie, militarised. Within this evolution lies the deeper paradox, that just as the 
concept and refinement of literacy springs initially from from its opposite, the 
perception of and concern with a nullity, a condition of illiteracy (Williams, 1989: 
188), the possibility of war rests on the presumption of peace as normative. 14 
14 	. . . Viriho ,  s (1986) concept of 'pure war', where under conditions of contemporaneity, war and 
peace are equivalent rather than opposed terms, the recent (quasi-)official translation of 
warmaking into peacekeeping activities by defence analysts (Maren, 1994), and the fourth-
century maxim of Vegetius - to 'let him who desires peace, prepare for war' - particularly as 
recycled by deterrence theorists in a Cold War context, testify to the resilience of this theme. 
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To recap the core argument: the proxy principle reconstitutes the natural world as a 
surrogate world-as-text, and the skin-bounded self as a (multiplicity of) textual 
artefact(s). Through engagement in reading and writing, the sell comprehends and 
controls - and is comprehended and controlled in - this alternative world. War is 
likewise the outcome of a process of 'proxification', an abstracting of the 
(inter)personal. This selfsame principle allows for a reconstruction of the world as 
war-zone, of territory as state(s), and its allied, neutral or enemy inhabitants - 
citizens - as soldiery, target, casualty. 
The conjunction between the twinned domains and the essential paradoxes 
underpinring them both singly and jointly, render them amenable to sociological 
analysis. Formulating a sociological approach to textuality involves a 
methodology built up from series of particular strategies: the importation from 
neighbouring disciplines of perspectives valorising (or problematising) 
alphanumeracy as central to part or all of social life; a revisionist examination of 
"mainstream" sociological praxis as - and often in opposition to its own claimed 
mission/agenda - inherently textual; a reclamation of formerly marginalised work 
and a consideration of newer approaches within the discipline that see it as 
primarily an exegetical endeavour; and a process of bricolage aimed at bringing 
these disparate projects into conjunction. 15 
15 I use "bricolage" here in the original Levi-Straussian sense - as "primitive" ad hoc 'make-do' 
procedures using extant material turned to other purposes (in opposition to purpose-built 
"engineering" techniques), and the extension of the concept into analysis of late-C2Oth 
subcultural "style" in Hebdige (1979: 102-06). Relative to literature I also lean on William S. 
Burroughs' cut-up' compositional method, and Birkert's description of Virginia Woolf as an 
archetypal 'bricoleuse' in terms of the way A Room of One's Own - and by inference all works of 
imaginative litearature - is created, on the principle of "magpie aesthetics" (1996:13). Van 
Maanen brings such aesthetics back into the purview of the social sciences in seeing 
anthropological fieldworkers as 'notorious analytic bricoleurs, sniffing out and sifting through 
current theory for leads as to how fieldwork materials might be conceptualized' (1988: 66), and 
sociologist Paul Atkinson links the narrating practices of the ethnographer and the historian to 
the degree that '[t]here is an element of bricolage in both types of writing' (1990: 49). He also cites 
the opinion of Law & Williams (1982) that the authors of scientific papers are chiefly engaged in 
'organizing bits and pieces' of a variety of textual artefacts (Atkinson, 1990: 43). 
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1.5: Summary of the Following Chapters. 
The thesis works through these issues in the following order: Chapter 2 is a review 
of the sociological literature on war and reading /writing, premised on themes of 
neglect and resistance to both fields. It examines the turn to textuality across a broad 
spectrum of disciplines, and maintains that sociology, while apparently resisting 
any such trend, paradoxically reveals itself as intrinsically textual in all important 
respects. Ongoing disciplinary divides in sociology are taken as points of departure 
into the first, most abstract elaboration of the constituent elements of the proxy 
principle - 'bodies', 'bodies politic' and the 'world-as-text' - in Chapter 3. Chapter 
4 sets this theory in motion: it is applied to the formulation over time of the 
war/text axis in 3 types of society - the "primitive", ancient and medieval: relevant 
sections of the master typology (Figure 1.1) ground the subsequent analysis. This 
practice is continued in Chapter 5, where 2 further examples of this synthesis across 
time and space are detailed: the proxy principle's production of a war/text axis in 
conditions of the modem and the 'post'-modern. The core element of Chapter 6 is an 
analysis of the 1991 Gulf War as both heritage and harbinger of this principle in 
action. Chapter 7 concludes with an overall summation and an indication of 
potential lines of further research. 
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Glossary. 
Source: THWAITES T, DAVIS L & MULES W (1994): Tools for Cultural Studies South Melbourne: 
MacMillan Education Australia. Numbers in square brackets [n] refer to page nos. 
pp. 1-24  
Culture is the ensemble of social processes by which meanings are produced, circulated & exchanged [1] 
A sign is anything which produces meanings [7]. A sign's referential function is its ability to invoke a 
content [101 A sign's metalingual function suggests the codes by which the sign is understood [11]. A 
sign's formal functions involve its formal structure and the format which it takes [12] 
The addresser of a text is the position it constructs as its source: where it says it is from. The sender is 
the actual source. The addressee of a text is the position it constructs as its destination: where it says it 
is going. The receiver is the actual destination[13]. 
A sign's expressive function is its construction of an addresser. A sign's conative function is the 
construction of an addressee. A sign's phatic functions are the ways in which it constructs a relationship 
between addresser and addressee[14]. The conative, expressive and phatic functions are the sign's 
functions of address [15]. A sign's contextual functions indicate the situation in which it operates [17]. 
SYNTHESIS: Fig 1.4 The Functions of the sign [19]. 
pp. 25-43.  
The signifier is the sensory impression of the sign: the mental image of marks on a page, or of 
sounds in the air, for example. The signified is the abstract concept the sign invokes. The 
relationship between signifier and signified, the way in which a sound impression 'points to' or 
invokes an abstract concept is called signification [27]. 
parole (or utterance, or speech): a given act or artifact of language, such as a spoken utterance, a 
conversation, a postcard, a novel, or a course handout; and langue (or code, or system, or the 
language): the system which allows such acts of parole to be produced [35]. 
A syntagm is an ordered array of signs combined according to certain rules. A paradigm is a set of 
signs, any of which are conceivably interchangeable within a given context [39]. 
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pp. 44-66.  
A metaphor is an explicit or implicit comparison between signs [44]. A metonym is an association 
of terms. One sign is associated with another of which it signifies either a part, the whole, one of 
its functions or attributes, or a related concept. The general process of association is called 
metonymy [47]. 
The connotations of a sign (not to be confused with the conative function) are the set of its possible 
signifieds [57]. The denotations of a sign are the most stable and apparently verifiable of its 
connotations [58]. 
pp. 67-131.  
A text is a combination of signs [67]. Myths are naturalised codings of social meanings and values. 
The extreme effect of myth is to hide the semiotic workings of a text's codes and signs [73]. 
[model of] Textual Production [76] 
myth 	> denotation 	> codes and connotations 	> signs 
[model of] Textual Analysis [75] 
signs 	> connotations and codes 	> denotation 	> myths 
A genre is a grouping of texts which are similar in structure or subject matter [91]. Narration 
consists of the processes and effects of representing time in texts. A narrative is any text that 
functions through these processes and effects [111]... a structured sequence of events in time. 
Narratives are told by narrators to narratees. A narrator is the narrative's addresser. A narratee 
is the narrative's addressee [118]. Plot is the narrative as it is read, seen or heard from the first to 
the last word or image. That is, like a signifier, it is what the reader perceives. Story is the 
narrative in chronological order, the abstract order of events as they follow each other. That is, 
like a signified, story is what the reader conceives or understands [121]. Events are the basic units 
of a story. They constitute the paradigm choices that are combined into the narrative syntagm 
[122]. Closure is the restoration of narrative equilibrium [123]. 
pp. 132 ff...  
An institution is a relatively stable set of social arrangements and relationships [132]. 
A discourse is a set of textual arrangements which organises and co-ordinates the actions, 
positions and identities of the people who produce it [135]. 
Embodiment is the learning of a set of knowledges and competences which can be habitually 
reproduced [136]. 
Realism is a mode of representation that claims to reproduce faithfully events that happen in 
the real world [150]. 
Redundancy is the repeated structuring of texts according to a set of readily identifiable social 
values [152]. 
Ideology is the process of representing material social relationships, and of attempting to 
reconcile them in discourse [155]. 
Hegemony is the social process of consensus in which power relations follow the cultural 
leadership of a dominant group [158]. 
A habitus is a lived network of objective social relationships and situations. Its effect is to 
produce agents with dispositions to certain practices rather than others. Dispositions are the 
'second nature' one gains through habitus [187]. Capital is a social product used in social 
production [188]. 
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Bhola's (1984) 'Taxonomy of Justifications for Literacy Promotion' :  
'In evaluating the evidence concerning literacy effects, it may be useful to think in terms of three 
different types: the cognitive effects of pure literacy (Type P), the social effects of literacy (Type S), 
and the instrumental effects (Type I). Type P effects result purely from the cultivation of the ability 
to encode and decode a language, irrespective of what language is used, of what is read during and 
after the acquisition of literacy, or of the uses to which the newly acquired literacy skill is put. 
Type S effects relate to the new definition given to the newly literate person by himself and others 
in his environment. These effects may relate to the realignment of status, economic and power 
relationships, and to the development of mutual expectations that follow once the new literate has 
been initiated into the magic circle of the literate and can "make the stones speak". Type I effects 
are those which result from the uses to which literacy is put by those who teach literacy and those 
who learn to read. These instrumental effects may come from the content of the message that is 
taught; from the predispositions and the possibilities that literacy creates in regard to seeking and 
handling information; and from the participation and decision-making skills that have been 
learned by adult participants 	[The typography above] represents, horizontally, the kinds of 
effect which can be used to justify literacy promotion in a society; and, vertically, the loci of such 
effects. Examples for some of the thirty cells of the matrix suggest themselves more easily than for 
others. Change in the technology of the intellect will be an example for cell 1; human rights for cell 
6; scholarization of children for cell 10; abolition of class structures for cell 21; better prospects 
for a new international economic order for cell 26, etc. For other cells, possible and plausible 
effects will require research' (Bhola, 1984 : 22-23): 
Nature of 
Justification 
Loci of 
Effects 
Cognitive Developmental Cultural Ideological 
Economic Political Social 
Individual 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Family 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Community 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Nation 19 20 21 22 23 24 
World Community 25 26 27 28 29 30 
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Bhola: Version 1 COGNITIVE 	ECONOMIC 	POLITICAL 	SOCIAL 	CULTURAL 	IDEOLOGICAL 
[ +ye 
INDIVIDUAL 
FAMILY 
COMMUNITY 
NATION 
WORLD  
COMMUNITY 
1. 
Change in the 
technology of 
the intellect. 
7. 
Access to 
greater 
information 
and the 
processing of 
such 
information. 
13. 
Establishment 
of formal 
(schools) and 
informal 
(libraries, 
reading rooms) 
educational 
institutions. 
19. 
Rationalization; 
greater fund of 
'symbolic skills' 
at the macro-
societal level. 
25. 
Improved 
information 
flow; 
commonality 
and cognition 
throughout the 
global order. 
2. 
Higher income, 
safety on the 
job, access to 
unionization in 
urban settings; 
utilization of 
economic 
institutions 
such as 
extension 
activities, rural 
banks and 
marketing co-
operatives in 
rural settings. 
8. 
Economic 
survival, or at 
least greater 
economic 
outreach; an 
efficient 
pattern of 
family 
expenditures. 
14. 
Establishment 
of formal 
economic 
apparatuses 
(financial 
institutions) 
20. 
Increased 
productivity; 
qualitative 
increase in 
human capital 
(potential and 
acual); upping 
of per capita 
income and 
GNP. 
26. 
Better 
prospects for a 
new 
international 
economic 
order/world 
market. 
3. 
Active 
involvement in 
democratic 
processes. 
9. 
Rational 
interface 
between the 
family and the 
State; 
standardization 
of benefits for 
the family unit; 
improved 
multi-
generational 
socialization 
into awareness 
of macro-
political 
processes 
15. 
Establishment 
of political 
forms of self-
government, 
with elected 
membership 
based on non-
nepotistic 
criteria. 
21. 
Establishment 
and sustenance 
of egalitarian 
and 
participative 
parliamentary 
institutions. 
27. 
Potential 
political 
equality (non-
elitist status) 
between 
nations. 
4. 
Communicative 
competence. 
10. 
Scholarization 
of children. 
16. 
Significant 
demographic 
transition 
through 
changes in 
fertility and 
mortality rates 
and the shift of 
some age groups 
to the city. 
22. 
Solidarity and 
promotion of 
class 
consciousness. 
28. 
Universal 
scholarization. 
5. 
Individual as 
'maker of 
culture'; ability 
to codify 
realities as 
personally 
experienced; 
enjoyment of 
alien cultures; 
conscietization; 
emergence from 
culture of 
silence. 
11. 
Individuation 
and diversity of 
interests; a 
generally higher 
level of 
discourse; better 
communication 
skills. 
17. 
Possible 
enhancement 
of unique 
regional 
identity; civic 
pride; potential 
payoff in 
tourism due to 
reputation as a 
'literary centre'. 
23. 
Detribalization; 
the exchange of 
myth for 
history; 
acquisition of a 
future and with 
it a 
predisposition 
to plan. 
29. 
Higher level of 
global discourse. 
6. 
Human rights. 
12. 
More equitable 
distribution of 
rights amongst 
family members 
(particularly 
women and 
children)/ anti-
patriarchal.. 
18. 
Resistance to 
internal 
colonalism, 
exploitation, 
and mere 
neglect. 
24. 
Effective 
enjoyment of 
human rights; 
furtherance of 
the principle of 
the equality of 
man. 
30. 
Mass 
comprehension 
of and 
participation in 
the new 
international 
world-order. 
1. 
INDIVIDUAL 	Loss of the 'art 
of memory' 
/mnemonic 
ability (Yates, 
1966; 
Moulthrop, 
1993). 
FAMILY 7. 
'new 
generation gap 
between the 
computer-
literate young 
and their print-
literate elders' 
(Marien, 1988: 
654). 
COMMUNITY 	13. 
'De-schooling' 
(Illich, 1974) 
needed to 
eliminate 
'compulsory 
miseducation' 
(Goodman, 
1977); libraries 
as anomic non-
communal sites 
APPENDIX B  37. 
CULTURAL 	IDEOLOGICAL 
NATION 
WORLD  
COMMUNITY 
19. 
"'illiterates" 
carried the 
burden of 
society's evils... 
an excellent 
example of the 
individualising 
and totalising 
power of the 
modern state' 
(Rockhill,1987:1 
56). 
25. 
'Reading and 
writing are 
creative 
enterprises, not 
the shunting of 
information' (F. 
Smith,1984: 5-6, 
emphasis 
added). 
2. 
'The inner-
directed man, 
open to 
"reason" via 
print' is driven 
'to work longer 
hours and to 
live on lower 
budgets of 
leisure and 
laxity than 
would have 
been deemed 
possible before' 
(Riesman, 1964: 
89) 
8. 
Impoverish-
ment of rural 
families by 
latifundia-type 
landowning 
titles. 
14. 
Move from 
gemeinschaft to 
gesellschaft 
entails writing-
based 
bureaucratic 
financial 
institutions ; 
loss of trust and 
reciprocity. 
20. 
Systemization 
of the 
proletariat 
(Levi-Strauss, 
1961: 293); Dual 
Labour 
Markets; 
emiseration of 
workers 
through 
exploitative 
contracts. 
26. 
Preservation of 
global poverty, 
North-South 
and 'core/ 
periphery' 
divides by way 
of international 
(World Bank, 
IMF) loan 
protocols. 
3. 
Measurable 
literacy abilities 
as mechanism 
of exclusion 
from voting 
rights; 
structural 
impossibility of 
participatory 
democracy. 
9. 
State 
surveillance; 
atomization of 
family units via 
infrastructure 
of officially-
issued birth, 
marriage, 
divorce and 
death 
certificates. 
15. 
Myth of 
meritocracy; 
long-distance 
central control 
of local 
government; 
populism; dead 
voters; machine 
politics at the 
regional level. 
21. 
Spurious 
legitimacy of 
newly-created 
states 
established by 
national 
literatures and 
resort to 
'invented 
traditions' 
(Hobsbawm & 
Ranger, 1992). 
27. 
'the wars of 
expanding 
literacy' 
(Beaumont & 
Edmonds, 1974: 
x); print media 
scapegoatirtg/ 
isolation and 
sanctioning of 
"rogue states". 
SOCIAL 
4. 
Lukacsian 
reification, 
colonization of 
the lifeworld 
(Habermas, 
1984). 
10. 
Schools as dass-
divisive in 
distribution of 
'cultural 
capital', 
'elbaorated/ 
restricted' 
codes; 
Foucauldian 
'carceral' 
institutions. 
16. 
Desertion of the 
countryside, 
overcrowding 
of cities; no 
effect of literacy 
on demographic 
factors such as 
nuptiality or 
fertility rates. 
22. 
'[Communist 
rIevolutionaries 
[see] literacy as 
essential ... but 
...literacy is 
clearly an 
instrument for 
controlling the 
masses' 
(Winterowd, 
1989: 4). 
28. 
Universality of 
over- 
credentialing, 
the 'diploma 
disease' (Dore, 
1976). 
5. 
Loss of story-
telling capacity; 
INability to 
codify realities 
as personally 
experienced; 
alienATION OF 
culture; 
distanciation; 
emergence OF 
culture of 
silence 
(Benjamin, 
1969: 83-109). 
11. 
'standardization 
... when the 
printing press 
appeared, 
people began to 
measure 
themselves 
against a 
widespread 
norm and to 
doubt their own 
worth' ( Heath, 
1986:16) 
17. 
Xenophobic 
implications of 
Anderson's 
(1991) print-
capitalism-
fuelled 
'imagined 
communities'. 
23. 
Destruction or 
marginalization 
of indigenous 
(oral) cultures, 
imposition of 
conqueror's 
language and 
literature 
through 
codification (eg, 
Mignolo, 1992). 
29. 
'Mlle first 
effect of 
literacy...was to 
make people 
more vulnerable 
to propaganda' 
(Quincy Wright, 
[194211965: 
180-81). 
6. 
'The primary 
function of 
writing... is...the 
enslavement of 
other human 
beings' (Levi-
Strauss, 1961: 
292). 
12. 
Categorisation 
of women and 
children in 
terms of written 
laws relating to 
age/sex grades; 
enshrinement 
of patriarchy 
through 
machinery of 
legal precedent. 
18. 
New 
dichotomies 
between the 
'information-
rich' and 
'information-
poor'; isolation 
through reading 
as silent solitary 
act. 
24. 
'the written 
word.., that 
characteristic 
feature of 
terrorist 
societies.. 
writing.. .builds 
up terror' 
(Lefebvre, 1971: 
152). 
30. 
Information 
glut breeding 
moral and 
political 
torpor/inability 
to act on global 
issues 
(Reinecke, 1987: 
21). 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW of the LITERATURE(s) 
Being able to read is not a necessary part of being civilized or uncivilized, useful or 
useless. One can hate or kill with or without it. In fact, a nation can kill better with 
it - no argument for phonics or look-say Wayne O'Neil, 1970: 260. 
The text analogy now taken up by social scientists is, in some ways, the broadest of 
the recent refigurations of social theory, the most venturesome, and the least well 
developed. Even more than "game" or "drama","text" is a dangerously unfocused 
term, and its application to social action, to people's behaviour toward other 
people, involves a thoroughgoing conceptual wrench, a particularly outlandish bit 
of "seeing-as" 	 Clifford Geertz, 1993: 30. 16 
This chapter deals with leading sociological approaches to reading/writing and 
war, and is founded on a theme common to both object-domains: that theme is 
neglect. In sharp contrast to what I term the "textual turn" in other academic 
disciplines, each topic is generally held to have been ignored - or at least 
"underdeveloped" - within sociology, and regular calls for reconsideration of each as 
central to ongoing social processes from analysts of various theoretical persuasions 
are repeatedly advanced. But neither the reasons for such prior neglect (in some 
cases amounting to outright resistance), nor the implications of moving either 
subject-area from the margins to the centre of the discipline, are fully explored. Even 
less do standard accounts see(k) a significant linkage between the two fields beyond 
the commonality of neglect. 
2.1 The Ever-Impending Sociology of War.  
Leading sociological theorists are virtually unanimous in their judgement that on the 
whole, sociology has consistently and unjustifiably ignored the subject of armed forces 
and war (eg, Janowitz, in Giddens, 1985: 232-33; Giddens, in Hall, Held & McGrew, 
1992: 56-7; Mann, 1988: 146; Stein & Russett, in Hooks & McLauchlan, 1992: 757; 
16 	. I interpret Geertz broadly, and as meaning "game" both loosely, as in Huizinga-type ludic 
perspectives, or in the more formal tenets of Game Theory; and a similarly wide version of 
"drama" as in either Mead's developmental 'play-game-generalised other' formulation, or full-
blown Symbolic Interactionism. Of central import is the suggestion that the 'long-run fates' of each 
approach depend on extension of their assumptions and methods into other and unfamiliar fields, 
utilising 'the game idea to make sense of worship, the drama idea to explicate humour, or the text 
idea to clarify war' (Geertz, 1993: 33). 
38. 
Roxborough, 1994). Various ASA case studies of subfields within the discipline 
consistently show military sociology to be a lowly-ranked specialty field, (Simon, 
1968), often of little or no interest to sampled practitioners (Lundberg, 1932; Jones & 
Kronus, 1975), decreasing in prestige (Seater & Jacobson, 1976) and unrepresented in 
undergraduate course offerings (Simpson, 1961). Further evidence of such ongoing 
neglect includes Alvin Gouldner's examination of 25 introductory textbooks in 
sociology published between 1945 and 1954, and his subsequent finding that in 17,000 
pages of material 'only 275 dealt with some aspect of the causes of war. "More than 
half the texts", reports Professor Gouldner, "dealt with the single most important 
problem of the modem world in less than ten pages" ' 17 (cited in Bramson & 
Goethals, 1968: 202; the point more comprehensively endorsed by Horowitz, 1972). In 
1981, Harries-Jenkins & Moskos reflected on the same situation, noting that 
la] survey of three issues of Sociological Abstracts in the mid-1950s...indicated 
that some three percent of the items included could be classified as military 
sociology. Kourvetaris & Dobratz show that it was not until 1961 that military 
sociology appeared in the table of contents of the abstracts. They further point out 
that the two major sociology journals - American Sociological Review and the 
American Journal of Sociology - have devoted little space to the sociology of the 
military' (1981: 1). 
and six years later, this neglect of armed forces and warfare remains an issue for 
Ashworth & Dandeker, who indicate that until 1985, 'the British Sociological 
Association had neither formed a study group in this area, nor devoted an annual 
conference to it' (1987: 16). 
A variety of possible reasons are advanced for this neglect. One is the pragmatist 
objection that the client and funding body for such research is typically the military 
itself, a situation that in principle risks both "contamination" and misapplication of 
the resultant data. These are not entirely groundless worries given, eg, American 
sociology's intimate connection with the armed services (Bowers, 1967; Dickson, 
1971) and the potential threats this poses to disciplinary integrity. US Army 
17 Ironically, Gouldner himself is a prime instance of the practice he decries; in his own co- 
authored 700-page introductory textbook, the topic of war merits only three sentences (Gouldner 
& Gouldner, 1963). 
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funding for Stouffer's multi-volume American Soldier study of 1949 appears to have 
avoided criticism on grounds of sponsorship bias, but other projects such as the 
USAF-commissioned Bauer/Inkeles/Kluckhohn How the Soviet System Works of 
1956 have been criticised for precisely this reason (Bell, 1962: 337-341). As the 
abortive Project Camelot of the 1960s demonstrated, the issue of safeguards against 
breaches of objectivity was not addressed prior to and during that (particularly 
notorious) study. The acrimonious retrospective fallout from this case (Horowitz, 
1967) suggests that a solution to the negotiation of such an ethical minefield is to 
simply disengage from the topic area. 
This task is more easily facilitated because war is typically viewed as primarily 
the domain of other academic disciplines: for instance, Lang, in pointing to the 
paltry number of offerings in military sociology outside armed forces academies as 
'symptomatic of the reluctance of sociologists to face up to the realities of the 
military presence', notes that 'a perusal of the headings in the International Social 
Science Bibliography: Sociology ...contains subheadings for such institutional 
systems as education, medicine and law but not for the military', the number of 
entries on this topic area being 'far larger in the political science than in sociology 
volumes of the bibliography' (1972: 24). Hacker & Hacker date the reason for a 
declining sociological interest in military studies from the 1920s: this is fuelled in 
part by a move away from historical and typically evolutionist explanations, and 
towards scientism, but is primarily symptomatic of 'a widely felt revulsion against 
war' in the wake of World War I (1987: 756). 
Likewise, the preface to a special number of Sociological Forum given over to war 
and peace cites as reasons a concern to avoid being identified with Marxism or 
socialism; the fear that the study of conflict would be equated with approval or 
encouragement of violence; discouragement of research on conflict by powerful 
organisations; and the problematic nature of the relevant data. However, in this 
view, the void is probably best explained by a pervasive unwillingness within the 
discipline to face the existence of certain conflicts (Grimshaw, 1992: 1-5). 
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In Andrzejewski's view, the impact of military organisation on society escapes social 
scientific attention because most sociologists are by nature either a bookish peaceful 
breed, or else, in rarer cases, 'chauvinistic and inclined to worship might', hence not 
given over to critical analysis of organised violence that might 'besmirch the halo 
of their idols' (1954: 1; c/f Levy, 1971: 42-43). Combining mooted personal and 
professional predispositions with "regional" explanations centring on geopolitical 
circumstances, German expatriate sociologist Hans Speier, later to head up the 
RAND Corporation's social science division, said that America had been largely 
free of invasion or occupation by enemy forces; and since war 'has been on the whole a 
more remote experience to the American community than to any other big nation in 
the world' (1952: 296), US sociology can hardly be expected to place war and its 
aftermath high on the disciplinary agenda. 
Mann's variant on this theme concentrates more on the banishment of "losers" than 
the complacency of "winners", holding that social analysts giving a central place to 
militarism have been on the "wrong" side in the World Wars of the twentieth 
century. Thus theorists like Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, or Mosca and Pareto, are 
seen in retrospect (rightly or wrongly) as providing an intellectual foundation for 
subsequent German and Italian fascisms. The upshot of this is that 
'since 1945 the militarists have been forgotten, the waverers purged of their more 
violent side (e.g., Weber's Herrschaft became not "domination" but "authority" 
in English translation) and the classic tradition of liberal/Marxist pacific 
transnational sociology has been enshrined in pedagogy' (Mann, 1988: 148). 
2.2 War: Classical Approaches 
Early (and primarily Anglo/French) sociology indeed posited a "modern/ pre-
modern" divide in terms of a progression from military to civil state formations. In 
Comte's positivism war is a necessary feature of primitive social organisation 
because 'nothing else at that early stage could develop the principal mental and 
moral qualities of man' ([18761 1974: 274), but war disappears when overtaken by a 
third stage of industrialism, free organised labour and scientific progress. Spencer's 
brand of Social Evolutionism blended with the laissez-faire economics of the early 
books of Adam Smith's 1776 Wealth of Nations similarly presents a two-stage 
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model of progress from 'militant' to 'industrial' societies (Coser, 1971: 26, 89-127); 
and Tocqueville claims that with the move from aristocracy to early American-style 
democracy, 'it may be admitted as a general and constant rule that among civilized 
nations the warlike passions will become more rare and less intense in proportion as 
social conditions shall become more equal' ([1863] 1981: 541). But subsequent analysis 
has attacked such views on a number of fronts: Aron characterises Comte's Law of the 
3 Stages as optimistic, imprudent and essentially wrong (1968: 359-402), a flawed 
product of the disordered and possibly pathological state of Comte's mind; 
Tocqueville's study is both equivocal and ambiguous, able to assert that democracy 
'renders men comparatively insensible to the violent and poetical excitement of 
arms' ([1863] 1981: 541), and simultaneously that Inlo kind of greatness is more 
pleasing to the imagination of a democratic people than military greatness' (ibid, 
549); and Peel succinctly locates the problems of context-dependency and an 
uncritical commitment to mid-Victorian humanist values that permeate Spencer's 
militant-industrial dichotomy (1971: 192-222). 18 
In classical Marxism, frequency of war is generally acknowledged, only to be 
subsumed under the head of a symptom of broader productive processes or an aspect of 
exploitative class structure. Often contradictory, the most coherent statement is the 
metaphorical connection drawn between military and industrial organisation in the 
Communist Manifesto, with its bleak portrayal of '(m)asses of labourers, crowded 
into the factory, ...organised like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they 
are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants' 
(Marx & Engels, [1888] 1982: 87-88). Although Engels (aka "the General") wrote 
extensively and enthusiastically on military matters, notably in the Anti-Diihring 
18 Revisionist approaches also suggest that neither Spencer nor Adam Smith were unreservedly 
convinced of the benign pacific features of the contractual commercial-liberal society. Peel sees 
Smith's view of emergent capitalism as akin to Machiavelli's 'world of chronic political disorder 
and fragile sovereignties' (1971: 193). Minowitz notes not only the survival, but also the 
progress and intensification of warlike tendencies under developed capitalism and highlights 
Smith's own equation of the market's "invisible hand" and advanced technology's "invisible 
death" which makes war both 'more destructive and less noble' (1989: 311); and qualifiedly 
against Lang's later assertion that 'contrary to Spencer states do not necessarily become more 
"peaceful" as industry develops' (1972: 143), Coser notes that Spencer himself, while stressing 
peaceful conditions between 1815 and 1850, marks the period from 1850 to 1896 as a 'return 
towards the coercive discipline which pervades the whole social life when the militant type is 
pre-eminent' (cited in Coser, 1971: 94 - c/f Battistelli's [1993] even stronger endorsement of 
Spencer's "recantation" of his previous hypothesis in light of the Boer War ). 
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(Engels, [1894] 1975) and in encyclopaedia entries and journal articles for English and 
American publication (eg, Engels, [1857] 1983), Kiernan points out that by 1895 even 
he had 'hugged the too hopeful thought that new weaponry was making the perils 
of war more incalculable than any government would dare to risk, and that the 
coalitions between which the continent was divided might be expected to fade 
away' (Bottomore et al, 1983: 521) 
laurkheim's approach to war at the end of the nineteenth century finds him at 
perhaps his most Comtean. He works off the assumption that the former functions of 
war - in this case, the selfless exercise of 'violent courage' - have been superseded by 
a modern 'need for qualities of a different order', the calm and persistent detachment 
of 'the scientist, the engineer, the doctor, the industrial entrepreneur'. Thus, like his 
19th-century near-contemporaries, he avers that despite an artificial and 
'fetishistic' privileging of the French military founded on a desire to avenge the 
national defeat of 1870, 'there is every reason for believing that war will always 
exist, but that it will occupy an ever diminishing place in the life of societies...[t]he 
fact remains that war is increasingly destined to give ground' (Durkheim, 1899, 
trans. Giddens, 1986: 211-213). The challenge to this belief occasioned by the 
outbreak of total war in 1914 led not to an abandonment, but a modification of both 
Durkheim's optimism and his theorising on the moral bases of respective societies. 
His propaganda tracts from 1915 onward aim at what he terms the 'moral 
sustenance' of France and her allies, and analyse the enemy's war aims in terms of an 
aberrant 'German mentality', a 'will to power' exemplified in the work of 
Treitschke and his representative 'system of ideas. ..made for war' (Lukes, 1977: 547- 
559). Yet in Durkheim's schema, this PanGermanic 'state-mania' - 'a clear-cut case 
of social pathology' - is 'never more than temporary' precisely because of its 
hyperactive anti-humanism, and because in the final analysis 'life does not allow 
itself to be perpetually enchained' (Durkheim, 1916, trans. Giddens, 1986: 232-233). 
For Simmel, war is also centrally a cultural expression of collective social 
mentalities. Like Durlcheim, the occasion of the Great War affords Simmel the 
opportunity for meditations on the distinction between self-interest and 
individuation evident in periods of peace, and the near-ecstatic group solidarity 
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that effervesces under wartime conditions. More particularly, it similarly leads to a 
consideration of the differences between German collectivist sensibilities and 'the 
Latin mode of individuality' of 'the romance countries' (Watier, 1991: 228): But 
what Durkheim deplored as a 'morbid' German character, Simmel celebrated, and in 
1914, 'to the surprise of many and to the disgust of some...declared himself 
wholeheartedly for the war' (Frisby, 1984: 33). In later commentaries, this facet of 
Simmel's writings is glossed over, or variously "explained" - that this tendency was 
evident only in the last four years of his life, that it coincides with his 
disillusionment in transferal from Berlin in 1914 to Strasbourg, that his 'enthusiasm 
waned as the war progressed'(Frisby, 1984: 33), even that technically Simmel - 
always a disciplinary outsider - was primarily a philosopher rather than a 
sociologist at this stage of his career. Watier aligns the war writings more closely to 
Simmel's central hypotheses, seeing them as a necessary obverse to the cynicism and 
nonchalance of life in a metropolitan money-based condition of modernity, a form of 
social life pitched at a higher level. This is rationalised by reference to the context 
of the times, a peculiarly German social philosophy (a Nietzschean 'politics of 
cultural despair') and the splitting of an analyst's life and work - invoking Simmel's 
own words from 1914, 'it is erroneous to relate philosophical principles to the 
personalities of those who hold them' (Watier, 1991: 219). The validity of such 
rationalisations assumes added importance when applied to the work of Max 
Weber, a theorist in every sense less marginal to sociology than Simmel. 
2.3 Grounds for Neglect: Weber's 'Besmirched Halo'? 
As Maim implies at 2.1 above, the outstanding and respectable exception to a 
generally rosy picture of a relatively peaceful present within the sociological 
tradition is Weber, and as comprehensively detailed in Hacker & Hacker (1987), 
the military factor as a core element in modernity constitutes a key theme in 
Economy and Society (1968). Spinning off his central conviction that Imlilitary 
discipline gives birth to all discipline' (1968: 1155), Weber particularly stressed the 
part played by the armed forces and war in nation-state formation in general and 
capitalism in particular (1968: 980-982); the same influence at work in the 
organisation of civilian industry and workplace practices - shades of Marx cited 
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supra - so obvious that '[n]o special proof is necessary to show that military 
discipline is the ideal model for the modern capitalist factory, as it was for the 
ancient plantation' (1968: 1156); and that this discipline rather than weapons 
technology is the decisive causal factor in war outcomes (1968: 1148-1155). 
Exegeses of Weber update and foreground this theme. Harries-Jenkins claims that 
the sociological study of the military profession and military organization is 
grounded in 'Weber's brilliant and penetrating analysis of military institutions' 
(1982: 131). Dahrendorf (1965) claims that '(m)ilitary training on the Prussian 
pattern might be much more useful as a preparation for industrialism than Calvinist 
creeds might be, even under original circumstances' (cited in Weede, 1983: 12). In the 
work of Goldman, Weber's religious virtuosi imbued with the calling not only take 
monastic asceticism into the world, but take 'holy war away from the mediaeval 
aristocracy and generally.. .off the battlefields of Europe and into the smallest 
activities of everyday life...they are also heirs of the warrior tradition of the 
aristocracy. For Weber this world-mastering, innovating power is the essence of the 
Occident, the key to its success and uniqueness'(Goldman, 1988: 168). 
Earlier, James Aho pinpointed such a connection while remaining on the battlefield. 
Working within the context of the European military revolution of the 16th century, 
he contends that the sphere in which Protestantism as a source of inner strength is 
most evident is warfare. Taking his examples from the military reforms of the 
leading Protestant commanders - Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, and Oliver 
Cromwell - the author maintains a connection between organisational principles, 
strategies and technologies of the new model armies on the one hand, and an attitude 
of religiously-legitimated rationality towards the conduct of warfare on the other; 
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in the title of Aho's 1979 essay, the 'Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Violence' . 19 
Weber can thus be considered among the few "classical" sociologists to accord a 
central place to militarism in his analysis of modernity. Elements of his conflict 
sociology are, moreover, in part, experientially-based, at least influenced by 
martial elements such as his army service (however restricted to a non-combatant 
role) and his involvement with the key issue of his day, the impact of the Great 
War and its immediate aftermath. Yet these aspects of Weber's analysis are 
underplayed: my contention is that this is because, in both tone and content, and in 
themselves ultra-nationalist, they can be read in retrospect as something 
uncomfortably close to a form of proto-National Socialism. 
The military factor as an intrinsic feature of Weber's analysis and his personal life 
surfaces analytically in his definition of the state as controller of legitimate 
violence, in Arendt's view (1970: 35-6), of 'power' as kin to Clausewitz's definition of 
'war', and, in the 1916 essay on 'Religious Rejections of the World and their 
Directions', death in war as panacea to meaningless of life in modernity. In his 
writing style too, a fondness for military metaphors: in outlining Germany's 
contemptible international reputation in 1906, 
'Weber knew where the responsibility lay: not only with the Kaiser "who was 
dealing with politics from the point of view of a young lieutenant", but with the 
whole system of sham-constitutionalism and with the Conservative Party, 
which prevented its change. "The dynasty of the Hohenzollern" he wrote again 
to Naumann on November 18, 1908, knows only the corporal's form of power: to 
command, to obey, to stand to attention, to boast" '(Kohn, 1969: 279) 
19 Aho also notes the central part played in this military revolution by literature and literacy: the 
Bible, re-interpreting traditional Christian pacifism to as a duty to kill in time of war, and the 
distribution of Prayer Books and the institution of compulsory public worship amongst all levels 
of the soldiery; the spread and influence of Machiavelli's The Prince on political and military 
thinking across Protestant Europe; the revival/reprinting of leading Roman military strategists, 
these constituting the basis of the 'library of the typical well-read Elizabethan gentleman-
warrior' (1979: 111); and finally, absorption and application of these texts leading to a 
restructuring of Protestant military machines - Maurice's redesign of the Dutch armed forces and 
the establishment of the first modem military academy (1617), the 'Swedish Discipline' of 
Gustavus Adolphus, and Cromwell's New Model armies. 
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Further marginal evidence for a prosecution case is the thorny issue of "guilt by 
'association", as in Mommsen's (1989) discussion of the 'perverted' pickup of Weber's 
theories by Michels in Mussolini's Italy, Schmitt, Freyer and MUller-Armack in 
Hitler's Germany. Even more circumstantially (and retrospectively), the notorious 
1895 inaugural address at Freiburg (Mitzman, 1970: 136-144) is eerily similar in tone 
and content to Heidegger's later Rektoratsrede as rector of Freiburg in 1933 (Farias, 
1989; Wolin, 1991; and the symposium in Critical Enquiry, (1989) 15 [2]). Given that 
Weber's views in the Address are [a] consistent, and [b] expressed towards the end of 
his life and career, they cannot be ignored or marginalised as readily as, eg, 
Habermas' boyhood involvement with the Hitler Youth (Habermas, 1992: 77-94), an 
early episode discounted by that writer's later works. For the defence, Raymond 
Aron does 'not wish to minimise Weber's nationalism, though this term usually 
denotes attitudes very different from his. Nothing in his writings would offend or 
wound a foreigner' (1957: 88), and Gerth & Mills concur, maintaining that 
'It is, of course, quite vain to speculate whether Weber with his Machiavellian 
attitude might ever have turned Nazi. To be sure, his philosophy of charisma - 
his skepticism and his pragmatic view of democratic sentiment - might have 
given him such affinities. but his humanism, his love for the underdog, his 
hatred of sham and lies, and his unceasing campaign against racism and anti-
Semitic demagoguery would have made him at least as sharp a "critic", if not a 
sharper one, of Hitler than his brother Alfred has been' (Gerth & Mills, 
[1952[1977: 43). 
But - and relative to Aron's judgement - in Weber's own words from 1917: 'Germany 
fights for her life against an army in which Africans, Ghurkas and all kinds of other 
barbarians from the most forsaken corners of the world stand poised at the frontiers 
ready to devastate our country' (1968: 1382, emphasis added). An aberration 
attributable to the desperate exigencies of war? Possibly: but in Iggers' estimation, 
and in peacetime, for Weber, 
'[t]he economic developments in East Elbia and the replacement of the German 
peasant by the Polish farm labourer were part of the age-old struggle between 
races and nationalities for existence and elbow room. ..What mattered in this 
struggle, Weber holds, is not "peace and human happiness", but the "eternal 
struggle for the preservation and upward selective breeding [Emporziichtung ] of 
our national kind [Art]". In the tradition of German Idealism, Weber condemns a 
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utilitarian [euddmonistisch ] ethics which places welfare over the fulfilment of a 
higher ideal by man. "We want to improve by breeding [emporziichten ] not man's 
well-being but those characteristics with which we associate the feeling that 
they constitute human greatness and the nobility of our nature" ' (Iggers, 1968: 169, 
emphasis in the original). 
This tallies with the views initially forwarded by Guenther Roth's 1965 essay, and 
later reinforced, that 'he [Weber] favoured policies of ethnic exclusion that are 
again very much at issue today' (1993: 148); and, while defending Weber against 
Abraham's (1993) charges of anti-semitism, Roth provides evidence of his ongoing 
and pronounced anti-Polish sentiments: 
'In a speech in Heidelberg on January 2, 1919, he is reported to have exclaimed: 
"When you have reached the point where you have decided not to make any grand 
speeches but silently see to it that the first Polish official who dares enter Danzig 
is hit by a bullet - when you have decided to take the course that will then be 
inevitable - then I am at your disposal, then come to see me!"...Passages such as 
these worried the American publisher Helen Wolff and the translator Ralph 
Manheim, when the English version of Karl Jaspers' 1932 Weber essay was 
prepared. The upshot was an "ethnically cleansed" version that dropped several 
offensive quotations' (Roth, 1993: 160). 
There is, further and following Gerth & Mills (above) Weber's particular definition 
of "democracy" as expressed in Marianne Weber's report of the debate with 
Ludendorff (cited in Gerth & Mills, [1952]1977: 42): 
LUDENDORFF: Then, what do you mean by democracy? 
WEBER: In a democracy the people choose a leader in whom they trust. Then the 
chosen leader says, 'Now shut up and obey me.' People and party are then no longer 
free to interfere in his business. 
LUDENDORFF: I could like such democracy. 
WEBER: Later the people can sit in judgement. If the leader has made mistakes - to 
the gallows with him! 
and in another version of "democracy", as expressed in an essay on the 1905 
revolution in Russia : 
'it is highly ridiculous to ascribe to advanced capitalism, as it is now being 
imported into Russia and as it exists in America. ..any real affinity for democracy 
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or even with freedom. ..We individualists and partisans of democratic institutions 
are against the stream of material events[...] "Correct" Social Democracy drills 
the masses in the mental goose-step and directs them towards a paradise in this 
world instead of towards an otherworldly one. ..it makes a sort of social vaccine 
that serves the interests of the existing social order' (cited in Moore, 1958: 119-120. 
An alternative [and noticeably "cleansed"] translation of these passages are 
accessible in Weber, 1997: 109, 110). 
Then there is the issue of Weber's relationship to the man so worrying to Durkheim 
(above): Treitschke. Weber is cited by Dorpalen (1957: 294-295) as a follower of 
Trieitschke and a mentor of Naumann (who in turn was a significant influence on 
Heidegger (Heidegger, 1976; Poggeler, 1988: 210). Weber's criticisms of Treitschke 
are [a] of Trieitschke's style and personality, not the content of his ultra Pan-
Germanism; and [b] further qualified in that they lay fault for inadequate reception 
of Trieitschke's oratorical message on his listeners. As Kohn points out (1969: 278), in 
1887 'Weber defended Treitschke by putting part of the blame on his [ie, Weber's] 
fellow students' when asserting that there was a 
'truly idealist element in this man so unfortunate in many respects, in spite of his 
crude errors and injustices. The evil effects of his lecturing are primarily due to the 
lack of character of his audience. It is the same thing as with Bismarck: if the 
nation knew how to treat the latter and how to utilise him, remaining firm at the 
right moment and giving him its confidence where he deserves it, the often 
devastating effects of his personal politics could not have assumed such 
proportions' (Weber, cited in Dorpalen 1957: 239, emphasis added). 
In 1944, Mayer portrayed Weber as 'the Machiavelli of the age of steel', and Iggers 
(1968) maintains that Weber is in part 'a Machiavellian figure, more extreme than 
Treitschke and Droysen in reducing all politics to the power interests of the state' 
(1968: 171, emphasis added). As a final insight, Mitzman (1970: 224) transcribes part 
of a 'letter of 1914 condoling his sister Lilli on the loss of her husband at the front' 
which shows a 'total abandonment of his usual (after 1900) insistence on an ethic of 
responsibility rather than immediate, experiential gratification: 
For whatever the outcome may be, this war is really great and wonderful beyond 
all expectation. Not the successes but the spirit of the soldiers that one could see 
here, (and daily in the infirmary), exceeds all expectations, and here at least, 
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also the spirit of the populace, taken all in all. I would never have hoped for that, 
and whatever else may come, it will be unforgettable'. 
2.4 Preserving the 'Pacific Tradition' in Mainstream Perspectives.  
Yet despite these important exceptions, critiques and qualifications, the founding 
fathers' overriding faith in the capacity of modern industrial societies to achieve a 
permanent global peace - even when interpreted as more honoured in the breach than 
the observance - is echoed and retained in the assertions of a majority of their 20th-
century intellectual heirs. Dandeker accounts for this by detailing the discipline's 
overreliance on two dominant schools of thought. The first is a set of functionalist 
industrial society postulates where 'peaceful activities of production and exchange 
supplant warfare as the dominant social activities' (1990: 30) This is most typically 
expressed in Davis & Moore's seminal exposition (1945) of the functional theory of 
stratification, wherein the 'presence or absence of open conflict with other societies, 
of free trade relations or cultural diffusion, all influence the class structure to some 
extent. A chronic state of warfare tends to place emphasis upon the military 
functions...Free trade, on the other hand, strengthens the hand of the trader at the 
expense of the warrior and priest' (cited in Benclix & Lipset, 1970: 52) 
The second major paradigm is Marxist social theory (eg, Anderson, 1974: 30-33), 
which posits the view that the classless society 'would remove the socio-economic 
basis of war and military organization and would preface a peaceful confederation 
of socialist states' (Dandeker, 1990: 30). He argues that the pre-eminence of these 
two branches of theory have seriously limited sociology's analytical reach, and 
suggests as a corrective reconsidering the works of a "neo-Machiavellian" tradition 
represented by writers such as Mosca, Michels and Weber (Dandeker, 1990: 29-36; 
Ashworth & Dandeker, 1987). 
The implications of Dandeker's "cure" are open to debate, but examples of his 
diagnosis are readily available: Scruton's 'Notes towards a Sociology of War' 
centrally concludes that 'states governed according to principles of free association, 
market economy and a rule of law are inherently more peaceful members of the 
community of nations' (1987: 305, emphasis added); Calhoun's paper on the 
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infrastructure of modernity notes that in the early modern period, 'commerce began to 
compete with and then surpass warfare as the occasion for international 
communication' (1987: 21); and Fukuyama (cited in Mestrovic, 1993: 38) asserts that 
the 'fundamentally unwarlike character of liberal societies is evident in the 
extraordinarily peaceful relations they maintain among one another'. Risk Society 
perspectives, as propounded by Beck or Luhmann, and a related reflexive modernity 
position (eg, Lash, 1993; Lash & Urry, 1994) usually ignore war or, as in Giddens, 
stress contemporary 'demilitarisation' or conditions pertaining to '80s/90s 'post-
military' societies (Shaw, 1989). In a smaller-scale instance, when the BSA's journal 
Sociology devoted considerable space to Graham Crow's paper on 'The Use of the 
Concept of "Strategy" in Recent Sociological Literature' (1989), in subsequent 
responses Shaw took Crow - and by implication, sociology generally - to task, in that 
this wordplay with "strategy" tended to 'ignore the military origins of strategic 
thinking. ..more attention needs to be given to its diffusion from military to general 
social usage, as well as to specifically sociological uses' (1990: 465). Knights & 
Morgan also point to this 'surprising omission' in Crow's argument, that he 'fails to 
discuss developments in military and business thinking. In these areas, the concept of 
strategy does not have to be imputed to actors; on the contrary, it is part of their 
everyday language and serves to structure relations...[i]t was in the military field 
that the concept of strategy was first elaborated' (1990: 477). Knights & Morgan 
embellish this theme with a skeletal survey of the spread of the concept into 
corporate managerial, academic, and political enterprises: but this remains as an 
opportunity not taken. The prevailing view continues, to find perhaps its strongest 
contemporary expression in the "civilising process" thesis of Norbert Elias: 
'It is often forgotten that never before in the development of humankind have so 
many millions of people lived together so peacefully - that is, with the 
considerable elimination of physical violence - as in the large states and cities 
of our time. This becomes evident only when one realises how much more violent 
and how much higher in risk of physical attacks were the earlier epochs of 
human development' (Elias, cited in Keane, 1988: 178). 
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2.5 Alternatives: Spoiling the Orthodoxy 
On the surface, and in the light of claims that 'only Republican Rome has ever 
equalled the extent to which 20th-century societies have, on occasion, mobilised for 
military purposes' (Mann, 1985: 240-241), such 'orthodox' views seem at best 
problematic, at worst ludicrous. Further support for the alternative case comes from 
Sorokin's ([193711970) earlier analysis of 967 wars and 1, 615 internal disturbances of 
the last 2500 years, and his finding that 'the bloodiest period in all history was the 
first quarter of the present century - an analysis made before 1939. The average man 
of the thirteenth century had 6,500 more chances of dying peacefully in bed than his 
descendant of the twentieth' (Kaempfert, 1941: 442). For Collins, too, war moves 
along a continuum of increasing frequency and heightened violence, from the 
relatively low-level 'ferocity' of "primitive" conflict to the 'cruelty' of "iron age 
agrarian" societies, and culminates in the bureaucratised 'callousness' of modern 
industrial states that increases the prevalence of warfare by reducing the 
designated enemy to an abstraction (1974; c/f Keen, 1991: 72-88). Elliott-Bateman 
(1970:127) supports his general conclusion that 'the conduct of war as a means of 
political endeavour is becoming increasingly absurd, brutal and inhumane' by 
providing some disconcerting figures: 
'since there have only been 230 years of complete peace in the known world during 
the 3,466 years since 1496 B.C. war does seem to have some normal permanence in 
human political experience... the First World War resulted in some 9.7 million 
deaths, most of them servicemen and auxiliaries, while the Second World War 
caused 54. 8 million deaths of which the great majority were civilians'. 
This issue of increasingly skewed combatant/civilian casualty ratios is given fuller 
treatment in Gil Elliott's Twentieth Century Book of the Dead (1972) and is 
corroborated in Ihde's observation that lbly the end of World War II it had become 
very difficult to separate military from civilian casualties - the fire bombing of 
Dresden, followed by the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in no way 
distinguished between military and civilian targets' (1993: 136). On Born's figures, 
as cited in Galtung (1980: 9), by the time of the Korean War of the early 1950's, 
armed forces deaths are down to only 16% of the official body count. Similarly and 
summarily, Craig & Egan note that in the First World War, '5 per cent of the fatal 
casualties were civilian; in the second, 44 per cent; in the Korean war, 88 per cent; 
and in the war in Vietnam, 91 per cent' (cited in Goebel & Nelson, 1988: 140). 
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In economic terms, Verona (in Galtung, 1980: 8-9) analysed post-WWII global 
military expenditure in constant US dollars between the late '40s and the early '70s, 
and found a fourfold increase - from $51.4 billion in 1948 to $200 billion in 1971 - 
within this 22-year period. This may be usefully compared with the analysis of 
Smith & Smith (1983: 22), who utilise SIPRI figures to show that in 1981, world 
military expenditure stood at somewhere between $600-650 billion - relative to 
Verona's data, a threefold expenditure increase in half the time. 
In terms of the number of wars fought since 1945, Istvan Kende (Galtung, 1980: 7-8) 
estimates 97 local conflicts formally played out to 1969; and this tally is brought up 
to date by Brogan's list (1992: 622-625) of a further 70 wars occurring between 1970 
and 1992. Tilly's 1992 analysis, characterising the twentieth century as having 
'already established itself as the most bellicose in human history', supplies 
corroborating data: 
'Since 1900, by one careful count, the world has seen 237 new wars - civil and 
international - whose battles have killed at least 1,000 persons per year; 
through the year 2000, the grim numbers extrapolate to about 275 wars and 115 
million deaths in battle. Civilian deaths could easily equal that total. The 
bloody nineteenth century brought only 205 such wars and 8 million dead, the 
warlike eighteenth century a mere 68 wars with 4 million killed...These 
numbers translate into death rates per thousand population of about 5 for the 
eighteenth century, 6 for the nineteenth century, and 46 - eight or nine times as 
high - for the twentieth. From 1480 to 1800, a significant new international 
conflict started somewhere every two or three years, from 1800 to 1944 every one 
or two years, since World War II every fourteen months or so.. .The nuclear age 
has not slowed the centuries-old trend toward more frequent, deadlier wars' 
(1992: 67). 
Tying these strands together, Toffler & Toffler (1993: 13-14) cite between 150 to 160 
post-1945 wars and civil conflicts ('depending on how we count') claiming 30 to 40 
million casualties of whom 7,200,000 were combatants, and further assert that 'in 
the 2,340 weeks that passed between 1945 and 1990, the earth enjoyed a grand total 
of only three that were truly war-free'. Finally, a recent World Priorities Inc. report 
claims that al
0
though worldwide military expenditure had shown a 5-year decline 
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to 1992 - a factor attributed to severe cuts in Russian spending - the US defence budget 
had reached an unprecedented $715 billion in 1987; and a record 29 major wars 
causing 6 million deaths (the highest tolls in 17 years) were being waged in 1992 
(cited in the Australian, Armistice Day, 11/11/'93: 8). 
This evidence of increasing warfare under contemporary conditions is problematic but 
weighty. One difficulty with the sociological perspectives reviewed here is that 
they've not taken such evidence into account, preferring instead to rest somewhat 
magisterially on a myopic presumption of extant or imminent "peaceful conditions". 
This ceding of war as a topic to other disciplines is mirrored in sociology's antipathy 
to text-based approaches currently evident in alternative academic fields. I review 
this trend below; then outline the form of the sociological resistance, and conclude 
with an indication as to why a text-based approach ( a sociography) may be 
considered central to the discipline. 
2.6. The Textual Turn. 
A recent tendency across a wide range of academic disciplines has been to look more 
closely at the part that reading/writing processes play, both in their own 
constitution and the accreditation, methods and reputations of their practitioners, 
and in some cases, to recast their endeavours as a form of writing in toto. This is most 
evident in fields like Education, which has always been founded on a commitment to 
reading and writing practices - in folk terms, two of the "3 Rs", and recently 
reassessed as central by Whitherill & Noddings in their characterisation of 
education as permeated by narrative, an ongoing Stories Lives Tell (1991) - or 
Comparative Literature and English, although significantly the latter now focusses 
more directly on both cultural studies (Milner, 1996) and reflexive 'metafictions' 
(Ommundsen, 1993). 
But this textual turn also feeds into other disciplines seemingly unconnected with or 
only tangentially connected to narrativity: for instance, in Archaeology, extending 
Gelb's conclusion 'that writing is of such importance that civilization cannot exist 
without it, and conversely, that writing cannot exist except in a civilization' (cited 
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in Daniel, 1971: 31), Shanks & Tilley centre their overview on the way their 
discipline 'is a signifying practice, expressive and transformative. The past is 
written. Past and present are mediated in the archaeological text', and the under-
recognition of this factor leads to their regenerative call for '[w]hat is needed...an 
archaeological topology, a rhetoric; an archaeological tropology, a stylistics; [and] 
an archaeological poetics concerned with how the archaeological past may be 
written' (1987: 213). The singly and jointly produced work of Der Derian (1990; 1994) 
and Shapiro (1984; 1988) in Political Science suggests that the field of international 
relations can more usefully be mediated by concurrent or alternative studies of 
intertextual relations (1989). Psychology (Greenfield, 1972; Bruner, 1988; Carothers, 
1959; Freud's 1925 essay on the 'mystic writing pad' as a foundational concept in 
psychoanalysis [Wilden, 1984: 395-400]; or Lacan's emblematic 'A certificate tells 
me I was born. I repudiate that certificate. For I am not a poet but a poem. A poem 
that is being written, even if it looks like a subject', cited in Ragland-Sullivan, 1990: 
41), Philosophy (Dettering, 1955; Morrison, 1987; Derrida's grammatology of 1976; or 
Popper's thought experiments of 1972), and Economics (Innis, 1950, 1951; Myrdal, 
1968: 1651-1828; Cipolla, 1969; Boje, 1991; Nosanchuk & Erickson's correlation of 
literacy and GNP per capita [1985: 224-28, 241-43], or the claim advanced by 
Bowman & Anderson in 1963 that a necessary precondition for economic "take-off" in 
LDCs/Third World states is a literacy rate of 40%) have to varying degrees cast 
alphanumeracy and orthography as a necessary and sometimes sufficient condition 
for higher levels of cognitive performance, formal reasoning processes, or European 
and European-style societal development. 
Considering the genesis of Accounting as a profession and summarising an earlier 
(1986) paper, Hoskin & MacVe draw on a Foucauldian perspective in order 
'(1) to show how the late medieval development of accounting technologies, 
including double-entry, grew out of important advances in the technology of 
writing - the new disciplinary techniques for gridding texts and retrieving 
information - plus the use of the formal examination, that were first 
developed in the medieval universities: and (2) to explain the nineteenth-
century expansion of a discourse of accounting and accountability in terms of 
examinatorial innovations in higher education, viz, the introductioh of 
written examinations .and mathematical marking systems at the beginning of 
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that century (Hoskin & MacVe, 1988: 37, emphasis in the original). 
In Geography, as Goldberg emphasises (1990: 67, 102, 138, 155-56, 205, 219-20), the 
chief cartographers of the 16th-century, Gerardus Mercator and Jodocus Hondius, 
were also authors of key calligraphic manuals, Mercator's Literarum Latina rum of 
1540 and Hondius' 1594 Theatrum Artis Scribendi; and latterly, there is new 
attention paid to mapmaking as political (eg the Peters Projection, NI, 1989) and 
perceptual process (Gould & White, 1974) as well as the distinction between 
physical terrain and its printed representation, caught in the postmodern "map is 
not the territory" formula and its implications in Roberts (1987: 71-83) or the 
Baudrillardian thesis of simulacra-precession, where the map is antecedent to the 
territory (1983: 1-4) - and as their names signify, both geography and its subfield 
cartography are inherently written-representational subjects. 
The same is true for the subfield of historiography in History, where the ongoing 
work of Hayden White (1973; 1978; 1987) lifts discourse and narratology into the 
domain of the study of historical epochs in a more essentialist fashion. The Goncourt 
brothers previously maintained that generically 'history is a novel which 
happened' (cited by Lodge, in Atkinson, 1990: 35), and as referents to more specific 
periods, historians have specified the utilisation of an alphabetic script as in large 
part explaining the prominence of Graeco-Roman institutions in the ancient world 
(Castle, 1964; Havelock, 1980; Harris, 1989), and the emergence and diffusion of 
print technology as fundamental to the advent of both the Renaissance and the 
Protestant Reformation (Eisenstein, 1968: 45; 1969; Butler, 1968: xv; Goodman, in 
Mayor & Pugh, 1987: 401): empirically too, exegetical sociohistorical studies at the 
level of official vs. individual archives (eg Ginzburg, 1981; Foucault, 1975), the 
regional community as revealed in different types of transcribed register (eg Le Roy 
Ladurie, 1978; Duden, 1987) or the national literary habitus of State and citizenry in 
particular periods (eg ancien regime and [post-] revolutionary France in Darnton, 
1982; 1991, Mann, 1993: 187-97, or Furet & Ozouf, 1982) treat written discourses as 
more than variably reliable data-sets, as constitutive of both subject-matter and the 
historical approach to its depiction: as expressed by Chartier, 
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'one of the effects of a renewed interest in texts was to return the disciplines of 
erudition to the central role they once played. Long relegated to the level of 
ancillary sciences, these technical skills, which propose rigorous and 
formalised descriptions of objects and forms, became (or became again) 
essential once documents were no longer considered solely for the information 
they furnish but were also studied in themselves for their discursive and 
material organization, their conditions of production, and their strategic 
utilisation' (1997: 6). 
In Architecture, the evaluation and analysis of Peter Eisenman's groundbreaking 
Wexner Center in Ohio (Transition, 1988, especially Brenda Marshall's contribution 
at pp 5-12) was as concerned with the archi(text)ural as much as the concrete 
form/formal design components of this and other of Eisenman's structures; at 
considerably lower levels of generality, abstraction and disciplinarity, the Readers 
Digest quotes G. K. Chesterton's opinion of architecture as 'the alphabet of 
giants.. .the largest set of symbols ever made to meet the eyes of man' (1997: 125) and 
in the architectural entry in the ...for Beginners series, the first page cites Hitler's 
assessment of architecture as creating 'documents in stone'. 
Dealing with the concept of consent at Law, Scarry (1990), in considering Cardozo's 
decision in the 1914 case of Schloendorff vs Society of New York Hospital notes that 
the 'canonical statement' in the judge's decision not only sets a precedent in everyday 
courtroom practice, but that - as with all precedent, whether persuasive or formally 
binding - it moves into 'classroom practice as well': itself built on earlier recorded 
case law, it becomes pedagogical, 'so those designing classroom texts further 
underscore Judge Cardozo's own act of underscoring, and this becomes part of the 
education of every young law student reading that text' (1990: 869). More generally 
and extra-legally Illich & Sanders note the medieval jurisprudential shift, which 
they date from the Lex Ribuaria of 803, in the swearing of oaths by litigants and 
witnesses alike - from the validity of testimony sworn on the holy relic, the sword, 
or parts of the body, to the veracity of statements sworn on the book, the Gospels, 
which continues to the present (1988: 31-36). 
Turning to the physical sciences, one encounters De Certeau's consideration of 
authoritative language shifting gradually from something spoken to something 
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materially fabricated (written), illustrated by the example of Condillac, for whom 
'constructing a science and constructing a language amount to the same task, just as for 
the revolutionaries of 1790 establishing the revolution required the creation and 
imposition of a national French language' (1984: 138); Bacon's assessment in 
Aphorism 129 of the 17th-century Novum Organum, of printing as, along with 
gunpowder and the compass, comprising a trinity of world-changing inventions; the 
less serious but no less instructive claim of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) that within 
the scientific community '[i]n many quarters, people are more ready to yield to dead 
writing than living speech, for the former permits them to agree or dissent without 
blushing'; and Popper's notion that 'science is a branch of literature' (cited in Olson, 
1977: 270 - in chapter 2 of their Laboratory Life [1986: 43-104], Latour & Woolgar, 
drawing on a conception of literary inscription taken from Derrida, "concretize" this 
observation, showing the extent to which the construction of scientific fact and the 
day-to-day operations of the laboratory depend on the interface [in-house/outside 
world] between on-the-spot" and "on-the-run" referencing of prior written findings 
and the note-taking by members of the lab staff at each step in the designated 
activity, and the writing up of the results leading, not invariably but usually, to 
dissemination through publication). A similar approach produces fine-grained 
studies of the part played by rhetoric and genre in the construction and reception of 
medical discourses (Gusfield, 1976; Berg & Bowker, 1997), physics as a project of 
active reading by practitioners (Bazerman, 1988: 235-53), and especially biology, not 
only in terms of the knowledge claims of its publications (Lowood & Rider, 1994), but 
in equations between life and literature exemplified by the following review: 
'its often said that the DNA of our cells comprises a message, written in a 
"genetic code" or "language of the genes". Via a dizzying chemical virtuosity, 
its four-letter alphabet and three-letter words construct our tissues. Each of us 
is "written" into existence, with a specific, rich cultural environment, from a 
single recipe of 3 billion letters, or 100,000 genes. The Human Genome project 
will have transliterated a standard version of this document by 2006. So if we 
are all DNA texts, might molecular biologists and neuroscientists be best 
advised to move their labs to the English Department? Robert Pollack, a 
specialist in the SV40 virus, says science has much to learn from current 
literary theory [although its] unlikely he'd go as far as de Man in 
destabilising the text...' (Broderick, 1994: 21). 
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Finally, if the following statement, which casts writing as the key to distinguishing 
biology from history, anthropology and sociology, is viable, then Sociology could be 
expected to share in and welcome the textual turn - because 
'[1]ooked at in the perspective of time, man's biological evolution shades into 
prehistory when he becomes a language-using animal; add writing, and 
history proper begins. Looked at in a temporal perspective , man as animal is 
studied is studied primarily by the zoologist, man as talking animal primarily 
by the anthropologist, and man as talking and writing animal primarily by 
the sociologist...(T)o the extent that a significant quantity of written records 
are available, the prehistorian yields to the historian; and to the extent that 
alphabetical writing and popular literacy imply new modes of social 
organization and transmission, the anthropologist tends to yield to the 
sociologist'(Goody & Watt,[1963]1981: 27). 
2.7: The Sociological Resistance to Text 
For most of its relatively brief history as a formal academic subject, sociology has 
either ignored or been openly hostile to this mooted ceding of specifically literate 
populations as its special province. Such antipathy rests on several bases and 
expresses itself in a variety of ways: the notion of literature as a reflection of, 
rather than coextensive with or foundational to, an amenable-to-study society; a 
methodological commitment to observation, quantification, and/or forms of talk as 
legitimate data sources; theory expressed through the semiotics of the typology; 
and an ideology favouring a particular view of science, perhaps best expressed by 
John von Neumann's statement that the 'sciences do not try to explain, they hardly 
even try to interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a 
mathematical construct which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, 
describes observed phenomena' (cited in Gleick, 1989: 27, emphasis - stressing words 
as an adjunct to numbers - added). 
Evidence of this resistance is found in the statements of many of its leading analysts, 
and the sorts of rationale underlying this opposition says much about the way 
sociology "sees itself" as a particular kind of intellectual enterprise. Thus, for 
Merton (1968: 69-70; 1982: 105) and Homans (1947: 14), if sociologists write lucidly or 
vividly and to be generally understood, they are simply not 'doing science': Bourdieu 
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takes this one step further in his own practice, making sure his texts 'are full of 
indications meant to stop the reader deforming and simplifying things...In any case, 
what is certain is that I am not out to make my writing clear and simple and that I 
consider the strategy of abandoning the rigour of technical vocabulary in favour of 
an easy and readable style to be dangerous' (1990: 54). 
For Queen (1942: 1, 10 [PA] 2° ) or Mayo (1945: 20-21) library research is part of 'the 
mechanism of the sociological flight from reality', producing students who lack 
experimental skills, apply 'long unusual names to events capable of simple 
description', and who in the end are only capable of writing books about each 
other's books'. Rossi may be read as ironically or backhandedly mitigating this 
pessimism and the peril it represents to the discipline as a whole, because in 
sociology lalfter all, an article in a major professional journal, or a monograph, has 
little consequence except on the career of the writer' (1980: 896 [PA]), but Goffman 
picks up on the theme when he criticises his own major work, Frame Analysis, as 'too 
bookish, too general, too removed from fieldwork to have a good chance of being 
anything more than another mentalistic adumbration' (1974: 13) 21 , and his own 
wariness of coining unavoidable neologisms here is echoed more generally by 
Blalock's warning that sociologists 'can ill afford to go off in our own directions, 
changing our vocabulary whenever we see fit' (1979: 893 [PA]). 
Stinchcombe bemoans the high prestige accorded to the sociologist who studies 
'abstractions of people', who 'gets his or her facts from the books rather than the 
people' (1984: 51-2), and offers as an example of what he attacks the fact that the 
founding fathers of symbolic interactionism relied hardly at all on empirical 
methods: 'George Herbert Mead did no fieldwork, as far as I know, and Herbert 
Blumer published very little of his' (1984: 59). Identical criticisms are made of other 
20
1 am indebted to my friend and colleague Bob White for drawing my attention to the fact that this 
and several of the following citations - those labelled IPA]" - gain added force and prestige by 
virtue of the fact that they are presented as portions of ASA (American Sociological Association) 
Presidential Addresses. 
21 Beyond this self-criticism, at least one commentator holds Goffman's prose responsible for a certain 
reticence within the discipline to assess his works on their own substantive merits: 'Frequently, the 
presentational eloquence and expositional charm of his writing is allowed to conceal the centrality of 
its origins, and the potential originality of its contribution to sociology. In his writing, style regularly 
suppresses structure. And the result? Few people take Goffman seriously as a social theorist with a 
vital contribution to make to the development of sociology (Ditton, 1980: 2). 
major schools of sociological thought: Mills (1959), Baldamus (1976) and Homans (in 
Tilly, 1990: 263) attacking the writing style of Parsons in his elaboration of 
structural functionalism, and Davis accusing functionalism of being a 'crank method' 
because it substitutes 'the easy path of verbal tapestry' for tightly-framed and 
empirically-demonstrable propositions (1959: 768 [PA]); or Coser (1975: 697 [PA]) 
commenting on 'the hypertrophy of wordage among the ethnomethodologists' 
making for what Coleman deems an unacceptable and 'extraordinarily high ratio of 
reading time to information transfer'. Others (Shils, 1980: 249; Gans, 1989: 7, 9, 12 
[PA]; Schwartz, 1990: 378-79) regularly criticise the entire discipline for expressing 
its findings in turgid "sociologese" or what Wright Mills calls 'socspeak' (1959: 217- 
18), which either mystifies for mystification's sake - the thrust of Howard S. 
Becker's criticism of the tendency to evasion signified by sociology's favouring of 
passive over active grammatical constructions (1986: 44-5) -, or attempts to copy the 
style of the natural sciences. 
Lundberg, in an early consideration of this emulation, adopted a stance similar to 
some of the propos'itions outlined by philosophers of science assessing their field as 
importantly linked to textuality when judging scientific ideas as so complex as to 
necessitate their written transmission, that they 'cannot be matched in a succession 
of acoustic stimuli', and that consequently 'the language of science must increasingly 
consist of written graphic symbols, which provide an enduring instead of an 
immediately vanishing stimulus, and offer possibilities of arrangement...that 
cannot be communicated in oral language' (1936: 39 [PA]): but Hadden discounts this 
reliance on writing in the physical sciences, saying that 'the observability and 
practical objectivity of phenomena is a different matter for the "hard" sciences than 
for the social sciences. In the social sciences this is achieved only in texts' (1992: 429) 
- the 'only' in this statement and the overall tone implying the relative inferiority 
of "soft" text-dependent human sciences. 
Taking a different tack, Denzin and Andreski each view the attempted emulation of 
the natural science model as opportunistic and bogus, a problem that both see as 
"curable" if sociologists cultivate 'such essential skills as textual criticism, literary 
flair and semantic sensitivity' (Andreski, 1974: 123), or realise that lilf sociologists 
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set for themselves the goal of understanding patterned forms of human behaviour, 
then a valuable source of data for secondary analysis are the poems, novels, 
paintings and musical compositions of artists in various historical epochs', and that 
the 'discipline would have advanced more rapidly had sociologists emulated 
novelists and artists' rather than physical scientists (Denzin, 1973: 64). Yet relative 
to this advice, Short (1984: 715 [PA]) worries that sociology is often no different from 
"mere" journalism, and Lieberson (1992: 6 [PA]) is at pains to distinguish evidence-
based sociological accounts from the depictions of life conveyed by either the daily 
press, the essay, or the novel. 
In sum, as variously evidenced and at all levels, mainstream schools of thought and 
leading figures within sociology have shown a demonstrable resistance to this 
textual turn. While reading and writing figures in media sociology/communication 
studies (Tunstall, 1974), assorted sociologies of education (notably McHoull, 1982) 
and even a nascent sociology of literature (Watt, 1964; Laurenson & Swingewood, 
1972; Sociological Review Monographs #25 [ed. Routh & Wolff, 1977] and #26 [ed. 
Laurenson, 1978]), these subfields themselves are regarded as exploratory and 
marginal, or principally hybrids - mongrels rather than pedigree. Although the 
'nuts and bolts' of textual production is a necessary facet of organizational studies of 
the publishing industry in various countries (Escarpit, 1966 [France]; Bonchio, 1973 
[Italy]; Lane, 1974: 239-51 [Britain]; Coser, Kadushin & Powell, 1982 [the United 
States]), the rise of a reading public as a topic area for historical sociology or a 
broader sociology of culture (Williams, 1971; 1981: 9-20), and studies of illiteracy as 
a specialist branch of social problems and social policy (Freeman & Kassebaum, 
1956; Scarlett, 1984), reading and writing as a centre-stage phenomenon, cut loose 
from these established subdisciplinary.moorings, is sociologically inappropriate. 
Casting reading/writing as a Durkheimian social fact, as anything other than a 
subsidiary field of investigation, is either solipsist, self-indulgent, or a threat to 
disciplinary integrity: in Frank's summation, 
'In sociology, the written texts are understood as derivative descriptions of the 
world, or as supplementary to a reality that has its existence elsewhere; these 
supplements may be more or less useful, but they are supplements none the less. 
The texts, the writings of sociology, are treated as nothing more than traces - 
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provisional, ephemeral approximations of the presence of a world which is 
always outside the text. The texts mediate our understanding of this world, but 
this mediation is a lapse, a falling from grace of immediate vision. For a 
sociologist to take the writing or reading of texts too seriously is to perpetrate a 
decadence which is one of the typical scandals of sociology (known as "navel 
gazing"). The essence of this scandal is claiming for the text a presence of its own 
which is not supplementary but complementary to the presupposed presence of 
"the real world" ' (Frank, 1985: 113, emphasis added) 
2.8 Dismantling and Revisionism. 
Newer perspectives have at various points and in various ways attempted to 
overcome this resistance. In substantive terms this is expressed in calls for subfields 
and "new sociologies" of narrative (Maines, 1993; Somers, 1994), fiction (Knorr 
Cetina, 1994), information (Balnaves, 1993), written rhetoric (Brown, 1983), 
discourse (Chalaby, 1996), [auto]biography (Denzin, 1989), bibliography (as in 
McKenzie's [1994] view of this field as intrinsically a 'sociology of texts'), or text 
itself (as in Alexander's claim [1992: 295] that 'every social interaction can also be 
understood as a text'). 
In terms of method attention is focussed on sociology as essentially ethnographic 
(Atkinson, 1990), documents as data source (Scott, 1990), the importance of content 
and citation analysis (Hicks & Potter, 1991; Clemens, Powell, McIlwaine & 
Okamoto, 1995; demonstration by Baldamus, 1992), ongoing concern with "how-to" 
manuals on specifically sociological styles of writing (eg, appendix to Mills, 1958; 
Becker, 1986; Cuba, 1993), or the evaluative process of peer-reviewing manuscripts as 
essential, not ephemeral, to social-scientific production (McHugh, Raffel, Foss & 
Blum, 1974: 76-108). An older view of the science/humanities divide - a derivation of 
Snow's 'Two Cultures' - that banishes certain writing genres from the sociological 
agenda is implicitly or explicitly challenged to allow for the expression of 
sociological analysis as parody (Jones, 1980), dialogue between (f)actual and 
fictional dramatis personx (Mulkay, 1985; Latour, 1997) or poetry (Stein, 1966: 173- 
82; Wiley, 1976: 61-7; Ward, 1979). 
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But such enterprises continue to encounter patterns of resistance and bemusement.' 
For any intent on practising what Geertz labels a "new philology" within sociology, 
such resistance appears daunting. Yet 'alternative' views need not be constructed 
from scratch: because the sociological enterprise has always been essentially 
textual. Alternative approaches - and particular projects undertaken by even the 
textual turn's staunchest critics - provide palpable evidence for such a claim. 
I take Merton as a type-case here, for few express the anti-textual turn so pithily, so 
consistently, and in all its aspects (most strikingly in Merton, 1968 [orig. 1949]; 69-70; 
1982: 105). Yet Merton is his own best instance of the very "literariness" he condemns 
in his social-scientific domain. Crothers emphasises Merton's 'love, akin to a poet's 
or a philologist's, of words and language' and, citing Caplovitz, his use of source 
material - typically 'not the ASR or AJS, but...eighteenth and nineteenth century 
literary magazines...' or 'rare books that he uncovers in out-of-the-way second-hand 
bookstores': again, citing Hunt, many of 'Merton's writings, furthermore, are 
liberally flavoured with apposite references to literature and history' (1987: 30). 
Merton's doctorate, and associated work of the '30s in the sociology of science, 
largely consisted of textual 'content analysis and a "prosopography", (ie collective 
biography)' of elite English scientists of the 17th century; and in the '70s, 'from his 
"elder statesman" position. ..there has been a further flowering of Merton's 
contribution to belles lettres as a humanist as well as a social science scholar' (1987: 
35, 40). This "literariness" has often attracted peer comment, from Sica's somewhat 
cryptic 'Merton's writing is a legend in sociology because it is literary in the best 
sense, and therefore widely, if not deeply, read' (1988: 137) to the more openly 
22 Two brief instances: firstly, the UK journal devoted to the exploration of textual matters within 
the discipline, which contained Wiley's poetry - Writing Sociology - did not proceed past the 
inaugural issue (#1, October 1976); secondly, twenty years on, in a review of the recently-
published (1996) Passionate Sociology by Game & Metcalfe - an introduction to the field in 'the 
same genre as Peter Berger's Invitation to Sociology and C. Wright Mills' The Sociological 
Imagination' - Bryan S. Turner notes that book's central thematic organisation around reading, 
writing and the validity of a sociological poetics; argues that this is nothing to get very 
"passionate" about; and anecdotalises his own chastening undergraduate experience at the 
University of Leeds in 1963, 'confessing to Alan Dawe [of the "two sociologies" fame] that I both 
read and wrote poetry. His immediate observation was that those practices must be abandoned if I 
was to become a proper sociologist! It took me thirty years to recover from those instructions' 
(1997, unpaginated: forthcoming). 
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laudatory assessment of Tiryakian: he sees sociologists as principally essayists, and 
proposes 'that sociological metrology adopt as its standard unit the Merton, to be 
denoted by the symbol Mt' claiming that adopting the Mt as a standard for 
sociological writing would provide a common basis for the internationalization of 
sociology, similar to...the metric system' (1991: 507). 
As final exhibit of Merton's 'metrology', consider two of his own works: 1995's 
monograph on 'The Thomas Theorem and the Matthew Effect', not only derived from 
the exegesis of a single proposition, but composed in the genre of belles-lettrism; and 
On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript, in its entirety a philologico-
hermeneutic tracking of a singular turn of phrase, largely unintelligible to those 
unfamiliar with Sterne's original novel, the basis for a sub-sociology of aphorism 
(OTSOGgery), and, according to Merton himself in a letter of February 1988 to 
Stephen Jay Gould, the book that ranks, among its author monumental corpus, as his 
own 'favourite, prodigal brainchild' (Gould, 1990: 45). 
Similarly, the stated opposition to textuality backed up by the authority of the 
ASA Presidential Addresses cited earlier are by no means the whole story or the last 
word, as Huber's autobiographical anecdote in her own term of office makes clear 
when saying that, on '[e]ntering graduate school in the 1960s, I chose sociology 
because it examined societal constraints on individual behaviour. Perhaps I wanted 
to know why I had been a housewife for fourteen years when I liked books better 
than housework' ([PA] 1990: 2). Moreover, assumption of the ASA presidency may of 
itself tend towards a hard-line attitude to matters textual, if the ambivalence in 
Howard P. Becker's two alternative positions (pre- and post-term of office) are 
indicative: in his address, Becker maintained 'that as a sociological theorist I have 
little interest in fictions of any sort...[t]here is no substitute for remaining in close 
touch with the empirical evidence, with "the damned facts" ' ([RA] 1960: 809). Yet 
twenty years prior to this claim, the same author asserted that' "[c]ommon sense" to 
the contrary, it seems to me that the scientist in a very real sense operates with 
fictions - or, if that term is unpalatable, with the planned modifications or 
simplifications of the "empirically given", ie, of the configurations he first 
perceives. The working fiction of the scientist - any scientist - is a construct...' 
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(Howard P. Becker, 1940: 53) 
Perhaps no school of sociological thought has based itself more on the practices of 
all scientists - natural and social - nor stressed the social construction of supposedly 
"natural" and "unified" scientific methodologies as much as the loose 
amalgamation of sociologists grouped as adherents of Actor-Network Theory (AKA 
the [S]ociology of [S]cientific [K]nowledge): a key plank in the SSK platform is 
highlighted by Atkinson when citing the opinion of Law & Williams (1982) that 
the authors of scientific papers 'are organizing bits and pieces' (1990: 43). Also 
drawing on Law in discussing the concept of translation in actor-network theory, 
White explains that 
'Among the resources which scientists, or any producers of knowledge can deploy in 
the agonistic construction of networks, one is both particularly potent in imposing a 
structure on the world and particularly amenable to analysis: "...the text is the key 
weapon.. .First it is durable and extremely transportable. Second, it is reproducible 
and thus highly diffusible. But third, and this is perhaps the most important 
point, it displays its structure in a complex, "synchronic translation of the 
endlessly heterogeneous." There they all lie, the bits and pieces, in the same place 
at the same time, linked together on a sheet of paper..." [Law, 1986: 49]. Those 
"bits and pieces" include texts by other writers, marshalled, translated, for the 
purpose at hand. Every time an article or book is invoked, it is modified in some 
sense to support the text in which it is cited. It is not so much that citation or 
quotation reveals the "influence" of the cited authors, as that these writers are in 
part created through being cited and then woven into the network being 
established. This "context of citation" then becomes an arena of "Byzantine 
political schemes", with allies enrolled and opponents discredited. Strategies of 
citation thus carry certain risks. If opponents can show that the references 
marshalled in support of an argument are irrelevant, or can even be used to argue 
the opposite, the original argument is thereby weakened. It is this political sense 
of reading and writing which makes the notion of translation sociological to the 
core. Through a tracing of enrolments in any field, or of the networks created by 
citation and counter-citation, the construction of the social within that field 
becomes visible' (R. White, 1995: 4-5, emphases in the original[s]). 
In response to the mooted sharp divide between journalism and sociology, neither 
Short's implied concerns about the fuzziness of a sociology/popular press divide 
(above), nor Stinchcombe's charge of non-empiricism among foundational symbolic 
interactionists, overly concerned the relevant theorists themselves. Park 
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maintained that according to his 'earliest conception of a sociologist he was to be a 
kind of super-reporter, like the men who write for Fortune. He was to report a little 
more accurately, and in a matter a little more detached than the average, what my 
friend Ford called the "Big News", this defined as the 'long-time trends which 
recorded what is actually going on rather than what, on the surface of things, 
merely seems to be going on' (Park, 1950: ix); Sanderson celebrated the 'profound 
influence on the leaders of American thought' that sociology had in the first half of 
the 20th century, asserting that this 'has been not alone through the direct and 
indirect effect of teaching thousands of college students but by educating the general 
public through the press in the significance of the role of groups in modem society' 
(1943: 3); and Cooley's milestone work in establishing the basis of the interactionist 
perspective importantly linked writing to socio-psychological as well as societal 
development: 
'It is the social function of writing, by giving ideas a lasting record, to make 
possible a more certain, continuous and diversified growth of the human mind. It 
does for the race very much does for the individual. When a student has a good 
thought he writes it down, so that it may be recalled at will and made the 
starting-point for a better thought in the same direction; and so mankind at large 
records and cherishes its insights [...] If writing, by giving thought permanence, 
brought in the earlier civilization, printing, by giving it diffusion opened the doors 
of the modern world' (Cooley, [1909]1962: 72, 74). 
Surprisingly similar avowals are to be found in the works of the leading lights of a 
more structural macro-level theoretical persuasion - thus Parsons as leading 
functionalist claims that'Written language, the focus of the development out of 
primitiveness, increases differentiation between the social and cultural systems and 
extends the control of the latter. The symbolic contents of a culture can, with 
writing, be embodied in forms independent of concrete interaction contexts. This 
makes possible wider cultural diffusion, both in space (eg, relative to populations) 
and in time' (Parsons, 1977: 12, emphasis in the original). Luhmann, as an inheritor 
of the systems-theoretic perspective, similarly notes that in the course of evolution 
'there emerged a domain that prepared the way for solitary, interaction-free, 
but still societal behaviour and that has had far-reaching societal and 
semantic repercussions: the domain of reading and writing. The invention of 
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writing gave solitary social action the chance to be societal action, to be 
communication. One could then contribute to the reproduction of society even if 
no one else was present...Writing and printing make it possible to withdraw 
from interaction systems and nevertheless to communicate with far-reaching 
societal consequences' (Luhmann, [1984] 1995: 427) 
Elias' very different historico-sociological approach similarly privileges 
literature: at the macro-level, he sees increasing production and consumption of books 
as an indicator of the 'transformation and regulation of drives', a reliable indicator 
of an advance ('spurt') in the civilizing process. At the micro-level, too, this 
attitudinal change is historically 'moulded. ..in accordance with the network of 
dependencies that extend throughout a human life. One might think, for example, of 
the moulding of the facial muscles and thus of facial expression during a person's 
lifetime, or of the formation of reading or writing centres in the brain' (Elias, [1939] 
1982: 275, 276). 
The further back in time one goes and the more significant the theorist, the less 
opposition one finds in relation to aspects of textuality. In consideration of 
sociology's "pre"-founders, Condorcet's own 18th-century tilt at the evolutionary 
perspective, his Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, 
posits in 10 chapters the 'ten epochs or stages through which mankind has passed', 
from tribal unity to the 'future progress of the human mind'. Two later commentaries 
independently evaluate Condorcet's work, Bierstedt (in Bottomore & Nisbet, 1978: 
20) characterising the whole as 'an arbitrary arrangement of cultural conditions 
presented as a fictitious history of a fictitious people'; and from the same collection, 
speaking of content rather than style, Bock (1978: 53-4) notes Condorcet's special 
emphasis on the 'changes that have been brought into the world by the invention of 
printing. It has introduced into society a new force, the force of public opinion, which 
is especially able to protect the truth against error. "We now have a tribunal whose 
scrutiny it is difficult to elude, and whose verdict it is impossible to evade" '. Comte 
also stresses the centrality of printing in his own Baconian Law of the 3 stages (1893, 
orig 1830-42: 319-20): unlike the dismissal of Condorcet's vision by later critics, the 
1938 ASA Presidential Address of Faris maintains, with important reservations, 
that for all its problems, much in Comte's "positive philosophy" - primarily his 
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stress on the evolution of writing systems - remains retrievable. At the outset of the 
twentieth century, Tarde was similarly asserting the centrality of reading, writing 
and print in history as a causal factor in the Renaissance and the foundations of 
German Protestantism (Tarde, 1903 [orig. 1890]: 364; fuller citation of this passage in 
Chapter 5). 
In his commentary on the work of Elias, Chartier (1997: 107-08 ) made special 
mention of the degree to which the former's entire project rested on the historical 
documents - etiquette manuals - which he deployed. An earlier analysis by Sydney 
and Beatrice Webb more generally claimed documents - and written commentary on 
documents by researchers (notes or fiches)- as 'an indispensable instrument in the 
technique of sociological enquiry... For a highly elaborated and skilled process of 
"making notes", peculiar to this particular science, besides its obvious utility in 
recording observations which could otherwise be forgotten, is, in sociology, actually 
an instrument of discovery'. This is because the 
'social investigator's subject-matter, unlike the subject-matter of his fellow-
workers in other sciences, is an entity endowed with quite peculiar "language and 
writing habits"; habits yielding rich deposits of records about past and 
contemporary events which would be unobtainable by the methods of personal 
observation and statistical measurement [...] it is only the documents, the writings 
secreted for the purpose of action, that yield authoritative evidence of the facts 
about the constitution and the activities of the social institutions to be studied. 
Hence the first question must be: where are the documents of the organisation, and 
how can I get at them? If the documents are inaccessible, the subject is 
impracticable' (1932: 83, 98, 105-6). 
Scott endorses this view, noting that the 'handling of documentary sources - 
government papers, diaries, newspapers and so on - is widely seen as the hallmark of 
the professional historian, whereas the sociologist has generally been identified 
with the use of questionnaires and interview techniques' and further avers that 
fact, documentary investigation was the main research tool of the classical 
sociologists: Marx made extensive use of the reports of the factory inspectors, 
Weber utilised religious tracts and pamphlets, and Durkheim employed official 
statistics on suicide. The bulk of the historical and comparative work that is 
undertaken in contemporary sociology involves the use of documentary materials, 
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as does much work on contemporary societies. But textbooks on research methods 
have generally failed to recognise this and have given most of their space to 
discussions of questionnaires, interviews and participant observation' (Scott, 
1990: 1). 
The earlier work of Nisbet is of special relevance here. While opposing views of 
raw statistical data - censuses, demographic surveys and other such documents - as 
initiators of analysis (disparaged as 'the stork-story of science'), he posits a deeper 
level of literature-as-inspiration at work in the minds and procedures of the 
sociological tradition's most important pioneers. Taking the works of Tocqueville, 
Weber, Simmel, Thennies and Durkheim as the basis of the unit-ideas in sociology, 
he characterises these neither as springing from nor addressing finite problems 
solvable by the methods of logico-empirical analysis, but as something akin to 
artistic visions. The mooted sources of Durkheim's 'controlling idea' are thus not 
derived 'from a preliminary examination of the vital registers of Europe', for the 
'idea, the plot, and the conclusion of Suicide were well in his mind before he 
examined the registers'. Rather, Nisbet thinks that it originates in other sources - 
all of which are directly exegetical, or come from particular life-experiences, 
themselves mediated by texts: 
'He might have got it from reading Tocqueville, who could certainly have got 
it from Lamennais who could have got it from BonaId or Chateaubriand. Or, it 
could have come from personal experience - from a remembered fragment of the  
Talmud from an intuition born of personal loneliness and marginality, a scrap 
of experience in Paris. Who can be sure? But one thing is certain. The creative 
blend of ideas behind Suicide - a blend from which we still draw in our 
scientific labours - was reached in ways more akin to those of the artist than to 
those of the data processor, the logician, or the technologist. It is not different 
with the ideas and perspectives of Simmel...' (1963: 156-7, underlining added). 
2.9: Writing: The Classical Legacy  
Taking Nisbet's observation above as cue, this section centres on those Anthony 
Giddens considers the 'holy trinity' of sociology: Durkheim, Weber and Marx. This 
importance of this "triumvirate" to the discipline is a Widely- acknowledged 
truism: hooking it specifically to Giddens would seem unnecessary, were it not for 
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the fact that, in Clegg's analysis of Giddens' international professional reputation 
(what Clegg calls the 'Giddens phenomenon'), pride of place in the foundation of 
Giddens' own career is given to his treatment of the founders, which established 
him 'in British sociology as the prime broker of the classics and their translation 
into contemporary concerns' (1992: 578-82). 
2.9.1: Durkheim(-ianism) 
'...for Durkheim, society is a kind of writing that only he can read. Here, 
knowledge is already written in practices, but not yet enlightened. Science will be 
the mirror that makes it readable' (de Certeau, 1984: 68). 
Durkheim is considered as so thoroughgoingly (and self-descriptively) empiricist 
that to consider him as an ancestor of the social fiction as much as the social fact 
borders on the heretical. Yet such a view, drawing directly from Durkheim, informs 
the work of both Salazar (1993), who sees sociology as a 'science' of rhetoric and 
fable, and Knorr-Cetina, who, taking the Durkheim/Mauss-authored Primitive 
Classifications as her starting point, claims that succeeding constructionist studies 
suggest 
'the pervasiveness and relevance of fictionality as a routine aspect of social life. 
Here we should acknowledge the excess meaning constructionist studies have 
unearthed in connection with their distrust in facts, objectivity and meaning. Yet 
we should recognise this excess meaning not as a threat to scientific procedure, or an 
expedient of the dissolution of all order into contingency, but as a routine feature of 
the social world. Suppose we stand, so to speak, the constructionist message on its 
head and consider its negative findings as worthy of analysis. If science, and 
modern institutions in general, do not run on facts, this is no reason for despair and 
resignation - it is rather cause to investigate the ways in which these institutions, 
if they do not run on facts, run on fictions' (1994: 5, emphases in the original). 
More directly and self-evidently, both Overington's rhetorical reading of Suicide - 
that 'moral discourse' disguised as a 'pearl of positive science' (1981: 448) - and 
Jones' re-examination of The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life highlight that 
neither were built on "real-world" analysis: the first obviously because the primary 
data source is dead, leaving Durkheim to build his theorising on coroner's records 
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(the basis of Douglas' seminal critique of 1967); the second, as Durkheim 
acknowledged, resting largely on the 'marriage' of archival texts on totemism to the 
fieldwork on Central Australian aboriginal tribes carried out by earlier researchers, 
notably Spencer & Gillen (1899; 1904). Similar revisions (eg Roche's 1976 study of 
the Rules of Sociological Method, claiming sociology, as presented therein, as a 
reading procedure) tally with Mulkay's position, where, in relating his case study 
of the discourses of Nobel laureates to Durkheim's stress on ceremonial solidarity, 
he concludes that 
'[t]he Nobel ceremony is cohesive in so far as much wider social groupings are 
enabled to share in the honour by recipients' heavy reliance on laudatory 
reassignment, which itself seems to be generated by certain basic procedures of 
discourse-construction. However, we must not mistake this apparent 
cohesiveness or "social solidarity", along traditional Durkheimian lines, as an 
external and constraining social phenomenon... It is, rather, a textual 
phenomenon..., a facet or reading of participants' context-dependent 
interpretative procedures..., and is not necessarily reproduced in any 
interpretative work carried out by participants in any other contexts of 
discourse. Although I have just described "cohesiveness" or "social 
integration" as a textual phenomenon, I do not mean to imply thereby that it is 
separate from or independent of a distinct realm of "social action". Rather, I 
am suggesting that the textual phenomena examined above, the regularities in 
discourse which have been described and documented in detail, are best seen as 
constitutive of social action. In studying the procedures which participants use 
to organize their discourse, we are revealing how they construct social action 
and, indeed, social structure' (Mulkay, 1984: 547, emphases in the original). 
2.9.2: Weber 
Although Weber's own most direct formal examination of the effects of writing on 
social formation is restricted to his 1915 study of The Chinese Literati (in Gerth & 
Mills, 1977: 416-44) - a highly-localised instance constituting a minuscule portion of 
his overall corpus - later exegeses of Weber point out the degree to which aspects of 
writing lay at the base of his major works. Thus for Eisenstein, the 'appearance of 
the Protestant ethic, a spirit of capitalism, a middle-class ethos, new concepts of 
the family and the child, educational reforms, and a bureaucratic officialdom all 
owed much to multiple, complex interactions introduced by typography' (Eisenstein, 
1968: 45). 
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This lays out the key elements of the fundamental Weberian sociological agenda in 
one sentence, and simultaneously relates it to the technology of print. His own lack 
of direct or specific emphasis on reading and writing as technologies of 
rationalisation in the developing West could therefore be seen as somewhat 
puzzling in light of Darnton's micro-analytic studies of reading behaviour in post-
Reformation Europe, which lend empirical support 'to Weber's "de-mystification of 
the world" ' (1991: 165). A part-solution to this puzzle is that, like Elias after him, 
Weber's analysis is derived from documentary sources, notably the diaries of the 
Calvinist worthies in the Protestant Ethic thesis. From another angle: in rightly 
centring his overview of bureaucracy on Weber's own landmark ideal-type analysis, 
Albrow ensures that the reader understands both topic-area and the institution 
itself to be an intrinsically text-built issue. He cites the literal meaning of the word 
(derived from writing-desk, and/or the room or office in which writing occurs, 
crossed with the suffix '-cracy' for rule: hence, rule by the office or officials) and the 
earliest negative receptions of the phenomena which paved the way for and 
inspired Weber's own very different approach - Stein's 1821 complaint, that '[w]e 
are ruled by buralists...with a knowledge of books, hence not living in the real 
world, but one of letters...They draw their salaries from the exchequer and write, 
write, write,...and they bring up their children to be equally usable writing 
machines' and similarly, the relevant Brockhaus encyclopaedia entry of 1819, 
stressing the inordinate power of bureaucracy defined as the 'modern form of 
administration (which) executes with the pen everything which previously would 
have been done by word of mouth.. .many pens are set in motion... (and bureaucracy) 
becomes increasingly dangerous as the previous custom of conducting business through 
collegia falls into disuse' (both cited in Albrow, 1970: 19, 28). 
But in concentrating on the spirit of capitalism and the inexorability of the 
rational, Weber is less concerned to investigate a mechanism, more to convey a mood: 
hence his favoured methodology, and his (implicit or explicit) influence on key 
novelists of the period, critical literature on earlier authors, and later writers. 
Watt, in his analysis of Defoe's seminal Robinson Crusoe (1964: 60-92) relates both 
the message of that work and its author's intentions to 'much that sounds like the 
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formulations of Weber [...] Having asserted an autobiographical meaning for his 
story, Defoe goes on to consider the problem of solitude. His discussion is an 
interesting illustration of Weber's view of the effects of Calvinism' (1964: 73, 90). 
Hoggart also invokes Weber when placing his own work at - and less particularly 
staking out - a mid-point between literature/literary criticism and sociology when 
claiming that 'a writer's 'imaginative power' is equivalent to the social-scientist's 
framing of hypotheses; 'or the other way round, the social scientist's capacity to 
find hypotheses is decided by his imaginative power'. The 'literary imagination at 
work on a society and the social scientific mind "making sense" of its material' are 
equivalent, for 'are not the imaginations of the two at their best close to each other? 
I have to say "at their best" because it seems obvious that not all of us are as quick at 
ordering, at finding "significant detail", as others. Instead of "significant detail" 
there I almost wrote "ideal type" ' (Hoggart, 1973: 249). 
Moving from subject matter to composition, Goldman devotes two book-length 
treatments (1988; 1992) to the affinities between Weber and Thomas Mann, prefacing 
the first with Mann's own acknowledgement of the tie (1988: 11). For Goldman, and 
contra the 'stereotype of the empirical social scientist...Weber deploys a 
methodology of "ideal types" that he himself calls a fiction. This image is not 
simply a metaphor, nor is it to be taken lightly, for in putting aside a "copy" theory 
of truth, Weber raises important questions about the means available for grasping 
the nature of existing forms of reality' (1988: 8). This theme is reinforced in the later 
volume: 
'Interestingly, Weber's and Mann's works drew on textual strategies borrowed 
from what would normally be considered the domain of the other. Weber 
constructed a "fictional" or mythic subject of history and social theory, the 
Occidental personality, rooted in the methodological fictionalism of ideal 
types...later deployed to rescue and redeem both a self and a social world in 
crisis [...] In fact, both Weber and Mann find both personal redemption and 
redemption of the nation through the use of social theory combined with 
fictions or models of the subject...motivated by World War I, and despite their 
historical understanding, both Weber and Mann believed that self and world 
could be put back on track again only through the redeployment of these same 
fictions, revitalised for a secular and postbourgeois world' (1992: 30, 31). 
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This kind of approach to Weber's work, and the kind of "Weber" that emerges, is 
controversial. Green's 1988 attempt to consider sociological theory in terms of 
literary method, using as case studies Weber's Economy and Society and The 
Philosophy of Money by Simmel, was critiqued by Schroeter (1990), who also more 
roundly passed judgement on the unsuitability of viewing such sociological work 
through a deconstructivist literary-theoretical lens. Schroeter's many criticisms 
rests in part on Green's use of the analysed texts in translation - a salient point, but 
one that if followed to its logical conclusion renders much sociology inaccessible to 
(and immune to textual examination by) those not conversant in the mother-tongue of 
the theorist. The practical implications of this as a prerequisite of doing sociology 
aside, Schroeter's wider critique is of the relevance of deconstructionist-style 
analysis in the discipline generally, particularly in light of his claim that it 
'would be ironic if literary theory were to gain a foothold within sociology just as it 
was losing ground elsewhere' (1990: 93; c/f section 2.6 above). But the more cogent 
issue of translation of Weber in particular, in terms of how many 'Webers' are on 
offer and the possibility of determining which is "authentic", is ongoing (Adatto & 
Cole, 1981). It has already emerged with particular force in assessments of Weber's 
Pan-Germanic political writings (at 2.3 above) - and more generally, fine-grained 
textual analysis constitutes a prime element of Weber's own project and a prime 
resource in clarifying if not ultimately resolving Weber's core insights and their 
application, and should not be too hastily ruled out of court. 
2.9.3:Marxism (and neo-Marxism). 
If Durkheimian textuality often has to be derived from "underneath" his work (and 
arguably against his stated intent), and the centrality of reading/writing to Weber 
is largely dependent on later exegetical treatments, translations and particular 
interpretations of his literary corpus, the connection between Marxism and the 
textual turn is much more direct. Marx's house has many mansions, and to a large 
extent - although often obscured by vulgar apprehensions of the original 
base/superstructure model, and claims to the contrary (eg, Adorno, 1974: 87) - all are 
built in, on and by textuality. Baxandall's entry on "literature" in the Dictionary of 
Marxist Thought reveals the young Marx's 'first intention was to be a poet of 
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incandescent fantasy and withering social criticism, like his friends E. T. A. 
Hoffman, Heinreich Heine and F. Freiligrath' (1983: 284): more material is the very 
method employed by Marx in constructing his philosophy and political economy, 
the long days and nights in the British Museum's reading room, and the degree to 
which the day-to-day survival of the Marx family relied on his intermittent 
journalism (Marx/Padover, 1979); often overlooked is that the classical first 
sentence of the first paragraph on the first page of the Communist Manifesto - 'The 
history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles' - is 
accompanied by Engels' specifying footnote: 'that is, all written history...', and from 
the same tract, the utopian prediction of 'as in material, so also in intellectual 
production. The intellectual creations of individual nations have become common 
property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more 
impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a 
world literature' (1888/1982: 79, emphasis in the original; 84). 
In terms of recognisably 'real-world' text-event(s) conjunctions, historian A. J. P. 
Taylor also notes Marx's expertise in claiming to speak for a universal proletariat 
and a typified fraction of this group, the Communist League in London, which in 
actuality 'had seven members, all German exiles and not one of them an industrial 
worker' (1980: 128-9). The First International of 1864 was largely a fictive entity 
existing in the rolls of membership, Engels regularly representing "Spain", Marx 
often the delegate for New York even though 'he had never been to America and no 
one there had sent him any authority' (1980: 129-30). The Marxian International 
and its internecine competitor, the anarchist-led version, engaged in an ongoing 
game of mythical genesis and constitution throughout the latter years of the 
nineteenth century - '[t]he more [Marx and Engels] manufactured non-existent 
branches, the faster Bakunin outstripped them' (1980: 132). Although the flesh-
and-blood active membership of the International was small and its chances of 
success consequently remote in the event of actual physical confrontation with the 
forces of order arrayed against it, its rhetorical influence nevertheless created 
enough consternation to establish counter-initiatives (such as the League of the 
Three Emperors in 1873) to nullify the threat of revolution. 
76. 
Relative to "literature proper", a stream of more-purely Marxist literary and 
aesthetic theory, beginning either side of the penultimate fin-de-siecle with the 
work of Mehring in 1893 and Plekhanov in 1912, flowed through mid-century in the 
writings of Lukacs and Bakhtin on the novel (Brennan, in Bhabha, 1995: 54-55), and 
continues, via Lucien Goldmann's genetically-structuralist homologies and 
Lowenthal's Frankfurt School literary criticism, with Jameson's 'political 
unconscious' (1971), Eagleton's notion of texts as inherently and centrally 'ideology-
producing', (1976), Raymond Williams' cultural materialism' (1977), and Berman's 
(1988) work on the modern metropolis as filtered through the sensibilities of 
Goethe, Baudelaire, and the Russian "school" of Romantic Realism (Fanger, 1967). 
In first-order artistic production as opposed to secondary literary critique, Marxism's 
central concern with writing is evident in projects as various as the existential-
Marxist plays, novels and essays of Sartre, or the didactic poems and epic-theatre 
dramaturgy of Brecht. 
The centrality of writing in Marxist thought is even more clearly demonstrable 
when considering the work of two leading theorists who each adopt, on principle, a 
strategy of refusal, a way of working that militates against any notions of divorcing 
the writer's life from his/her work, or authorial ownership of product under 
capitalist principles of intellectual property. First, the work of Gramsci: contrasting 
'Popper's "knowledge without a human subject" and his notion of logic which 
operates independently of human volition' to Gramsci's thought, US-educational 
theorist Henry Giroux sees the Italian Marxist's writings as premised on the 
interdependence of knowledge as based on human interests. Moreover, 
'Gramsci's position cannot be construed as an argument for the type of relativism 
enshrined by the early proponents of the new sociology of education and rightly 
criticised...Nor can it be used to support Popper's view of knowledge with its 
underlying support of technocratic organizational forms designed "so that 
objective, ahistorical and abstract knowledge may be employed in controlling 
historical events". Gramsci was very clear about surrendering human action and 
social practice to projections based on statistical laws and models of objectivity 
and prediction. He argued that such a view not only reinforced passivity among 
the masses, it also supported the false notion that the future could be predicted 
through a mechanical reading of the past' (1988: 199, emphasis in the original). 
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In more detail and turning to Gramsci's own compositional practices, Arshi Pipa's 
1983 monograph maintains that the 'very milieu in which Gramsci wrote made it 
impossible for him to write literary criticism. Whereas literary critics write 
articles and books, Gramsci wrote "notes", "little notes", "remarks" ("note", 
"noterelle", "appunti"). Notes and remarks are usually written in the margin of a 
book or in a notebook. Gramsci was a writer of notebooks, not books' (1983:86, 
underline added). Pipa puts this down in part to the exigencies of Gramsci's 
imprisonment, but more tellingly to three other factors: the instantiation of his 
distinction between revolutionary class-based 'organic' and ruler-serving 
'traditional' intellectuals; his quadruply-marginalised position in the Italian 
literary, academic and political world of his time (Sardinian, anti-Fascist, 
physically deformed, and proletarian); and a concern 'to remain a reader, thus 
associating himself with the public at large that reads but does not 
write...Gramsci's merit has been to orient Italian criticism towards looking at 
literature from the reader's viewpoint, thus substituting the sociology of literature 
for traditional literary criticism' (Pipa, 1983: 87). 
Even more striking is the strategy of refusal adopted by Walter Benjamin, whose 
oft-confirmed aversion to the "official" historical record' only scratches the 
surface of his principled rejection of capitalist textuality. Four key essays wring 
variants on the same substantive theme: 'The Author as Producer' (1986: 220-38) 
23 'There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. 
And just as such a document is not free of barbarism, barbarism also taints the manner in which it 
was transmitted from one owner to another. A historical materialist therefore dissociates himself 
from it as far as possible. He regards it as his task to brush history against the grain' (Benjamin, 
1969: 256-7; also cited in Kellner, 1992: np; Milner 1996: 15). In the blackest of black ironies, 
documents figure heavily as causal factors in the author's own death. Arendt supplies details of 
Benjamin's suicide in late 1940 on the Franco-Spanish border: his Paris apartment and its 
contents - including his library and manuscripts - confiscated by the Nazis, Benjamin fled Vichy 
France. Although in possession of a Marseilles-issued US emergency visa and Spanish transit 
visa, at the time of his border arrival he lacked the necessary French exit visa, and usage of the 
other 2 legal documents of passage had been embargoed in deference to the Gestapo on the 
previous day: '[o]ne day earlier Benjamin would have got through without any trouble; one day 
later the people in Marseilles would have known that for the time being it was impossible to pass 
through Spain. Only on that particular day was the catastrophe possible' ( Introduction to 
Benjamin, 1969: 18). The circumstances of Benjamin's death also resonate with an observation by 
Blaise Pascal, another writer of cited fragments with his own selective "non-reading" strategy 
(1966: 355-6), who in the 60th meditation of his seventeenth-century Pensees states that It]hree 
degrees of latitude upset the whole of jurisprudence and one meridian determines what is true...lt 
is a funny sort of justice whose limits are marked by a river; true on this side of the Pyrenees, false • 
on the other' (1966: 46). 
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presents the ideal writer as politico-social specific intellectual with Brecht, 
Tretiakov and the Dada authors as examples; in 'Unpacking my Library' (1969: 59- 
67), Benjamin's collection of books is valued by him not for any material worth or 
intrinsic knowledge-content - most remain unread - but as touchstones of the personal 
emotions experienced in their acquisition; 'The Storyteller' (1969: 83-109) presents a 
mini-oral/literate divide in the wake of WWI, which paralyses the ability of the 
spoken to relate life first-hand and leads to the primacy of the written as an account 
of the lived unspeakable; and the prescient 'Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction', with its contrast between Fascist aestheticisation of politics leading 
to war, and Communist politicisation of art, leading to mass consciousness. In terms 
of method, Benjamin's very mode of literary composition - "drilling", or the 
assemblage of work only deploying the original fragments - shows his distance from 
dominant conceptions of authorship (Arendt, 'Introduction' to Benjamin, 1969: 47-48). 
The importance of the written is also central to Althusser's very different project - 
itself largely indebted also to Gramsci's earlier concept of hegemony, Greimas and 
the French structuralist tenet of author-effacement, and Bachelard's aesthetic-
poetical idea of the epistemological break - of establishing a thoroughgoingly 
scientific Structu.ral Marxism. At the foundation of such a project is a specific 
methodological Reading of Capital: for 
'only since Marx have we had to begin to suspect what, in theory at least, reading 
and hence writing means (veut dire). It is certainly no accident that we have been 
able to reduce.. .Capital, to the explicit innocence of a reading. For the Young Marx, 
to know the,essence of things, the essence of the historical human world,... was 
simply to read (lesen, herauslesen) in black and white the presence of the 
"abstract" essence in the transparency of its "concrete" existence... [to "do" science,] 
to treat nature or reality as a Book, in which, according to Galileo, is spoken the 
silent discourse of a language whose "characters are triangles, circles and other 
geometrical figures", it was necessary to have a certain idea of reading which 
makes a written discourse the immediate transparency of the true, and the real the 
discourse of a voice [...] If I stop here, before a threshold we shall still have to 
cross, allow me to recall that it is the peculiarity of scientific discourse to be 
written; and that it therefore poses us the question of the form of its writing . The 
reader will probably remember that we began with its reading...' (Althusser [& 
Balibad 1990 [orig. 1968]: 14, 15-16, 69, emphases in the original). 
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Track the progress over time and space, through the Baudelairean capital-of-the-
nineteenth-century Paris, of another of Benjamin's (re)creations (1986:156-58) - the 
fliineur - and encounter his mid-20th-century Parisian counterpart in the figure of 
the deriviste, the strolling player-to-be in the imaginings and praxis of the 
members of the short-lived (1957-72) neo-Marxist Situationist International (SI: for 
general accounts of the movement from both its active membership and outside 
commentators, see Debord, 1970; Knabb, 1981; Fields & Best, in Gorman, 1985: 384-87; 
Marcus, 1989; Wollen et al, 1991). According to Ball, the programmatic SI strategy of 
disrupting capitalist structures and bourgeois attitudes - the notorious detournement 
- is a text-derived 
'reterritorialization of the object. With verbal texts, the detourniste gets 
underway by taking an overdetermined text (a cartoon, a bestseller) and 
subjecting it to a systematic misreading. This reinscription of texts was a 
favourite situationist pastime...a kind of reading procedure. In this sense, the 
text is any object whose use has been prescribed for it (it carries a reading that is 
foreclosed). Detournement would be the intentional disarticulation of the text 
and its rearticulation elsewhere in a new set of reading conditions. Irony would 
be a main feature of this practice, insofar as the text is submitted to a double 
reading, first in its sanctioned context (the prescribed use of the text) and next to 
a pirate reading that contradicts the first. Finally, this overall business would 
have to be distinguished from the related practice of (academic) deconstruction, 
which shatters the text as an intellectual exercise and offers the alternative 
pleasure of dispersing meaning through a gridwork of adjacent discourses' (1987: 
34). 
This 'reinscription of texts' as simultaneously eye-opening dispeller of false 
consciousness and interventionist procedure resonates with different tributaries of 
Marxist thought. The Western Marxism of Adorn° & Horkheimer's austere Dialectic 
of Enlightenment referred to the hidden imperative of all branches of the 'culture 
industry' - even cartoons - in hammering 'into every brain the old lesson that 
continuous friction, the breaking down of all individual resistance, is the condition of 
life in this [ie, modern late-capitalist] society' (1986 [orig 1944]: 138): Disney's 
Donald Duck is particularly singled out as exemplary, and from an entirely different 
quarter, Dorfman & Mattelart's underground Chilean classic, Pato Leer al Pato 
Donald (translated as How to Read Donald Duck, 1975) applied the techniques of 
close reading and content analysis to the export of North American 'imperial 
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ideologies' into receptive 3rd-World locales. 
2.10 Warrants for a Sociography of Reading & Writing. 
The foregoing review suggests a number of justifications for a philological approach - 
or what I would term a "sociography" - as necessary to mainstream sociology, and as 
a way of keeping pace with the new discursive elements flowing into adjacent 
disciplines. It still, however, somewhat begs the question as to what is at stake 
beyond "in-house" concerns about cross-disciplinary alignment, potential intra-
disciplinary settlement of border disputes about the 'stuff' of sociology, or even the 
issues attending a focus on continual research publication rife amongst - and 
typically viewed as not extending much beyond - career academics. Were these the 
sole or even the central criteria for casting textuality as fundamental within and 
amenable to a specifically sociological treatment, any resulting outcomes might at 
best have applications limited to a scholarly community, at worst constitute an 
exercise in mere pedantry. 
A broader and more significant payoff involves the capacity of such a sociography to 
tackle some of the abiding problematics that have persistently dogged previous 
attempts at sorting out and solving reading/writing issues. This is particularly 
evident within the textuality-in-action domain of literacy. The abiding 
problematics of that field can be, for convenience and in the interests of parsimony, 
subsumed under four headings - ideological, definitional, statistical, and contextual. 
In typical non-sociological treatments, each interacts with and merges 
imperceptibly into the other, tending to create one large (and hence relatively 
intractable) social problem, rather than a series of analytically-separable (and 
potentially more practicably manageable) dimensions: moreover, having the 
resultant "big problem" couched inside the sense of "crisis" alluded to previously 
imparts a sense of urgency too often inimical to solid, sober and disinterested 
research. 
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With all these issues sociology - itself habitually crisis-ridden (see note 4) - is in 
principle methodologically equipped and professionally required to deal." 
2.11: The Essential Rationale. 
While these foregoing warrants - tracking aspects of an inherently dynamic field 
characterised by =resolved debate, the argument for academic relevance, the 
exposure of a hidden factor in a discipline's constitution, the tapping into areas of 
public concern and policy-making - could be considered sufficient justification for a 
large-scale sociological treatment in themselves, there is a deeper level of 
legitimacy at work in this thesis. As indicated in the Introduction, it rests on the 
central argument that we are what texts determine us to be. 
The writing that we manufacture and distribute, the manifold reading of the 
writings produced by others pertinent to both our worldview and identity, constitute 
a "reality" that - for all the artifice of its construction - becomes over time more 
potent than the still-extant but non-textual "real". The world and its inhabitants 
not connected to or formed by writing is gradually destroyed, depleted, diminished 
or dominated by the world-as-text in which we dwell. The "we" here (and its 
adjunctive "our" and "us") is a universal, not confined to either academia and its 
publish-or-perish ethos, or the professional writer in any other occupational field: 
"publish or perish", if the first part of that term is broadened to describe all forms of 
textual mark-making and the second is narrowed to a literal (ie, non-metaphorical) 
form of perishing - social and sometimes actual (see note 23 above) death - is a 
24 ..although with regard to literacy, as with other facets of textuality it has yet to fully engage 
with the task: Redfield's 30-year-old statement, that the 'sociology of literacy has not yet been 
written' (1967: 36) still tends to hold true; most basic sociological encyclopaedias and 
dictionaries (eg, Theodorson, 1969; Martin, 1970; Dushkin Publishing Group, 1974; Mitchell, 
1975; Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1988) contain no entries under this heading; and surveying 
the cumulative indexes of relevant entries in Sociological Abstracts, the International Sociological 
Association's in-house reference journal, confirms the scant treatment of the subject within the 
discipline. Under the headings of 'literacy' and 'literacy programs are listed a mere 353 items 
between 1953 (the first year of publication) and the first half of 1995. Of these, 242 appear 
between 1980 and 1995; in only 12 years of the 42-year span are there more than 10 references to 
the subject (15 in 1978; 15 in 1982; 13 in 1984; 11 in 1985; 17 in 1987; 18 in 1993), in 5 of these 
more than 20 (27 in 1989; 27 in 1990; 21 in 1991; 23 in 1992; and 23 in 1995) and in only one 
year (32 in 1994) more than 30. With one exception (in 1955), between 1953 and 1959 there are 
no listings under 'literacy' at all. Moreover, a cursory overview of the extant entries shows that 
most contributions are to be found in the journals of non-sociological academic disciplines and 
are not written by accredited sociologists. 
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dictum for the lay as well as the academic, the social(-ite, social being or object of 
sociological attention) as well as the sociologist. 
This claim will be more fully outlined in the next step of the undertaking in which 
you and I are currently engaged.* 
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*... the degree to which the phrase "in which you and I are currently engaged" in the 
last sentence of the preceding page generated a sense of unease may be taken as a 
smallest-scale and most direct initial empirical test of the force of the central 
argument. Generally, use of the second-person singular is an odd form in prose of any 
genre except the written letter/personal correspondence: in fiction, it largely fell into 
disuse after the 18th to mid-19th century, gradually metamorphising into the 'Dear 
Reader' trope, and thereafter largely abandoned except as a "special effect"; in 
factual - and especially scientific - writing it seems most particularly an affectation 
or a quirky rhetorical device. In the formal sense, and if 'you' are a sociologically-
informed reader, the use of the direct address is an unsettling rarity in the 
disciplinary writings to which you are exposed qua sociologist. It is even more 
potentially unsettling in a thesis, and as a concluding statement in the 'review of the 
literature' section of such a discourse: if you are professionally compelled to read 
these words in the context of a thesis - either as an examinable work or as an object of 
study - and have occasion to physically mark (annotate, underline, highlight or 
otherwise note) the phrase, then the thing read has generated in itself its own 
corollary of further writing. If the claim of rarity of resort to the direct address in 
sociological writings provokes checking or challenging, you may proceed to refer to 
your own collection of books and/or journals, or those stored in a larger library - in 
which case the phrase leads on to the physical activity involved in wider 
supplementary reading; if the claim is accepted prima facie, then it stands as 
confirmatory to your already-existing black-boxed stock of knowledge. If the 
accompanying asterisk (*) directed your eye to the bottom of the page for further 
explanation, you are responding to a particular literary convention - in any case, the 
symbol alerts you to all in the sentence not being what it seems. At a deeper level of 
significance: for the duration of this reading (current engagement), you and I have 
forged a specific relationship brought into being by the text you hold in your hands 
and attend to. The degree of attendance is immaterial (although the closer the 
reading, the more the 'outside world' ceases to exist or constitutes an interference) as 
is the response to the meaning of the text itself (which is in principle autonomous, 
determined by you) - the key point is that I as writer have created a surrogate lisible 
'you', and you as reader have created a surrogate authorial 'me'. These virtual selves 
exist regardless of whether [a] we are familiar in any other context; [b] they combine 
with (enhance, reinforce, override or nullify) former or other relationships; or [c] 
they form the basis of/breed future relationships. Centrally, until the text is read, 
the reading 'you' and the scriptible 'I' do not - each from the point of view of the 
other - exist: unless read, they cannot be constituted. In the act of reading/writing we 
build ourselves, each other, the form of linkage between us, and an alternative 
world. A sense of the construction, and the scope of the operant conditions, of this 
proxy world, is the subject of the next chapter. 
84. 
CHAPTER 3: FORMULATING The PROXY PRINCIPLE. 
I have constantly emphasized that the social world is, to adapt the title of 
Scopenhauer's famous book, 'will and representation'. Representation in the 
psychological sense but also in the theatrical and political senses - that of 
delegation, of a group of proxies. Bourdieu, 1990: 53. 
This chapter lays out the theoretical foundations of the proxy principle; relates it to 
(as well as distinguishing it from) cognate social-scientific concerns and concepts; 
outlines its potential scope as a general analytical tool; and provides a rationale for 
its particular application, in this instance, to the object-domains of war and 
textuality. 
3.1: Meaning of the Word "Proxy". 
A standard (1987 Collins English) dictionary definition of "proxy" reads as follows: 
Prox•y (' proksi) n., pl. prox•ies. 1. a person authorized to act on behalf of 
someone else; agent: to vote by proxy. 2. the authority, esp. in the form of a 
document, given to a person to act on behalf of someone else. [C15 prolcesye, 
contraction of procuracy, from Latin procuratio., procuration; see PROCURE]. 
and according to Roget's Thesaurus, synonymous terms (the word has no antonyms) are: 
deputy, agent, alternate, proctor, substitute, surrogate, representative, second, delegate, 
aide, lieutenant, steward, emissary. 
This accepted definition of the word "proxy" and its affiliations exhibit an essential 
tension. In one sense, a proxy is inferior relative to its original. It is subsidiary, 
"standing in" for (or representing a facet of) whatever produces it, and dependent on an 
originating source without which it cannot come into existence. The purpose of a proxy 
is to reflect, act for or artificially embody an underlying real - the product of creation is 
ipso facto subordinate to the creative producer. 
Yet in another sense, and paradoxically, the necessity that calls for the manufacture of 
a proxy in the first instance signifies an incapacity to act unaided - a form of weakness 
or dependency, a limitation of power - in this originary source. At once a derivative of a 
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necessarily greater power, the proxy exhibits some of the properties on which this 
power relies and others which exceed, rather than merely supplement, the power of its 
original. A proxy is created initially as an enhancement to the capacity of the self - a 
bodily or "skin-bounded" self, necessarily limited by the physiological constraints this 
condition imposes - to act (exert power in) the world. The proxy principle comes into 
operation at the point where the conferred power of this proxy (or proxies) [id 
determines the operant conditions of its bodily original; and [ii] reshapes the world - 
and the self's knowledge of the world - in which it operates. 
3.2: 'Bringing Bodies Back In' 
In the course of outlining a consideration of text as a sociological imperative, Chapter 2 
thematised a resistance to this notion by an anti-textual, 'non-sociog(raph)ic' sociology 
based on the distinction between a "real world" and a 'world-as-text'. This chapter 
examines (and further casts as problematic) what a "real world" might mean and what 
its constituent features might look like, and proceeds from the following presumption: 
that, the basal and indispensable element of the social, this "real world", consists of 2 
primary elements - an aggregate of bodies located in a material space. All other 
aspects of an analysable "social" spring from this primal initial condition. Here, I deal 
with the relation of text to the first element of this equation (bodies): later sections of 
this chapter centre on the second feature, that of space. 
3.3 The Body as Physical 'Fact'. 
In one sense, the body is the most natural thing in the world. That humans all 'have 
one' is a fact so glaringly obvious that it almost goes without saying, and until 
relatively recently, sociology in fact had little or nothing to say about bodies, as in 
Turner's assertion, that 'social sciences have often neglected the most obvious "fact" 
about human beings, that we have bodies and they are embodied' (1984: 227). It was 
what people thought intellectually or felt emotionally - and the way that they 
expressed these thoughts and feelings - that were the prime subject of investigation. In 
quantitative research, based on statistics and the counting of numbers, a factor such as 
the size of populations - how many people a given society or piece of society contained, 
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the distribution of opinions on any given issue across a representative sample of this 
population - were clearly essential facts of life: so too were features like the age, sex, 
ethnicity, occupation, income, residence, religious beliefs or political affiliations of 
the group studied. Even on the level of averaging out, the physiological characteristics 
of the population studied - things like size, shape, skin colour, skeletal structure, 
height, weight, posture, bodily adornment - were usually seen as irrelevant or 
incidental, and generally ignored altogether. Qualitative analysis, focussing on finer-
grained and smaller-scale features of the social landscape, paid closer attention to the 
individual actor, and came up with a battery of alternative techniques - participant or 
non-participant observation, the structured or unstructured interview - to try and make 
sense of the person's direct, felt experience as mediated through and by actions in and 
placement within the small circle of the immediate environment: but in looking at 
what people did or said in their daily life, it too rarely gave much consideration to 
the idea that these recorded activities and impressions had much to do with - let 
alone be motivated by - physical appearance or bodily sensation. How minds made 
sense of and ordered the world was the "normal" stuff of sociology. The way in which 
that world was itself on one level a collection of flesh-and-blood beings that both felt 
and relayed sensations through the medium of their bodies, was more the subject-
matter of biologists and physiologists, and could safely be left to them to deal with. 
3.4 The Body as Social Fact. 
This ignoring of the body as a sociological issue - except in particular circumstances 
such as the Parsonian 'sick role' or Goffmann's treatment of 'stigma' - is 
understandable. Firstly, in relation to sociology's relationship with other disciplines 
in both the humanities and the natural sciences, the body is outside sociology's area of 
expertise of patterned social behaviour. The discipline tended to take on board the 
viewpoint of philosophy, as expressed in either Berkeley's dictum of Esse es Percipi, 
or Descartes' cogito ergo sum. For Grosz (1994: 6), the Cartesian linkage of knowledge to 
mind-body dualism placed 'the mind in a position of hierarchical superiority over and 
above nature, including the nature of the body', and earlier sociological adherence to 
such a position can be found in the work of Mead on consciousness, or in probably the 
most famous single law-like axiom in sociology, the Thomas theorem. Thinking, 
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perceiving and articulating is the defining feature of human life, not moving and 
feeling. Every living thing moves and feels to a greater or lesser degree and responds to 
physical stimuli or instincts, but only humans have consciousness. If studying human 
behaviour, therefore, this defining feature is paramount. 
Secondly, attempts to reverse this mind/body split - both in the early days of sociology 
(remembering Lombrosco's attempt at analysing deviance from a physiological 
perspective) and in hybrid disciplines like sociobiology - have been treated with 
suspicion by sociologists, as both theoretically misguided and politically unpalatable 
(if not, as in the case of early 20th-century eugenics, outright dangerous). The extreme 
upshot of this view was the nearly total removal of the body from the sociological 
agenda. 
Third - the failure to analyse the body as a social entity not only corresponds to the 
usual approach in the other academically-based human sciences: it also relates to 
common perceptions in that, as a general rule in everyday life, people take their bodies 
very much for granted; until something goes wrong with their body, or unless 
specifically concerned with the physical in an occupational sense - eg, as medical 
practitioners, professional athletes, models or sex workers -, one's own body 
(discounting narcissism) can be safely "left to itself". So sociology could justify this 
neglect by reference to both cognate disciplines and 'typical' lay everyday experience. 
But recently the social sciences, along with assorted other academic disciplines, has 
lately been much occupied with the body as a topic. Driven by new technologies and 
developments in the natural sciences, various 'post-' perspectives, revivals in a 
"suitably cleansed" sociobiology, and multidisciplinary perspectives like feminism 
and a newly resurgent masculinity, "body talk" has seeped into more traditional 
humanities and social science fields such as anthropology, psychology, history - and 
sociology. Such attention opposes older views that the body is, in one sense and except 
to technical specialists, "just there", and normatively unproblematic. The idea that 
other people's bodies merit detailed inspection, but that one's own can be 'bracketed 
off', when examined, makes the visible simple taken-for-granted body the most 
mysterious and paradoxical of entities. 
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Just how many difficulties arise from the new "body talk", and what kinds of 
conundrums they pose, may be gleaned from the range of possible answers on offer to a 
question as mundane and seemingly straightforward as the number of bodies any 
individual has... 
3.5 One or Several Bodies? 
A simplest response to the above query is "one", but Kroker & Kroker, in their 'theses 
on the disappearing body in the hyper-modern condition', dispute evert this 
presumption, of any body at all, in their claim that under this "condition" 'the body no 
longer exists' (1987: 20). For those holding to the constitution of the one, the issue is the 
unity of the corporeal self, which itself exposes a range of contradictory positions, such 
as the 'shifting' or 'fragmented' self in Hall (1992), and bodies internally riven in 
Deleuze, when he states that '[w]e no longer find ourselves dealing with the 
mass/individual pair. Individuals have become "dividuals" and masses, samples, 
data, markets, or "banks" ' (1992: 3, emphases in the original). There is also the body 
emptied of content, as in the DeleuzoGuattarian concept of the 'Body without Organs 
[Bw0]', or Virilio's hollowed-out bodies drained of will, soul and reason and 
institutionally 'filled'/reconstituted as 'metabolic vehicles', reduced to the human 
organism's capacity to harness speed and power (1986: 75-95). Contrarily, from 
alternative quarters comes the idea of the contemporary body as augmented, as in the 
figure of the cyborg (Haraway, 1985; Gray, Figueroa-Sarriera & Mentor, 1995) or, at 
the increasingly blurred borderline between scientific fact and sci-fi genre, in the 
cyberpunk netherworlds of novelist William Gibson, fictional anti-heroes (and a 
goodly share of Gibson's real-world readership) striving to be prosthetically 
"posthuman". A further spin on the same theme sees the body not mechanically 
augmented so much as sensorily extended courtesy of electronic communicative 
technologies: as the Cyberspace Hashishim Advanced Hype Infantry (1995: lines 11- 
20) headily states, in declaring a Jihad against proposed governmental regulation of 
the Internet, 
89. 
'Your "self" is not confined directly to your physical body, rather it is the 
interface between your mind, your PSY in cybernetic theory, and the outside 
world, the PHI. It's a morphing intersection, the points at which you process 
information from the outside world. For instance, thru telepresence your "self" 
can be moved outside of your body and into a robotic apparatus, your senses are 
located and extended thru wires, cameras, and the interface is no longer tied 
down to the meat. Cyberspace becomes yet another sensory organ, or rather an 
entirely new sensorium, an array of input into your mind, extending your 
"presence" beyond your body, even beyond your terminal'. 
For Mary Douglas (1973: 93-112), following Mauss, there are two bodies: the 
genetically (naturally) and the socially (symbolico-culturally) constructed. The latter 
is of most interest because it has the extra-corporeal capacity to interact with, attach, 
and adjust itself to others. Schwartz, in spinning off a remarkable variant of Orwell's 
1939 Coming Up for Air, posits three bodies: the 'first is the substantial body of middle 
age: fat and present. The second is the sweet body of youth: thin and past. The third is 
the phantom body of death: streamlined and futuristic' and proceeds to generate a 
potted 20th-century 'cultural history' explanation of anorexia, shoplifting and 
schizophrenia centred on 'the thin body inside the fat body, and of a third body 
beyond, dangerous, and possibly explosive' (1989: 411). 
In Paul Valery's self-described 'simple reflections', four bodies co-exist "within" each 
person: the 'object My Body', what we live in, seen only piecemeal by its "inhabitant" 
and occupying a perpetual present; a second body whose exterior is visible only to 
others or on a reflected surface; the third, the internal machinery of the body 
examinable only through technologies of incision and dismemberment, usually through 
the gaze of the accredited surgeon or forensic expert; and the fourth, paradoxically 
both 'real' and 'imaginary', the fiction of the subject that integrates these other 3 
bodies into a coherent taken-for-granted whole (Valery, trans. Manheim [1964] 1989: 
395-402). For Frank also, an initial second-order consideration of organising a discourse 
around four 'academic imaginations of the body' - the medicalised, sexual, disciplined 
and talking formulations (1990: 134) - quickly develops into four correspondent bodies: 
the dominating, mirroring, disciplined and/or communicative types (1991: 51-6). In his 
earlier monograph, Frank also makes mention of O'Neill's 1985 concept of five bodies - 
'the world's body, social bodies, the body politic, consumer bodies, and medical bodies' 
- each legitimising, and used as a resource for, a situated institutional practice (Frank, 
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1990: 134). 
Obviously, such a range of considerations touches base with sociological concerns, 
creating as they do not so much a "morphing" as a soci(ologic)al intersection, where 
the body is situated 
'between a number of different domains; the biological and the social, the 
collective and the individual; that of structure and agent; cause and meaning; 
constraint and free will. But this interface only emerges in sociological discourse 
because it is at the same time the objective centrepoint of the internal tension 
existing between the social and human sciences and because it is materialised in 
an irreducible being: the individual who is both object and subject, product and 
actor, structure and meaning' (Berthelot, in Lawler, 1991: 65). 
However, the utility of "body talk" does little to allay the confusions often occasioned 
by these perspectives: in Corrigan's assessment, lcDearly, the human body does have 
anatomical, biological and physiological properties and processes. But for every claim 
that there may be something universal about the human body, it is possible to find an 
example which contradicts or at least complicates this claim' (1994: 41). Such 
misgivings not only concern simple factors like "number of bodies", but methodological 
salience, to the degree that some analysts wonder whether "the body" is being 
considered at all - in Bynum's monograph 'Why all the Fuss about the Body?', she 
reviews the plethora of recent literature, and notes that '[i]n much of this writing, 
body refers to speech acts or discourse' wherein 'the lived body seems to disappear' 
(1995: 4); and Halton, in discussing this relatively new specialty in sociology, claims 
that the "body" under study is less flesh-and-blood than a 'conceptualised and 
ethereal body modelled on the text' (1992: 35). 
Herein, I argue that both positions - that the body as topic is the site of (and has the 
potential to sort out) Berthelot's checklist of sociological 'great divides', and that the 
"body" as recently conceptualised has been obscured by textual discourse - are 
essentially correct. The seeming clash between the alternative positions comes about 
through a less-than-complete conception of what reading, writing and text(uality) 
actually does to bodies, and/or a premature attempt at integration (which may never 
eventuate). To take one persistent divide as an instance: in sociology, attempts to 
overcome the structure/agency hiatus pursue one of two alternative courses. The first 
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articulates one of the two dimensions as determinant while ignoring the other, positing 
either a fully-hegemonic structure and reducing agency to puppetry, or casting structure 
as merely the sum of actions performed by totally autonomous agents. The second tries 
to bridge the divide, and is best represented by attempts as diverse as Giddens' 
structuration, Merton's theories of the middle range, or grounded theory as formulated 
by Glasser & Strauss. 
Such structure/agency-type divides characterise literature as well as life. In relation 
to writing, a one-sidedness comes out in views of 'high' authorship as the mystical gift 
of personal creativity or, conversely, in the Barthes or Foucauldian claims of 'the 
author' as inheritor or conduit of a pre-given textual discourse: the "middler" position 
is appropriately typified by Coffey, Holbrook & Atkinson's recent (1996) try at 
melding 'realist' grounded theory, rhetorical analysis/narrativity, and Hypertext in 
Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) for sociological 
purposes. Pitched at somewhat lower levels, is the work a sui generis authorial 
product, or not fully comprehensible unless interpreted by a critical infrastructure, or 
radically incomplete until the reader provides it with ultimate meaning - or is Ricouer 
right in saying 'that to read a book is to consider its author already dead and the book 
as posthumous. For it is when the author is dead that the relation to the book becomes 
complete and, as it were, intact. The author can no longer respond; it only remains to 
read his work' (1991: 107)? These issues also feature in Solomon's discussion of what he 
terms the 'polemical difference' between an agency-driven Rezeptionsiisthetik and a 
(here, paradoxically structural-type) Deconstruction: 
'It has long been argued that the text is everything, that the reader just reads, 
supplying nothing but, one hopes, literacy and comprehension, and perhaps some 
structural analysis. Today, this nonsense is being overcorrected by "reader 
response" theory; the reader supplies almost everything, the book and the 
author are all but incidental. So, too, it has long been argued that literacy 
demands an uncritical respect if not awe for one's own literary tradition. Today, 
this view has been violently challenged by some of the Derridean 
Deconstructionists, who rightly point out some insidious cultural biases in our 
literary tradition but also nonsensically deny the very existence of authors and 
masterpieces. Moreover, they reject (or "deconstruct") the very idea of the 
subject, of author, and of reader, creating an impossible dilemma' (Solomon, 
1986: 53). 
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The issue also splits along spiritual and ideological dimensions, where the book, or all 
forms of writing as artefact, is alternatively unique product-of-individual-genius, or 
outcrop of a time/space-defying literature. The document is either active instance of 
rights and/or rites of passage and a testament to individual and corporate identity, or 
instrument of surveillance, constraint, control. A key question for both domains is thus 
the 'place' of the person - whether as acting social being, or creating 
writer/interpreting reader - in a structured (societal) world (or a world of text). 
I proceed from the tenet that the initial task of the sociological analyst - as against 
the perceptions of the social analysand, who normatively experiences structure and 
agency simultaneously and as a taken-for-granted unity until disrupted - is (a) to 
broaden the gulf between the two elements; and (b) to bracket off assumptions of 
integration until (c) evidence of empirical interplay between the elements is 
established. 
3.6 Doubling as the Essence of the Social 
Figure 3.1: Doubling - Base Model: 25 
In sociological terms writing is centrally about identity-formation instantiated by the 
production of surrogate selves (proxies). Figure 3.1 draws from Mead's 'background of 
the genesis of the self', and his concept of the creation of doubles as the distinction 
between organic/non-organic self, and the beginning-point of the social: 
25 . Consistently throughout, in the following diagrams and despite any changes in size or shape, 
the black figure(s) il represent bodies: neither colouration nor implied gender should be read as 
st 'ficant. The corresponding (basically) white "figures" 	are proxies. Solid 4-sided figures 
II signify written matter/artefacts of text, and lighter/"broken" quadrograms 0 denote 
institutions. 
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TIThe individual has a thing-like self that is affected by the individual as it 
affects other people and which is distinguished from the immediate organism in 
that it can leave the body and come back to it. This is the basis for the concept of 
the soul as a separate entity' (1934, ed Morris: 149-50). 
That Mead instances such doubling with reference in the first instance to 'primitive 
people' and the 'invisible, imaginary companions' of children may give rise to 
discomfort on ethical or ideological grounds: but in view of Mead's extension of the 
proposition to the concept of the generalised other, and the implication of the 
advantages accruing to the double ('soul'), I interpret the passage as being both (a) 
exemplary of the universally-applicable, and (b) the description of an originary 
condition, both sociohistorically and in terms of the lifecourse of persons. 
When Mead extends the concept to the relationship and responses of the individual to 
the group as reference for behaviour and active self-identification/construction, we 
may properly speak of a move from doubles to multiples in an organismic and 
perceptual sense. The different groups (subsets) to which the individual relates creates 
different situationally-appropriate selves, generated by either the individual or - as 
in the case of the generalised other, Cooley's 'looking-glass self', Frank's 'mirroring 
body' or Valery's 'second body' as reflected in mirrors or outsider's perceptions - one or 
several other(s). As the individual prepares for (or retrospectively evaluates) these 
encounters, s/he produces a double appropriate to the situation: 
Figure 3.2: Doubles to Multiples 
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But this is a necessarily later development, and recalling the initial Meadian 
concentration ('background genesis') on "primitives" and - if "the child" may be taken 
as closest to infancy - "children", does bring out one major point: that both exemplary 
groups may fairly be taken as non-literate. Indeed, objectively this is one of the few, if 
not the major, empirical ground(s) for commonality. The first doubles generated will 
therefore, to all intents and purposes, take a non-textual form: if considered from the 
point of view of the person, the double originates in the mind (primitive consciousness, 
the child's imagination) and multiplies over time (as in anthropomorphism, or a 
widening circle of imaginary friends as the child's contact with a circle of others 
expands); the requisite doubles move out into the world and are externally represented 
- either in 3-dimensional form (the fetish/totem, the toy/doll) or in flat pictorial form 
on various surfaces (the flesh of self and others, the walls of the cave or the nursery). I 
will argue that this difference in form is paramount in that the different constituent 
properties of the textual double and its multiple successors produces different effects to 
those of its non-textual counterpart (s). 
Figure 3.3: Textuality 
3.7 Textual Doubling/Multiplication. 
In Doubles in Literary Psychology, a study of the origins and developments of the 
cloppelganger in fiction, Ralph Tymms notes that 
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'Night from the start an essential distinction is to be made between the double-
by-duplication and the double-by-division; though these distinct psychological 
approaches constantly mingle. One secondary distinction is that in the second 
case [that of the double-by-division] the counterpart may be of a different 
substance from the original - in other words, may be a spiritual double' (1949: 
16-17). 
The ways in which the self is artificially multiplied - the surfaces on which the 
surrogate is displayed, the substance of which it is composed, its interaction with the 
originary source, and the range of its various capacities - is an issue for examination of 
the double-by-duplication as much as the double-by-division when moving from the 
'literary' to the 'social'. Relative to surface, two issues arise: writing done on (or into) 
the flesh, and writing onto other surfaces. In three separate but cognate analyses, the 
origins of writing are located not in attempts to visually represent speech/language, 
but in the practice of bodily markings: each holds that the subsequent history of 
alphabetization constitutes a shift from such scarring to the later encoding of sound 
units. According to Lingis, '[o]f all that is savage about savages, the most savage is 
what they do to themselves. They paint, puncture, tattoo, scarify, cicatrize, 
circumcise, subincise themselves'. All these processes denote the precursors to 
textuality, for 
'[w]hat we are dealing with is inscription. Where writing, graphics, is not 
inscription on clay, tablets, bark or papyrus, but in flesh and blood, and also 
where it is not historical, narrative [...] before historical - narrative, 
signifying, phonocentric, logocentric - inscription, there is a savage inscription 
not yet despotic, not serving oral speech' (Lingis, 1983: 23, 24). 
For Deleuze & Guattari, similarly, such marking and marked bodies are the 'essence of 
the inscribed socius' whose simultaneously creative and repressive organisation 
'constitutes a system of cruelty, a terrible alphabet': and 'if one wants to call this 
inscription in naked flesh "writing", then it must be said that speech presupposes 
writing, and that it is this cruel system of inscribed signs that renders man capable of 
language, and gives him a memory of the spoken word' (1990: 144, 145). Working from a 
position maintaining that 'a body is itself defined, delimited and articulated by what 
writes it'; that "what writes it" constitutes law; and that 'in times of crisis, paper is no 
longer enough for the law, and it writes itself again on the bodies themselves', De 
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Certeau summarises and extends such observations in maintaining that 
'for the law to be written on bodies, an apparatus is required that can mediate 
the relation between the former and the latter...tools work on the body. 
Formerly the tool was a flint knife or a needle. Today the instruments range 
from the policeman's billyclub to handcuffs and the box reserved for the accused 
in the courtroom. These tools comprise a series of objects whose purpose is to 
inscribe the force of the law on its subject, to tattoo him in order to demonstrate 
the rule, to produce a "copy' that makes the norm legible. This series forms an 
in-between:... it separates the text and the body, but it also links them, by 
permitting the acts that will make the textual "fiction" of the model 
reproduced and realized by the body' (1988: 139, 140, 141; emphases added). 
The rapid shift into the present and the concentration on aspects of power in De 
Certeau's analysis not only aligns his work with Deleuze/Guattari and Lingis (and 
their acknowledged predecessors in body-inscription theorising - Foucault, 
Nietzsche's Second Essay in On The Genealogy of Morals, and the Kafka of 'In the 
Penal Colony'): it also links into Innis' concentration on 'communication bias' and 
power-differentials at the level of empires, determined by the surfaces on, and 
substances into which, writing is engraved; and it gels with Connerton's concept of 
writing, which in Lash & Urry's summation 
'distinguishes between incorporating and inscribing practices and considers their 
relationship to how memory is sedimented in the bodily postures of those living 
in particular societies. Incorporating practices are messages which are imparted 
by means of people's current bodily activity, the transmission only occurring 
when their bodies are so present. Inscribing practices are the modern devices for 
storing and retrieving information, photographs, print, alphabets, indexes, 
tape, etc... These practices trap and hold information long after the human 
organism has stopped informing...' (Lash & Urry, 1994: 239, emphases in the 
original). 
But this summation tends to leave out of account two of Connerton's central themes - an 
overemphasis on transmission at the expense of bodily activity; and the way in which 
collective and individual memory is transformed and eroded by exteriorised inscribing 
practices. 
Connerton's theme, as in the title of his 1989 book, is how societies remember, and 
forms part of an important recent re-emphasis on the subject of commemoration and 
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mnemotechnics. Writers in this field share common themes and concerns - individual 
(personal) as distinct from group (societal) memory, tensions between affect and 
rationality in what is recalled/forgotten, technologies of remembrance, and the 
relationship between oral and 'officially'-recorded histories. This brings their work 
within the purview of the written record as alternative to memories lodged in the 
head of the individual: representatively, for Fentress & Wickham, although the fact 
that we 'are so accustomed to using texts that we tend to see them everywhere' (1992: 
19) and hence take them for granted, when examined, customary notions about writing 
as speech-based, or text as only supportive of memory, tend to collapse, as in the co-
authors' statements that 
'[for us, by contrast, the text is no longer a support for memory, but its 
replacement...Literacy influences the form in which knowledge is articulated. 
Once knowledge is textualized, it tends to evolve in a characteristically textual 
way... that has little connection with the way knowledge evolves purely in 
thought and speech' (Fentress & Wickham, 1992: 11). 
This concept of the dislodging and replacement of a sensual/'natural' by an 
'artificial'/inscribed memory draws on the earlier work of Yates (1996, orig. 1966). 
She finds its seminal expression in Classical Greece, in Plato's Phaedrus , where 
Socrates argues that the invention of writing - which he ascribes to 'the Egyptian god 
Theuth' - 'will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because 
they will not practice their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external 
characters which are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own 
memory within them' and foster the appearance - not the reality - of wisdom 
([196611996: 52-3, emphasis added; also part-cited in Moulthrop, 1993: 77). Yates picks 
up on the ancient theme in dealing with the suggestion that 
'this passage may represent a survival of the traditions of oral memory, of the 
times before writing had come into the common use. But as Socrates tells it, the 
memories of the most ancient Egyptians are those of truly wise men in contact 
with the realities. The ancient Egyptian practise of the memory is presented as 
a most profound discipline. The passage was used by a disciple of Giordano 
Bruno when propagating in England Bruno's Hermetic and "Egyptian" version of 
the artificial memory as an "inner writing" of mysterious significance' (Yates, 
[1966]1996: 52-3). 
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The significance of the shift from this "inner" to an exteriorised writing involves not 
only a divorcing from, but a feedback into, the organic entity, both as a whole and as it 
affects the constituent parts of the physiological system: not merely the 
'soul'/'spiritual double' or the memories 'housed' in the skull of the subject. The 
citation (in Chapter 1, p. 6) of the unknown author of the Silos Beatus suggested as 
much: Lowenthal (1985) relatedly notes in the course of his own analysis of historical 
texts, that Macaulay saw the duty of written factual history as being to ' "make the 
past present, to bring the distant near.. .to invest it with the reality of human flesh 
and blood" ; and in historical fiction, Sir Walter Scott's fame was based his ability to 
fabricate convincing "bygone ages...actually filled with living men.. .with colour in 
their cheeks and passions in their stomach", as Carlyle attested, "not by protocols, 
state-papers, controversies and abstractions" (1985: 225, emphases added). But 
neither Lowenthal - nor Connerton, whose project is to re-establish corporeality in the 
social - can fully endorse this latter statement, because both, while marking the 
interplay between physicality and inscription, also mark the power of writing and the 
written over the practices of the corporeal body. 
What is at stake here is not only the transformation of the skin-bounded self's 
practices, but also its comprehension of and placement in the world of time and space. 
Both the world as gener(ic)ally perceived by the textual proxy and the specific 
environs in which it operates (subsets of the larger system) are likewise textually 
transformed, and by the same sequence of proxification - a move from the originary pre-
given material (real or natural), into a mediated representation (cultural), and the 
refinement of this representation into a hegemonic 'world-as-text'. 
3.8: A Variant on Analytical '3-Worlds' Models. 
In concentrating on understanding of and action in the known world, several theorists 
have grounded their respective analyses on distinctions between [1] the world-as-it-is, 
the material environment whose diversity, complexity and magnitude render it 
ultimately unknowable in its entirety; [ii] the-world-as-represented, a symbolic 
second-order version of this first world, limited and framed in order to match [Hi] the 
cognitive capacity of the (individual and collective) human actor (a world-as- 
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perceived). In a number of the more prominent of such tripartite schemes, the 
interplay between these three entities is significantly constructed and mediated by 
text. This is evident in projects as disparate as those of Latour (1991: 6), who conceives 
of the world sociologists study as simultaneously 'real like nature, narrated like 
discourse, and collective like society', and Popper's philosophical argument for three 
worlds (1972: 107-52) - the constitution of the first two (the objectively physical and 
the cognitively perceived) dependent on an autonomous third (a communicative 
theoretico-cultural entity, based - as his "thought experiments" indicate' - primarily 
on artefacts of writing). 
The Cole & Keyssar model (FIG. 3.4 below) is a graphic representation of such an 
approach: 
Figure 3.4: Cole & Keyssar's model of mediated knowledge (in Olson et. al., 1985: 54-56.): 
Descriptions/representations 
of the world 
The world 	 Individual knowledge 
26 'Experiment (1). All our machines are destroyed, and all our subjective learning, including our 
subjective knowledge of machines and tools, and how to use them. But libraries and our capacity to 
learn from them survive. Clearly, after much suffering, our world may get going again. Experiment 
(2). As before, machines and tools are destroyed, and our subjective learning, including our 
subjective knowledge of machines and tools, and how to use them. But this time, all libraries are 
destroyed also, so that our capacity to learn from books becomes useless. If you think about these 
two experiments the reality, significance, and degree of autonomy of the third world (as well as its 
effects on the second and first worlds) may perhaps become a little clearer to you. For in the second 
case there will be no re-emergence of our civilization for many millennia (Popper, 1972: 107-108, 
emphases in the original). Drawing from this scenario, Winchester posits 2 fictive societies - an 
orally-based 'Atlantis' and a race of 'Alpha Centaurians' whose detonation of a "litron bomb" 
precisely mirrors Popper's speculations - in order to demonstrate the real-world connections 
between Western forms of theology ('interrogation of God'), science ('interrogation of nature') and 
literature ('interrogation of human nature') and the degree to which these achievements, singly and 
in combination, are based on the writing process and its products (1985: 36). Elsewhere and less 
speculatively, Winchester will argue that the very existence of ordinary historical persons can 
only be authenticated by a methodical cross-referencing of 2 or more documents testifying to their 
identity. In the absence of such record-linkage, the individual is considered to have no verifiable 
life (Winchester, 1978; commentary in Tilly, 1984: 27-28) - another more concrete variant wrung 
on the importance attached to Popper's autonomous third world 'of objective contents of thought, 
especially of scientific and poetic thoughts and of works of art' and its priority over first-world 
physical objects or states, and second-world mentality/consciousness states with their 
concomitant behavioural dispositions to action. 
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Herein - and as with several information theory/cybernetic schemes (Ruben, 1984: 40- 
71) - knowledge of the world is gleaned by the actor either directly, or by reference to 
a representation of the "original". In the latter case, the actor's stock of knowledge 
both derives from and feeds back into this representation. But both actor and world 
are "free-standing" entities: there is no sense conveyed of the other surrogate world-
as-depicted as independent or alternative, let alone as having the capacity to distort 
or displace either the actor's powers of perception or the "real" world's constitution. 
While retaining the basic elements of a 3-worlds concept, and subscribing to the 
analytic purchasing power of its general form, my elaboration of the proxy principle 
makes specific changes to the scheme's components and impressions of unity pertaining 
within and between them. There are as many significant ruptures as there are 
interactions in a real/represented (or 'nature/culture') divide, and the notion of a 
seamless flow between entities attracts as much opposition' - both empirical and 
conceptual - as support. Nor are the elements internally unitary: text is separated out 
from other representational forms, and when the entities are recombined, assumes a 
position of dominance relative to the other elements. Finally, the category of the 
'individual' is problematised - converted from corporeal agent to social proxy 
springing from, relating to and acting upon the hierarchically conjoined three worlds: 
Figure 3.5: Extension of the Cole/Keyssar model - The three worlds. 
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27  As in Habermas' analysis of Lukacs' 1922 work on reification (1984: 355-72), who notes that 
the latter, like Popper, also theorises in terms of a "three worlds" model: but unlike Popper the 
Hungarian thinker's 'three worlds [ie, objective nature/things, the social interpersonal sphere, and 
subjective nature/inner life] are so lopsidedly coordinated that category mistakes are built into 
our understanding of interpersonal relationships and subjective experiences; we apprehend them 
under the form of things, as entities that belong to the objective world, although they are really 
elements of our common social world or of an individual subjective world' (1984:356). 
The proxy of the actor in the right-hand section of Figure 3.5 signifies the surrogate 
self as "seen" from the point-of-view of the world-as-text: a panoply of documents 
testifying to, and framing the conditions for action of, an extant self. This proxy 
assumes a degree of autonomy over its pre-existing "original" (the body); becomes a 
conduit and/or signifier for and/or of the organism; and is the focus for other-issued 
written discourses which the perceptual sensing body must read, and take into account. 
To operationalise these points, a brief turn to a representative fiction and its real-
world counterpart(s). 
Pirandello's novel Il Put Mattia Pascal ['The Late Mattia Pascal'] is about the 
attempt of the titular protagonist to adopt a new identity in the wake of a mistaken 
report of his death. The plan ends in failure, because the bogus "new" individual - 
'Adriano Meis' - lacks the range of documents necessary for engagement with social 
life. Without such official certification, Pascal/Meis suffers a "second" (social) 
death. Immediately following its first publication in 1904, the novel was subjected to 
severe critical attack, primarily on account of the implausibility of the plot's central 
premise: that social identity is not just mediated through or aided by assorted papers 
testifying to the bearer's "bona fides", but that modern human existence is actually 
constituted by such documentation. In the eyes of the State, the "fact" of physical 
being is subsidiary to a subject's placement in [a] requisite set[s] of authorised files. 
Pirandello's book asserted that when and if these two aspects of self - the corporeal 
and the 'official' archival - come into conflict, the latter overrides the former. 
Responding to early reviewer hostility the author appended a two-part postscript to 
all later editions of his novel, defending himself against the purportedly 'absurd and 
unbelievable' elements of the work (1987: 255-262). This defence generally claimed 
that the orderly work of fiction is a pallid replica of the unpredictable and chaotic 
absurdity of "real life", with its 'blissful contempt for verisimilitude' (Pirandello, 
1987: 262). More specifically, the novelist cited the account of a real-life parallel to 
the Pascal/Meis situation in the Ambrogio Casati case, where a man wrongfully and 
irreversibly declared officially dead in 1917 subsequently visited his own grave. A 
later reviewer (Radcliff-Umstead, 1978: 183) sees the book as not only a credible 
reflection of real-life processes but as positively prescient, in that contemporary civic 
authority has considerably tightened up the document-based mechanisms that 
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effectively nullify the individual's autonomy: 
'Pirandello's novel has been called "the triumph of the civil state" because of 
Meis's failure to live without a legal identity. His success in sustaining the 
disguise for a period of two years was possible only in the politically relaxed 
conditions in the early years of the twentieth century, when persons could travel 
in Europe and stay in hotels without displaying a passport. Since the First 
World War no one would be able to play Adrian() Meis's masquerade, because 
positive identification has been required for even an overnight stay at a 
touristic pensione in the most remote village' 
From an altogether different source, some backing for this assertion, general agreement 
as to when 'positive identification' becomes a matter of governmental concern, and the 
extension of such concern beyond the borders of Europe. An early-'80s monograph 
investigates 'the history and use of six of the most common personal documents in the 
United States' (Rule, McAdam, Stearns & Uglow, 1983: 222) with an eYe to the way 
such documents are used as instruments of mass surveillance and social control. Of 
these items, the researchers find that 
• legislation requiring a uniform system of birth certificates was not enacted until 
1903, and that the first states to meet the official criteria of registering an 
estimated 90 percent of births within their boundaries only did so in 1915; 
• despite considerable irregularities in the early issuance of driver's licenses 
between states (first required in Massachusetts in 1907 but not until 1957 in South 
Dakota), so great was the eventual need for them that 'by 1977 at least 40 states 
issued "non-driver's licenses" for those that did not drive, but who needed the 
documentation for other purposes' (1983: 225); 
• the provision of passports did not become an exclusively federal government 
prerogative until 1856, consonant with the practice of most countries in the 19th 
century who saw passports as only a wartime necessity. 'The United States did not 
require US nationals to use passports for travel in peacetime until 1952, and it is 
estimated that most US travellers did not carry passports in peacetime until the 
late 1940s' (1983: 225); 
• the holding of Social Security cards - originating in 1935 legislation and now 
encompassing 'nearly every economically active adult' in North America - proved 
so effective for state investigation purposes that since 1961, 'the Internal Revenue 
Service [IRS] has adopted the use of Social Security numbers for ordering income tax 
records and for identifying taxpayers' (1983: 226); 
• credit cards, initially issued in the early decades of the present century and 
lately a virtual monopoly of two corporations (VISA and MasterCard) are rich 
sources of information on citizen's various economic activities, and exchange of such 
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information among private and governmental organisations 'is a regular part of 
their clerical practice' (1983: 228); and 
• when issuing bank books, a relative rarity in the turn-of-the-century US but 
increasingly common at present, 'bank officials may contact the applicant's 
employer or personal and business references' if irregularities are suspected: 'Banks 
appear responsive, in these matters, both to their own interests in avoiding fraud 
and those of local businesses and law-enforcement agencies' (1983: 229). 
Rule and his associates, while attentive to civil-libertarian fears about the 
totalitarian implications of governments' increased ability to track the activities of 
its citizens, are more concerned with the fragility of the surveillance system. Their 
monograph refers at several points to the ease with which a foundational document - 
the birth certificate, serving as a validation of identity creating ('breeding') 
subsequent documentation - can be fraudulently obtained, and stops just short of 
endorsing more efficient direct checking via computerisation. However, the central 
facet of this analysis lies less in the strength or weakness of such monitoring 
procedures, more in the epistemological and ontological implications of such a 
construction of identity itself: the interplay between the institutional conception of 
the individual, and the individual's generation of a series of documentally-textured 
identities in response to institutional demands. 
Figure 3.6: The Personal-social Identities Matrix (after Brewer, 1991: 476): 
3.6.1: Base Model 
	 3.6.2: Initial Variant 
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UCLA social psychologist Marilynn Brewer sees the self as conceptually split between 
a core personal identity and a number of extended social identities, wherein the former 
'is the individuated self - those characteristics that differentiate one individual from 
others within a given social context'. Social identities are 'categorisations of the self 
into more inclusive social units that depersonalise the self-concept, where I becomes 
we. Social identity entails "a shift towards the perception of self as an 
interchangeable exemplar of some social category and away from the perception of sell 
as a unique person" (1991: 476, emphases in the original). The left-side portion of the 
Figure above (3.6.1) is Brewer's depiction of such a process, using her"self" as salient 
instance nested within her professional domain. At the centre is Brewer's personal 
identity as social psychology teacher/researcher, distinct from her colleagues. The 
first (next closest) ring is inclusive of these colleagues, constituting a specific academic 
sub-set (social psychology) embedded inside a specific Department (of Psychology). 
The relationships of this Department and others occurs within the frame of reference 
of the third ring, the university (UCLA), itself operating within the context (ring four) 
of other academic institutions. These frameworks and the different constructions of 
social identities they entail are lodged within the bordering outer ring, where the 
subject identifies 'with academia as a whole, as compared with nonacademic 
institutions in the United States or the world' (Brewer, 1991: 476). 
This scheme is highly suggestive, with other' clear applications beyond the 
occupational sphere. Brewer implies as much when prefacing her monograph with 
reference to the strength of 'currently familiar.. .ethnic and national identities capable 
of arousing intense emotional commitment and self-sacrifice on the part of 
individuals...People die for the sake of group distinctions...' (1991: 475). But Brewer's 
exemplary matrix underplays the degree to which [i] all identities are constituted by 
text - from the reading/writing activities resulting in the credentialling of the 
personal (here academic) identity to the textual infrastructures facilitating relations 
Some such further applications may include, eg, a familial identity, frames of reference radiating 
outwards from the individual to kin relations within a (neo-local) family of orientation--> 
extended kin--> family of procreation--> socially specific family-type--> (species-distinct or 
figurative) 'human family'; an urban identity, with the person located within the dwelling 
(household, residence)--> neighbourhood--> suburb--> municipality (borough, shire)--> city; or a 
(formal-) religious identity, the believer situated in a web of prayer-group--> congregation--> sect 
(denomination)--> national/international church--> world of theists. These random examples can 
clearly be multiplied. 
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between the successive circles; [ii] disparities exist between self-conceptions and other-
generated perceptions of the successive social identities; [iii] independence of these 
respective social identities; and [iv] social identities are constructed on the basis of 
'fuzzier' notions of the world's wider parameters: in regard to the latter point, one is 
reminded of the looser self-placement - the universal address" - of Joyce's Stephen 
Dedalus in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (ed. Levin,1948 [orig. 1916]: 175-367). 
An initial attempt to refine the matrix in these directions, and wed them to the 
pattern of textual self-reconstructions as formulated in the proxy principle, is given in 
the right-hand section of the preceding Figure (3.6.2) - less T. S. Eliot's poetic 
preparing of 'a face to meet the faces that you meet' than a presentation of a world-
aware self encountering assorted other selves in specific social situations. A fuller 
elaboration synthesising these elements is provided in Figure 3.7 below: 
Figure 3.7: Brewer Matrix Second Variant - Situated Personal and Social Identities: 
'He turned to the flyleaf of the geography and read what he had written there; himself, his name 
and where he was. Stephen Dedalus, Class of Elements, Clongowes Wood College, Sallins, County 
Kildare, Ireland, Europe, The World, The Universe' (Joyce, 1948/[1916]: 183). 
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Figure 3.7 represents a synthesis of all the foregoing features of proxies. In Barbara 
lauden's terminology, the skin-bounded self at the centre is transformed into 'a layer 
cake of superimposed texts, each "text" lettered by a different profession to define a 
separate set of needs that only that profession can meet. The body thus appears as the 
incarnation of "texts" '(Illich & Sanders, 1989: xi), each 'layer'/proxy acting in a 
variety of surrogate - or in Esser's (1975) phrase, 'prosthetic' - worlds. The proxy is 
situated on a cusp' of the institutional subsets that make up these worlds, composed 
partly (on the assumption that the individual is literate) of self-generated, and 
partly (wholly if the individual is not literate) of other-issued, texts. On the far right 
of the matrix, the interplay of institutions produces a "world" -0.( 	E ) , and the 
bundling together of the various textual proxies into a narrative and hierarchical 
(--.6t. 0 ) 
sequence produces a "life" 	. 
3.9: The Power of the Proxy 
At the outset of this chapter (section 3.1), I referred to what the textual proxy 
'procures' from its originary source as a surplus of that source's power. The essence of 
that power is located in the ability of writing and the written to transcend the time 
and space constraints that limit the capacity of the "unproxified" corporeal self. I 
illustrate these two facets of the written - mobility and durability - below, showing 
how textuality provides [i] an infrastructure for the conveyance of bodies from one 
place to another; and [ii] an ultimate form of transcendence, the determination of 
mortality and the survival of the personality past the point of physical death. 
3.9.1: 'Something to Read for the Journey'  
Notable among sociologists is the analogy drawn between aspects of social structure 
and locomotion, as expressed through the metaphor of the train. The variants on 
30 This corresponds to Goffmann's contention that the 'simplest sociological view of the individual 
and his self is that he is to himself what his place in an organization defines him to be. Perhaps we 
should...initially (define) the individual, for sociological purposes, as a stance-taking entity, a 
something that takes up a position somewhere between identification with an organization and 
opposition to it [...] Our status is backed by the solid buildings of the world, while our sense of 
personal identity resides in the cracks' (1961: 319-20, emphases added). 
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this metaphor are pervasive in classical sociology, and employed by major 
theorists of diverse persuasions to different ends. Marx uses it both descriptively 
and as an integral factor in Capital's politico-economic structure. In a letter of 1879, 
he considers railroads as the courronement de l'ouevre (crowning achievement) of 
advanced industrial capitalism, 'in the sense that they were at last (together with 
steamships for oceanic intercourse and the telegraph) the means of communication 
adequate to the means of production' (Marx, edited de la Haye, 1979: 19, emphases 
in the original). Weber, more figuratively, characterises his prime movers of 
historical processes as intellectual "switchmen" who determine the "tracks" along 
which roll the dominant material and ideal interests that 'directly govern men's 
conduct' (Weber, in Gerth & Mills, [195211977: 280). 
Mead uses a similar image in a different context: drawing from Einstein's theory of 
relativity in his 1932 elaboration of the self as a conscious organism whose 
perception of reality is always and necessarily contingent on time/space location, 
he stresses the equivalence between physical- and social-scientific concepts by 
reference to the situation of 'a man in a train [passing] from the system of the 
movement of his train to that of the movement of a neighbouring train', and his 
uniquely perceptual ability to simultaneously conceive of two opposite states, 
'passing from one to the other'. This passage is claimed by Mead as the very 
'character of reality', in that it denotes essential 'change in the structure of things, 
and that because of passage objects can occupy different systems' (Mead, 1959, orig. 
1932: 81; discussion in Ezzy's conceptualisation of narrative identity, 1998: 241). In 
a further variant, Schutz illustrates his own essential relational difference 
between the phenomenological categories of consociates and contemporaries as 
follows: 
'[w]hen I board a train, ...I orient myself to the fact that the engineer in charge 
can be trusted to get me to my destination. My relationship to him is a They-
relationship at this time, merely because my ideal type "railroad engineer" 
means by definition "one who gets passengers like myself to their destination". 
It is therefore characteristic of my social relationships with my contemporaries 
that the orientation by means of ideal types is mutual. Corresponding to my 
ideal type "engineer' there is the engineer's ideal type "passenger". Taking up 
mutual They-orientations, we think of each other as "one of them" '(1972: 202). 
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Schutz expands this conceptual illustration in an attached footnote that extends 
the virtual worlds of contemporaneity from ideal-typical engineer/passenger to 
ideal-typical author/reader. But these analogies between the soci(ologic)al and 
the transportational are more than merely figurative aids to thinking, and the 
way that reading /writing and documentation figure in actual mobility operates at 
a deeper level than the analogical. 
Pierce Butler (1968: 1-2) foregrounds the typically taken-for-granted debt that 
"modern man" owes to the printer - 'apparent to anyone who will review a random 
segment of his daily routine and count the number of times that it is marked with 
printing ink' - in a culture permeated by typography: 
'Consider, for example, an ordinary city dweller as he sets out for a holiday in 
the north woods. Paradoxically, he cannot even get to the wilderness without 
the assistance of a printer. He has probably selected his destination because 
printed postage stamps have brought him printed advertisements which 
describe and picture the local attractions. The taxicab that takes him to the 
railroad station prints a receipt to certify that the driver has not overcharged 
him. At the station he buys a printed ticket with printed money and finds out 
from a printed timetable the hour of his train's departure and the route it will 
follow. In the baggage-room he exchanges his heavier luggage for a printed 
check on which an official prints with hand stamps the date and the other 
particulars to fit the occasion. As his bags rumble off on a truck he wonders if 
he has forgotten anything and runs over in his mind an inventory of their 
contents. Although he may not notice it, nearly every article that he thinks of 
is, or has been, in a container elaborately covered with printing. Perhaps our 
hypothetical traveller can recall no forgotten necessity for last-minute 
purchase so, hoping for the best, he prepares to enter the train. Here, then, we 
may leave him - at the newsstand buying "something to read" for the journey'. 
De Certeau writes in a corresponding key, but places his "traveller" on the train 
itself. His ruminations also link transport to text, but in an entirely different and 
more speculative fashion. He begins with the observation that in moving through a 
landscape by rail and contrary to the evidence of the senses, neither the landscape 
nor the traveller is in actual motion - only the locomotive. The commuter is in the 
grip of a 
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'travelling incarceration. Immobile inside the train, seeing immobile things 
slip by...Nothing is moving inside or outside the train...Inside, there is the 
immobility of an otder...Every being is placed there like a piece of printer's 
type on a page arranged in military order. This order, an organizational 
system, the quietude of a certain reason, is the condition of both a railway 
car's and a text's movement from one place to another [...] In modern Athens, 
the vehicles of mass transportation are called metaphorai. To go to work or 
come home, one takes a "metaphor" - a bus or a train. Stories could also take 
this noble name: every day, they traverse and organize places; they select 
and link them together; they make sentences and itineraries out of 
them...stories, whether everyday or literary, serve as a means of mass 
transportation, as metaphorai' (De Certeau, 1988 [orig. 1974]: 111, 115). 
A quarter-century on and a continent away from Butler's speculations, another form 
of metaphorai: constructing an anthropology of the proximate in the consideration 
of "non-places" that constitute habitual dwellings in contemporary society, Marc 
Auge (1995: 1-5) sets his fictional traveller 'Pierre Dupont' off on an international 
business trip, flying from Paris to Bangkok. Under what Auge terms a new condition 
of 'supermodemity', Butler's earlier debt owed by the commuter to the printer has 
not yet been discharged. 'Dupont's' progress, from leaving his house to aircraft 
take-off, is similarly punctuated by encounters mediated by artefacts of print: 
credit cards, receipts for purchase, parking voucher showing the location of his 
stored vehicle, passport/visa, airline ticket, boarding pass and seat allocation 
slip, "fasten seatbelt' and "no smoking" signs, and - along with information 
brochures on safety, flight paths and aircraft specifications - again the optional 
'something to read for the journey' either purchased at the airport bookshop or 
provided by the company's in-flight magazine or complementary periodicals. Had 
Auge broadened his description, he could well have noted that the immediate 
typography surrounding and utilised by 'Dupont' also extended to corollary 
institutions concerned with travel risk-management, and to the favoured form of 
transport, the aircraft itself. Noting that in modern industrial societies, 'the vast 
majority of books bear no cultural burden at all: they are parts catalogs, census 
reports, Department of Agriculture pamphlets, tide tables, tax codes, repair 
manuals, telephone directories, airline schedules - documents whose appearance as 
books rather than in some other form has mostly to do with the practical 
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requirements of display and diffusion and the limits of available technologies', 
Nunberg goes on to illustrate his claim by example: 
'The Travellers Insurance Company produces printed output at a rate of roughly 
a billion impressions a month, enough to fill all the shelves of the new 
Bibliotheque de France every six months or so. The printed documentation that 
accompanies the delivery of a single Boeing 747 weighs about 350 tons, only 
slightly less than the airplane itself' (Nunberg, in Bloch & Hesse, 1995: 14). 
3.9.2: "Journey's End": the Dead.  
Two axioms, familiar to sociology - that the dead are both more numerous and more 
powerful than the living - reach higher levels of determinancy in societies utilising 
written records. The written instantiates a variety of continuing relationships 
between dead and living bodies, particularly (and paradoxically) under conditions of 
modernity. Examples of such a claim would include Comte's aphorism that 'society is 
composed of more dead than living members'; Fontenelle, who states that the dead 
are not only more numerous but more powerful than the living; or, in an 18th-century 
political context, both Burke's avowal that society 'is a contract...it becomes a 
partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, 
those who are dead, and those who are to be born' (1961, orig. 1790: 110) and Paine's 
direct response, which finds him 'contending for the rights of the living, and against 
their being willed away, and controlled and contracted for, by the manuscript assumed  
authority of the dead; and Mr. Burke is contending for the authority of the dead over 
the rights of the living' (1961, orig. 1791: 278, underline added). Two centuries on, the 
same context, and Massumi's claim that '[t]he dead have always played an active 
role in American politics. During the 1980s, they came to be one of the most powerful 
constituencies in the country' (1993: 16). Later, Marx, in the Eighteenth Brumaire of 
1869, will declare that 'the tradition of the dead generations weighs like a 
nightmare on the minds of the living'; and from a different perspective we hear 
Virilio (1987: 29) speaking of a synthetic modem order where 'the living and the 
living dead merge to the point of delirium'. 
For C. Wright Mills, 'the first rule for understanding the human condition is that men 
live in second-hand worlds...in their everyday life they do not experience a world of 
solid fact...Yet for every man these images - provided by strangers and dead men - are 
the very basis of his life as a human being' (1963: 405); and staying within the realms 
of sociology, Morgan affirms that in various ways 
'death is socially constructed. In order that a person can be considered dead in 
our society, there must be a death certificate. Even then, death is not 
immediately recognised. In some areas, people stay on the electoral register 
until their death is proved by the Registration Officer actually seeing the 
death certificate. ..the dead are not gone away; they remain present amongst 
the living in a different form and the living must take account of this in their 
everyday actions' (1990: 165). 
3.10: Applying the Principle. The Military Proxy and the World-as-Warzone.  
This chapter has provided an entry-point into a general 'proxy theory' and indicated 
some of its more specific contexts. Germane to this thesis, Bourdieu's observation in the 
accompanying headnote relates a concept of proxies to the sociological enterprise, and 
the term has been deployed in other fields - specifically literary theory (Hix, 1990: 
163-93), political activism (Alinsky, 1971: 165-83) and interstate confrontation (Duller, 
1981). Proceeding from this chapter as a whole, and with especial reference to the 
discussion at 3.8, the figure below focusses on a particular "type" of proxied self and its 
situation in a specifically-constructed "world-as-text", detailing the movements of 
both towards a situation of lethal conflict - the condition of war: 
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Figure 3.8: Application of the Proxy Principle - The War Situation. 
In this last depiction, an institutionalised social grouping - the state, alone or in 
alliance with one or more other similarly-constituted entities (...+ n) - establishes 
hostile relations ( .4-70-0. ) with another (combination of) state(s). An area of the 
larger world both entities inhabit (0) is demarcated (0) as the arena - geopolitical 
and ideological - where the hostile parties will contend. For the duration of 
hostilities, the multiple social identities attaching to the 'civil' self, the individuals 
that make up the populations of the conflicting states, are reduced/reconfigured into a 
particular being consonant with the state's war effort: a 'military proxy'. Military 
proxies are constituted from the state's archived knowledge of the capacities of its 
(singular and collective) citizenry. On the basis of this knowledge, the populace is 
divided into those whose characteristics - age and able-bodiedness - are convertible 
(through training in institutional isolation from the individual's prior peacetime 
social world[s]) to membership in a branch of the armed forces: these become 
combatants, who will directly engage ( -41-110- ) the similarly-constructed soldiery of 
the rival state(s). The remainder of the population not so 'fitted' to direct 
confrontation are reconstituted as a 'home front': auxiliary non-combatants whose 
activities provide support for the contending militaries in the field. 
This is war as delineated from the perspective of the proxy principle, and as 
understood under conditions of contemporaneity. But arrival at such a conception is the 
outcome of an aggregated series of significant changes in violent intergroup conflict 
over what Braudel and the Annales School term the longue duree of history: it 
includes a precursive history that encompasses non-state human formations and non-
textually constituted humans engaging in orchestrated warlike head-to-head 
confrontations. The following chapter elaborates the origins and development of the 
transformations that will culminate in this contemporary war situation. 
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Chapter 4: The PROTO-TEXTUAL GENESIS of ORGANIZED  
CONFLICT.  
This chapter examines three temporal phases - using standard historical 
periodisations of the primitive, the ancient and the medieval - in the origins, 
evolution and spread of writing and war, and their gradual merging over time into a 
war/text axis. 
I initially treat at some length two long-run disputes in anthropology. The first 
concerns the problematic of "primitive war": do instances of intrapersonal violence 
within, and/or organised intergroup physical fighting between, societies classified 
as primitive, qualify as war? The category of primitive war remains a site of 
essential contestation resting on two opposed and irreconcilable paradigms: the 
"primal order" as either an unremitting violence of the war of all against all, or the 
idyllic image of a pacific noble savagery. Recent analyses have qualified - but not 
eliminated - this base-level disparity, and two of the most recent take it as a 
specific point of departure: in the first, Paul Crook's survey of the sociobiology of 
war builds from 'the "Kropotkin paradigm" of a benevolent nature/humanity 
encountering violent technologies and state/class systems'. This is contrasted with 
'the "Huxley paradigm" of a violent nature/humanity curbed by an ethical, nature-
transcending civilisation' (1994: 194). In the second, archaeologist Lawrence Keeley 
locates ongoing debates in the topic area of war at the earlier and more "classical" 
historical remove, to the way in which, in 'the modern period, these ancient 
mythic themes were elaborated by Hobbes and Rousseau into enduring 
philosophical attitudes towards primitive and prehistoric peoples' (1996: 5). 
Addressing this issue thus continues to hinge - explicitly or implicitly - on 
conceptions of [i] pre-civilized societies as either inherently savage or 
fundamentally peaceful; and, at a broader and deeper level, [ii] humankind as 
"naturally" either bellicose or pacific. 
The second area of contestation deals with a key facet of the category "primitive" 
itself. "Primitive" (alternatively, 'simple') societies and cultures are typically 
defined in the negative, characterised as lacking in features found in "civilized" 
(aka 'complex' or 'developed') social systems. Amongst the items lacking is a 
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sophisticated - or more often, any - form of writing. Anthropology shares with 
sociology much of the ambiguity of being enstooled midway between C. P. Snow's 
"two cultures", the physical sciences and the humanities (Lepenies, 1988), and 
persistently maintains that a simplest way of viewing its subject-matter is as the 
study of peoples without writing (Levy-Bruhl, 1923: 352-83; Mair, 1966: 9; Daniel, 
1971: 19-43; Crick, 1976: 153; Kalmar, in Olson et al, 1985: 157). A stronger statement 
of this type is found in Levi-Strauss (1961: 291), that of 'all the criteria by which 
people habitually distinguish civilization from barbarism, this should be the one 
most worth retaining: that certain peoples write and others do not', and that 
anthropology's bailiwick is the study of peoples on the nether side of this 
distinction. However, the oral/literate 'great divide' as a valid marker of "the 
primitive" has been challenged (Finnegan, 1988: 12-14, and passim), sometimes by 
its chief theorists (Goody, 1977), as has the firmly-entrenched doctrine of the 
centrality of the fieldwork account that brings it into being (the putatively 
'postmodern' challenges issued by Boon, 1982; Stocking, 1987; Geertz, 1988; Van 
Maanen, 1988; or the seminal Writing Culture collection edited by Clifford & 
Marcus, 1986). 
Here I bring these contestable arenas into conjunction. My claim is that (a) the 
presence or absence of writing is a valid demarcation between types of societies; (b) 
there is no such thing as primitive war; and (c) a prime reason for (b) is (a). 
Expressed at its bluntest, it is argued that the unequivocal term (")primitive 
warn is both conceptually and empirically problematic, and has meaning - and 
utility - only in a suitably qualified sense: hence, following Giddens (1985: 53), I 
maintain the convention of placing the term within inverted commas. 
But this indicative move alone is insufficient: a potential problem remains, in that 
if the logic of the proposition that writing both predates and is a causal factor in 
war holds, then analysis of group conflict within and between societies without 
writing may be regarded as both unnecessary and anomalous - or at the very least, in 
need of explanation. Within the scope of the thesis, why consider, in Turney-
High's (1949) classic formulation, the practices of 'preliterate societies below the 
military horizon'? 
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There is a fivefold justification for such an analysis: firstly, to unpack the thinking 
behind the commitment of those anthropologists who unqualifiedly describe their 
subjects as primitive-warring confederations; second, to stress that although 
"primitive war" is a null category retrospectively applied - equivalent to 
'literacy's' nineteenth-century formulative origin in "illiteracy" (see Chapter 1) - 
this makes it, in the sense of the W. I. Thomas axiom, no less true in its consequences; 
regarding one such consequence, thirdly, to assess the degree to which particular 
forms of exploitative cultural contact (colonialism, imperialism) have been recast 
by the conquerors as legitimate war outcomes; fourthly, to uncover the common 
precursive origins of war and writing - drawing on Keegan's insight, although we 
'date "history" from the moment when man began to write or, more precisely, from 
when he left traces of what we can recognise as writing' and the 'history of warfare 
begins with writing, ...its prehistory cannot be ignored' (1993: 115); and finally, to 
note the way in which "primitive" combat tactics have been incorporated into 
warfare 'proper'/modern war. Hugh Thomas (1995: 148-49) is particularly eloquent 
in elaborating this fifth point: 
'The violence of savage peoples was, and is, expressed in head-hunting, 
assassination, man hunts and predatory expeditions...Can such killings be 
dignified by the name of warfare? No: the idea of "warfare" applies when, 
as J. H. Huizinga put it, a "special condition of hostility solemnly proclaimed 
is recognised, as distinct from individual quarrels and family feuds". This 
definition has not always been carried out even by modem peoples who 
believe themselves civilised. Still, in African communities a fight over 
succession to the chieftainship was traditionally a permanent feature of life. 
To men of the Stone Age, war was not the business of a few select people. It 
was the occupation of every adult male, whose aim was to kill enemy males 
and to abduct the women and children. In some respects, people of the 
twentieth century have returned to a condition where discrimination between 
victims is impossible: slaughter is now on total lines' 
Recourse here to the observations of historians raises a final point: the distinction 
herein between the relatively detailed analysis of the "primitive", and the 
broader and more cursory treatment of the ancient and medieval periods, rests on 
two rationales. The first and more general concerns the essential difference between 
history and the social sciences: while the former necessarily bases depictions solely 
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on what survives of the archaeological and literary record, the latter frames its 
account partly on the artefactual but primarily on the experiential: that is, with 
reference to living subjects. We - as temporally and generically modern - cannot 
"know" the historical past in the same way that we can access the ethnological 
present. The second rationale, related to this first factor but more specific to the 
confines of the present thesis, sees this historical past as both constitutive of and 
constructed by the present. While ancient and medieval eras are 'read' on the basis 
of their recognisable similarity to the present, the "primitive" is resolutely non-
modern, and is studied from the viewpoint of being fundamentally different - such 
difference demanding a more detailed treatment. 
This treatment takes the following form: first, I indicate from the anthropological 
literature the type and degree of the assorted positions within the fields of 
contention. This discussion is grounded in a derivation of the War/Text Axis (Figure 
1.1) as it relates to the societal types in question. Since both the relative size of 
these societies and the social relations that pertain within and between them 
looms large in the analysis, I eschew the unequivocal term "primitive societies" 
and its variants, replacing it with the more indicative designation of reciprocal 
mini-systems. This produces the scheme in Figure 4.1 (below): 
Figure 4.1: RECIPROCAL MINI-SYSTEMS 
Type of Military 	[1] Masaic [MsC] 
Organization Tallenic [Msc] 
Combat Mode: 	[2] "PRIMITIVE WAR" —P.- [3] Simulation/Heroics 
Praxis/Examplefsl (hunting, raids, the feud) 	Ritual- 'Manual' [I] 
Predominant 
Communicative 
Mode 
[4] ORAL CULTURE 
NON-LITERACY —00- 	[6] SAVAGERY [-X, -Y] 
("Amodem") 	 Arche -writing/trace [Osc/OsC] 
coding I 
 
Relative 
Historical Condition 
   
Educational Locus 
	
[7] Band, Tribe. 
& Agents of 
Transmission 
	
Elders. 
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To flesh out this model and further advance the argument, I then construct an 
inventory of 76 societies classified as 'non-warring' in the works of 24 separate 
analysts (Appendices C and D to this Chapter). The particular selections and the 
concomitant choice of analysts is based on [i] a relatively high level of agreement 
on the peacefulness of the chosen societies - some are cited in as many as seven 
separate accounts; this despite the fact that [ii] at least 13 of the authors deployed 
subscribe to the view that 'pre-civilized' societies exhibit high degrees of violent 
organised conflict. The resort by the majority of analysts to [iii] a common database 
- the Human Relations Area File (HRAF) - minimalises the potential for either 
misunderstandings about, or an "apples & oranges"-type comparison between, the 
units of analysis. Moreover, this near-unanimity as to the absence of war in these 
cases is [iv] consistent over time (the earliest study undertaken in 1911, the latest in 
1996). These cases are then placed in a comparative data-set organised around 
their respective structural characteristics (Appendix E), and a determination is 
made as to which of these characteristics is shared, and which are most conducive 
to the evident peace pertaining within these societies. 
4.1: "Primitive War" 
Among savages the means of intercourse are restricted to tribes who are neighbours, 
and hostilities confined in the same manner. As knowledge increases the means of 
intercourse extend, and nations not in the immediate vicinity, learn to mingle in 
each others affairs. The history of European nations proves this, among whom 
treaties offensive and defensive have been constantly extending and multiplying for 
the last two centuries, as their intercourse has increased, and wars, without 
becoming less frequent, have become far more general, bloody, and expensive. 
James Currie, 1793. 
The upper section of Figure 4.1 (segments 1 to 3) deals with aspects of intergroup 
conflict between small-scale societies: which societal members fight and how the 
group's combat formation is coordinated; how such fighting is undertaken and with 
what kinds of technology; and how such conflict is described and classified. 
Regarding the first aspect [1], Andrzejewski (1954) maintains that the basic 
military structures of such groups are of two main types. While both exhibit high 
degrees of combat participation (M) by "suitable" group members (typically adult 
males), and egalitarianism, with low levels (s) of formally-hierarchical ranked 
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authority structures, the Masaic has greater group solidarity (C) than the Tallenic 
type (c). In the case of the Tallensi of Africa, this low cohesion is accounted for by 
environment - small tribal units live in inhospitable terrain, kin-bonded but 
geographically isolated. In Andrzejewski's extension of this Tallenic ideal-type to 
South Africa's Trekboers, early Cossack settlements and particularly the 
frontiersmen of pre-20th-century North America, there is lack of cohesion partly 
because of geographical dispersal, but primarily because of (i) a 'rugged 
individualist' ethos, couched within (ii) an awareness of cultural sameness and 
commitment to a (iii) roughly egalitarian value-system enforced by (iv) personal 
armaments - in the trans-Appalachian states of early 19th-century America, 
'everybody had his gun' - , all operating in (v) the absence of a strong centralised 
government with 'a large disciplined army and a well-organised administrative 
machine; both of which would have been indispensable had the United States been 
exposed continuously to a serious external threat' (1954: 140-41). Thus, 'Tallenic' 
military organisation is applicable to groups outside the "primitive" - ie, not 
structurally simple in the ethnological (technical) sense (although typically 
characterised as "savage" in looser lay terms). Group size is largely irrelevant, 
geographical situation is more salient, but the determining factors in such an 
organizational form are clearly cultural and political. 
With reference to the second aspect above - combat methods and technologies - the 
term 'simulation' as deployed here [3] refers firstly to symbolic substitutes for 
physical confrontation - either the use of non-lethal "weaponry" (such as jokes or 
vocal abuse rather than "sticks 'n' stones") or the application of physical force to a 
substitute non-human "enemy". This is akin to Malinowski's (1941) reference to 
Eskimo 'public insult' songs as a grievance-settling mechanism and to Vayda's 
(1971) description of the 'nothing-fights' of the New Guinea Maring. It is further 
equivalent to Sumner's observations of 1911, citing the practices of Papuan and New 
Guinean peoples, and of "Australian" fighting, where 'Meal fighting rarely takes 
place unless the women arouse the men, and even then it is carried on by taunts and 
wrestling. ..the first wound ends the combat'; this same principle applying amongst 
the Chatham Islanders; the Rengmahs on the Assam Hills, who 'attach to the 
body a tail of wood eighteen inches long, curved upwards, which they wag in 
119. 
defiance at an enemy'; the 18th-century account of the Colombian Aurohuacos, who 
settle disputes by having the contenders 'go out to a big rock or tree, and each with 
his staff beats the rock or tree with vituperations...(t)he one whose staff breaks 
first is the victor; then they embrace and return home as friends'; and the Mm, who 
'do not fight but call in an exorcist to take the sense of the spirits on the matter'. 
From these and other like examples spring Sumner's general conclusion, that 'we 
cannot postulate a warlike character or a habit of fighting as a universal or even a 
characteristic trait of primitive man'. 
Another variant on simulated lethal confrontation - and one that significantly 
shades off into 'heroics' - is the widespread Plains Indian practice of "counting 
coup". Here the warrior acquires personal status through bravery, not by injuring, 
capturing or killing the opponent(s), but by touching the live enemy lightly with a 
hand or stick - the amount of status gained dependent on the degree and kind of 
personal risk involved in the manoeuvre (representative Comanche instances of the 
practice in Fehrenbach, 1975: 75-6; Dyer, 1986: 10). 
If such theatrics constituted the sum total of "primitive" conflict, the image of the 
peaceful 'savage', inhabiting a benign state of nature until exposed to violence 
through contact with "corrupt" civilized societies, would have an indisputable 
basis in fact. But the ethnographic record also shows that some of "nature's 
children" displayed and commemorated their heroic prowess through more 
malignant forms of simulation: reduction of the enemy to meat, mutilation of 
vanquished foes before (and after) their defeat and death, and the spoils of victory 
- trophies both functional (goods, land and kinfolk) and symbolic (portions of the 
enemy's carcass, with the head and parts of the head - skull, scalp' - particularly 
favoured). Evidence of such practices - archaeological (Keeley, 1996; Ferri11, 1985), 
in early accounts of Europeans in close and regular contact with indigenous societies 
(Catlin, [1867] 1967; Cremony, [1868] 1991; Haddon, [1899] 1932), in the recorded oral 
testimonies of surviving members of such peoples (Weems, 1991; W. B. "Woody" 
Skinner, 1987) and in the ferocity displayed by these groups recruited into modern 
al  Claims that scalping was a European importation into New world societies and not practised 
by Amerindians prior to contact with white invaders/colonisers, is effectively discounted, on 
the basis of forensic, etymological and artefactual evidence, by Axtell & Sturtevant (1980). 
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combat situations (account of Evans-Pritchard' described in Geertz, 1988: 49-72) - is 
abundant. 
Such evidence forms the basis for categorising these practices as elements of 
(")primitive warn [2]. Anthropologists adopting such an unqualified category as a 
point of departure are then left with the task of analysing its structure/ mapping 
its distribution, or describing features of - and assigning motives to - this group 
enterprise. Motives are typically sociobiological (gender-based as in McCarthy 
1994, or the 'male supremacist complex' hypothesis of Divale & Harris [1976]), or 
ecological (relying on population pressure and control of fertile land - Harris, 1974; 
Ember, 1982) or some combination of both. The latter approach factors new elements 
- cultural, economic and political - into the explanation, chief amongst which is the 
primitive origin of the state as a war-making entity. 
Social analysts of various persuasions (eg, Hart & Taylor, 1944: 292; Krader, 1968; 
Parsons [ed. Jackson, 1977]; Mann, 1987: 34-72) are roughly agreed on a general 
typology of state evolution. Amalgamating such representative analyses, the 
archaeological and historical record shows a trend from smaller to larger 
aggregations, as in Earle's taxonomy: 
Table 4.1: Some common anthropological typologies of social evolution 
(Earle's synthesis, in Ingold, 1997: 941) 
ChiIde (1936) 
Service (1962) 
Johnson & Earle (1987) 
Sahlins (1963) 
Earle (1978) Fried (1967) 
Hunter- 
Gatherers 
Band 
(family level) Head man Egalitarian society 
Farmers Tribe 
(local group) Big man 
Ranked society 
Civilization 
Chiefdom 
Simple 
Complex Stratified society 
State State State 
32 Evans-Pritchard 's military memoir of 1973 records his leadership of Anuak troops against 
Italian forces in 1940-41: according to Keegan (1993: 89), the 'horrors of the revenge they [the 
Anuall took on their former rulers caused him [Evans-Pritchard] anguish for the rest of his life' 
Each movement also represents an increase in land-fixity, political complexity, an 
extension beyond kin-based relationships and, correspondingly, a shift from 
concreteness to abstraction. In these terms there are five such moves: 
1 family/band -> 2 (= 1 x n) clan -> 3 (= 2 x n) tribe -> 4 (= 3 x n) state -> 5 (= 4 x n) empire/commonwealth 
As indicated by the parentheses, each successive unit is formed from a conglomerate of 
its predecessor(s). Average sizes of the respective formations vary, but following 
Carporael's 1995 scheme and proposals by Mann (1987: 42-4), population estimates of 
at least the first 3 groupings are possible: families minimally comprise 2-5 persons and 
the normal size range of the band is 20-70; clans, considered as lineage-based congeries 
of several families, range between c.30-175 people; and the tribe - for both authors a 
'maximum band' or `macrodeme' - consists of 7-19 bands with a maximal workable size 
of no more than 400-500 persons. 
Population increase past this figure leads to either fission, or the necessary (but not 
sufficient) conditions for the emergence of a state, and the possibility of a subsequent 
assemblage of confederated states into an empire. Past this point also, theories of the 
state become at once and necessarily (a) less empirically grounded, leading to an 
increase in (b) selectivity in terms of independent (and therefore relevant dependent) 
variables, producing both (c) an objective support for the ideal of theoretical 
parsimony as a virtue, wedded to (d) competition between diverse "schools of 
thought", fostering in the domain of discourse (e) premature integration . Mann 
addresses these issues in his presentation of five main theories of the state - class, 
pluralist, realist (international relations), elite and 'cock-up' or 'foul-up' theory - 
before presenting his own mostly-synthetic version: 'organizational materialism', 
which conceives the nation-state as 'power container', this power drawn from an 
amalgam of the ideological, economic, military and political resources 
(acronymically therefore, the IEMP model) that the state can command (Mann, 1993: 
44-88). 
An alternative view posits the properties of the land itself as a determining factor in 
originary state-formation. Working from the standpoint of the ecology to the 
territory in which populations are initially located, and returning to first principles 
rather that deducing retrospectively from later developments, Cameiro critiques 
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both voluntaristic theories - claiming state-formation as spontaneously generated 
from a 'social contract' as unsupported by evidence - and coercive/conquest theories, 
which, although granted as a factor in all states, equally leaves out (i) cases where 
belligerence does not result in the construction of a state; and (ii) does not identify the 
conditions that connect the state to warfare, nor which factor is causal, which effect 
(1970: 168-69). What is eschewed here are theories that rely on human nature as 
either "naturally" associative or "instinctively" acquisitive/ territorial. Presented as 
alternative to both these options is what Cameiro terms circumscription theory: 
originary states arise in diverse locales and differ in terms of their specific 
geographies, but they 'do, however, have one thing in common - they are all areas of 
circumscribed agricultural land' (1970: 169, emphasis in the original). This 
circumscription takes 3 forms: natural barriers (environmental circumscription), 
where the territory is bounded by mountains, deserts, or the sea; resource 
concentration, where the land is available but unproductive; or social circumscription, 
where adjoining desirable land is occupied by (a) pre-established group(s). Given 
that Irdeolithic communities...generally tend to grow in size, placing increasing 
demands on arable lands and other resources' (Graber & Roscoe, 1988: 407), and fission 
or nomadism is vetoed by the circumscribed environment, 'breakout' and expansion into 
fertile but socially circumscribed territory leads to war against the original occupiers, 
and subjugation by the victors leads to more population pressure causing more resource 
depletion and need for expansion, and 'successively larger and more complex units are 
formed until, eventually, a polity is created that deserves the title of state' (Graber 
& Roscoe, 1988: 408). 
As an explanation of war, Carneiro's theory has many virtues. The tenet of the origins 
of a state - and war as a specifically statemaking activity - originating in neolithic 
territorially-bounded groups tallies with other analyses: for instance, in terms of 
acquisition and possession of land and a cognate materialist mindset, it resonates with 
Sahlins' argument in Stone Age Economics (1972) around his conception of 'original 
affluent societies'. 
In his opening chapter, Sahlins builds his depiction of hunter-gatherer/foraging 
groups around the notion of the two possible courses to affluence', alternatively, 
producing much or desiring little. The first course, production of an economic surplus 
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and its negative corollary (the principle of scarcity and inadequacy of economic 
means) is the path adopted initially by neolithic groups, and is most evident/at its 
peak in modern capitalist societies. Paleolithic hunter-gatherers adopt the second 
("Zen") road to affluence. To the degree that this is valid, it means that the "limited 
resources x unlimited desires" formula is inapplicable to such groups on either side of 
the equation - and if this is so, it must also follow that there is likewise no 
motivation for war in such groups. 
Relative to political organisation resulting from territorial expansion, Clastres 
(1987) distinguishes tribes from what, in Carneiro, will later develop through 
warring into states. Tribal chieftainship and leadership in states are opposed to each 
other here - the former, in fact, is a deliberate 'strategy' to prevent the formation of 
the latter: 
'Hence there is no king in the tribe, but a chief who is not a chief of State. What 
does that imply? Simply that the chief has no authority at his disposal, no 
power of coercion, no means of giving an order. The chief is not a commander; the 
people of the tribe are under no obligation to obey. The space of the 
chieftainship is not the locus of power, and the "profile" of the primitive chief 
in no way foreshadows that of a future despot. There is nothing about the 
chieftainship that suggests the State apparatus derived from it... the chief's 
word carries no force of law...' (1987: 205-6, emphases in the original). 
In short, tribes operate on a different basis to 'advanced' societies inasmuch as the 
chief is a reflection, not a "shaper" of 'public opinion', and cannot within his "term of 
office" act contrary to a 'general will' (which he embodies). Clastres argues that the 
structure of non-Statist (here, tribal) chieftainship is such that, were the leader to 
utter the 'mere word' initiating war, the basis of his leadership - prestige and his 
sense of the group's desires - is undercut, and the tribe is duty-bound to abandon him: 
his examples of this process in action are the respective fates of Fousiwe of the 
Yanomamo, and the Apache leader Geronimo. On this reading, tribal formations, 
unlike States, are not governed in a top-down manner, and the chief is ostracised 
unless his pronouncements mesh with a popular will. This links back to Sahlins' 
response to Hobbes' [in]famous take on the primal human condition ('Warre'), where 
warfare is so pervasive and chronic that only the institution of a regulatory State can 
ensure peace. As maintained in Tribesmen, with originary moves out of hunter- 
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gatherer society, '..the potential of Warre is, if anything, increased by the advance to 
tribalism' (Sahlins, 1968: 8), and further increased - indeed, realised - under 
conditions of Cameiro's concept of primal lebensraum. 
Cameiro's theory has further strengths: in style, brevity and concision (the seminal 
1970 paper occupied only 5 pages in Science); and in coverage, applying to later 
situations of colonial expansion (especially the maritime imperialisms of England, 
Holland or the Iberian thrusts into remote territory) as well if not better than the 
original (neolithic and ancient mesoAmerican) exemplary instances. But this latter 
virtue is double-edged; for the type of "war" provoked by various forms of 
circumscription which will evolve into a state is insufficiently differentiated from 
the type of war that such a state will prosecute once established. The power of the 
theory is marred by a consequence of its own evolutionary postulate, a tendency to too 
seamlessly equate an initial form of conflict (originary "primitive war") with its 
state-initiated successor (political war). 
Two earlier analyses undertaken in the 1940s- those of Wright and Malinowski - may 
be regarded as forerunners of Carneiro's account of the origins of war. But unlike 
Cameiro, each carefully distinguishes between the types of violent conflict that 
respectively occur within "primitive/savage" societies and fully-developed 
"civilized" states. Wright preserves "war" as a valid term, but breaks it into 4 
discrete forms - defensive, social, economic and political - maintaining that only the 
last of these are carried out by people 'on the verge of civilization', and that even 
here prototypes of such behaviour among the "pre-civilized" are warlike as opposed 
to unqualifiedly warring. Malinowski's 6-part distinction of conflict-types (a-f) is 
even clearer. For him, only categories (d) - war as an instrument of nation-state 
formation - and (f) - intergroup war 'as an instrument of national policy' - count as 
"war" at all. 
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Each approach is fully detailed for inspection in Table 4.2 overleaf: 
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Table 4.2  Comparison between WRIGHT'S four types of warfare and MALINOWSKI's 
six-part classification: 
• Wright  (1942/1965: 546: underlining 
added). 
'Defensive war refers to the practice of 
those people...having no war in their 
mores...These people have no military 
Organization or military weapons and 
do not fight unless actually attacked, in 
which case they make spontaneous use of 
available tools and hunting weapons to 
defend themselves but regard this 
necessity as a misfortune. Social war 
refers to the practice of people...stated to 
be unwarlike or to engage in only mild 
warfare...These people have customs 
dealing with military tactics, military 
weapons, the circumstances and 
formalities of warmaking and 
peacemaking, and the warriors consist of 
all men in the tribe trained in the war 
mores from youth. Tactics involve little 
group formation or co-operation but 
consist of night raids, individual duels in 
formal pitched battles, or small head-
hunting or blood-revenge parties. War is 
initiated and ended by formalities, often 
quite elaborate. Its purpose is blood 
revenge, religious duty, individual 
prestige, sport, or other social objective. 
It may on occasion involve considerable 
casualties in proportion to the 
population of the group and is 
characterised as cruel or bloody by some 
writers because prisoners are not taken. 
Land or booty of economic value is not 
taken either. The object is slaughter of the 
enemy or acquisition of trophies, such as 
heads or scalps, of symbolic significance. 
These wars are, however, usually not 
very destructive of life and are looked 
upon as thrilling adventures by the 
participants. Economic war refers to the 
practice of people who, in addition to 
other purposes, fight to provide the 
economic needs of the group, such as 
women, slaves, cattle, tools, raw material 
and land. Such people usually have a . 
system of military training in mass tactics 
and regard war as a necessary part of 
the tribe's economic activities...Political  
at refers to the practice of people who, 
in addition to other purposes, fight for a 
political purpose, ie, to maintain a ruling 
dynasty or class in power, to suppress 
rebellion or insurrection, and to expand 
political territory or control. Such 
people usually support standing armies, 
disciplined in group manoeuvres and 
utilizing specialized weapons and 
methods which may prolong a war for a 
considerable period of time. Among them 
the military profession is usually 
regarded as especially honourable. 
People with such practices are on the 
verge of civilization, but writers usually 
classify them as primitive but very 
warlike...' 
• /vtalinowski (1941: 541-42, emphases 
added). 
'(a) Fighting, private and angry, within a 
group belongs to the type of breach of custom 
and law and is the prototype of criminal 
behaviour. It is countered and curbed by the 
customary law within the institutions and 
between institutions. 
(b) Fighting, collective and organized, is a 
juridicial mechanism for the adjustment of 
differences between constituent groups of the 
same larger cultural unit. Among the lowest 
savages these two types are the only forms of 
armed contest to be found. 
(c) Armed raids, as a type of man-hunting 
sport, for purposes of head-hunting, 
cannibalism, human sacrifices, and the 
collection of other trophies. 
(d) Warfare as the political expression of 
early nationalism, that is, the tendency to 
make the tribe-nation and the tribe-state 
coincide, and thus to form a primitive nation-
state. 
(e) Military expeditions of organized pillage, 
slave-raiding, and collective robbery. 
(f) Wars between two culturally 
differentiated groups as an instrument of . 
national policy. This type of fighting, with 
which war in the fullest sense of the word 
began, leads to conquest, and, through this, to 
the creation of full-fledged military and 
political states, armed for internal control, 
for defense and aggression. This type of state 
presents, as a rule, and for the first time in 
evolution, clear forms or administrative, 
political and legal organization. Conquest is 
also of first-rate importance in the processes 
of diffusion and evolution. 
The types of armed conflict listed as (d) and 
(f), and these two only, are, in form, 
sociological foundations and, in the 
occurrence of constructive policy, are 
comparable with historically-defined wars. 
Every one of the six types here summed up 
presents an entirely different cultural phase 
in the development of fighting. The neglect to 
establish the 'differentiation here introduced 
has led to grave errors in the application of 
anthropological principles to general 
problems concerning the nature of war. The 
crude short-circuiting - by which our modern 
imperialisms, national hatreds, and world-
wide lust of power have been connected with 
aggression and pugnacity - is largely the 
result of not establishing the above 
distinctions, of disregarding the cultural 
function of conflict, and of confusing war, as 
a highly specialized and mechanized 
phenomenon, with any form of aggression' 
The centrality of the advanced state to warring practices calls into question the 
(unproblematized) primitive war category in toto. More specifically, organised 
conflict supposedly rife in 'simple' non-state societies has been cast into doubt. 
Thus Schneider contests Murdock's account of Haida violence, and Warner's of 
Murngin fighting, unequivocally concluding that for these as with other 
"primitive" groupings, '[t]his is not war' ([1950] 1968: 291). Fjellman similarly 
queries another notable anthropological work, wherein the 'Yanomamo are said 
to be fierce and are so coded in reports about war. Yet Chagnon (1976: 213) writes 
"the appearance of shotguns in a few villages has had a drastic impact on the 
scale and seriousness of wars. Fighting has broken out where it did not exist 
before" (emphasis mine). This last sentence is ambiguous enough to suggest that 
not all localities among the Yartomamo can be so clearly coded for war' (1979: 198). 
Kiernan (1989: 22)follows suit in maintaining that among the Maori 'before the 
white man and his firearms, hostilities were small-scale and desultory, and the 
issue might be settled by a challenge and single combat, conducted by some degree 
of chivalry even if tricks like throwing sand in an opponent's eyes were resorted to 
at times. It was much the same among the Zulus, before Shake the "Zulu 
Napoleon" organized his military machine and put an end to the sporadic sport of 
"reluctant warfare" they had been accustomed to'. Finally, Nettleship (in 
Nettleship, Givens & Nettleship, 1975: 81), incorporates the views of two other 
prominent analysts in his own opposition to the (")primitive warn 
classification: 
'Speaking of the Masai [c/f Andzrejewski's designation of Masaic military 
organization], the New Guinea Highlanders, and the Crow Indians, Tiger 
and Fox (1971: 214) observe that," At this very primitive level there is not 
- nor was there ever - much of what we would recognise as 'war'. The 
history of our international violence has been, for more than ninety percent 
33 The legend of Shaka's politico-military "raw native genius" tends to ignore the part played in 
Zulu military reforms by his predecessor and mentor, Dingiswayo. Dingiswayo's rise to power 
occurred at a time of Boer expansion and European penetration in the African South, and in his 
years of exile before his accession in the 1790s, he 'had encountered at least one European 
...probably a doctor called Cowan, who is said to have become his friend. Elected chief, 
Dingiswayo deliberately set himself to strengthen the Mtetwa state, and did so with a fuller 
understanding of his times than any previous chiefs ever had. "Not only with the mere novelties of 
horse and gun was it that Dingiswayo had returned from exile...but, infinitely more momentous, 
with the idea of civilization and militarism which those things signified" - and that his successor 
would refine to such devastating effect (Davidson, 1974: 246). 
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of the time, a history of raid and skirmish". ("International" is an obvious 
error of terminology for reference to a "primitive level", no doubt motivated 
by a desire to ease identification of their material by contemporary general 
readers - perhaps they mean "intergroup"). Primitive societies are not 
sovereign states, they lack armed forces, and their fighting is of 
inconsiderable magnitude and of especially brief duration'. 
How, then, do we more accurately classify the conflicts in "primitive" societies? and 
how is such violence ("primitive war") to be separated out from homicidal 
criminality on the one side, and non-lethal simulations of violence in non- "primitive 
war"ring (peaceful) societies on the other? 
In relation to the first issue, I follow Black-Michaud's distinctions between raiding, 
the feud, vengeance killing and warfare: the last term is distinguished from the first 
three by dint of its being finite in time, directly political, normatively exceptional, 
invariably collective and impersonal (1975:1-32, esp. pp 27 ff). In my conception, and 
as analytically distinct from this category of war, "primitive war", even when 
prosecuted on a sizeable scale, shares structural and tactical characteristics with 
these alternative forms of conflict. 
With reference to the second issue, - the conditions under which the levels of physical 
violence and lethality attending "primitive war" do not emerge, or are sublimated 
into non-lethal pantomimes of violence - we return to the 'peaceful societies' 
paradigm and its exemplars outlined at the beginning of this chapter.  Appendices C  
and D exegetically 'extract' seventy-six such societies from ethnographic sources; 
when comparatively examined in Appendix E, across the range of variables detailed 
in the accompanying coding key, the top 20 societies - those yielding the greatest 
range of ethnographic information - show marked dissimilarities in terms of 
geographical and ecological factors (columns c-e); mode of subsistence (column f); intra-
political organisation (although clans predominate) and inter-political relations 
(although the 'isolated' category is heavily represented - columns g-h). Similarities 
emerge in column i, where with one exception (case 18) groups engage in Wright's 
special categories of 'social war' (6 cases), 'defensive war' (2 cases) or no war of any 
kind (4 cases). In columns j-n, on Otterbein's criteria for military activity comprising 9 
cases, 'civil war' occurs 'frequently' in 3 cases, 'infrequently or never' in the remainder; 
and war against other societies occurs 'infrequently or never' in all bar one recorded 
instance (case 9 - column j). Column k shows that the 'military organisation(s)' in the 9 
samples are either composed of 'nonprofessionals' (5 cases) or non-existent (the other 4 
cases); military tactics, where evident (5 cases) are lowest-level (column 1) and 
casualty rates are correspondingly low (column m - 4 cases). When the 9 societies fight 
at all (5 cases), motives centre on land, plunder and/or revenge - and significantly 
never on 'subjugation and tribute', 'trophies and honour' or 'defence' (column n). 
Finally, on the evidence of the 13 groups ranked by Cameiro in terms of the presence of 
cultural and political traits characteristic of 'civilized' societies, a dearth of either is 
clearly apparent (columns o and p), indicating a closeness to 'nature' and a consequent 
distance from the world as organised governmentally and mediated culturally. 
In these findings the 'deficit theory' of "primitive" circumstances is preserved. The 
greatest commonality between the groups under consideration (reciprocal mini-
systems) is negative, a lack the majority of factors later assessed by the 'civilized' as 
vital to military success. Whether 'red in tooth and claw' or fundamentally pacific, 
the contrast' with war-waging entities formed into states, supplied with the 
technological, attitudinal and military advantages this provides - and endowed with 
command of an infrastructure of writing that is both progenitor and product of such 
advantages - is clear. The consequences of confrontation between such societies and 
their opposite numbers - 'simple' precivilized' "primitive warring" groups without a 
systematics of advanced writing - is typically fatal to the survival of the latter, as 
illustrated in Appendix G, and as avowed by Wright when maintaining that 
'Out of the warlike peoples arose civilization, while the peaceful collectors 
and hunters were driven to the ends of the earth, where they are gradually 
being exterminated or absorbed, with only the dubious satisfaction of observing 
the nations which had wielded war so effectively to destroy them and to 
become great, now victimized by their own instrument' (Wright, cited as the 
closing statement to Otterbein, 1970: 108). 
34 In Appendix F, I attempt to further clarify this contrast. The left column is an inventory of "non-
primitive" peaceful societies. As opposed to the equivalent list in Appendix D, Melko's items must 
be ranked according to time-periods rather than locales, his societies occupants of a surrogate/ 
mediated rather than a "real"/natural environment. Keeley's list on the right shows how the 
alternative view of "primitive war" as the provenance of overt "savagery" is deployed in the 
contexts of modern war - the tactics of what Taber (1970) refers to as 'the war of the flea', Tallenic 
or guerrilla warfare - so different from the conventions of 'real' war as to result in the diversity of 
outcomes on display. 
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These outcomes graphically demonstrate a key consequence of life in a primarily oral 
culture [4] mediated by non-textual signs and face-to-face interaction. In the same way 
that the illiterate in a literate culture is/are significantly disadvantaged relative to 
the lettered, "amodern" societies living in a retrospectively-evaluated condition of 
non-literacy [5] have this condition equated to [6] savagery, with low or formally non-
existent levels of formally differentiated power [-X] or the institutional mechanisms 
of a rational economy [-Y], the development of both checked by the absence, or at most 
a primal form (Arche-writing/the trace) of textuality. In the sphere of knowledge, 
relevant information about the known world is in principle accessible to all members of 
the society (band, tribe), gleaned in the first instance from the material world itself, 
and transmitted to neophytes by those (elders) with the longest tenure in this world 
[7]: an educational locus so different from that pertaining in modern 'complex' societies 
as to permit analysts as divergent as Jamake Highwater (1981) and Lucien Levy-Bruhl 
(1923) to respectively refer to a 'primal mind' and a 'primitive mentality'. 35 
As claimed earlier (at p. 115 of this chapter, and on p. 17 of Chapter 1), Levi-Strauss is 
clearest in maintaining that the presence of writing differentiates between societal 
types, and confers power - primarily military power - on one type at the expense of 
others. But the status of his position, which in its fuller elaboration (in the 28th 
chapter of Tristes Tropiques) not only casts writing as a differentiator between peoples 
but evaluates it as a hegemonic exploitative force, is heavily contested. Moreover, a 
key problematic of an oral/literate divide involves the validity - and the rights - of 
the "civilised" to speak of and for the "primitive", and the legitimacy of 
communicating findings about societies built on utterance by credentialed 
ethnographers, in a written form, for a literate audience. 
The favoured way of alleviating this potential dilemma - the 'cultured' reporting on 
the 'natural' - is through fieldwork. Writing, both in the form of notes in the field and 
the resulting polished ethnography produced after the research event, is an adjunct to 
That this difference is a consequence of social structure and not cognitive incapacity is evident in 
works dealing with the diverse effects of "unschooled" literacy on a-modern nonindustrial 
groupings such as the Limba and the Mende of Sierra Leone (Finnegan, 1988: 45-58; Bledsoe & 
Robey, 1986), the Dayak of the Ulu Paku in Sarawak (Nicholl, 1951), the Kaonde of Zambia 
(Crehan, 1985), the Hausa of northern Nigeria (Armer & Youtz, 1970), the Vai of Liberia (Scribner 
& Cole, 1981) and the White Hmong of Northern Thailand (Tapp, 1990). 
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engagement in the daily rounds of the designated group: first- hand in situ experience 
of the group is privileged. The cardinal sin within the discipline is "armchair 
anthropology", and on this score Levi-Strauss is taken to task by Edmund Leach's 
(1973) critique. In openly declaring himself as a Malinowski-style functionalist, and 
hence hostile to the tenets of structuralism and its founder, Leach attributes what he 
views as the weaknesses of the structuralist perspective in anthropology to the fact 
that Levi-Strauss himself did so little actual fieldwork: 'about five months of actual 
field experience' in Brazil between 1934-7, during which time he 'can never have 
stayed in one place for more than a few weeks at a time and.. .he was never able to 
converse easily with any of his native informants in their native language' (1973: 10, 
18-19). On this critique Levi-Strauss, like Frazer before him, is too much a creature of 
the pen and a child of the academy, too little immersed in the life of the tribe' . 
The methodological hegemony of the fieldwork account has lately been subjected to 
scrutiny by revisionist 'postmodem' practitioners who see anthropology as primarily a 
species of narrative: most notably Geertz (1988; 1993: 1-36) and the contributors to 
Clifford & Marcus (1986). But this text-centred approach has been subject to attack on a 
number of grounds: Cameiro, championing the scientific validity of physical 
anthropology as established by methodologies in the field, brands the "post-modern" 
new ethnography as fatuous, obscurantist, aberrant and over-reflexive (1995; c/f a 
near-identical critique of the Clifford/Marcus collection dismissed as 'metatwaddle' 
in Gellner, 1992: 36-48, and Auge's belief that Clifford's thoroughgoing textual 
approach in ethnology 'runs the risk of triviality' [1995: 36] ); and a fine line separates 
the treatment of ethnography "as if" it were a fiction from ethnography as a fiction - 
'6 A fuller attack on Levi-Strauss, working from an entirely opposed premise and from outside 
anthropology, is offered by Derrida: 'If writing is no longer understood in the narrow sense 
of linear and phonetic notation, it should be possible to say that all societies capable of 
producing, that is to say, of obliterating, their proper names, and of bringing classificatory 
difference into play, practice writing in general. No reality or concept would therefore 
correspond to the expression "society without writing". This expression is dependent on 
ethnocentric oneirism, upon the vulgar, that is to say ethnocentric, misconception of writing. 
The scorn for writing, let us note in passing, accords quite happily with this ethnocentrism. 
The paradox is only apparent, one of those contradictions where a perfectly coherent desire 
is uttered and accomplished. By one and the same gesture, (alphabetic) writing, servile 
instrument of a speech dreaming of its plenitude and its self-presence, is scorned and the 
dignity of writing is refused to nonalphabetic signs' (Derrida, 1976: 109-10, parentheses in 
the original; but c/f Goldberg [1990: 17- 26], who suggests a range of affinities between the 
speculations Levi-Strauss derives from the Nambikwaran 'writing lesson' and the wider 
implications - in spite of and/or against the stated intent - of Derrida's critical attempt to 
deconstruct this text). 
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the latter demonstrated in the differently problematic works of Tobias Schneebaum 
(1972) and Carlos Castaneda (De Mille, 1980: 68-91). 
Moreover, recent moves towards what Franklin calls 'deep ethnography' in the 
Anthropology of Nature (1996: 3-4) see a re-emphasis on even more intense fieldwork 
(for general overviews see Ingold, 1994; the 1996 readings edited by Descola & Palsson; 
and especially Rival's work [1993; 1996], re-examining the Huaroni from the vantage-
point of actual involvement in their hunting and gathering activities rather than 
relying on "door-of-the-tent" fieldnotes built up from informants ex-post facto 
accounts). The eventual status of this work - and the extent to which it is motivated by 
dissatisfaction with former ethnographic studies gleaned by reading the record of 
precursor anthropologists in the first instance - is an open question; but the divide' 
between the existential and the textual is maintained. For Harris, the distinction is 
clear enough to posit the presence of the written as a point of subject-matter 
demarcation between affiliated social-scientific domains, where laInthropologists 
and sociologists recognise no more fundamental distinction than that which separates 
literate from preliterate cultures, and the differences are manifest in countless details 
of social organisation and institutions' (cited in Finnegan, 1988: 6). 
The attempts by ethnographers to bridge this divide bring out a final instance of the 
complexities of reading/writing, and an ironic manifestation of its connection to 
warfare. For, consonant with the vestigial traces of "primitive war" methods in the 
37 The ongoing discomfiture this divide induces is apparent in the attempts by the two following 
prominent anthropologists to place "primitive" beyond the reach of usage as a term of abuse. 
Firstly, Mair: 'Many anthropologists have classed as "primitive" the peoples who do not have 
writing. ...Where writing is not known, the number of persons who can be said to have a common 
government - if we may beg the question for a moment and assume that there always is such a thing - 
is small, rarely more than a few hundred thousand. So anthropologists sometimes refer to "small-
scale" societies. "Pre-literate" is another word that does not have the offensive connotations of 
"primitive". But neither of these words goes very well with "government". So let us keep 
"primitive", but remember that when it is used it refers to the outfit of techniques available to the 
members of a given society, and not to their mental characteristics (1966: 9). Similarly, Kalmar: 'I 
have indicated that there is a gradient of text permanence between languages in which there is little 
or no composed oral literature (no texts or memorized perorations of any length) and those with a 
large body of permanent written texts. To simplify the argument, let us call languages at the first 
extreme "primitive" and the others "evolved". (As in social anthropology, primitive here means 
simply "in an early stage". The thesis that a primitive language is of inferior worth will not be 
revived by any thinking linguist today. It is not even necessary that a primitive language be less 
complex than an advanced one. Adaptation to changing extralinguistic factors is all that is at 
stake). There may be many features not found in primitive languages that are found in evolved ones, 
and vice versa' (Kalmar, in Olson et.a/.,1985: 157). 
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theory and practice of guerrilla war (see note 34) and its adoption/adaption by 
advanced 'civilized' armies in specific war situations, anthropologists must also in 
part "go native" - paradoxically to render their a-modern human subject-matter 
comprehensible to a modem readership itself created and conditioned by textuality: 
'It can be argued, then, that the phonetic alphabet, alone, is the technology 
that has been the means of creating "civilized man" - the separate 
individuals equal before a written code of law. Separateness of the 
individual, continuity of space and time, and uniformity of codes are the prime 
marks of literate and civilized societies... .It is in its power to extend patterns 
of visual uniformity and continuity that the "message" of the alphabet is felt 
by cultures' (McLuhan, 1971b: 94). 
I now turn to the next step(s) in the origins of this creation. 
4.2: Reading/Writing and War in the World of Antiquity. 
This section is premised on those parts of the ancient world that presage, or are held 
to usher in, aspects of the modern. Discussion is therefore limited firstly to facets of 
textuality and war in this world, and - although other societies are tangentially 
considered - a particular portion of the ancient domain: a Grwco-Roman "legacy" 
bequeathed to the peoples of succeeding eras. 
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'The Classics! It is the Classics.. .that devastate Europe with wars!' 
William Blake, cited in Taplin (1989: 244). 
Homoic warfare is characterised by a low military participation ratio (in relative 
rather than absolute terms), low levels of subordination, and high cohesion W. The 
first factor - low MPR - marks the beginnings of restrictions placed on a given 
population's combat involvement, and the rise of a consequent military caste. 
Whereas in (massed) "primitive" combat all able-bodied adult males fight, Grwco-
Roman" war limits participation by personal status (restricted in principle to fully-
fledged citizens of a pre-Hellenistic polis or the earlier Roman Empire, an elite) and 
by economic class ( limited in practice to those who can afford to equip themselves 
with personal arms, personal army and/or direct frontline and logistical support in 
the form of a retinue of personal followers). Command of these armies - basically 
independent units engaged in a common enterprise for the duration of hostilities - 
accounts for autonomous generalship and consensual campaigning, hence low levels of 
subordination within the command hierarchy. High cohesion is maintained, not 
simply or only as in the Masaic sense of a community of fate linked by blood and 
affinal ties, but in the sense of affective (non-kin) bonds and residence within a 
bounded territory: a cartographically-determined terrain that must be defended (or 
extended) by force of arms." 
38 By the composite term "Grco-Roman" I stress a retrospectively-applied western cultural 
heritage: the period covered by the term follows standard historical chronology (eg, Parker 1995), 
the Greek world spanning the period c. 750-300 BC (from the establishment of the city-states to the 
collapse of the Hellenistic world following Alexander's death in 323), Imperial Rome's extending 
from 264 BC-AD 565 (from the early Republic to the death of Justinian). 
39 This emphasis on territory figures heavily in the analysis in Connor's (1988) monograph on 
early Greek land warfare as symbolically rather than materially significant. The field of battle is 
mutually determined by contending armies as an area outside the polis. It is of no strategic 
importance to either side: hence, at the war's conclusion, although the battlefield is commemorated 
it typically remains unoccupied by the victors - neutral ground, the chief purpose of which is to 
strengthen the institution of the polis itself. Connor's description of early hoplite warfare (1988: 8- 
18) also stresses that this form of fighting - a pattern of mobilisation, procession to the field, 
forming into close battle ranks, the clash, the trope (or "turning", giving of ground by one side, 
pursuit and slaughter of those fleeing by the other), the mutually-agreed outcome and retrieval of 
the dead prior to return to the polis - and the fact that commanders lead by example, stresses heroics 
through individual combat and tactics in determining victory [2], but leaves no (remotely-located/ 
uninvolved) overview of the battlefield, thus no space for strategy. This fighting space is further 
restricted by the weaponry deployed - defensive shields and body armour, swords and spears for 
assault, a distaste for projectiles accounting for the low status of slingers, archers and by extension 
naval personnel - weaponry that, unlike the adapted hunting implements of "primitive" warriors, 
is purpose-built (Manual II) for use in war. 
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The consensual aspect of homoic warfare has several ramifications. At the origins of 
the city-state - and as prototype to the modern fully striated state, in the Greek polis 
- Detienne considers the place of the military assembly in the institution of what 
Habermas, in his oppositional contrast between a democratic Lifeworld colonised by 
an increasingly hegemonic System, would later call an 'ideal-speech community'. In 
the Achaean world, and unlike the worlds of either Wittfogel's precedent 'oriental 
despotisms' or their own "barbarian" contemporaries (those Jaynes [1993] refers to as 
'bicameral literate theodicies'), 
'[t]he language of warrior dialogue-speech was not only egalitarian; it was also 
secular. It was language that belonged to human time, unlike the 
magicoreligious speech that coincided with the action it promoted in a world of 
nonhuman forces and powers. Dialogue-speech, by contrast, preceded human 
action and was an indispensable complement to it. The Achaeans met to 
deliberate before every engagement.. .In such military assemblies, the value of 
speech for the first time depended on the judgement of the social group as a 
whole. It was here that preparations for the future status of legal or 
philosophical speech were made, speech that submitted itself to "publicity" 
and drew its strength from the approbation of a social group' (Detienne, 1996, 
orig. 1967: 99, emphasis added). 
The importance of consensual speech in the early military assemblies both accounts for 
the high status accorded to rhetoric and orality in the ancient Greek worldview and 
the concomitant Platonic antipathy to writing (see 3.7, p. 98 above). This is both 
unlike earlier (and most later) military systems, and a planting of the seeds of 
subsequent (and also unique) Athenian participatory democracy: but it also (i) contains 
an essential and militarily fatal tension between individual prestige and the 
necessity of a war cohort united by common aims, leading directly to (ii) imperialism 
[3] fostered by (iii) a more steeply-stratified command and control structure predicated 
not on an organisational infrastructure of speech, but on writing. 
An indication (early warning system) of the tensions that set this process in train can 
be found in Homer's Iliad: then as now the cornerstone' of a (")Classical(") education 
" In the context of the thesis, it is at least noteworthy that the foundational works of the western 
literary canon - Homer's Iliad and Odyssey - are epics of, respectively, war and repatriation. My 
fuller contributions to the Homeric issues broached here can be found in Golden L, Shay J, Van 
Northwick T, Williams MF, Sproule W, Cramer 0, Tandy D, Becker AS, Carnes JS, Haluska JC [ed], 
Rosienne AM & Clay JS (1995): 'The Iliad Thread', Classical Bulletin, 71, [1]. 
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[7]. There the narrative turns on the wrath of Achilles directed at his commander-in 
chief, Agamemnon, on the basis of a perceived slight to his honour. Achilles, along 
with his personal contingent (the Myrmidons), initially withdraws from the Greek 
expeditionary force, later rejoining the fray - again personally motivated, this time 
by the death of his companion Patroclus - with fatal consequences for the Trojans and 
their leading basileus (hero), Hector. Encapsulated within this plot and the 
character of its leading protagonist are several of the inherent flaws in a homoically-
organised army: insubordination publicly expressed in the presence of assembled 
commanders; subsequent loss of morale and personnel in ensuing engagements; 
resignation and reappearance on the battlefield at will." On this basis, Bowden's 
reading (1993) of the 'message' in the Iliad for a city-state social system is that the 
strength of the polis lies not so much in the cult of the hero, but in the cohesion of the 
phalanx - a lesson gradually absorbed by the armed forces of subsequent eras, in their 
formal prohibitions against Achillean behaviour (insubordination, loss of 
disciplinary self-control, breaking ranks and desertion). 
Echoes of these structural tensions recur in the 5th Century BC, in a civil rather than 
an international conflict, and in a record of life rather than literature. Thucydides' 
account of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) details - in the first recognisably 
factual/objective history - the ruinous consequences of personal hubris in conflict with 
collective civic interests in time of war.. .and the escalation of the problem when 
voiced in a broad public forum. In Books V, VI and VIII of his history (translated/ 
edited Warner, 1976), Thucydides devotes much of his narrative to the personality 
41 In The Lust to Annihilate, Eli Sagan (1979) highlights another facet of Achilles' character - his 
"berserking", his "barbaric" treatment of Hector's corpse, stopping just short of cannibalism - as a 
further affront to both post-Archaic Greek sensibilities and the (then-extant and succeeding) rules 
of war regarding treatment of the vanquished. A life-imitating-art instance of such savagery occurs 
in October, 332 BC: Alexander's successful assault on Gaza is celebrated by his piercing of the 
ankles of the Gazan leader Batis, and dragging him to death behind his chariot around the walls of 
the defeated city in a mimesis of/identification with the Achillean example. The incident is related 
in Curtius (4.6.25ff) and, while still controversial within Alexandrian historiography (see, eg, de 
Selincourt's appraisal [1971: 147, n. 581 in his translation of Arrian's account of this campaign), 
not inconsistent with the more psychotic aspects of Alexander's career - particularly evident 
when the Macedonian conqueror behaves as a proxy of mythical icons such as Achilles or 
Herakles. A 20th-century parallel of such self-concepts survives in General George S. Patton's 
beliefs ('subconscious memories') in himself as (re)incarnation of warriors from previous epochs 
(Wallechinsky, Wallace & Wallace, 1978: 81 - "past lives" including #2, a Greek hoplite who 
fought the Persians of King Cyrus, one of Caesar's legionnaires stationed in northern Gaul [#4], 
and #3, a 'soldier of Alexander the Great at the siege of Tyre'). 
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and activities of the Athenian general Alcibiades, and the part the latter plays in 
key events - most notably initiation of the disastrous Sicilian expedition - that lead to 
the ultimate defeat of an imperialist Athens, and its submission to the succeeding 
Spartan and Theban hegemonies. The concluding books detail accusations against 
Alcibiades and charges brought against him (for supposedly private excesses and plots 
to form a dictatorship); his subsequent recall, escape to Thurii, and outlawing in 
absentia; his appearance in the Peloponnese, and emergence as an adviser to the 
Spartan assembly and leader of the Spartan forces; and his negotiations with the 
Persian ambassador Tissaphernes, firstly arranging Persia's alliance with the 
Spartans, later - when Alcibiades crosses back to the Athenian side in 412 - 
guaranteeing Persian backing for Athens against Sparta. Thucydides - an avowed 
Periclean - is clearly ambivalent as to Alcibiades' character-traits that set these 
machinations in motion: but just as clear on their consequences, noting from his earliest 
appearance in the narrative that, for the Athenians, 
'Although in public capacity his conduct of the war was excellent, his way of 
life made him objectionable to everyone as a person; thus they entrusted their 
affairs to other hands, and before long ruined the city' (VI. 15/1976: 419, 
emphasis added). 
What is extraordinary to modern normative understandings of military activity in 
the cases of a mythical Achilles and a real-world Alcibiades is not just the degree of 
personal autonomy they exhibit in the face of group war-aims - but the seeming 
acceptance, or at least taken-for-grantedness of such actions, in the social context of 
the world(s) in which they operate. Aspects of Achillean "heroics" will later 
contribute to the refinement of both the laws of war relating to battlefield conduct and 
treatment of the defeated dead, and strong military strictures against breaches of the 
chain of command. The ease with which Alcibiades slips in and out of allegiance to 
contesting sides in a war-situation, while likewise eventually prohibited, will have 
a longer life-span. Instances of Alcibiadean "side-swapping" prior to its eventual 
reinterpretation as a form of treachery, are to be found in the careers of Sir John 
Hawkwood [?-1394], most famed of the fourteenth-century condottieri (Stephen & 
Lee, 1917: 236-242; Tuchman, 1979); Albrecht Eusebius Wenzel von Wallenstein, Duke 
of Friedland and Meckleburg [1583-1634], rated, with Gustavus Adolphus, as a 
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military genius of the Thirty Years War, whose 'lack of loyalty and overreaching 
ambition brought his downfall' (Keegan & Wheatcroft, 1987: 324); and the 'almost 
legendary' Henry Humphreys Evan Lloyd [c. 1718-83], who 'served most of the 
(competing) political causes of Europe both on the battlefield and in clandestine 
operations' (Gat, 1989: 67ff). Although the inheritors of this tradition survive to the 
present in the form of the mercenary, Lloyd's "career moves" represent the last such 
instance of the acceptability of military privateering and Alcibiadean loyalty 
shifts. From the late-18th Century onwards, such radical side-changing will be 
reinterpreted as treason, and the career (and the very name) of another prominent 
sideswapper - Benedict Arnold [1741-1801] - will become a by-word for treachery 
(Windrow & Mason, 1997: 16-17). 
The long-run history of the Roman military, by way of contrast and despite the 
assorted mutinies, factional contests/army coups and divided loyalties to rulers of 
state that colour the last days of the imperium, is conspicuously less susceptible in 
toto to the cult of the personality - the quasi-mythical individual 'hero' - and its 
ensuing consequences. In the surviving accounts of Sallust (composed 44-40 BC), the 
abortive Catiline conspiracy of 63 BC is unambiguously seditious, despite Catiline's 
Alcibiadean-like mixed reputation for personal excess, coextensive/jostling with 'a 
man of enormous energy, a brave soldier, popular with a wide circle of friends to 
whom he was intensely loyal, generous with both his money and his time' (Handford, 
introduction to Sallust, 1975: 163). The historian's prior narrative of The jugurthine 
War implies that immunity to a Catilinian insurrection rests heavily on the 
organisation of the army itself in the wake of the long-standing reforms instituted by 
Marius in the Second Century BC. These reforms centred on conversion of the army 
from a conscript militia to a regimentally-structured professional fighting machine, 
manned by able-bodied citizen recruits - and as Sallust makes clear, the motives of 
Marius in instigating these reforms are to avoid the structural weaknesses and the 
attendant indiscipline of the Greek model. Marius' consular policy speech of 107 BC 
portrays him as a plain-speaking "new man" of the people, risen from the plebs but 
retaining their practical values, opposed to his patrician consular peers who have 
'taken to studying history and Greek military treatises', gaining their military 
knowledge 'from hearsay and reading'. Thus Marius maintains that it is 'my 
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adversaries who require oratorical skill to cover up their turpitude. Nor have I 
studied Greek literature; I had no interest in a branch of learning which did nothing 
to improve the characters of its professors' (Sallust, trans/edited Handforth," 1975: 
118, 120). 
The Marian antipathy to oratory and a high-cultural Greek literature as inimical to 
a militarily-defined 'character' produces, through refinements over time, an Imperial 
armed force, wherein the older convention of the Achaean military assembly as a 
decision-making entity is first supplemented, then supplanted, by a bureaucratised 
system of planning, initiating and organising war. The command-control structure and 
fighting capacity of the Legion increasingly relies on an infrastructure of writing, and 
is composed of a soldiery recruited from a general population versed in alphabetic 
literacy: a condition to which the army itself is the main contributor as well as the 
prime beneficiary. As Hopkins' analysis of Rome and its provinces in the 1st and 2nd 
Centuries AD maintains, the empire 'was bound together by writing... The whole 
experience of living in the Roman empire, of being ruled by Romans, was 
overdetermined by the existence of texts' (1991: 144). In order 'to explain why the 
Roman conquest state helped produce more literates than ever before', Hopkins centres 
on the 'instruments of coercion, which helped maintain the Roman government and 
elite in power': these being 'written laws, courts of justice, bureaucratic 
administration, and the army' (1991: 137). In relation to the last of these institutions, 
'compared with the army, the professional bureaucracy was itself only a minor 
consumer of literates' (1991: 139). In part this was an simply a matter of numbers, the 
fact of the army being the single largest organization in the period, with an 
estimated strength of c. 300,000 bodies: but principally it was due to education as 
'a factor which helped promotion, because the army by its procedures of written 
rosters, written orders, and book-keeping, fostered the use of writing. It was not 
simply that some or many Roman soldiers could write; they were repeatedly 
asked, ordered or required to write; the Roman army's organization presupposed 
42 Handforth also supplies a succinct description of the organisation of the legion in the Republican 
period (1975: 26-8). For an analysis of Roman military structure, personnel, training, weaponry 
and size in the period of the long Pax Romana under Hadrian and the Antonines - a model basically 
unchanged from the time of the Marian reforms, and enduring across the period of the Principate - 
the first volume of Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1983, orig. vols. I-VIII, 1776-88: 
I, 32-65) is, despite its age, an indispensable guide. 
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that many soldiers could write' (Hopkins, 1991: 138, emphasis added). 
Just how central and pervasive writing was within the military is indicated by the 
1970s archaeological find at Vindolanda, a garrison near Hadrian's wall on the 
northern frontier of the Empire, of a cache of preserved texts dating from c. AD 90-120. 
The recovered artefacts show a variety of writings in different hands, bearing 
signatures from all ranks, and with contents both official and personal - from 
administrative and diplomatic correspondence to letters for friends and family: 
evidence robust enough for Bowman (1994: 123) to 'implicate a fairly broad range of 
people (not just the equestrian officer class) in the literacy-using network' that joined 
the peripheries of the Empire to its centre. The intercontinental reach of the 
conquering Empire at its height - and the necessity of contact with and control of 
barbarian" peoples, the brunt of which is borne directly by its legions - in fad accounts 
for this military privileging of writing as both an organisational principle and a 
technological means of maintaining affectual ties with a faraway homeland. 
The ambivalence of Grxco-Roman attitudes to the barbarian origins (see note 44) of [4] 
alphabetic writing equally shapes the form and status of that writing - rendering 
ancient literacy [5] both always and ever dependent on speech, which it merely 
records, and - in opposition to the semiotic codes in the orthography of 
precedent/rival empires and societies, [6] functional within the political economy of 
slave-based societies. Harris study of the functions of literacy in the Grwco-Roman 
world (1989: 26-27) underlines the lowly-statused but necessary applications of 
43 The constitution of the 'barbarian' in Greek and Roman conceptions is noteworthy here. For the 
Greeks, the barbaroi are distinguished from the Hellenes on a number of grounds: "they" are not 
organised as true poleis, practise only hetero-(rather than homo- or bi-)sexuality, clothe their 
bodies rather than appear (semi-)naked in public (Sennett, 1994: 31-67), and favour forms of 
writing over the rhetorical arts. The insularity of pre-Alexandrian offensive Greek imperialist 
war mitigates against challenges to such a view. Roman Imperialism is not so "immunised", but 
nonetheless retains the last distinction: Woolf (1994: 84) emphasises the retrospective irony here, 
in that the 'idea that literacy implies higher levels of modernity and rationality remains deeply 
ingrained in our consciousness...but for the Greeks writing was invented and imported by 
barbarians, and most Roman accounts followed in that tradition. Even if litterae were thought in 
some contexts to be connected with civilized knowledge, barbarians were distinguished from 
civilized men by language, along with appearance and temperament, and their innate irrationality 
was not attributed to a lack of letters'. Gibbon underpins the irony in a footnote, stating that the 
'use of letters was introduced among the savages of Europe about fifteen hundred years before 
Christ; and the Europeans carried them to America about fifteen hundred years after the Christian 
era. But in a period of three thousand years the Phoenician alphabet received considerable 
alterations, as it passed through the hands of the Greeks and Romans' (1983 [orig. 1776]; I, 49). 
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writing. Schematically, and bearing in mind that 'this list is certainly not an 
exhaustive one..., but it probably covers the great majority of what was written down 
in antiquity' (Harris, 1989: 27), writing was employed in the following domains and 
applied to the following activities: 
Table 4.3: Functions of Grwco-Roman Literacy (Harris, 1989: 26-27):  
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1. LEGAL/ECONOMIC  
indicate ownership 
maintain accounts 
make offers of sale by means of signs 
provide receipts 
label commodities or products 
indicate weights or measures 
make contracts 
write letters 
give instructions to a subordinate 
make notes of useful information for oneself 
make wills 
2. COMMEMORATIVE 
honour a distinguished person 
commemorate one's presence 
memorialize the dead 
3.RELIGIOUS 
dedicate something to a god 
publicize a religious calendar 
record prayers 
circulate prophecies 
record a magic spell 
curse someone 
transmit a sacred story 
4. CIVIC  
record treaties 
state statute law 
issue an edict 
display political slogans 
put legends on coins 
cast a vote 
record trial proceedings 
record the proceedings of officials 
compile military records 
compile lists of demesmen, citizens, etc. 
record an award of citizenship 
record manumissions 
declare a birth or death 
record the names of magistrates 
apply to or petition authority 
answer petitions 
announce entertainments 
5.CULTURAL 
transmit works of literature 
transmit compendia of information 
perform school exercises 
This estimate of usage tallies with Goody's observations in The Domestication of the 
Savage Mind (1986), which shows that the earliest uses of a writing system were not for 
"literary" works, but for the compilation of lists and inventories. This function was 
common to, and set limits on, writing systems preceding and coextensive with the 
developed Greek alphabet: Sumerian and Mesopotamian cuneiform, Egyptian and 
Hittite hieroglyphics, Indus writing and Chinese logographs, and Mycenaean Linear 
A/B. The functional applications of the Archaic Greek alphabet preserves the range of 
what is possible in earlier heavily-consonantal/ideogrammatic scripts, but extends it by 
tying the written to speech.What is revolutionary here is not the introduction of vowels, 
but the isolation of graphic signs that represent phonemes in natural language. This 
technical feature has wide social ramifications, in that texts are in principle accessible 
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to all members of the group, down to the level of the slave. Unlike pictographically-
based systems, 'unprivileged' phonetic literacy does not restrict textual access, and the 
monopoly of power/knowledge it confers, to a particular - usually priestly - class." For 
Skoyles, this also accounts for certain anomalous features of the Graeco-Roman cultural 
heritage: Greek democracy - literate-based but lacking libraries, tightly-organised civic 
archives, mechanico-technological innovations or anything like a text not based on the 
monologic or dialogue form (ie, the novel) - is in one sense a "throwback to egalitarian 
"primitive" societies: 
'Many if not all novelties of Classical Greek culture can be explained by an 
interaction of hunter-gatherer traits in the resources and material circumstances 
of an urban" environment. Instead of seeing the originality of the Greeks as 
progressive, this suggests they should be seen as regressive. The "Greek 
revolution" was a return of human existence to those traits previously found in 
hunter-gatherer bands but in urban circumstances which could give them new 
opportunities to realise their cultural potential' (Skoyles, 1990: 331). 
Relative to imperialism, the work of Innis (1950; 1951) is centrally predicated on the 
idea of empire-creation as intertwined with both the development of writing as an 
intellectual - but more as a material - technology. The relationship between the two 
gives rise to the concept of 'bias'; the essence of 'bias' resides in communicative form as 
either 'space-binding' - monumental, durable, boundary-marking, permanent - or 'time-
binding' - light, flexible, mobile. The shifts from the fixity of a pictorial writing system 
(hieroglyphic, ideogrammatic) to a phonetic alphabet, and the shift from what is 
written on - flesh to stone to papyrus to parchment to paper - corresponds to the control of 
" As evidenced by the admonition of the anonymous 'Egyptian of the New Kingdom' to his fellow and 
future literati to 'Put writing in your heart that you may protect yourself from hard labour of any 
kind. The scribe is released from manual tasks; it is he who commands' (cited in Hovles 1977: 23, 
citing Goody & Watt 1962-3, citing V. Gordon Chi1de 1941: 187-8, cited in Giglioli, 1977: 323). 
Weber also stresses the 'civilization of antiquity' as a distinctively urban culture, and conceives of 
the origins of the city as a juxtaposition of the political, the commercial (a market) and the military - a 
garrison/fortress (Weber, 1968: 1212-1372). Elsewhere, in analysing the ancient world's demise, 
'one basic point must be stressed: the civilization of Antiquity did not decline because the Empire fell, 
for the Roman Empire as a political structure existed for centuries after ancient civilization had 
passed its, prime. In fact this civilization had been in eclipse for a long time. By the early third 
century Roman literature was played out, and Roman jurisprudence deteriorated together with its 
schools. Greek and Latin poetry was moribund, historiography faded away, and even inscriptions 
started to fall silent. Latin itself soon gave way to dialects. When, after one and a half centuries of 
decline, the Western Empire finally disappeared, barbarism had already conquered the Empire from 
within' (Weber, 1988 [orig. 1896: 389). 
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space by territorially-expansionist empires. Writing historically expanded spatial 
structure of itself, provided a body politic 'with a transpersonal memory', established 
diverse monopolies of knowledge based on control of the medium, and extended social 
structure, which 'strengthened the position of an individual leader with military power 
who gave orders to agents who executed them. The sword and the pen worked together' 
(Innis, 1950: 11). Spengler neatly summarises the longer-term heritage of such a 
conjunction: 
'The build of the Latin sentence is yet another consequence of Rome's battles, 
which in giving her conquests compelled the nation as a whole to think 
administratively; German prose bears traces even to-day of the Thirty Years' 
War.. .world-history is dependent - to a degree that students have hitherto 
scarcely imagined - upon the exisence of script as the essentially historical 
means of communication. The State (in the higher sense of the word) presupposes 
intercourse by writing; the style of all politics is determined absolutely by the 
significance that the politico-historical thought of the nation attaches in each 
instance to charters and archives, to signatures, to the products of the publicist; 
the battle of legislation is a fight for or against a written law; constitutions 
replace material force by the composition of paragraphs and elevate a piece of 
writing to the dignity of a weapon' (1971 [orig. 1922]: 152-53; original emphasis). 
The next section details aspects of such a heritage - a further paradoxical meld of the 
regressive/progressive - and casts the Middle Ages" as a beginning-point of 'all those 
who feel themselves to be associates of one of the more ancient or more typical secret 
societies of the West, those oddly indestructible societies unknown it would seem to 
46 A word on periodization: one indicator of the complexity associated with the medieval epoch is the 
scholarly problem of assigning to it a precise beginning, ''middle" and end. A definitive sorting-out of 
such a problem is beyond the scope of this thesis: but for my purposes, suggested borderline dates for 
the period's inauguration would follow Wallace-Hadrill's (1988) characterisation of a 'Barbarian 
West' ranging from 400-1100 AD, with the career of a representative later leading figure of the period 
in its entirety - Dante (1265-1321) - spanning the Medieval and the Renaissance. Tighter symbolic 
inaugural dates would be 529 AD, the year that St. Benedict founded his monastery at Monte Cassino, 
and Justinian closed the Academy in Athens, or the burning of the Library at Alexandria in 640 AD. 
Tentative end-points for the period are similarly arbitrary, depending on what one wishes to 
emphasise: one possibility is the early 1450s - the introduction of the printing press in Europe - or the 
more precise May 29th 1453, the day the Emperor Constantine died on the battlefield in his 
unsuccessful defence of Constantinople against the Saracens. Key aspects of such a dating are the rise 
of early nation-forming, and the waning of the concept of Crusades, effective armour, and an effective 
system of feudal demesnes. An alternative choice would be 1492, marked by the European discovery of 
the Americas, and the expulsion of the Moors and Jews from Spain which ended the characteristically 
medieval Islamic culture in the Spanish south and paved the way tor extreme European nationalism. As 
an outer limit closure, 1517- the beginning of the Protestant Reformation - would constitute a final 
obvious choice. 
[2] 
Praxis/Examplels1  
Combat Mode: 
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Antiquity, which came into being with Christianity, most likely at the time of the first 
monasteries, at the periphery of the invasions, the fires and the forests: I mean to speak 
of the great warm and tender Freemasonry of useless erudihon' (Foucault, 1980 [orig 1976]: 
79). In terms less scathing than Foucault's, the medieval era is framed as sporadically 
initiating a 'republic of letters'/community of the book. The focus is on the way in which 
the seemingly 'useless erudition' of scribes, copyists and exegetes spreads beyond the 
hermetically-sealed boundaries of its institutional loci - the monasteries, surviving and 
reconstituted libraries, and the earliest universities - and becomes an organising principle 
for a chaotic world predicated on interpersonal and intra-/inter-group violence. I 
concentrate particularly on the bellicose interactions between devotees of religions of the 
Book - transcontinental holy war(s) and the establishment of various forms of the 'church 
militant'; the re-orchestration of ancient warfare patterns, a concomitant revamping of 
classical textuality, and the interplay between these factors segueing into a 
revolutionary era of modernity; and - with particular reference to Chapter 3 - significant 
steps towards the evolution of both a collective (state) and individual (self) body 
through the instantiation and spread of a particular type of textual proxy. 
4.3: Feud(alism) and Text(uality) in a 'World lit only by Fire' 
Figure 4.3: FEUDAL SOCIETIES 
Type of Military  
Organization  
Predominant 
Communicative 
Mode 
[1] Ritterian [msc] Mortazic [mSC] 
4 
HOLY WAR ----0" [3] 
(Crusade, Jihad) 
t 
SCRIBAL LITERATURE 
+ [4] 
Tactics/Strategy 
Mechanical 
Relative 
Historical  
Condition 
[51 RESTRIC1ED LITERACY (Premodern) 
[6] DESPOTISM/BARBARISM [X, -Y] 
Montagism [Isc/ISC] 
overcoding 
Educational Locus  
& Agents of 
Transmission  
[7] Monastery, Academy 
Monks, 'Wandering Scholars'. 
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The title of section 4.3 is purloined from Manchester's 1992 study, and typifies a dominant 
view of the medieval epoch as literally and figuratively "unenlightened": springing 
from the 'dark ages' of a civilizational collapse, contingent - what the 'Middle Ages' are 
in the "middle" of are the glories of Graeco-Roman antiquity and a 
renascent/Enlightened contemporaneity - pervaded by superstition, fear, and the 
unrelieved brutality that are the fruits of a condition of ignorance (representative 
assessments in Huizinga, 1924; Tuchman, 1975; J. Burke, 1985). Although an organised 
system rather than randomly chaotic (Bloch, 1978), and despite the fact that over an 
approximately thousand-year timespan, a civilizing process develops through a 
phylogenetic pattern of self-control and the ontogenesis of a fully-formed State (Elias, 
[1939] 1982), the overwhelming impression of feudal societies remains one of isolated 
outcrops of restricted enlightenment in a whirlpool of relentless violence. 
The period's turbulence is chiefly accounted for by the resort to armed force, and the 
organisation of such force constituting a world composed of societal ties based on military 
obligations to assorted elites controlling a technics of violence - the oppressed and the 
rest. In my adaptation of Andrzejewski's categories [1], the medieval MPR is always 
relatively low; the extreme variations in degrees of both subordination and cohesion 
depend on whether the aims are primarily outward-directed (empire-building through 
conquest, the Mortazic type) or inner-centred (Ritterian, the consolidation of militarily-
derived power by control of a subjugated populace, what could be referred to as, following 
Marxian historiography, a feudal "protection racket"). These ideal-types are mutually 
constitutive, the manpower necessary for the accomplishment of large-scale military 
ventures (Crusade/Jihad)" reliant on a muster of the obligated population in an 
47 The Crusades - whose contending forces date their respective origins from the adoption of 
Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire in 324, and the birth of Muhammad ibn 
Abdullah in 570 - begin with Urban II's declaration of a 'War of the Cross' to liberate jeruasalem 
from Muslim Turkish occupation in 1095, and continue in a series of erratic mass engagements until 
the Crusade of 1228 led by Frederick II in the aftermath of the Fifth Crusade of 1217. Although these 
specific episodes by no means involve all warring contenders, nor exhaust all categories of warfare 
in the Middle Ages, they centrally exemplify the blend of religious and military power essential to an 
understanding of the period in its entirety. In concrete terms, the Crusades are prefigured by the 
Reconquista of Muslim Spain begun under Alfonso 11 (866-911); they constitute a basis for the judicial 
development of the 'Just War' concept; they establish the leading military orders (the Hospitallers in 
1070, the Templars in 1118, the Teutonic Order in 1128, and the Iberian Orders from the mid-late 12th 
Century) that shape the Christian world globally and locally; they adopt secular form in the chansons 
de geste and the chivalric code of the later (High) middle ages; and they presage later eras of 
reconaissance and colonial expansion of the fifteenth century. Subsequent (secular) war retains 
aspects of it's 'Holy' precedents. 
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enterprise of holy war [2], which in turn leads to the expansion of the sphere of 
territorial control by the victor - and consequently, more human raw material to draw 
from in subsequent ventures. 
This is a variant on patterns evident in the world of antiquity, a blending and 
heightening of the formerly-opposed despotic/barbaric [6] and early-democratic. As the 
term feudalism itself suggests, war and the military figure heavily in the foundations 
and maintenance of the medieval polity, most especially in the maintenance of 
monarchies (Harriss, 1976). Less well-acknowledged is the role played by armies in 
nascent moves towards medieval proto-democra tic assemblies. Bisson maintains that our 
comprehension of the era is coloured by an 'underestimation of military aspects of 
parliamentary origins', which can be 'attributed to the tendency to view developments of 
the High Middle Ages anachronistically. In recent times representative institutions 
have come to be regarded as incompatible with militarist rule. Ordinary affairs of state 
are usually distinguished sharply from what we like to think of as the extraordinary 
affairs of war'. But - and contrary to such an assumption - it is 
'hardly open to doubt that European representation arose in a society of a different 
sort: a society that, notwithstanding considerable advances in social objectives and 
political-administrative techniques, remained organized primarily for war. Even in 
England, with its exceptionally progressive institutional life, those who ruled were 
still in the thirteenth century mainly those who fought. Those who were ruled, 
moreover, were still thought of in fundamentally military terms. Landholding, the 
obligations of society, and privileges long continued to be defined militarily - and no 
one questions the significance of tenure and status in parliamentary beginnings. The 
"people" or "nation", considered in relation to the ruler as well as to other peoples, 
was in the first instance an army, or at any rate the pool from which an army could be 
mustered' (Bisson, 1966: 1199-1200). 
Yet despite this formal structural precondition - and despite the image of bellicosity and 
barely-leavened 'barbarism' with which the period is broadbrushed - medieval war 
never, in any of its various stages, reaches the scale or intensity of war in either 
Antiquity, Byzantium or Modernity. Contamine's (1984) invaluable analysis of the 
period concludes that, regardless of a conscriptable 'commons' from which to draw - with 
exemptions for particular cohorts such as children, the aged, clerics and women - 'a 
system of conscription such as the Roman Empire had known or which contemporary 
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states have in general had to adopt was almost unknown in the Middle Ages... the 
"populace" at best constituted potential combatants, but they were only called upon in 
critical situations (and then with some apprehension and reservations)' (1984: 305). 
Similarly, with regard to the warrior nobility, he notes the stark contrast between 'the 
smallness of armies of knights with the considerable numbers which could be assembled' 
(1984: 306), judging that in terms of either the ancient empire's or the modern nation-
state's ability to assemble and consistently maintain in the field considerable armies, 
'the inferiority of the Middle Ages appears startling' (1984: 307). 48 
Equally noteworthy for Contamine is what the era does not experience relative to earlier 
and later ages: war-migration and demographic displacement; slave wars; large-scale 
wars of hegemony; or (except 'at the periphery') rivalry 'between nomads and sedentary 
peoples' (1984: 303-04). Any claim to originality that feudal warfare can stake must be 
based on the the technical mode of combat [3]: the preponderance of 'a very experienced 
heavy cavalry, possessing costly mounts, stirrups, complete armour and very firm, 
enveloping saddles' (1984: 303), and the development of defensive systems - centred on 
the baronial castle - and perfection of siege instruments to breach such defenses. The 
development from tactics to a time/space mastering strategy is assessed by Contamine as 
being more noteworthy than critics such as Liddell-Hart, Overstraeten or Muraise credit; 
but examples of strategic innovation are limited to medieval familiarity with the works 
of Vegetius (late 4th-Century AD) (1984: 208-37) or at most with Maurice's Strategikon of 
c. 1100, a handbook of specifically Byzantine military thinking (trans/ed. Dennis, 1984). 
Strivings towards strategy are present but prodromal at most, and Gat's (1989: 1-24) 
survey of military theory also claims no innovatory movement in the field until 
Montecuccioli's and Machiavelli's Renaissance contributions. 
48 Contamine also points to another difference between the modem and the feudal when characterising 
the high Middle Ages (within the period 1150-1300') as experiencing 'times of almost complete peace': 
'In this respect Brittany, which in the half century from 1250 to 1300 knew only one war of any 
length...was by no means exceptional. During Henry III of England's reign of 56 years (1216-72), only 
20 were affected by warfare [6 on the continent, 5 in Wales, 2 on the Scottish borded...in England 
itself there were only six years when fighting broke out. Even the rivalry of Italian lordships and 
communes... had only a limited impact on life and daily activities. For many sovereigns the time had 
now finally passed of annual military expeditions so characteristic of the earlier Middle Ages. Philip 
Augustus after Bouvines (1214) and St. Louis, throughout the major part of his reign, only had to raise 
armies periodically and no longer knew the constant fatigue and dangers of military campaigns. Their 
links with war became very tenuous' (1984: 65). This is a useful point of comparison with Melko's 
peace periods (Appendix F1 and its qualitative and quantitative significance relative to the frequency 
of modern/'post'modern war will become apparent in the following Chapter. 
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The explanation for these practical limitations on war in the Middle Ages is not 
attitudinal - whether prompted by holy fervour and the 'righteous cause' (particularly 
within the Military Orders - Seward, 1974), status, the ethos of a warrior confraternity 
or simple brigandage, commitment to the martial virtues are evident and pervasive 
throughout the period. Nor is it due to technological incapacity: apart from innovations 
facilitating mounted combat and operational siege warfare referred to above, the era also 
saw the refinement of the crossbow, the catapault, and the introduction of gunpowder (all 
initially anathematised as 'diabolical', but increasingly deployed from the 12th Century 
onwards). The true impediments to the medieval prosecution of total war are politico-
economic: the lack of an efficient administrative infrastructure within the medieval 
polity to motivate and control, or to raise and sustain, anything resembling a permanent 
professional standing army; and an inadequately organised fiscal mechanism, either to 
employ a stable military force at a war's inception or to offset the often ruinous financial 
costs of war-prosecution. Underpinning and feeding into both these curtailments is a 
further cultural factor - a particular premodern view of the written word [5] ,restricting 
literacy to a societal minority, a stratum of literati dedicated to the practice of a [4] 
scribal literature, a sacred corpus of knowledge so precious as to be preserved and 
reproduced unchanged, stored in scriptoria, and disseminated to the unlettered through 
the auspices of adepts trained' in interpreting the message(s) contained within its 
text(s). In the same way that this circumscribed form of textuality specifically and 
simultaneously provides a rationale for the activities of the miles Christi, establishes 
formal prohibitions on the use of weaponry, and lays down the precepts of the "Just War", 
more generally 'Christian and courtly values (forerunner of bourgeois values) were foreign 
to martial values even when they in some sense integrated them' (Contamine, 1984: 305). 
49 An indicator of the rigour of such training from the Rule of St. Benedict (480-543 AD): 'Idleness is an 
enemy of the soul. Because this is so the brethren ought to be occupied at specified times in manual 
labour, and at other fixed hours in holy reading. We therefore think that both these may be arranged for 
as follows: from Easter to the first of October, on coming out from Prime, let the brethren labour till 
about the fourth hour. From the fourth till close upon the sixth hour let them employ themselves in 
reading. On rising from table after the sixth hour let them rest in their beds in strict silence; but if any 
one shall wish to read, let him do so in such a way as not to disturb any one else [...] A mattress, 
blanket, coverlet and pillow are to suffice for bedding. The beds shall be frequently searched by the 
abbot to guard against the vice of hoarding. And if any one be found in possession of something not 
allowed by the abbot let him be subjected to the severest punishment. And to uproot this vice of 
appropriation let all that is necessary be furnished by the abbot, that is cowl, tunic, shoes, stockings, 
girdle, knife, pen, needle, handkerchief, and tablets. By this every pretext of necessity will be taken 
away' ([Cardinal] Gasquet [ed], 1966: 84, 96, emphases added). 
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A further and broader paradox: while medievalism is acknowledgedly a time of 
widespread illiteracy - monastic life excepted - C. S. Lewis is nevertheless able to 
plausibly refer to the 'overwhelmingly bookish or clerkly character of medieval culture', 
and speak of a Middle Ages that 'depended predominantly on books';' ) not merely 
Classical works or Christian scripture, but a literature that 'had roots in the "barbarian" 
North and West as well as in that Graeco-Roman tradition which reached them 
principally through books.. .in the Germanic countries, including England, the debt of the 
medieval (and modem) literatures to their barbarian origins is all-pervasive' (1964: 5-7). 
Moreover, the authority extended to manuscript knowledge produces an overweening 
credulity to anything written, an 'astonishing failure or refusal to distinguish... between 
books of different sorts' as in the validity of a scientific against a poetic proposition 
(1964: 31). That this attitude eventually spread beyond the respect accorded to the 
cloistered world of the monastery was due to the circumstance that 'medieval man was by 
no means a static animal. Kings, armies, prelates, diplomats, merchants, and wandering 
scholars [7] were continually on the move' (1964: 143; cf. Waddell, 1927 [1954]). 
Thus, in the West and beyond its borders, several literatures and sub-literatures are in 
active circulation, albeit each assessed in terms of the hegemonic sacral - itself rife with 
interpretational differences and divisions. An early awareness of the governmental and 
military power-potential of this culture of privileged script occurs in the Carolingian 
era, when Charlemagne, Holy Roman Emperor from 800-814 - and himself illiterate - 
employs the scribe Alcuin as chief drafter of legislation for what will become a 
recognisable federated kingdom of Europe (Leff, 1962: 59-61). Two generations later, in 
the secular sphere of politics, two of Charlemagne's grandsons, Charles the Bald and 
5° The centrality of scriptural knowledge to the politico-theological medieval worldview - and the 
tension inherent in the permeable division between the temporal and the spiritual - is well illustrated 
in these two representative statements separated though they are by a roughly 700-year timespan: 
[T]hose who exult in divine assistance and who glory in being able to understand and to treat the 
sacred books without precepts of the kind I have undertaken to supply herewith, so that they think 
these precepts superfluous, should calm themselves for this reason: although thay may rightfully rejoice 
in the great gift God has given them, they should remember that they have learned at least the alphabet 
from men [...] All doctrine concerns either things or signs, but things are learned by signs...' (St. 
Augustine, 396 AD [revised 427 AD], in Robertson [ed], 1958: 4,8); c/ f It is no sluggard who carries 
off the apples of the Hesperides guarded by the ever-sleepless dragon, nor one who reads as though not 
awake but drowsing and dreaming as if eager to reach the end of his task. It is certain that the pious 
and wise reader who spends time lovingly over his books always rejects errors and comes close to life 
in all things' (John of Salisbury [12th Cent], Policraticus bk. vii, cited in Ross 8r McLaughlin, 1977: 
602). 
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Louis the Pious, will ally against the third, Lothair, and seal their union in a treaty, the 
Oaths of Strasbourg (842) - the first official document to be written in a vernacular 
language. Within the monasteries, a Carolingian script will set a standard for 
craftsmanship and manuscript illumination - although unlike their forebears of 
antiquity, the scribal class will limit their creativity to calligraphy, and remain 
copyists rather than composers of text. 
This overview of the Middle Ages shows an epoch riddled with contradictions. In one 
sphere of activity, a condition of incessant warfare, the outcomes of which impact upon 
whole peoples even though the vast mass participate in neither the declaration - nor as a 
rule in the execution - of the warring enterprise. In another, a valorisation of the Written 
Word as established truth in societies where illiteracy is the norm for the majority of 
both rulers and ruled.' Higher-order power - governance of the temporal world - rests 
principally in the hands of a warrior elite, with a king at its apex: higher-order 
knowledge - understanding of and access to the spiritual realm - is primarily the province 
of a sacral status-group of monks, clerks and scribal copyists. The two orders are strictly 
exclusionary relative to the mass of the populations they control, act sometimes in concert 
and at other times in conflict: they are symbiotic but the boundaries of, and criteria for 
membership in each are clearly delineated. 
As an augury of modernity and a significant step in breakdown of this system - and in a 
further contradiction not atypical of the medieval, a step taken with the intent of 
unifying the sacred/spiritual realms, blending the powers of Church and State in an 
effort to introduce new levels of stability into the social structure of feudalism - the early 
11th century sees the production of a legal text by an unknown Norman author forwarding 
the doctrine of the King's Two Bodies. This discourse - clearly against its writer's stated 
intentions - is foundational to a revolutionary new patterning of both war and textuality, 
a new way of conceiving of both bodies and bodies politic, and the resultant configuration 
" Greenblatt (1997: 464-67) highlights another paradox of the epoch: ecclesiatical courts determined the 
punishment of condemned criminals by resort to the mechanism of benefit of clergy. The convicted felon's 
sentence - typically death - could be waived or reduced to codification of the crime committed by 
branding of the body, if it could be demonstrated that the accused was within the purview of 'God's 
Grace'/the possibility of personal redemption. The demonstration took the form of the convicted 
reading aloud from a passage of the Bible. This suggests for Greenblatt the probability that the most 
literate -functionally literate section of society, after a judicial priestly class and the monastic orders, 
was constituted by an outlaw cohort learned enough in selective reading to escape the full 
consequences of their crimes if apprehended. 
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of a contemporary modem world. 
In general, sociology is little concerned with ultimate origins, preferring to leave such 
stories to either religious cosmology or the natural sciences. An exception to this 
observation, however, concerns the origins of its subject matter - aspects of societies under 
conditions of modernity - and its own origins as a distinctive field within the human 
sciences. Among the most durable of these origin myths is the one that sees both 
modernity and sociology as coming into being via a series of two or more revolutions. 
Arguably the most important of these are the political revolutions in mid-17th century 
England and more especially late-18th century France (see, eg, Nisbet, 1970: 21-44; 
Touraine, 1990; or Coleman's 1992 ASA Presidential Address [1993: 1-4]). The first 
produces perhaps the prime emblem of western governance, Hobbes' Leviathan, provides 
a possible answer to Simmel's wondering 'how is society possible?', and sets what Parsons 
will later come to see as the fundamental sociological agenda item, the Hobbesian 
'problem of order': as Callon & Latour maintain from the differing perspective of actor-
network theory, '[t]he solution proposed by Hobbes is... of major importance to sociology, 
formulating clearly as it does for the first time the relationship between micro-actors and 
macro-actors' (1981: 278). 
Hobbes' artificial man, a transcendent amalgam of the bodies of all his subjects held 
together by a covenant of armas y lettras, constitutes the essence of the orderly social. As 
the Frontispiece attached to the original (and associated with all subsequent) edition(s) 
illustrates, he embodies in his person the secular and the spiritual, and is symbolically 
bigger than his subjects and indeed his kingdom: a bulwark ensuring the non-recurrence of 
the "war of all against all" that Hobbes saw as the essential human condition in a 
primeval state of nature. The most fundamental challenge to the king and the system he 
represents - in the English case, culminating in the execution of Charles I in 1649 - 
disposes of the monarch's 'mortal coil' but not the ruler's divinity, which remains intact 
to reinstitute itself through martyrdom in the first instance and the eventual restoration 
of physical rule. The significance of the second political revolution in France, the impact 
of which produces a Condorcet, a Saint-Simon and through Auguste Comte the birth of a 
self-conscious sociology proper, goes further into the establishment of a secular 
democratic system. As Camus points out in The Rebel, the beheading of Louis XVI on 
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January 21 1791 differs from all prior eliminations of rulers in that it entails not only 
killing the king (regicide) but also the practical possibility of his replacement, and the 
overarching principle of his ordination by God (deicide). The cut through Louis Capet's 
neck is simultaneously a cut (aka epistemic break or paradigm shift) in history: public 
order henceforth resides not in the physical person of the monarch but in political 
activities of what John Stuart Mill sees as sovereign individuals operating under the 
Rousseauist concept of the general will. 
Note two prime aspects of this paradigm: firstly, the notion that in the ferment of 
revolution and its aftermath, the older form of sovereignty is severely circumscribed, 
remaining as primarily an ornament under the terms of a constitutional monarchy, or 
disappears completely; and secondly that the singularity of political power - a sovereign 
individual, the general will is maintained, albeit in a more heterogeneous and abstract 
form. But contemporaneous with this unified signifier ran another and eventually more 
potent fiction, initially designed to consolidate regal regimes, eventually to supplant 
them - the proxifying axiom of the King's Two Bodies. 
This doctrine suggests alternative versions of both the historical record and another way 
of conceptualising political power. Briefly stated, this jurisprudential concept puts 
forward 
the claim that the king possessed two bodies or capacities, the one natural and 
private in which he, like any other mortal, began life as an infant, progressed to the 
age of majority and suffered illness and death; and the other political and public in 
which he enioyed such transcendent powers as timelessness - he was always of age, 
immortality - he never died, and ubiquity - he was considered virtually present in all 
his courts even though he was personally absent. While his natural body consisted of 
flesh and blood, his politic body was invisible and incorporeal. The latter was, in 
fact, in the nature of a corporation; it was a juristic person created by the policy of 
man' (Greenberg, 1991: 213; cf. Low, 1915: 255-89; Weston & Greenberg, 1981: 11, 47, 56, 
82, 153). 
Investigated and largely denigrated by Maitland (1911; introduction to Gierke, 1900), 
this fact/fiction compound was given a thorough treatment by Kantorowicz in 1957, who 
both takes the notion more seriously than his predecessor, and relocates its origins in 
English legal history, away from the machinations of contending Tudor, Elizabethan, 
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and early Stuart lawyers, to the Eleventh Century in the writings of the 'Norman 
anonymous', thence through a timespan of two hundred years and a range of European 
countries. The doctrine will later be elaborated in Hammond's (1991) monograph on 
representations of Charles II and the changing status of the doctrine after 1660, Gilman's 
charting of the spread of the 'curious perspective' in primarily seventeenth-century 
painting and literature (1978: 88-128), the collection of monographs in the 'Corps 
Mystique, Corps Sacre' issue of Wale] Ffrench] Studies] dealing with "textual 
transfigurations of the body from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century" (Semple 
& Jaouen, 1994), and Axton's (1977) discussion of the 'Queen's 2 Bodies' as it related to the 
problematic of Elizabeth I's virginity in the 1500s. 52 
Axton importantly notes in a general statement on the King's Two Bodies concept, that 
'[t]his body politic should not be confused with the old metaphor of the realm as a great 
body composed of many men with the king as head. The ideas are related but distinct' 
(1977: 12). The analyses cited above help in elaborating just where the essential 
distinctions lay. The competing metaphor cited by Axton, the realm as singular/ 
integrative body writ large, is well-attested to in medieval and Renaissance literature 
(eg, in the Polycraticus of John of Salisbury [1115-80], Catherine de Pizan's Book of the 
Body Politic [1405-7], or such later secondary overviews as Barnes [1948: 3-28] or Chroust 
[1971: 226-31]). The pictorial and narrative Leviathan and its more ethereal and 
antithetical successors, the Millsian individual and the virtu[ous]al general will of 
Rousseau, can be seen on one reading as heir to this model - but in the drive to either 
preserve or initiate a unitary ideology of political power, conservative or radical, the 
pure symbolism of the older model is retained at the expense of its more material and 
52 Probably better known to sociology is the takeup of Kantorowicz's theme in Bourdieu, who relates 
it to Durkheim's insights about group integration and perpetuity beyond the life of high-status 
individuals through a variety of commemorative mechanisms (1979: 72); Geertz, who allies it to 
Weberian charisma and sees it as a tool for understanding the as-yet-unwritten "political theology" of 
the twentieth century (1993: 121-46); Discipline and Punish, where Foucault presents an inversion of 
the principle in his discussion of the sovereign's polar opposite - the targetting of the monarch's justice 
centred on the least body of the condemned man' (1977: 28-9); and Turner (1992: 49-50), who utilises 
it as a bridge-building device between a social-constructionist modernity and an anti-foundational 
postmodernist orientation. Notably - and oddly in the face of these other appropriations - Le Roy 
Ladurie (1985: 43) cautions against such adoptions of the model; and Coleman's (1993) brief 
discussion traces the persona ficta doctrine to Innocent IV in 1243, notes its transference from 
boroughs, churches and towns to the legal personhood of the king, cites Maitland (who was scornful 
of the concept and dismissed it as "metaphysical - or should we say metaphysiological nonsense") and 
ignores Kantorowicz completely - perhaps in the interest of preserving the perspective of the 
revolutionary 'great transformation'? 
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functional aspects. The 'King's Two Bodies' does not speak the language of reified 
amalgamation and the brutal simplifier', but - consonant with the proxy principle 
deriving from and extending its applications - of relationships between concrete and 
abstract entities, symbolism and corporeality. 
What is missed in post-medieval single body politic models is not only the mortal/ 
mystical body interface of the living sovereign, but the very real concern in the Middle 
Ages with the relationship between dead and living bodies. This is particularly evident 
in the upper social orders (Kantorowicz, figs. 28, 30 and 31; Brown, 1981), but according to 
Finucane also concerned the treatment of the corpses of 'criminals and traitors, saints, and 
those who opted out of the Church or never had the chance to join it' as well as 'the 
ordinary laity and clergy' (1981: 41). Regarding deceased royalty, however, Finucane 
stresses the importance of a wooden likeness of the king, the effigy, which 'was to become 
customary for kings, queens and the nobility... [alt first the effigy was merely a stand-in 
for the dead king but eventually, especially in France, it very nearly developed a life of 
its own' (1981: 47). This corresponds to Dupont's rewinding of the twinned sovereign 
principle back as far as Augustan Rome with its cult of 'the Emperor-god's other body', 
and the largely imperial and patrician practice, striking in a society that had no belief 
in an immortal soul, of fashioning for deceased worthies a 'second body, in wax [imago], 
for which another funeral was conducted' (1989: 398). Auge traces the idea spatially 
rather than temporally when noting that 'in the Akan civilizations (of present-day 
Ghana and the Ivory Coast) the psyche of each individual is defined by two "entities", 
a belief originating in "primitive" kingship: 
'The theme of the king's body double is wholly pertinent in Africa. Thus the Agni 
king of the Sangwi...had a double, a slave by origin, who was called Ekala:...with 
two bodies and two ekala - his own and that of his slave double -the Agni 
sovereign was thought to have particularly effective protection, the body of the 
slave double obstructing any aggression aimed at the king's person. If he failed in 
this role and the king died, the ekala would naturally follow him into the grave' 
(Auge, 1995: 61, 62, underline added). 
But a progressive shift in the composition of the 'royal dummy' is decisive in the collapse 
of the medieval world and the practical end of monarchy. When the double of the body 
politic is ensconced or based primarily on a documentary form - subject to inspection, 
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revision, and interpretation of the archival rules of governance by a literate observer - 
then the possibilities opened up by particular readings render the ruler's 'body natural' 
more accountable to Condorcet's non-evadable 'tribunal' of truth that print introduced 
(see 2.8, p. 68) and consequently more vulnerable. 
Against the maxim that 'the king can do no wrong' (Greenberg, 1991) and the smooth flow 
of hereditary succession entailed in 'the king is dead - long live the king!', the doctrine of 
the King's Two Bodies, reaching its apogee in the heartland of medieval political 
theology, opens into the paradoxical Puritan anomaly that "We fight the king to defend 
the King"; against Louis XIV's Tetat c'est mai', a caricature Sun King, whose power lies 
in the correlation between a wizened ugly 'body natural' turned kingly-mystical only 
when clothed in the trappings of his robes of office (Kantorowicz, fig. 26). The potential 
updates signalled by the sociological extensions of the doctrine are applicable to 
contemporary (non-monarchical) polities; and the lineaments that outline the central 
features of the modern mystical self are likewise not semiotically ceremonial, but 
textual. 
The virtual disappearance of monarchies in favour of other governmental forms - a move 
from divine right of kings to the principles of popular sovereignty - and historical 
advances in processes of secularisation and rationality may be seen as rendering the legal 
fiction of the ruler as possessing a "physical" and "mystical" body obsolete, quaint, of 
merely antiquarian interest as a backwater of nascent jurisprudence. I would argue here 
that, under conditions of modernity, a 'democratised' version of this principle has been 
extended to all members of a given populace - the bodies politic - fictionally bound into an 
imaginary unity. As with modern 'individuals', the formation of modern states is an 
artefact of writing. To take the United States as an instance, Derrida points out that the 
terms of US foundational documents - the Constitution, Bill of Rights, Declaration of 
Independence - are addressed to entities ("Americans") that are only brought into being 
by the documents themselves. As to the national heroes of these entities and the founding 
fathers of these United States, Baehr & O'Brien (1994: 31) echo the King's Two Bodies 
paradigm and posit "2 Thomas Jeffersons": 
'First there was Thomas Jefferson the flesh-and-blood individual who was born in 
1743 and who died in 1826. This was the Jefferson who penned the Declaration of 
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Independence, who was elected as the third president of the United States and who 
was inexorably tied to the context in which he lived. Second, there is Jefferson the 
founder, whose work continues to shape, and continues to be shaped by, ongoing 
political discourse in the United States, without regard to political context. This 
Jefferson, unlike the first, is not dead. The first Jefferson cannot be changed; the 
second cannot remain the same. Jefferson - the man and his work - has become a 
founder, an image, a symbol, a tradition...' 
What intervenes between the two periods, and presages the move into 'modernity 
proper', is the adoption and refinement by the military warrior caste - as will be shown 
in the forthcoming Chapter, more thoroughly and prior to its privileging in civil society - 
of the technologies of alphabetic literacy, leading to new concepts of both consciousness 
and the meaning of 'democracy'. The closing sentence of the Bisson citation (above, at p. 
146), with its hint of the importance of a mass-conscriptable populace, gets directly at 
the true horror of modern warfare and its distinction from/evolution out of the feudal 
model. It can be considered as the rise to pre-eminence of the military's 'mystical body'. 
Warfare persists because war is a specific form of conflict, the central element of which is 
not violence, but the application of means-ends rationality (1.2.2) - the progressive 
control and replacement of impulse by restraint.The possibility of war comes to rest, 
paradoxically, on the presumption of peace as normative - like the paradox inherent in 
the King's Two Bodies construct, the very basis of legitimacy of the entity is the thing 
that destroys it, and the non-monarchical analogue to "fighting the king to defend the 
King" destroys the distinction between warmakirtg and peacekeeping, calling upon more 
resources devoted to the former in order to advance the latter (prime examples here being 
the Cold War or the Reaganite SDI). The justification for war is eventually constructed in 
the abstract, and it becomes an entirely moral enterprise; in the realm of the 'body 
natural', the modern prosecution of war similarly depends on abstracted (more properly, 
latent rather than actually deployed) combat units - hence the centrality of the concepts 
of the army reserve, air power doctrine/strategic bombing theory (Stephens, 1994: 46-79), 
and the fleet-in-being (Till, 1982: 111-39), all logistically supported by supplies from 
rapidly-convertible (ie, civilian into military) 'shadow factories' (Pearton, 1982). Just as 
paradoxically, "civilianisation", "demilitarised" and 	"post-military societies" 
become an eventuality only when and where civil society has been effectively 
militarised 
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The following chapter provides details of these paradoxical affinities; not least 
paradoxical because of mooted connections forged between (a) war as uncontrollable 
violence, the military life as totally-institutionalised unfreedom (Yarmolinsky, 1973), 
the military mind as 'anti-book-learning', and the soldier as robopath (Yablonsky, 1973); 
and (b) the obverse - reading/writing and freedom, textuality and civilisation, literacy 
and democracy. 
APPENDIX C: 158. 
INVENTORY of PEACEFUL SOCIETIES (multiple coding in bold type; n =76 cases ): 
1) W. G. Sumner (1911: 205-07): (Aboriginal) Australians; (unspecified areas of) Papua 
New Guinea and German Melanesia; Chatham Islanders; the Khonds in Madras; the 
Rengrnahs on the Assam Hills; the Mru on the Chittagong Hills; the Bechuana (South 
Africa); the Hierro of the Canary Islands; the Aurahuaco of Columbia; and the peace-pact 
activities of lelven our American Indians' En = 101. 
2) Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg (1915: 228-29): Survey material showing 'nine certain 
and four doubtful cases of "no war". These are mainly confined to the lowest grades, there 
being 4 1 /2 among the lower, 3 1 /2 among the higher hunters, and 2 in the lowest 
agriculture [...] Lower Hunters: ?Winturn, Kubu, Sakai, Punan, Semang; Higher Hunters: 
?Ghiliaks, some Chepawyans, Point Barrow Eskimo, Greenland Eskimo; Agriculture: 
Paumari, Curetu' [n=9]. 
3) M. Mead (1940: 270): (all) Eskimos; the Lepchas of Sikkim [n = 2]. 
4) R. E. Park (1941: 239): the Semangs; the Veddas of Ceylon; the 'blameless' Punan [n=3]. 
5) 0. Wright (1965, orig. 1942: 474, 1216): citing Elliot Smith (1930) whose own research 
relies on 'travellers' accounts' - the African Pygmies, Veddahs of Ceylon, Semang and 
Sakai of the Malay Peninsula, Andamanese, Kubus of Sumatra, Punans of Borneo, Aru 
Islanders, Phillipirte Negritos, Australians, Eskimos, Dene Indians, Salish, Algonquins, 
Beothuks, Paiutes, California Indians, Tierra del Fuegans, and Siberians; the Yurock 
Indians of California [n=20]. 
6) J. Schneider (1950: 288): 'Davie observes that the "native Australians are far from being 
a warlike race in spite of their frequent affrays...real war does not exist among the 
Australians" [n = 1]. 
7) E. R. Service (1966: 95-97; 110).: (aboriginal) Paiute and (Western) Shoshone; Tierra del 
Fuegians (specifically Alakaluf, Chono, Ona and Yahgan); Andaman Islanders [n=4]. 
8) M. Sahlins (1968: 5; 43-4): Hopi Pueblos [n=1]. 
9) K. Otterbein (1970: 20): Copper Eskimo (n. coast of Nth. America); Dorobo (E. Africa); 
Tikopia (Polynesia); Toda (South India) [n = 4]. 
10)R. Harrison (1973: 7-8): '[Gorer lists] the Arapesh of New Guinea, the Lepchas of 
Sikkim, [and] the pygmies of the Ituri rain forest of the Congo as nonwarring peoples. To 
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this list might be added the Tiwi of Bathurst Island off Australia' [n = 5]. 
11) E. Fromm (1974: 167-681:  'System A: Life-affirmative Societies...[those that have] a 
minimum of hostility, violence or cruelty among people, no harsh punishment, hardly any 
crime, and the institution of war is absent or plays an exceedingly small role... Among the 
societies falling under this life-affirming category, I have placed the Zuni Pueblo Indians, 
the Mountain Arapesh and the Bathonga, the Aranda, the Semangs, the Todas, the Polar 
Eskimos, and the Mbutus' [n=8]. 
12) S. K. Tefft (in Nettleship, Givens & Nettleship, 1975: 708-09): '...the Majangir of 
Southwestern Ethiopia...The Majang had no military organization and no war patterns [...] 
a war ethos did not develop among the Majang' [n=1] 
13)M. Roper (in Nettleship, Givens & Nettleship, 1975: 661): 'Certainly, if Huber [c /f 
same source, p 643] is correct in his analysis, the Anggor [of New Guinea] do not engage in 
war' [n=1] 
14)Morey & Marwitt (in Nettleship, Givens & Nettleship, 1975: 447): 'The Siriono and 
the Warao...were not warlike...' [n=2] 
15)A. Montagu (1976: 262): Australian aborigines; Kalahari Bushmen; (all) Eskimos; the 
Pygmies of the Ituri Forest; the Hadza of Tanzania; the Lepchas of Sikkim; the Birhor of 
Sthn. India; the Semang of Malaya; the Punan of Borneo; the Tasaday of Mindanao; 'Most 
of the peoples of the Arctic, Subarctic, Great Basin, northeast Mexico and probably Baja 
California, lacked anything resembling true warfare before European contact' (1976: 267); 
the Lapps of Scandinavia (1976: 270) [n = c.11]. 
16) D. Fabbro (1978): the Semai of Malaya; the Siriono of eastern Bolivia; the !Kung 
bushmen of the Kalahari; the Mbuti Pygmies of equatorial Africa; the Copper Eskimo of 
Nthn. Canada; the Hutterites of N. America; the islanders of Tristan da Cunha in the 
South Pacific [n = 7]. 
17)Karig, Horan & Reis (1978: 204):  Overview - 'Ethnographers and other coders find the 
following have no warfare: Central Eskimo (Boas, 1888: 57); Copper Eskimo (Jenness, 1922: 
86, 94-96); Dorobo (Otterbein, 1968: 280); Kung (Thomas, 1959: 21-22); Lepcha (Gorer, 1938: 
133, 138, 142, 327, 359); Siriono (Holmberg, 1950: 11, 152, 158-159); Toda (Otterbein, 1968: 
280); Trumai (Murphy and Quain, 1955: 15); and Woleai (Otterbein & Otterbein, 1965: 
1481)' [n = 9]. 
18) 1. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1979: 170): the Tasaday; the Phi Thong Luang (Mrabri) [n=2]. 
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19)G. Dyer (1986: 5-11): the Walbiri aborigines of Australia; the Bushman population of 
South Africa; [unspecified] New Guinea tribe (1986: 9); the Piegan and Shoshoni Indians; 
(all) Eskimos [n=6]. 
20)M. Harris (1987: 190): the Andaman Islanders, the Shoshoni, the Yahgan, the Mission 
Indians of California, and the Tasaday of the Philippines [n=5]. 
21)P. Crook (1994): Eskimos, Australians, Fuegians and Bushmen (following Kropotkin, 
1902; 1994: 109); the Kayans of Borneo (following McDougall & Hose, 1912; 1994: 165; 258 n 
58); the Arafuras, Todas, Bodo, Mislunis, and Pueblos (following Spencer, 1876; 1994: 216 n 
40) [n=10]. 
22) B. McCarthy (1994: 109): special case of 'those cultures in which warfare is rare or has 
long been abandoned': the Gisu of Uganda; the Mechinaku of Amazonia; and 'the pacific 
!Kung Bushmen of the Kalahari' [n=3]. 
23)G. Trompf (1994: 27-8): the Indian Chenchu; the 'sacrosant places of refuge' among the 
Sawi of coastal Irian Jaya; 'certain Arapesh clans'; the Chambri of the Sepik River region; 
the Gebusi of the Strickland River region in Papua [NB: Trompf states (1994: 25 n 3) that 
Ji]n the following pages, I tend to use the terms "war", "warfare" and "feuding" 
interchangeably..."] [n=5]. 
24)L. Keeley (1996: 27-32, 205): the relatively more unequivocal attributions - the Gonds of 
India; the Lapps of Scandivania; the Tikopia of Polynesia; the Cayapa of Ecuador; the 
Mbuti Pygmies of Zaire; the Semang of Malaysia; the Semai of Malaya; the Copper 
Eskimo of arctic Canada; the Mardudjara of the western Australian desert; [in North 
America] the Panamint, Battle Mountain, and Hukundika Shoshone; the Gosiute and the 
Kaibab Paiute of the Great Basin; the Wenatchi and Columbia Salish of central 
Washington [n= 16]. 
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76 SOCIETIES Classified as 'NON-WARRING' in the Works of 24 , 
REPRESENTATIVE ANALYSTS: 
I. (Aboriginal) Australians [x5] 	 39. Majang 
2. Algonquins 	 40. Mardudjara 
3. Andaman Islanders [x3] 	 41. Mbuti [x6] 
4. Anggor 	 42. Mechinaku 
5. Arafuras 43. Mission Indians of California [x2] 
6. Aru Islanders 	 44. Mishmis 
7. Aranda 	 45. Mru 
8. Arapesh [x3] 	 46. (Gosiute and Kaibab) Paiute [x2] 
9. Aurahuaco 47. (Panamint, Battle Mntn. & Hukundika) Shoshone 
10. Bathonga 	 48. Paumari 
11. Bechuarta 49. Phi Thong Luang (Mrabri) 
12. Beothuks 	 50. Phillipine Negritos 
13. Birhor 51. (Piegan 	Shoshoni [x3] 
14. Bodo 	 52. Point Barrow Eskimo 
15. Cayapa 53. (Hopi & Zuni) Pueblos 
16. Chambri 	 54. Purtan [x3] 
17. Chatham Islanders 	 55. Rengmahs 
18, Chenchu 	 56. Sakai [x2] 
19. (some) Chepawyarts 	 57. Sawi 
20. Copper Eskimo [x4] 58. Semai [x2] 
21. Curetu 	 59. Semangs [x6] 
22. Dene Indians 	 60. Siberians 
23. Dorobo [x2] 61. Siriono [x3] 
24. (all) Eskimos [x7] 	 62. Tasaday [x3] 
25. Gebusi 	 63. Tierra del Fuegians [x3] 
26. Ghiliaks 64. Tikopia [x2] 
27. Gisu 	 65. Tiwi 
28. Gonds 66. Toda [x4] 
29. Greenland Eskimo 	 67. Tristan da Cuhnans 
30. Hadza 	 68. Trumai 
31. Hierro 69 . Veddas [x2] 
32. Hutterites (Nth. America) 	 70. Walbiri 
33. Kayans 	 71. Warao 
34. Khonds 72. (Wenatchi and Columbia) Salish [x2] 
35. Kubu [x2] 	 73. Wintum 
36. !Kung Bushmen [x6] 	 74. Woleai 
37. Lapps (x2] 	 75. Yahgan 
38. Lepchas [x4] 	 76. Yurock 
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KEYS TO CODING FOR PEACEFUL SOCIETIES SPREADSHEET:  
Column A: NAME of group 
Column B: Rf=NUMBER of ANALYSTS citing group (overall n = 24) 
Column C: Rg= geographical REGION(Textor, 1967: 65 ff): 
AF= 'Africa, exclusive of Madagascar and northern and northeastern portions of the 
continent'; 
CM= 'Circum-Mediterranean, including Europe, Turkey and the Caucasus, the Semitic Near 
East, and northern and northeastern Africa'; 
EE= 'East Eurasia, excluding Formosa, the Philippines, Indonesia and the area assigned to the 
Circum-Mediterranean, but including Madagascar and other islands in the Indian Ocean'; 
IP= 'Insular Pacific, embracing all of Oceania as well as areas like Australia, Indonesia, 
Formosa, and the Philippines that are not always included therewith'; 
NA= 'North America, including the indigenous societies of this continent as far south as the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec'; 
SA= 'South America, including the Antilles, Yucatan, and Central America as well as the 
continent itself'. 
Columns D to I: Wright's designations (1965: 527-574). 
D:C1=CLIMATE [C=cold, T=temperate, H=hot]; 
E:Hb=HABITAT [F=forest, M=mountain, S=seashore, D=desert, G=grassland]; 
F:Ct=CULTURE [H=hunters, P=pastoralists, A=agriculturalists]; 
G:P1=POLITICAL ORGANISATION [C=clan, V=village, T=tribe, S=state; following Spencer's 
1896 scheme, but c/f Service's more usual 1962 taxonomy of Bands-Tribes-Chiefdoms-States in 
Otterbein, 1970: 18-19]; 
H: Ir= INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS [I=isolated, M=moderate contact, C=close contact; 
"contact" means contact with either 'any people of higher culture' or 'modern European 
civilization', 1965: 551]; 
I: Cw=CHARACTER of WAR [D=defensive war, S=social war, E=economic war, P=political 
war]. 
Columns J to N: Otterbein's coding (1970: 143-49). 
J: 04/5=INTERNECINE (civil) WAR - 'If there is more than one political community within the 
cultural unit, how frequently do they war with each other?' &/or EXTERNAL WAR - 'How 
frequently does the cultural unit (or one of its political communities) attack other societies?' 
[1=continually, 2=frequently, 3=infrequently or never]. 
K:08='What is the type of MILITARY ORGANIZATION?' [1=composed of professionals 
('age-grades, military societies, and standing armies'), 2=composed of both professionals and 
nonprofessionals, 3=composed of nonprofessionals ('professionals are usually full-time, paid 
warriors'), 4=no military organization]. 
L: 013/4='What is the major type of MILITARY FORMATION?'/ 'If there is an 
ALTERNATIVE type of military formation, what is it?' [1=specialized units and coordinated 
actions; 2=lines, shock weapons; 3=lines, projectile weapons, cover; 4=lines, projectile 
weapons, cover not used; 5=ambush - surrounding enemy; 6=ambush - laying trap]. 
M: 015= CASUALTY RATES: 'In most battles using major type of military formation, are 
casualty rates (deaths) high or low?' [1=high - over one-third of combatants, 2=low]. 
N: 023/4/5= 'What is the MAJOR REASON the military organization goes to war?'/ 'If there 
is an ADDITIONAL REASON for going to war, what is it?'/ 'If there is a THIRD REASON 
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for going to war, what is it?' [1=subjugation and tribute; 2=land - for fields, hunting or grazing; 
3=plunder; 4=trophies and honours; 5=revenge; 6=defense]. 
Columns 0 & P: Carneiro's scalograms (1973: 840-45). 
0: #C= presence of specified CULTURAL traits (13 cases): 
TODA [10] special religious practitioners; trade between communities; formal political 
leadership; 
social segments above family; peacekeeping machinery; craft specialization; domesticated food 
sources predominant; judicial process; supra-provincial organization; temples. .ANDAMAN  
ISLANDERS [2] formal political leadership; peace-keeping machinery. COPPER ESKIMO [2] 
special religious practitioners; trade between communities. SEMANGS [1] special religious 
practitioners. SIRIONO [1] formal political leadership. !KUNG BUSHMEN [2] special 
religious practitioners; formal political leadership. YAHGAN [2] special religious 
practitioners; trade between communities. WALBIRI [2] trade between communities; social 
segments above family. VEDDAS [3] special religious practitioners; trade between communities; 
formal political leadership. LAPPS [7] special religious practitioners; trade between 
communities; formal political leadership; social segments above family; peacekeeping 
machinery; domesticated food sources predominant; judicial process. WARAO [8] special 
religious practitioners; trade between communities; formal political leadership; social segments 
above family; peacekeeping machinery; communities of 100 or more; significant social status 
differences; judicial process. KAYANS [11]; special religious practitioners; trade between 
communities; formal political leadership; social segments above family; peacekeeping 
machinery; communities of 100 or more; significant social status differences; craft 
specialization; domesticated food sources predominant; judicial process; supra-provincial 
organization. BAITHONGA] [19] special religious practitioners; trade between communities; 
formal political leadership; social segments above family; peacekeeping machinery; communities 
of 100 or more; significant social status differences; craft,specialization; domesticated food 
sources predominant; judicial process; craft production for exchange; full-time political leader; 
death penalty decreed; supra-provincial organization; political leader grants audiences; full- 
time craft specialists; administrative hierarchy; corvee; taxation in kind. 
P: #P= presence of specified POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONal traits (13 cases): 
TODA  [3] headman, chief or king; political leader has assistants; supra-community political 
units. ANDAMAN ISLANDERS [3] headman, chief or king; political leader has assistants; 
supra-community political units. COPPER ESKIMO  [0]. SEMANGS [0]. SIRIONO [2] 
headman, chief or king; supra-community political units. !KUNG BUSHMEN[l]headman, chief 
or king. YAHGAN[0] WALBIRI [0] VEDDAS [1] headman, chief or king. LAPPS [3] headman, 
chief or king; political leader has assistants; supra-community political units. WARAO [1] 
headman, chief or king. KAYANS [5] headman, chief or king; political leader has assistants; 
regular rule of succession; strong political leadership; full-time retainers for political leader. 
BA[THONGA]. [12] headman, chief or king; political leader has assistants; regular rule of 
succession; supra-community political units; strong political leadership; installation ceremony 
for political leader; political leader is full-time specialist; supra-provincial organization; 
political leader grants audiences; administrative hierarchy; deceased ruler revered; appointed 
governors. 
MELKO'S (1973) 52 PEACEFUL SOCIETIES: 
DURATION OF PEACE PERIODS (1973: 34-5). 
PEACE 	DATES 	 LENGTH 
Over 400 years 
1. Icelandic 1256- 716 
2. Phoenician BC 1269-725 544 
3. British 1485-1940 455 
4. Hispanic-Roman BC 19-409 AD 428 
Over 300 years 
5. Han BC 202-184 AD 386 
6. New Kingdom c. BC 1540-1220 c. 320 
7. Mesopotamian c. BC 1550-1240 c. 310 
8. Tokugawa 1638-1942 304 
9. Cham 650-952 302 
10.Old Kingdom c. BC 2650-2350 c. 300 
11. Fujiwara c. 600-900 c. 300 
Over 200 years 
12. Venetian 1033-1310 277 
13. Mameluke 1250-1517 267 
14. Scandinavian 1721- 251 
15. T'ang 628-868 240 
16. Byzantine 838-1071 233 
17. Sun 1004-1235 231 
18. Corinthian BC 655-427 228 
19. Sassanian 363-590 227 
20. Ming 1403-1629 226 
21. Middle Kingdom c. BC 1990-1785 205 
Over 150 years 
22. Bohemian 1197-1394 197 
23. Polish 1410-1606 196 
24. Burmese 1084-1277 193 
25. Roman BC 31-161 AD 192 
26. Laotian 1373-1564 191 
27. Achemenian BC 521-331 190 
28. Australian 1788- 184 
29. Brandenburg 1447-1627 180 
30. Hawaiian 1796- 176 
31. T'ai 1802- 170 
32. Athenian BC 683-513 170 
33. Manchu 1682-1852 170 
34. Italian 1538-1701 163 
35. West Indian 1815- 157 
36. Anglo-Indian 1818- 154 
Over 100 years 
37. Kamakura 1185-1331 146 
38. Dutch 1794-1940 146 
39. Arakanese 1546-1684 138 
40. Ottoman 1452-1590 138 
41. Habsburg 1711-1848 137 
42. Nepalese 1846- 126 
43. Hungarian 1312-1437 125 
44. Swiss 1848- 124 
45. Ptolemaic BC 341-217 124 
46. Mughal 1585-1707 122 
47. Gupta 336-450 114 
48. Javanese 1830-1942 112 
49. Mon 1426-1535 109 
50. Khmer 813-921 108 
51. Nth American 1866- 106 
52. Costa Rican 1842-1948 106. 
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KEELEY'S (1996: 211) LIST OF GUERILLA  
WAR OUTCOMES (n=50)  
[la] GUERILLA WINS (n=23): 
Mexico (1911-1919) 
Ireland (1919-1922) 
Arabia (Ibn Saud) 
Nicaragua (Sandino 1927-1933) 
Yugoslavia (World War II) 
Albania (World War II) 
Palestine (Israelis 1944-1948) 
Indochina (1945-1954) 
Indonesia 
Algeria 
Cyprus (independence) 
Cuba (Castro) 
Vietnam 
Laos 
Cambodia 
Angola 
Mozambique 
Guinea-Bissau 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) 
Aden-Yemen 
Namibia 
Afghanistan 
Nicaragua (Sandinista) 
[lb] GUERILLA VICTORIES CORRELATED 
WITH CONVENTIONAL MILITARY 
VICTORIES (n=6): 
Arabia (World War I) 
China (1927-1945) 
USSR (World War II) 
Greece (World War II) 
France (World War II) 
Italy (World War II) 
[2] GUERILLA LOSSES (n=17): 
Boers (1899-1902) 
Philippines (1899-1902) 
Soviet Union (Basmatchi 1919-1930) 
Morocco (1921-1927) 
Brazil (Prestes) 
Palestine (Arab 1936-1939) 
Poland (1944) 
Iraqi Kurds (1945-1975) 
Philippines (Huk 1946-1956) 
Greece (communists 1947-1949) 
Malaya (communist) 
Kenya (Mau-Mau) 
Venezuela (1962-1965) 
Peru (1962-1965) 
Oman (1962-1976) 
Guatemala (1964-1967) 
Bolivia (Guevara) 
[3] TIES (n=4): 
German East Africa (1914-1918) 
Southern Sudan (1955-1972) 
Syria (1925-1936) 
Yemen (civil war (1962-1970) 
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CHAPTER 5: The WAR/TEXT AXIS - Modernity and Beyond  
This chapter aims at the (necessarily less than definitive) coming to fruition of a 
war/text axis. The 'modern' is to be taken as starting in the 15th century: an end-
point of Tuchman's 'calamitous' Fourteenth century (1979), and an era characterised 
by a nascent mercantile capitalism, state-consolidation and colonial expansion, 
religious reformation, and techno-scientific invention, particularly Bacon's trinity 
of world-altering inventions, 'those three which were unknown to the ancients, 
namely, printing, gunpowder and the compass' in his aptly-titled 17th-century 
Novum Organum (Aphorism 129). The first two are accorded due respect in the 
orienting Figure 5.1 below (at points [31 and [41), and linked to other features of the 
period: Neferic military organizations [11 geared to engagement in total war on a 
global scale [21 on behalf of populations increasingly exposed [71 to the practices 
and principles of full involvement in an alphanumeric world [61, an ideal(ist) 
condition of mass literacy [51: 
Figure 5.1: INDUSTRIAL NATION-STATES 
Type of Military  
Organization  
[1] Neferic [MSC] 
Combat Mode: 	[21 'TOTAL WAR' -40131 Strategy/Logistics 
Praxis/Examplef sl (Intra/Inter-State) 	 Explosive 
Predominant 
Communicative 	
[4] PRINT TECHNOLOGY 
4, Mode  
Relative 	[51 MASS LITERACY 	> [6] CAPITALISM [X, Y (ii)] 
Historical Condition 	(Modern) 	 Liberacy/Massolit [LSC] 
1' 	 decoding ----> recoding II 
Educational Locus 	[71 Schools. 
& Agents of 
Transmission 	 Teachers. 
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In the society that has come into existence since the Middle Ages, one can always 
avoid picking up a pen, but one cannot avoid being described, identified, certified, and 
handled - like a text. Even in reaching out to become one's own "self", one reaches out 
for a text. 
Illich & Sanders, 1988: x. 
5.1: The Legacies of the Proto-Textual. 
In Chapter 4, I outlined a series of cumulative stages in the development of war. 
The underlying premise of that evolution was that the forms of organised conflict 
displayed in each stage underwent a series of refinements - a syncopated and/or 
contrapuntal pattern of constraints and enablements - in the orchestration of mass 
conflict. As a key to understanding how these changes in war showed any evidence 
of systematic regularity, and how such a pattern could culminate in a distinctively 
modern world, I argued that the structure of war in diverse temporally/spatially 
located societies was directly related to the reading/writing practices of such 
societies. 
Thus the 'preliterate' condition of "primitive" groups ensures that a concept of war 
- as an extraordinary phenomenon, or an event opposed to a condition of "peace" - 
cannot arise: societal structure is dependent on, and harmonised with, a natural 
order, and this state of nature is either normatively savage, or non-violent. War in 
the Grwco-Roman world is predicated on culture - the human(ist) potential to 
impact on and 'improve' this state of nature, and to distinguish themselves from, 
control, absorb or eliminate those groups ('barbarians') closest to unmediated 
nature: writing - barbaric mark-making - is adopted as functional, but suitably 
modified to the privileging of a higher-order uniquely human capacity (speech 
and the art of rhetoric) to produce an utterance-dependent alphabetic literacy. In 
the medieval epoch instantiated by the breakdown of the temporal order of the 
Fax Romana, and the rise of a feudal system held together by the fragile 
patchwork of sovereignties under the sway of competing warlords, writing regains 
a measure of both its ancient magic - a fetishised symbol of a spiritual order - and is 
concomitantly the province of a formally limited priestly cohort of scribes. 
In the following table, these assorted developments in the written and their 
advances into a configuration of (western) modernity, are summarily mapped out: 
Table 5.1: GRAFF'S 'Key Points in the History of Literacy in the West' (1982: 17): 
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ca. 3100 BC 
3100-1500 BC 
650-550 BC 
500-400 BC 
200 BC-200 AD 
0-1200 
800-900 
1200 and onward 
1300 and onward 
1450s 
1500's 
1600s 
1700s 
1800s 
1900s 
late 1900s 
Invention of writing 
Development of writing systems 
"Invention" of Greek alphabet 
First school developments, Greek city-states, 
tradition of literacy for civic purposes 
Roman public schools 
Origins and spread of Christianity 
Carolingian language, writing, and bureaucratic developments 
Commercial, urban 'revolutions", expanded administration and 
other uses of literacy and especially writing, development of lay 
education, rise of vernaculars, "practical" literacy, Protestant 
heresies 
Rediscovery of classical legacies 
Advent of printing, consolidation of states, Christian humanism 
Reformation, spread of printing, growth of vernacular 
literatures, expanded schooling (mass literacy in radical 
Protestant areas) 
Swedish literacy campaign 
Enlightment and its consolidation of traditions, "liberal" 
legacies 
School developments, institutionalisation, mass literacy, "mass" 
print media, education for social and economic development: 
public and compulsory 
Nonprint, electronic media 
Crisis of literacy 
A significant watershed in the development of the modem is accorded, in this 
scheme, to the period from the 1450s onward, with the advent of printing 
associated with a vast range of politico-economic changes that signal the end of 
medievalism." Graff's scheme, from line 14 ff, ties the instigation and diffusion of 
print to the development of a functionally-literate culture, and a range of socio-
political consequences that follow in its wake. In the following section, I look in 
This both forms a bridge between the current and preceding Chapter, relates to the 
accompanying headnote (p. 169) and resonates with the more detailed model (reproduced below) 
of a Script/Print dichotomy between the medieval and the modern in Hoyles (1977: 21). 
Noteworthy in this typology is the synchronous development of both (a) flexibility and fixity of 
text, and (b) individual autonomy in, and authoritative control of, reading/writing: 
Scrip t 	 Print 
Feudal Bourgeois 
International 	 National 
Latin 	 National Language 
Varied Orthography 	Accuracy 
Changeable Texts Permanence and Authority 
Reading Aloud 	 Private Silent Reading 
Authorship Unimportant 	Authorship and Copyright 
Copying Approved 	 Idea of Plagiarism 
Books Bequeathed in Wills 	Books Commonplace 
Illiteracy 	 Middle-class Literacy 
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more detail at some of these suggested connections. 
5.2 : Mooted Literacy Impacts. 
5.2.1: Third World Development. Within the global context of "underdevelopment", 
a 
reading and writing capacities are assumed as factors positively influencing 
agriculture and rural innovation at the level of both technology and politics (P. 
Harrison, 1985: 303-306; Schryer, 1984), fertility rates and family structure (Stycos, 
1982) and effective participation in a contemporary world-system (Bhola, 1984). Yet 
under examination, each of these connections has been substantially modified where 
not flatly denied. Stycos' analysis of the effect of literacy on fertility decline in Costa 
Rica, despite being based on 'data... of unusually high quality' (1982: 15) is equivocal 
at best, unable to disentangle the respective effects of literacy and urbanisation - and 
an equivalent study undertaken in a different setting, investigating aspects of 
demographic behaviour in 19th Century France, finds that 'no independent effect of 
literacy.., is apparent' on nuptiality and marital fertility (Lehning, 1984: 550). A case 
study of the impact of literacy on agricultural development in southern Brazil found 
'that, except for a necessary association between literacy or level of education and 
reading of printed farm information, these variables do not serve in a general way to 
enhance exposure to information about agriculture' (Fliegel, 1966: 15); and a more 
comprehensive survey, taking in almost all of India's 334 rural districts, concluded 
that 'district literacy levels probably have no impact on increasing agricultural 
production' (Barnes, Fliegel Sr Vanneman, 1982: 263). Kamerschen, in an early test of 
the claim by Golden (1955), that 'literacy affords an excellent index of the level of 
socioeconomic development of a country', undertook a linear regression analysis of 80 
countries, finding that 'Golden's theory becomes more suspect as the data are 
disaggregated...the relationship between literacy and either per capita income or 
industrialisation is much weaker and, in fact, is not statistically significant' (1968: 
178-179). 
5.2.2: Formal Education. The taken-for-granted conflation of literacy with formal 
education processes, a typical feature of those claiming beneficial development effects 
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for reading and writing (for the stronger sociological views in this perspective, see 
Shils, 1966; Inkeles, 1973; hikeles & Smith, 1975) has also been subjected to query at a 
number of points. As noted, the posited failure of the schools to successfully transmit 
reading and writing skills is an ongoing theme of the contemporary popular and 
scholarly press in the core-countries of the West. What critics such as Kozol (1980; 
1985) or Copperman (1980) label as this 'breakdown' of the educational system is 
deemed responsible for the current "literacy crisis", giving rise to the nagging suspicion 
that schools may be the site for the 'disease' of illiteracy as much as centres for its 
prevention or cure. Cost-benefit analysis by Blaug (1966) suggests that literacy training 
is most efficiently carried out in adult education environments, and that in Third-
world contexts at least, the establishment of Western-type primary and secondary 
schooling is a relatively wasteful option in terms of time, money and effectiveness - a 
point concretely borne out by the much-lauded pedagogical practice of Paolo Freire 
(1974; 1990). Further, case studies such as that undertaken by Thomas in Pakistan 
(1974) and numerous examples of the rise of indigenous literacies in societies partly or 
wholly lacking an institutionalised educational infrastructure attest to the acquisition 
of reading and writing skills without formal schooling of any kind; and studies of the 
'involved marketing and trading systems of traditional West Africa or Melanesia' 
(Finnegan, 1988: 149), the Ibadan cattle market in Nigeria (Cohen, 1965) or the Indians 
of Panajachel in Central America indicate no difficulty in engaging in 'a variety of 
economic transactions apparently without the aid of the written or printed word' 
(Laqueur, 1976: 255-256). 
Moreover, such studies resonate with historical analyses of the early progress of 
literacy in advanced Western countries. These suggest that the regions with the 
highest rates of literacy in 17th and 18th centuries, eg Sweden (Johansson, 1981), 
Scotland (Laqueur, 1976), or Wales (Williams, 1982), achieved this pre-eminence 
independently of formal educational institutions. The mode of production and 
population distributions prevailing in these areas further tend to spoil the neat 
equation between widespread literacy and high degrees of urbanisation and 
industrialisation. More specifically, assorted empirical studies of England prior to the 
Education Act of 1870 tend to further unravel some or all aspects of the 
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industrial/urban/formal schooling/literacy correlations. Thompson (1972: 782-794), 
Johnson (1980) and Howard (in Barton & Ivanic, 1991: 78-108) stress the autodidactic 
and anti-institutional nature of radical working class acquisition of reading and 
writing, lending some support to Laqueur's wider proposition that 'over several 
centuries, the literate popular culture of England largely made itself' (1976: 255) 54 
Sanderson (1972) maintains that the Industrial Revolution actually brought about an 
initial decline in mass literacy. The encyclopaedic survey by Stephens studying the 
geographical distribution of literacy in provincial England between 1830 and 1870 
notes that there is 'insufficient evidence to demonstrate a firm connection between 
literacy levels and puritan influences or the availability of schooling, and little more 
to suggest a relationship with the type of agriculture pursued' - further, `no simple 
distinction between urban and rural areas is discernible'(1987: 4, 5). Weliens (in 
Musgrave, 1970: 59-64) notes the distinction between the 'hard way man' and the 'man 
with paper qualifications' - valorisation of the former amongst workers in British 
industry being a feature of an English anti-intellectual tradition in the C19th, 
bolstered by its upper-class equivalent - the public school 'colonial code' built on 
"character" and physical prowess rather than mastery of book-learning; and elite 
dedication to the principle of keeping the labour force ignorant, a view largely 
unified and in the ascendant up to 1825 (Kaestle, 1976; Best, 1975). In summary, 
la]mong the working classes of C19th England and Scotland, reading was 
54 How and why did Tory-based opposition to mass education change? My own explanation 
would rest on growing elite perceptions - whether well-founded or not - of the success of 
'indigenous literacies'. If reading and writing were transmitted through institutions out of 
reach of direct control by the state (coffee houses, working mens associations, craft guilds, the 
family) and if the style and subject-matter of this literature was potentially or actually 
seditious, taking the form of Chartist or Owenite missives, Luddite tracts or the publications of 
the 'unstamped press', then governmental priorities must have taken account of these factors. 
Hence, in the Education Acts of the Cl9th, control over what is learned (the content of 'morally 
edifying' literature/"Useful Knowledge") is coupled with control over where, when and how it 
is learned (in classrooms, by suitably qualified teachers, under a system of compulsory 
attendance). For general support of such a position, see Foucault, 1991, and Rockhill, 1987: 157; 
for application of the view to the English case, see Reinecke, 1987: 25, I. Hunter, 1988, or Jones 
& Williamson, 1979; for a Canadian example of the same process, see Curtis, 1985. 
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learned in many situations outside formal education, and its purposes and 
consequences were varied...[e]conomic laws of supply and demand of job 
opportunities in C18th England dictated levels of literacy and secondary 
education which were set as ideals, but there was no direct relation between 
skills achieved in secondary education and job success' (Heath, 1980: 124; 
emphasis added). 
5.2.3: Protestantism. A more historically specific and potentially more cogent and 
demonstrable conjunction is that drawn between the dissemination of reading and 
writing skills and the rise of Protestantism. Graff characterises the Reformation as 
'the first great literacy campaign in the history of the West' (1982: 18) and in relation 
to the spread of literacy in specific countries mentioned above, Sullivan notes that 
'the Reformation has been throughout the modem era a pervasive force in the 
propagation of literacy...[i]n the Scandinavian peninsula, Denmark and Holland it ... 
made literacy a typical phenomenon among the natives of these countries', as it 
apparently did also in pre-industrial England and Scotland (1948: 516; c/f O'Day, 
1982: 217-238). A number of commentators find a comparable linkage between literacy 
and Puritanism in colonial New England (Cremin, 1970; Beales, 1978; Hall, in 
Darnton, 1991: 148-149) and in Germany, where 
'the political possibilities of print were recognised immediately and fully 
exploited by both the authorities and their opponents during the 
Reformation...[t]here was a large trade in heretical religious books, particularly 
from Germany and Switzerland, and it has been estimated that between 1517 and 
1520 the thirty publications of Martin Luther alone sold well over 300,000 
copies'(Marshall ,1983:12; c/f J. Burke, 1985: 116-118; Luke, 1989). 
Shortly before the twentieth century, Tarde was similarly asserting the centrality of 
writing and print as a causative factor in history: 
'As the Renascence was connected with discoveries in arts and letters, so the 
Reformation proceeded, in large part, from the invention of printing. The idea 
of acquiring by the mere reading of sacred books the highest type of knowledge, 
a full solution of the most difficult problems, could only have arisen when the 
sudden and extraordinary diffusion and invasion of books, hitherto unknown, 
had developed a general epidemic of reading and of the illusion of thinking 
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that books were the source of all truth. It was perhaps because of this, Germany 
being the birthplace of printing, that Protestantism was German in its origin. 
Otherwise, this fact would be surprising, for, prior to the Reformation, all great 
heresies, all attempted rebellions against the Church, started from the South 
of Europe, a more civilised region than the North' (Tarde, 1903 [orig. 1890]: 364). 
Yet in general terms, elements of this thesis are at least questionable. Kenneth 
Lockridge has argued that literacy 'was of little significance for the shaping of 
modern social values in colonial New England' (cited in Resnick & Resnick, 1977: 372). 
The second edition of the Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought dismisses the notion 
that the 'invention of printing is held to be responsible for the Protestant 
Reformation' as a key instance of the flawed concept of technological determinism 
(Bullock et. al., 1988: 847). Stone highlights a gap between the proselytising 
ambitions of Protestantism and its subsequent effect, arguing 'that all these efforts at 
religious indoctrination by education have ultimately proved futile... the most 
striking result... has been the inexorable growth of secularism' (1969: 83), a view 
subscribed to by Chadwick (1990), who cites rising popular literacy and the rise of a 
cheap press as key causal factors in the Cl9th 'secularisation of the European mind'. 
Moving to cases, two monographs on C16th Germany - the site of both Luther's 
decisive break with Rome and the invention of Gutenberg's printing press - are dubious 
about the presumed affinity. R. W. Scribner shows that even if the broadly-agreed 
optimum estimate of 300,000 copies of Luther's works in circulation between 1517 and 
1520 were accurate, 'only 2.3% of the population, or 1 person in 43, would have 
encountered Luther's ideas in this way...it seems fairly certain that the real mass 
dissemination of ideas took place orally, not through the printed word'(1989: 20); and 
a study by Strauss & Gawthrop concurs, finding that 'the facts as we can establish 
them do not substantiate the generally accepted notion - which no one has ever felt 
obliged to prove - of a causal link between the Lutheran reformation of the sixteenth 
century and popular bible reading' (1984: 41). On the evidence of divergent trends - 
rising literacy and declining religiosity - since the early C16th, it would be fair to 
suggest that the most satisfying form of this particular connection would take a 
Weberian turn; ie, Protestanism plays a role in kick-starting the dissemination of 
printed matter and mass literacy, but that the latter, like capitalism, subsequently 
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runs under either other auspices, or "its" own steam. 
5.2.4: Political Freedom. Other approaches tie literacy to the "free society" via 
participation in democratic electoral processes and active citizenship - a view largely 
deriving from C19th liberal-humanist perspectives (such as Mills': see Chapter 1). In 
an attempt to give some quantitative bite to the notoriously slippery concept of 
freedom within a national context, Raymond Gastil's (1975: 3-9) 7-point index of 
political rights (with "1" representing 'a political system in which the great majority 
of persons or families has both the right and the opportunity to participate in the 
electoral process' and "7" referring to 'tyrannies without legitimacy either in tradition 
or in international party doctrine') is instructive in this regard. If we take at face 
value Herzog's bald assertion, that Inio nation has achieved extensive economic 
development without also having high literacy rates, upwards of 80 percent' (1973: 
325), take countries claiming literacy rates above this figure within a given time span - 
in this case 1975, at the completion of the 10-year UN-sponsored Experimental World 
Literacy Program - and apply Gastil's political rights index to these countries, are the 
anticipated correlations evident? 
On UNESCO figures for the year 1975 (UNESCO Statistics of Education Attainment 
and Illiteracy, 1945-1974 [Paris, 1977]; Statistical Yearbook, 1977 [Paris, 1978] ; World 
Bank, World Development Report, 1978 [Washington, 1979]), 31 countries asserted 
national literacy rates of 80% and above. Of these, 3 - Surinam, Puerto Rico, and Hong 
Kong - were not accorded a rating on the political rights scale, and 2 - Guyana and 
Western Samoa - rated a mid-point score of "4" on the Gastil index. Of the remaining 
26 cases, 13 countries were rated "1" to "3" (on the "democratic" side of the rankings), 
and the other 13 were rated "5" to "7", as relatively 'tyrannical' regimes. Comparing 
some individual cases, one finds, in a purported 88% literacy range, Costa Rica rated 
"1" in political rights and Chile, rated "7"; Italy, Barbados and Ireland as having 
98% literacy rates and a political rights index of "1", and Poland and Romania, "6" 
and "7" on the Gastil scale but also with supposedly 98% literate populations; China 
and Venezuela as having 82% literacy rates, rated "7" and "2" in terms of political 
rights respectively; and two countries - Denmark, with a political rights indice of "1", 
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and the former Soviet Union tagged as a "6" on the Gastil scale - both of which claim 
literacy rates of 100%. Gastil's similarly-scaled civil rights measure ("1" denoting 'a 
country in which the rule of law is unshakened [sic [', "7" equalling a country where 
'citizens have no rights in relation to the state') yields similar results, since only 
three nations - Guyana, Western Samoa (see above), and Chile - display a 2-point 
discrepancy, civil rights uniformly higher than political rights. Five countries vary 
by one point between civil and political rights; and the remaining 17 assessed countries 
have identical scores on the two indexes. Briefly, on the evidence of these admittedly 
problematic figures, " the most charitable assessment would maintain that the 
impact of popular literacy on political freedom is either purely rhetorical, or is yet to 
be demonstrated. In sum, then, Graff's initial skepticism towards the benign collateral 
effects of literacy, and his later statement that '(h)istorically, large-scale efforts to 
provide literacy have not been tied to the level of wealth, industrialisation, 
urbanization, or democratization of a society' (Amove & Graff, 1987: 2, emphases 
added) tends to hold as a generality and within a variety of more specific contexts. 
There is a final correlative prospect for consideration - a connection seldom averred, 
but as maintained throughout, a linkage more cogent (even if less palatable) than 
those offered above. 
5.2.5: War and Military Organisation.  A series of suggestive linkages between 
these topics were proffered in Chapter 1 (pp. 16-18), and gradually built up over 
time (in Chapter 4). More particularly, Nelson (cited in Little, 1971: 94) notes the 
premium placed on the ability to read and write as a function of military fitness in 
World War II, when, out of roughly 18 million men psychologically examined, 
'nearly five million were rejected from service - forty percent for illiteracy'. This 
observation raises the initial question of when, and the eventual questions of why 
and how, literacy becomes a measure of military competence in itself. Such queries 
are particularly germane in view of army careers seen (stereotypically) as an 
option for the =lettered - a notion prevalent in both civil society and the services, 
55 Even at a perfunctory glance, the suggestion that the countries under discussion above might 
somehow exemplify Herzog's notion of "extensive economic development" also constitutes 
something of a surprise. 
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nicely captured in Barnett's characterisation of Britsh army service as 
'traditionally the preserve of Irish peasants or urban riff-raff' (cited in Wolfe & 
Erickson, 1969: 6); Levy's observations that Americans tend to 'regard armed forces 
careers as undertaken only if one were unable to do any better' with military 
personnel caricatured as 'unintelligent, humourless, authoritarian and above all 
anti-intellectual' (cited in Bienen, 1971: 42-43); Fischer's (1932) view as recorded in 
the infamous Report from Iron Mountain ("ed." Lewin, 1968: 74-75) that 'the 
typical European standing army of fifty years ago consisted of "... troops unfit for 
employment in commerce, industry or agriculture, led by officers unfit to practice 
any legitimate profession or to conduct a business enterprise" '; and the remarks of 
an anonymous seventeenth-century French nobleman that, in his day, 'gentlemen 
studied only to go into the Church...Montmorency, the late Constable, knew how to 
hold his own in the provinces and his place at court without knowing how to read' 
(cited in Eisenstein, 1968: 44). Alvin and Heidi Toffler's later assessment sums up 
what they see as the prevalent - and inaccurate - stereotype of the soldier: 
'Intellectuals, in particular, have tended to caricature military men as 
brutish or just plain stupid. Think of political cartoons picturing pigeon-
breasted generals dripping with medals and sashes, their faces devoid of 
intelligence. Think of Gilbert & Sullivan's satirical song "I Am the Very 
Model of a Modern Major-General", or the First Lord of the Admiralty in 
H.M.S Pinafore, who claimed, "I thought so little, they rewarded me/ By 
making me the Ruler of the Queen's Navee!" '(1993: 11) 
Taken in isolation and in light of the opinions expressed above, the Nelson quote may 
suggest that armed forces investment in literacy may be either limited to the USA, or 
be specific to wartime conditions in the mid-20th century. Other data, however, 
suggest that the involvement is both more geographically widespread and 
historically pervasive. Polemically, (and as instanced in the introductory Chapter at 
p. 17) one of the most potent and recurrent of the metaphors deployed when discussing 
literacy is, of course, itself military. One is reminded of psychologist William James' 
advice to American teachers early into the present century: 
' "In war, all you have to do is work your enemy into a position in which natural 
obstacles prevent him from escaping...then fall on him in numbers superior to his 
own. ..Just so in teaching; you must simply work your pupil into such a state-of-
interest with every other object of attention banished from his mind; then reveal 
it to him so impressively that he will remember it to his dying day; and finally, 
fill him with a devouring curiosity to know what the next steps 
are.."(Sprinthall, 1994: 6164) • 56 
Politically, such rhetoric is often evident both at the local, idiomatic level, and is 
also incorporated into the official language of national policy. But behind this 
rhetoric lies a more corporeal involvement of the armed services in the promotion and 
dissemination of literacy; and the identification of illiteracy as a widespread 'social 
disease' in need of curing tends to follow in the wake of direct involvement in warfare 
or revolution by the nation(s) concerned. Numerous instances of this pattern and an 
indication of its pervasiveness are provided in general studies by, eg, Amove & Graff 
(1987). Flora, in an essay that both demolishes Lemer's proposed tie between literacy 
and urbanization and maintains that in the west there 'is no doubt... that no direct 
connection existed between industrialisation and literacy development' (1973: 230) 
notes that for Prussia, France and Austria 
'the development of efficient civil and military bureaucracies and thus of 
literacy was a necessity of national self-defence and self-assertion. This 
condition was true to a much less extent for Spain and Portugal after having 
lost their colonies, and for Italy before gaining national unity. This 
relationship is further illustrated by the English efforts to accelerate the 
development of education in the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
Japanese educational policy after 1868 directed to national strength, and the 
Russian reform attempts during the Napoleonic Wars and after defeat in the 
Crimean War' (1973: 230). 
66 In commenting on this citation, the author continues to deploy the military metaphor: Thus, 
'the difficulty, as James goes on to say, is that the student, like the opposing general, may be 
working just as avidly and keenly for a different set of goals. Just what the students think and 
want may be as difficult for the teacher to discern as the military commander' (Sprinthall, 1994: 
6164). 
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Similarly, in Houston's assessment, perceptions of the need for literacy have 
consistently tended to occur 'at times of military failure or perceived political crisis, 
as in Prussia [1806-13] when commentators debated the role of education in reviving 
and creating national sentiment, Russia after 1856, England during the 1830s, France 
in the 1870s and 1880s or Spain after the First World War' (1988: 2). 
5.3: The Geopolitics of Textuality 
In this section, applying this pattern to specific countries, more detailed examples 
of the same processes are evident in the well-documented cases of direct military 
involvement in not only in literacy campaigns, but in all aspects of textuality - 
particularly the part played by forms of writing in nation-state formation and 
warmaking. To demonstrate this, I supply qualitative instances of an operational 
war-text axis in 107 geographical entities - states or quasi-states. Since these 
entities are primarily cultural rather than material realities - states appearing, 
disappearing, subject over time to varying nomenclature, movable borders and 
shifts in the criteria for qualitative/quantitative membership by people(s) in such 
entities - the total number of states within a world-system at any given point in 
time can never be definitive. However, if, following Doogan & Plessey (1984) or 
McGrew (1992), we estimate the number of extant states in the global system as plus 
or minus 155 - and bear in mind the caveat that this depends entirely on how we 
count - the figure of 107 represents a fairly robust sample size. These samples 
validate the broader claims, of a civil/military interplay at the level of 
institutionalised knowledge, contended for within the thesis: a resonance between 
contemporary characterisations of literacy as mass and/or functional, these same 
imperatives as originary and ongoing features of armed service organization. Thus, 
though precise measurement of all relevant phenomena - states, war/text, literacy 
and militarism - is problematic, the circumstantial evidence of a general trend, 
that of rising literacy and qualitative and quantitative increases in the 
preparedness for and prosecution of organised combat,-is apparent. The sampled 
regions are as follows: 
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LAF_Iacte a 
1 Abyssinias' 2 Afghanistan 3 Algeria 4 Burkina Faso 
5 Chad 6 Egypt 7 Eritrea" 8 Ethiopia 
9 Ghana 10 Iran 11 Iraq 12 Israel 
13 Ivory Coast 14 Kenya 15 Lebanon 16 Liberia 
17 Madagascar" 18 Mali 19 Morocco 20 Nigeria 
21 Rhodesia° 22 Somalia 23 Sudan 24 Syria 
25 Tunisia 26 Uganda 27 Tanganyika" 28 Zaire" 
29 Zambia 
IL TFIF AMERICAS 
30 Ar&entina 31 Bolivia 32 Brazil 33 Canada 
34 Chile 35 Costa Rica 36 Cuba 37 Ecuador 
38 Guatemala 39 Honduras 40 Mexico 41 Nicaragua 
42 Paraguay 43 Peru 44 United States 
Ella& 
45 Burma 46 Cambodia's 47 China 48 India 
49 Indonesia 50 Japan 51 Korea" 52 Laos 
53 Pakistan 54 Ban$la Desh 55 Philippines 56 Sabah" 
57 Malaysia 58 Thailand 59 Viet Nam 
IV. AUSTRALASIA/PACIFIC {Oceania' 
60 Australia 	61 Melanesia" 62 Fiji 63 New Guinea 
64 Papua" 65 Solomon Islands 66 Great Admiralty Island 
67 New Hebrides 68 New Zealand" 
V. EI MOPE 
69 Austria 70 Balkans" 71 Yugoslavia" 72 Serbia 
73 Slovenia 74 Croatia 75 Dalmatia 76 Montenegro 
77 Belgium 78 Cyprus 79 Czechoslovakia 80 Finland 
81 France 82 Germany 83 Prussia" 84 Greece 
85 Hungary 86 Italy" 87 Venice 88 Florence 
89 Milan 90 Genoa 91 Netherlands 92 Norway 
93 Poland 94 Portugal 95 Romania 96 Russia" 
97 Soviet Union" 98 Spain 99 Sweden 	. 100 Switzerland 
101 Turkey 102 Kurdistan's 
YLLUEEEPIEICAMYILEM 
103 England 104 Falklands 105 Ireland 106 Scotland 
107 Wales 
57 Now Ethiopia (case 8). 
58 Disputed ongoing status: sometime sub-region of Ethiopia (case 8). 
59 Since 1960, the Independent Republic of Malagasy. 
60 Since 1980, Zimbabwe. 
61 In 1963, united with Zanzibar to form the present Tanzania 
62 Since 1997, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Kampuchea from 1975 to 1982. 
64  Only South Korea in this sample 
65 subregion of the Federation of Malaysia (case 57): pre-1963, North Borneo. 
66 Broader designation incorporating cases 62-67. 
67 Amalgamated (with case 63) to form the union of Papua New Guinea (PNG ). 
58 Alternatively, Aoteroa. 
69 Broader designation incorporating cases 71-76. 
7° Post-1989, "the former..." 
71 Sub-region of Germany (case 82). 
72 Incorporates cases 87-90 - the latter cities constitute special instances in this set, as the relevant qualitative sample 
situates them historically-specifically and refers only to their status as independent Renaissance principalities. 
73 'Supercedes' case 97. 
74 Post-1989, "the former..." (c/f note 14 above). 
75 Sub-region of Turkey (case 101). 
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5.3.1: AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST 
[1] Writing of the Italian invasion (Oct. 1935) and subsequent annexation of 
Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia - see [8]), Phillip Knightley maintains that the 
outcome of the war was primarily the result of serious misconceptions about the 
nature of the conflict and the combatants. Western print media responsible for the 
coverage of the invasion fostered, communicated and enforced as policy a fictive, 
romantically-primitive "Abyssinia": reporting on the war for the Daily Mail, 
Evelyn Waugh, author of the putatively fictional Scoop (described by Knightley 
as 'actually a piece of straight reportage, thinly disguised as a novel to protect 
the author from libel actions', 1989: 173) noted that "'Few [editors] could find 
Abyssinia on the map or had the faintest conception of its character. Those who 
had read Nesbitt believed that it lay below sea-level in stupefying heat, a 
waterless plain of rock and salt, sparsely inhabited by naked homicidal lunatics, 
those who glanced through Budge pictured an African Thibet, a land where 
ancient inviolable places jutted on to glaciers. ..the editor of one great English 
paper believed.. .that the inhabitants spoke classical Greek" ' (cited in 
Knightley, 1989: 172). In the Addis Ababa war zone itself, on-ground information 
was limited by the fact that with one exception - a Lithuanian - not one 
correspondent spoke Amharic, the native tongue. Journalists were also confined by 
the Emperor to a limited area of the capital and relied largely on official 
handouts for an assessment of the situation. Aside from questionable content, 
outgoing communiqués were hampered partly by eventual censorship, but 
primarily by the exorbitant cost of cable rates, forcing foreign journalists to resort 
to clipped "cablese" incomprehensible to both the local cable clerk and subsequent 
sub-editors, who were forced to resort to further wildly inaccurate "decoding" 
when the stories went to press: incoming communications were, 'if anything, even 
worse. The system of delivery was completely haphazard. The cable clerk 
waited until he had enough cables to justify engaging a delivery boy, and the boy 
then set off to the Hotel Imperial. Since he could not read, his delivery technique 
was to hand all the cables to the first European he met at the hotel and ask him 
to pass them on' (1989: 174). The net result of these communicative glitches led 
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more than one journalist to the production of editorially-acceptable copy based on 
adaptations of specious source material: two - Gallagher of the Daily Express and 
Phillips of the Daily Telegraph - filed stories 'paraphrased from an old book 
called In the Country of the Blue Nile, by Colonel C. F. Rey' (1989: 177). 
Correspondents covering the story from the Italian side, by contrast, were heavily 
censored - and as Knightley emphasises, since 'an invented story, unhampered by 
facts, makes more exciting reading than a heavily censored account of a minor 
engagement, newspapers plumped for stories from Addis Ababa, and this created 
a false impression of what was happening in Abyssinia' (1989: 179) - a false 
impression that delayed both League of Nations sanctions against Mussolini's 
Italy, and intervention or aid to Hailie Selassie's forces, contributing to the war's 
conclusion with the victorious Italian occupation of May 5th 1936. Similarly, in 
his assessment of another conflict forty years on - the Russian invasion of 
Afghanistan [2] in 1978 - Knightley again cites distance, unfamiliarity and 
biased reportage as contributory to general dis/misinformation: 'Afghanistan was 
reported from across the border in Pakistan, from brief visits to Kabul, or from 
furtive interviews with guerrilla fighters who soon developed a reputation for 
being willing to tell the correspondent what he wanted to hear. In such 
circumstances many a correspondent became the tool of the intelligence 
agencies.. .easy prey for the CIA or the KGB line [...] little wonder, then, that the 
editor of the Toronto Sun, Peter Worthington, declared that Afghanistan was one 
of the worst reported wars of recent times. "The fighting there is the subject of 
rumour, unconfirmed reports, and widespread ignorance.. .and the media are the 
prime villains" '(1989: 432-33). 
[3] In the wake of the invasion of Algeria by the French Army of Africa in 1830 
and the establishment of France's public-school system under a law of 1883, 'the 
education of the largely nomadic peoples in the vast southern territories was left 
in the hands of French missionaries and the military'. Following the outbreak of 
the Algerian rebellion, by 'the beginning of 1957, the [French] army had opened 
212 schools, with 355 army teachers and 11,700 pupils', although these 
establishments were 'described by FLN sources as organs of psychological warfare 
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rather than true schools' (Gillespie/Halpern, 1963: 13, 21). 
[4] In Burkina Faso, the colonial education system - male-centred, authoritarian 
and urban-dominated, with literacy deemed irrelevant to the 90 percent peasant 
population - remained 'virtually intact after independence in 1960' (Daouda Api, 
1988: 9): but the 'revolution of 1983, led by former President Thomas Sankara, 
brought a new direction'. In February 1986, under the auspices of the new 
governing CDRs [Committees for Defence of the Revolution], 'project "Alpha 
Commando" was launched from 1,000 literacy centres throughout the country', 
aimed at forging through the medium of text 'a new type of Burkinabe farmer, 
politically conscious of a role in building a national, independent, self-sufficient 
and planned economy. This new type of farmer is one who refuses to submit to 
nature, who rebels against passivity and fatalism and who dares to innovate' 
(1988: 10). 
[5] In Chad, Collelo (1988) notes that 'France has played a paramount role in the 
training of the Chadian armed forces since independence. In 1980, during the worst 
fighting of the Chadian Civil War, the French withdrew their training mission 
and other forms of military cooperation. French involvement resumed in 1983 
when Habre appealed for help against renewed Libyan intervention in northern 
Chad. As of late 1987, the French training mission consisted of about 250 officers 
and enlisted men. Of the 10,000 soldiers composing FANT at its inception in 1983, 
about 8,000 had been rotated through French training by 1987. The principal 
training sites were at N'Djamena, Koundoul, and Moussoro. At an instructional 
centre at Mongo, thousands of former codos (commandos) had been "recycled" by 
French trainers, assisted by a large cadre of Chadian military. A small number of 
codos had been integrated into FANT, but most had been organized into work 
brigades for service as agricultural or road labourers'. Problems with the French-
supervised Chadian military organisation were primarily caused by 'the extreme 
variation in educational and experience levels of the soldiers. In some cases, 
combat veterans had to be combined with new recruits. Most enlisted men were 
illiterate and did not understand French; when an interpreter was unavailable, 
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instruction was done by demonstration and imitation'. Solutions entailed the 
establishment of an interservice officers school staffed by the French at 
N'Djamena with a two-year program which 'combined general and military 
subjects' where successful graduates were 'commissioned as infantry platoon 
leaders with the rank of second lieutenant'; the selection of officers for advanced 
training abroad; and further specialist instruction in the country delivered by 
'United States mobile training teams' in the late 1980s. 
[6] 'Education in Egypt represents an amalgam of the centuries-old, religiously-
oriented Islamic tradition on the one hand and a Western-inspired, secular system 
on the other [...] Secular education in Egypt had its origin with the absorption of 
Egypt in the Ottoman Empire in 1517, but did not develop extensively until the 
period of French influence in the nineteenth century. Napoleon's invasion brought 
many French scholars to Egypt, and later Muhammad Ali (1805-48) set up schools 
on the French model with the help of French experts...' (Wilber, 1969: 106, 108). 
Another better-known, more apocryphal and unintended cultural consequence of 
the invasion was the accidental discovery of the Rosetta Stone, unearthed in 1799 
by anonymous French soldiers repairing the ruins of Fort Rashid in the Nile 
Delta. As the key to hieroglyphic decoding, its landmark status in the 
establishment of Egyptology and the furtherance of the fledgling disciplines of 
archaeology and linguistics is indisputable (Honour, 1966), vindicating 
Doblhofer's claim that the 'saying that in times of war the Muses are silent does 
not apply in the history of decipherment' (1957: 47): a view endorsed by Daniel 
Foss in his observation that the 'papyrus roll in the Near East was the best cheap 
writing material prior to paper, which replaced it after 750. Survival of the 
evidence was quirky, contingent upon the arid conditions of Upper Egypt or the 
caves of the Negev. This is where we make such finds as the Oxyrhyncus papyri, 
the Dead Sea Scrolls, Nag Hammadi, and the Babatha archive (deposited for 
safekeeping in a cave in AD 132 and containing legal documents which the Jewish 
woman Babatha intended to retrieve after the Bar Kochba war but didn't make 
it)' (1998: 2). 
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[7] Swift (1988: 18-19) describes how, in the Sahel region of Northern Eritrea, the 
Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF] has established the concept of the Zero 
School, where the 'school is scattered in a series of classrooms that dot several 
interlocking valleys. Each classroom is built of sticks and foliage and is either 
carefully camouflaged under trees or else dug into the sides of rocky hills. Every 
village school in Eritrea is designed in this way so as to prevent detection from 
the air by the MIGs and Anatov bombers of the Ethiopian air force' (1988: 18). 
The author contrasts this high-risk commitment to primary schooling in socialist 
Eritrea with the education system in that country's hostile neighbour Ethiopia 
[8]. There, according to Acia, a former educator in Ethiopia now working as an 
EPLF Zero School science teacher, the 'system was based on individual 
advancement and your marks in the final national exam. "If you did well you 
became a manager, got a job in the airlines or a good position in the army. Those 
who did poorly often became teachers" '(Swift, 1988: 19, emphasis added). 
[9] Drawing attention to the relative speed and ease of transition to modernity in 
former colonial African territories south of the Sahara (characterised in part as a 
marriage between 'writing and the technology of the intellect' at p. 343, and 'the 
gun and the means of destruction' at p. 346), Goody notes that 'in Northern Ghana, 
fifty years passed between the coming of the colonial troops and the graduation of 
the first university student; despite the pejorative comments of many 
contemporary nationalists, the colonial regimes achieved a considerable amount 
of educational development in a comparatively short time' (cited in Eisenstadt & 
Rokkan, 1973: 344). More cogently, as well as endorsing and extending this link 
(1969: 242), Dowse's study of the military coup of 1966 that toppled the Nkrumah 
government cites 'shared educational experiences' as the key factor uniting the 
successful army officer/bureaucratised middle class coalition (1969: 229). He 
further underscores, in the debates surrounding a mooted reform constitution, this 
new military regime's 'suspicion of the "masses". For example, it was suggested 
that only the literate should be given the vote, and the authorities' 
constitutional proposals were certainly geared towards the chiefs, the older 
generation, and especially the judiciary (which might emerge as a "guardian" 
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group); and against the illiterate, who would not be allowed to stand for election 
(this would exclude about 70 per cent of the population)' (1969: 241). 
[10] Foss notes that when 'the army commanded by Abu Muslim, leader of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran which destroyed the Umayyads, routed a Chinese 
lance-cavalry army outside Samarkand in 751, the Arabs captured skilled 
Chinese papermakers. Within a few years, there were enormously elaborated 
bureaucracies, diwans staffed by katibs. State spending stimulated textile 
production, commercial crops, education, Arabic grammar and literature (into 
which was translated the Greek classical corpus), and proliferated forms and 
varieties of slavery and war (which overlapped) given the sheer quantity of 
records which could be kept of units, tribal or slave, with differing military 
specialties' (1998: 2). In 20th-century Iran, linked (somewhat incongruously) by 
the International Council of Adult Education with global neighbours Israel and 
the USSR as a trinity of regions where 'organizational bases of the army have 
been used for literacy support' (ICAE, 1979: 19), Api describes how 'during the 
early 1970s the Shah's regime launched an ambitious literacy project', with the 
avowed aim of attracting multinational investment in industry, increasing the 
market for consumer durables, deepening villager involvement in the cash 
economy and attempting to 'help the Government to control the outlying areas'. To 
this end, It]housands of young people were drafted into the "Army of Knowledge" 
which was to bring literacy into the countryside'. With the benefit of hindsight, 
Api goes on to evaluate the outcome of the experiment and place it in a broader 
context, stating that the 'authoritarian nature of the Iranian example is typical 
of many literacy programmes in the Third World. The relationship between 
[conscripted] Government educationists and villagers was a political one, and 
created the seeds of resentment and conflict that eventually spilled over in 1979 
with the overthrow of the Shah. Reading over the literature of that period, it is 
remarkable just how crude and ethnocentric the thinking behind the literacy 
campaigns and education programmes were. And yet they were founded on the 
theories and practices worked out by UN "experts" ' (Api, 1988: 9). According to 
Michael Rose, under the subsequent government of Ayatollah Khomeini, '[t]he 
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Cultural Revolution Committee was set up in the summer of 1980 to rid the 
university of opposition elements and to "islamicize" the curriculum', and 
likewise at elementary and secondary schools teachers 'have to pass an 
"ideological test" before they are allowed to teach...Children's textbooks have 
also been redesigned and rewritten so that they will conform both to proper 
Islamic principles and to Iranian traditions ...Children are questioned by teachers 
about their parents', and those 'parents who come under suspicion are visited by 
authorities and punished in the appropriate way' (1983: 21). 
[11] From William Frawley's Text and Epistemology comes the observation that 
'Gelb, like others working in the history of writing, sees writing as developing 
around 3000 BC, in post-Sumerian pictographs, which gave rise to both Sumerian 
cuneiform and Egyptian hieroglyphics. Through cultural contact and conquest 
these two writing systems developed into the systems which we know in the 
West today' (1987: 2, emphasis added). Under the head of 'WAR' in the 
Encyclopaedia of Human Behaviour Vol. 4, Gabriel & Metz assert that the 
'world's oldest armies appeared in Sumer (modern Iraq) and Egypt. Between 3000 
and 2000 BC, Sumer developed a professional army which fought in phalanx 
formation and was the first to be equipped with body armour and helmets. 
Sumerian military technology brought into being the first military application of 
the wheel, the chariot, and the invention of the socket axe, the penetrating axe 
and the composite bow. The Sumerian states were at war with one another almost 
constantly over a thousand year period culminating, around 2400 BC, in the 
appearance of the world's first military dictatorship under Sargon the Great' 
(1994: 530). On this interpretation development of warfare and writing occur 
together, and that by implication, non-literate pre-Sumerian societies were also 
non-warring. 
[121 'During the War of Independence and during the establishment of its defence 
forces in the 1940s and 1950s, Israel and the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] absorbed 
thousands of new immigrants, "olim" from every comer of the globe.. .As well as 
fulfilling the defence needs of the country, the IDF has to pay particular 
189. 
attention to the individual, including those who have not yet managed to plant 
their roots firmly in the country, as well as those who have not succeeded in 
acquiring even a basic education' (Soloman, 1989: 108). The author goes on to note 
that the 'principle [sic ] aims of military education in the IDF are derived not 
only from the current needs of the military but are also a function of civilian life'; 
and central to these aims are 'improving the soldier's knowledge of Hebrew (or 
giving him the basics of the language in the case of a new immigrant), and 
ensuring that every soldier completes his basic educational requirements in 
society' (1989: 110). 
[13] lAlfter his election as President of the Ivory Coast in 1960, Houphouet-
Boigny stated. ..that, beginning in 1961, twenty-year olds would be called upon to 
serve in the military and civic service, which would replace the French military 
service to which some had been subject in the past.. .They will receive, in addition 
to basic military training, a civic education in two parts: ideological and 
practical. The latter is the most important, and will consist of work on major 
public projects. ..This is a significant manifestation of the Ivory Coast's break 
with colonial traditions of education and the beginning of a new era of 
mobilisation for national construction' (Zolberg & Zolberg, 1963: 472-473). 
[14]Profiling Kenya amongst a range of other 19th and 20th century English 
colonial possessions, Terence Ranger finds that steps were 'taken to ensure that 
the military and administrative services in [turn-of-the-20th-century] Africa 
were related to the dominant traditions. Much use was made in the early period 
of colonial administration of officers of the newly efficient and honourable 
British army [...] Meanwhile the educational system of England began to turn out 
civilian colonial administrators...the recruiters for the colonial service testified 
to the success of these endeavours...But the universities too came to play their 
part [...] In the end some settler communities were successful enough to set up in 
Africa itself replicas of the schools whose traditions validated the British 
governing class. Thus in 1927, 
a plan was discussed with Eton College to found the "Kenya Public School", 
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under the joint auspices of Winchester and Eton, with reciprocal staffing 
arrangements and scholarships for the children of poorer white parents. After 
a trip to Britain to test support for the project, the Director of Education 
decided to ask "all the leading public schools to present us with pictures of 
their school buildings so that the boys may be constantly reminded of the great 
schools at home and old boys visiting the school may likewise remember their 
Alma Mater" '(1992: 215-17) 
The purpose of such practices, in Ranger's estimation, was 'the determination of 
those who controlled Kenyan society to keep it in the hands of "the public school 
educated with a patrimony, a military pension, investment income or an assurance 
of family support" ' (1992: 220). 
[15] Edward Said begins his pathbreaking study of Orientalism as follows: 'On a 
visit to Beirut during the terrible civil war of 1975-1976 a French journalist wrote 
regretfully of the gutted downtown area that "it had seemed to belong to. ..the 
Orient of Chateaubriand and Nerval". He was right about the place, of course, 
especially so far as a European was concerned. The Orient was almost a European 
invention...Now it was disappearing; in a sense it had happened, its time was 
over' (1985a: 1). For Said the Lebanon is a type-case of the Western tendency to 
view the Arab world through the eyes of varieties of canonical literary fictions - 
colonial, cultural, travelogical and/or religious (such that 'Biblical poetry is 
engraved on the land of Lebanon' [1985a: 177]) - and that adherence to such 
constructions can have devastating political ("realist") consequences. Elsewhere 
(1985b: 19-20), he holds that Western analysts failed to predict sociopolitical 
breakdown in Lebanon in the 1970s because of such Occidental bias and belief in 
the tenets of modernisation theory (Geertz, with his 1973 assessment of Lebanese 
religious and ethnic harmony - the durability of the "nice piece of mosaic" - is 
particularly singled out for criticism). Similarly, Corm refers to a general sense of 
time being thrown out of gear (1988: 233) characterising aspects of the conflict as 
'surreal' at four different points in his narrative (1988: 218, 221, 237, 238). More 
concretely (?), "surrealism" is cranked up a notch or two in the architectural 
design project headed by Michael Markham aimed at a proposed rebuilding of 
the Lebanese capital. Although its maintained of the blueprints and modelling 
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that 'Nile process was rational in a sense' (1993: 480), the finished product belies 
"rationality" as conventionally understood in that the 'drawing became a chance 
for the visionary project, only theory, in which one was apt to see, believe in, or 
be deluded by, the relations between all the lines, a trigger for the imagination, 
an excess of possibilities, rather than the finite reality of the world  normally 
representing a designer's intention' (1993: 49, italics in the original, underlining 
added). What seems to be proposed is a "Greater Lebanon" theme park, and a nice 
purchase on the mooted shift into newer versions of the Orient-as-Fiction is 
gained by comparing Markham's Deleuzoguattarian/Baudrillard-type approach 
to the proposed town plan for Beirut written by Salaam (1972: 109-119) prior to 
the outbreak of hostilities. Somewhat opposed to either vision is the commitment 
of Nicholas Fattouch, Lebanon's 1993 Minister for Tourism, to leave central Beirut 
in its current demolished condition and cater for the new boom industry of "war 
tourism", where '[b]us loads of tourists can be seen visiting sites like the battle-
ravaged Martyrs Square in the centre of the capital, driving along the Green Line 
that once divided the city and walking through hollowed-out, bullet-riddled 
buildings' (Gedeon, 1993: 6) - perhaps a case of life-imitating-art, in that the P. J. 
O'Rourke Holidays in Hell comic literary genre (see, eg, Fraser, 1991; Buckoke, 
1991) seems to have either replaced or joined earlier western 'Orientalist' 
narratives, and spread to the actual practices of the travelling public. 
[16] Reporting from the battlefront in Liberia, torn between the competing forces of 
Charles Taylor's NPFL, Alhaji Kromah's ULIMO and Prince Johnson's INPFL 
(with Amos Sawyer's "Interim Government of National Unity", a varied 
contingent of UN and NGO aid workers, and the West African peace-keeping 
force ECOMOG acting as buffers between the rival factions) war correspondent 
Janine di Giovanni vividly and ironically ('Liberia is Haiti without the 
discipline', 1994: 94) conveys that country's atmosphere of ferocious and 
seemingly interminable chaos. However, amidst the turmoil one set of protocols - 
documentation - remains constant. On disembarking at the airport, she discovers 
that 
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' "Arrivals" is an open-air porch swarming with people, all with hands open, 
all wanting something. Money. My passport. My yellow fever 
certificate.. .Someone shoves me and Gary into another room. 
"Your entrance visas?" 
We show him our passports. He says in barely intelligible Liberian English: 
"You have no letters of welcome?" 
We look at each other. I say, "What letters of welcome?" 
"You cannot enter the country without letters of welcome. You are journalists, 
no? You need a letter of welcome from the Foreign Ministry. But perhaps if the 
lady would like to leave the room...the men can discuss an alternative?" 
I leave the room and stand outside smoking a cigarette. An old woman passes 
and spits near the ground where I am standing. Another omen? I put out my 
cigarette and Gary emerges, brandishing passports. 
"How much?" 
"Twenty bucks" (di Giovanni, 1994: 98). 
[17] Citing historical incidents in Madagascar (since 1960, the independent 
Malagasy Republic) between 1820 and 1860 as an instance of indigenous 
modernisation in a traditional 19th-century society (continued in a less 
collaborative and indigenous form after the 1896 French conquest and colonisation 
of the island under General Gallieni), Dan Avni Segre highlights the key aspects 
of outside intervention facilitating this process: 'The British were quick to grasp 
the great cultural and economic potential of the Merinas. [Scottish sergeant] 
James Hastie and another sergeant from the Indian Army, a mulatto called 
Brady, completely reorganised the Malagasy army, making it a central 
instrument of modernisation. Hastie's diary is full of notes and observations about 
the possibilities of improving existing trades and crafts in order to strengthen the 
military and economic power of the King [Radama I]. He makes a list of locally 
produced knives, bayonets, iron plates, leather works which might be useful to 
the very shaky "ordnance corps" of the King. He taught the King the use of horses 
and showed him, with great success, the advantages of wearing European 
uniform. He also realised that the key to Malagasy modernisation was the 
possession of a written language. While teaching the King English, he preserved 
the work of a few British missionaries who in a very short time had transcribed 
the Malagasy idiom into Latin characters. His influence on the King was so great 
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that after his death in 1826 the British Government decided to record his merits 
in a special Blue Book. The King, who had made him his "blood brother" and 
who had created him one of the highest noblemen in the kingdom, gave him a 
royal funeral' (Segre, 1969: 75). 
[18] 'In Mali, villagers selected people who could volunteer for a short training 
course. Two "lettered" individuals were selected... One was the elder (called war 
veteran )... the other was the "opposite", a young person...who was more up to 
date than the elder' (ICAE, 1979: 27, emphasis added). 
[19]In the course of his heartrending account of the final (and fatal) procession of 
Mulay Hassan, effectively on his death in 1894 the last of the old-regime kings of 
Morocco, Geertz explains the background and ongoing praxis - the religio-textual 
legitimation and the politico-military necessity of the court-in-motion - of 
Moroccan dynastic rule as follows: 'Politically, eighteenth and nineteenth-
century Morocco consisted of a warrior monarchy centred in the Atlantic plain, a 
cloud of at least sporadically submissive "tribes" settled in the fertile regions 
within its immediate reach, and a thinner cloud of only very occasionally 
submissive ones scattered throughout the mountains, steppes, and oases that rim 
the country. Religiously, it consisted of a sharifian dynasty (that is, one claiming 
descent from Muhammad), a number of Koranic scholars, jurists, teachers, and 
scribes (ulema), and a host of holy men, living and dead, possessed of miraculous 
powers, the famous marabouts. In theory, Islamic theory, the political and 
religious realms were one, the king was caliph and head of both, and the state 
was thus a theocracy; but it was not a theory that anyone, even the king, could 
regard as more than a lost ideal in the face of a situation where charismatic 
adventurers were constantly arising on all sides. If Moroccan society has any chief 
guiding principle, it is probably that one genuinely possesses only what one has 
the ability to defend, whether it be land, water, women, trade partners, or 
personal authority: whatever magic a king had he had strenuously to protect' 
(1993 [orig. 1977]: 135-36). 
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[20] In Nigeria, during World War II 'an adult literacy campaign was very 
successful, but interest nearly vanished at the end of hostilities. It was not for the 
sheer joy of intellectual mastery that people had wanted to read and write; they 
had wanted to communicate with their young men who were away as soldiers. 
When the soldiers returned, there was much less felt need for literacy' (Foster, 
1973). Luckham reports on a later effort in the 1960s to remedy this ambivalence 
towards literacy within the Nigerian military itself, where attitudes veered 
between formal education as politically dangerous (reflected in the tendency 'for 
officers to suggest that the January 1966 coup occurred because the Majors who 
staged it "were too clever by half", read too many books about politics and were 
too much influenced by the university graduates among them'), and 
occupationally honourable, in that the 'social prestige of the officers among other 
elites has been governed in the main by their level of educational attainment' 
(1971: 122-130). 
[21] Writing of early African proto-states prior to European colonisation, Philip 
Mason notes that a 'frequent feature of the African empires is an inner ring of close 
neighbours who pay regular tribute, and an outer ring who are subject to sporadic 
raids.. .Sometimes it is felt that the outer ring, the raided folk, are in some way 
the property of the central kingdom; this is "our" raiding territory, it is felt. A 
raid might mean that a heavy tribute was exacted, usually in cattle and young 
people; more often it was like an operation of war. ..This concept of the hunting 
territory which "belonged" to an African state was later used by Europeans, 
notably in Northern Rhodesia, but also in Southern Rhodesia, as a fiction 
enabling sovereignty to be transferred. A great part of Northern Rhodesia was 
assumed to be within the "sovereignty" of Lewanika, king of the Barotse, and 
transferred by Treaty to the British South African Company' (1970: 79, emphasis 
in the original). 
[22]Outlining the course of the literacy campaign in Somalia between 1973 and 
1975, Bhola provides the relevant historical backdrop: prior to formal 
independence in 1960, the 'colonisation of Somalia began during the mid-1800s. 
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French Somaliland, today the independent nation of Djibouti, was established in 
1860; British Somaliland, now Northern Somalia, was established in 1884; and in 
1889 Italy took control of what is now Southern Somalia to establish Italian 
Somaliland...The years 1960-69 were marked by political and social chaos with 
some eighty political parties vying for power and fanning the fires of tribalism 
and nepotism. This led to the army coup of 1969 that established a government 
committed to scientific socialism. During 1969-76, military leaders ruled the 
country through a Supreme Revolutionary Council' (1984: 159). On March 8th 
1973, this government launched a 2-year mass literacy program, divided into 
separate rural and urban components. In terms of provision of teaching personnel, 
in the rural campaign '[c]ivil servants, members of the armed forces, and 
volunteers were considered but not actually used' because of the prioritising of 
other essential governmental tasks (1984: 164, emphasis added); in the urban 
campaign, however, sets of educational 'orientation centres were assigned the 
tasks of bringing together state employees, military personnei,literate 
businessmen, students and teachers living within the zone and to recruit them as 
voluntary literacy teachers, inspectors, and orientation personnel for the 
campaign' (1984: 162-3, emphasis added). 
[23] Kitchen's 1963 monograph on the Sudan maintains that the 'army, which has 
closely dominated the government of Sudan since 1958, is accused by its civilian 
critics of being anti-intellectual. Few of the army officers now in controlling 
positions are university graduates themselves, and traditionally the Military 
College has drawn the second- and third-level secondary school graduates rather 
than the honours students. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the 
revolutionary government has given high priority to the advancement of 
education at all levels. The number of students attending the University of 
Khartoum and the Khartoum Institute of Technology has virtually doubled since 
1958, and the number of students going abroad to study is increasing annually. 
Moreover, with the rise of the army to political prominence and the progressive 
closing of a range of civilian avenues to professional advancement and political 
prominence, the military is beginning to draw better material from among 
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Sudanese school leavers' (1963: 79). 
[24]Lerner's 1958 study of Syria - headnoted and scene-set by a Syrian 
schoolteacher's claim that Im]ilitary service is the best means for training the 
soul so that it can face hardships' - characterises modernising political change in 
the country as arising not through mass action 'but from the alliance between 
young army officers and the radical intelligentsia of the "new middle class"' 
(1958: 264). The military wing of this "elite" arose from the military 
dictatorships which ruled from 1949 to 1958, themselves brought to power under 
conditions of British wartime occupation until independence in 1946 (1958: 270). 
The rise of newer nationalist parties 'also supplies new recruits to the army 
officer corps, which has been involved in all the postwar political crises' - a local 
professor is cited as noting the importance of the armed forces as a bridge into 
political reform for these would-be elites: thus, '[n]ot infrequently high school 
teachers and lawyers, dissatisfied with their professions or believing their 
ambitions can better be attained in the army, enter military schools and resume 
their public careers in the military service' (Khadduri, cited in Lerner, 1958: 276). 
[25]In Tunisia, '[i]n response to pressures from the British and French governments 
and with the drafting assistance of the French Consul, Muhammad al-Sadiq 
(1859-82) became in 1861 the first Muslim ruler [bey] to promulgate a 
constitution.. .General Khayr al-Din, a Circassian mamluk who served as the 
bey's principal adviser, founded in Tunis in 1875 Sadiqi College, the first secular 
institution of higher learning in the Maghrib. The equivalent of a French lycee, 
Sadiqi College under the protectorate became an unplanned centre for training the 
rising political leadership' (Hurewitz, 1969: 401). 
[26] Ranger writes that in British Colonial Africa of the 1930s, 'royal visits were 
necessarily rare occasions. In the intervals the royal cult had to be sustained by 
locally invented traditions. Men could make their careers by inspired 
contributions to these. A prime example is the career of Edward Twining, later 
governor of Tanganyika...Twining's not very distinguished military career and 
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his transfer to the colonial service was a search for convincing distinction...While 
still an administrative officer in Uganda, Twining wrote and published a 
pamphlet on the English coronation ceremony.. .[and] was, in fact, first brought to 
official attention by his successful organization of the 1937 celebrations in 
Uganda, a triumph of ceremonial creativity, vividly described by its author: 
...[t]he Buglers then sounded Retreat in the dark and then on went some 40 odd 
spotlights, floodlights and footlights, and the drums and the band beat 
tattoo. ..Then some schoolboys did the Parade of the Toy Soldiers. I got the 
particulars of this from the Duke of York's School at Dover, and adapted it to 
the local conditions. The boys wore white trousers, red tunics, and white pill 
box hats, the officer a bear-skin...The tattoo then proceeded. Fireworks. A 
war dance by 120 warriors in Leopard Skins. Ostrich feathers and spears and 
shields. Then "From Savage to Soldier"showing the process of turning native 
warriors into real soldiers (Twining, cited in Ranger, 1992: 234) 
Ranger continues: 'The rest of Twining's distinguished career shows the same 
concern for invented ceremonial. He was a flamboyant governor [...] as governor of 
Tanganyika [27: independent since 1961 and since 1963 forming the republic of 
Tanzania with Zanzibar] [he] refused to negotiate with Nyerere's Tanganyika 
African Union because he regarded them as disloyal to the queen... [as this] fatal 
rigidity in Tanganyika demonstrates, the colonial manipulation of monarchy and 
indeed the whole process of traditional inventiveness, having served a good deal 
of practical purpose, eventually came to be counter-productive' (1992: 233-36). The 
tradition did however, have a longer lifespan in other states, such as the 1960s 
Zambia of Kenneth Kaunda, who 'in his search for a personal ideology to help 
him on the road to national leadership found solace and inspiration in Arthur 
Mee's Books for Boys' (1992: 227), and in the murderous qurnpen-militariat' 
regime of the "model" British-trained lance corporal Idi Amin during his term as 
Ugandan president (Ranger, 1992: 225-26). In a brutally grim irony, Twining's 
idyllic rite de passage of boy-"savages" to men-"soldiers" reverberates at the 
close of the twentieth century. Reporting on a recent upsurge in the phenomenon of 
underage recruitment ('boy soldiers'] in warring armies, Frankel et al (1995) finds 
that '[t]he end of the cold war...has accelerated the trend. As Washington and 
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Moscow cut funding to their regional military proxies, some national militaries 
and guerrilla movements turned to kids, who (to put it bluntly) cost less than 
adults': but Inlot all youths must be coerced into the army. For many poor 
children.. .conscription represents a step up in life...hundreds of war orphans 
adopted into the ranks of the Ugandan Army have been fed, educated and - in a 
few cases - sent to university' (1995: 48). 
[28]Writing of post-colonial governmental processes in Tropical Africa, Foltz 
(1973) says that the 'years since independence have seen the emergence of two 
powerful new elite groups...The first of these groups is a university educated new 
intelligentsia with a strong technocratic orientation. The expansion of higher 
education, and the politicians' need for competent administrators to fill the 
bureaucratic positions established by the nationalists' centrally directed 
economic activities have given this group a powerful corporate identity and 
access to major positions of power in the state apparatus. The second group is, of 
course, the military. Also technocratic in its orientation, its rise to power has 
most often helped to advance the careers and group interests of the civilian 
technocrats at the expense of the nationalists.. .So far, the military and civilian 
technocrats have formed a powerful alliance in several African states. They 
have emphasized a development-oriented centralization of power which has, in 
effect, tried to carry out and perfect the work of the nationalists. (Ex-president) 
Mobutu's Zaire (since June 1997 the Democratic Republic of the Congo) is perhaps 
the best example of this...All have reinforced the nationalist approach to 
nation-building through first building the state apparatus, and some of the new 
military leaders have attempted to assume the national hero position of the 
nationalist political leader. Mobutu's emphasis on donning the Lumumba mantle 
is the most obvious example' (1973: 374-75). 
[29] In Zambia, the 'program for educational reform stated that teaching English 
is not a goal of the national literacy program: "The war on illiteracy will be 
conducted through the medium of Zambian languages. The aim of the campaign is 
to teach every illiterate Zambian to read, write and reckon in a language he 
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knows well..." VCAE, 1979: 62, emphases added). 
5.3.2: THE AMERICAS 
[30]In Argentina, at 'the turn of the [20th] century all young men were required to 
register for compulsory military service and were subject to call at the age of 
twenty. The disciplined and regimented Argentine army, strongly influenced by 
German military missions after 1900, did not teach democracy, but a year in the 
barracks provided illiterates with the rudiments of reading and writing and gave 
conscripts elementary concepts of public health and some notion of the existence of 
a national authority. ..In 1912.. .all men (and women after 1947) over eighteen 
years of age received the right to vote by secret ballot but with the added 
prescription that suffrage was mandatory and failure to vote was punishable by 
fine. The enrolment booklet the men received upon registration for military 
service served as the voter's identification, as his record of having voted, and as 
a document for all civic and legal matters' (Scobie, 1971: 195). Speaking of an 
ongoing legacy of 'military disdain for civilian competence' in the later 20th 
century, the writer notes that the 'Argentine officer, like most of his Latin 
American colleagues, considers himself to be far more than a professional 
soldier...The smattering of law, literature, history, economics, psychology, and 
international relations which career officers received along with their 
engineering and military training not only rounded out their preparation, it also 
encouraged their self-confidence as experts in all fields' (Scobie, 1971: 220). 
[31]In their account of the succession to power of an assortment of directly 
military or militarily-sponsored governments in the political history of Bolivia, 
Hudson & Hanratty (1989) lay particular emphasis on not only the importance of 
armed services training academies, but trace the establishment of civilian 
education centres back to the birth of the nation: thus, the regime of the first 
native-born president Andres de Santa Cruz y Calahumana (1829-39) - a mestizo 
who 'had a brilliant military career fighting for independence in the armies of 
Bolivar' prior to 1826 independence - 'codified the country's laws and enacted 
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Latin America's first civil and commercial codes. The Higher University of San 
Andres in La Paz was also founded during his rule'. The mixed fortunes of such 
enterprises in the political instability of the next hundred years saw a significant 
increase in the military-educational nexus, such that in 1936 then-president 
Colonel David Toro Ruilova 'invited an Italian military mission to establish two 
military academies' which 'provided instruction for the first time in such subjects 
as sociology and political science'. The pattern of outside intervention in the 
continuing refinement of armed service schooling continued under Paz Estenssero's 
(1952-56, 1960-64) governments, which both appointed US military instructors to 
the defence colleges and, in 1960, inaugurated the new School of High Military 
Studies (EAEM) 'to educate senior civilian and military leaders on strategic 
issues affecting Bolivia'. US-Bolivian cooperation was further deployed in 1967 
when with 'counterinsurgency instructors from the United States Southern 
Command (Southcom) headquarters in Panama, the army established a Ranger 
School in Santa Cruz Department' to combat the abortive insurrectionary attempt 
of Ernesto "Che" Guevara (executed October 7th 1967). 
[32] In Brazil, although Stepan's study is skeptical of wider governmental claims 
of its barracks as literacy centres ("huge classrooms") where recruits make their 
first contact with modernity, he cites a lesser-known official publication stating 
an armed forces preference for drafting urban, literate youth - a preference shared 
by assorted upper-echelon commanders interviewed by the author, and evident in 
the statement by the chief of schools for the Brazilian army, that '[w]e draft only 
a small percentage of draft-age people. We try to select draftees who are the best 
of the group. I believe illiterates form less than 5 per cent of the total' (1971: 15- 
17) . 
[33]Woodcock, in his booldength treatment of the social history of Canada, 
assesses the cultural as well as the overtly military impact of British troop 
detachments stationed in major urban centres like Quebec and Halifax, and other 
provincial areas such as Toronto and Kingston, up to the 1860s. His claim is that 
lolne way in which the garrison society contributed to the emergent culture of 
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Canada was in its fostering of the arts'. Aside from its major influence on painting 
(an adjunct to the strategic necessity for accurate topographical information) and 
music (an offshoot of the Regency notion of musical skills as the attributes of a 
gentleman of the officer caste and a breaking of the tedium of barracks routine), 
another major sphere of influence was literary: thus, the 'first novel set in 
Canada, The History of Emily Montague (1769), was written by Frances Brooke, 
friend of Dr Johnson and wife of the garrison chaplain at Quebec. It concerned the 
lives and loves of officers and ladies during the occupation period after the 
Conquest. One of the first important novels written by a Canadian was a Gothic 
tale about garrison life, John Richardson's Wacousta - which was set in the 
British fortress of Detroit during Pontiac's rebellion in 1763. John Richardson was 
the son of a medical officer in a British regiment and himself served as a 
gentleman volunteer in the War of 1812, later being commissioned in the regular 
British forces' (Woodcock, 1988: 186-87). Moreover, despite opposition from other 
colonial interests - in particular the Church - in terms of the staging of 
productions acted by armed forces personnel, the building of playhouses (notably 
the New Grand Theatre in 1789) and, following the 17th-century lead of the 
French-colonial military's introduction and performance of the works of 
Corneille, Racine and Moliere to the region, the production of seminal English 
plays, the 'British garrisons were also responsible for developing the theatre in 
Canada, if not actually introducing it there...' (Woodcock, 1988: 187). 
[34] In Chile, after 'the military coup that knocked the socialist government of 
Salvador Allende out of office... a drastically revamped education system was to 
be one of the main planks in the junta's plan to forge the "new" Chilean character 
- acquiescent, uncritical and patriotic...The first step was to replace thousands of 
"subversive" teachers and education officials with junta supporters - all strictly 
controlled by military overseers...The junta's long term plan for education centred 
on two clear strategies. The first was to push more of the financial obligations 
onto the shoulders of local government and municipalities. The second was a pay-
as-you-learn approach. Those who could pay would get schooling, those who 
could not would be effectively condemned to illiteracy. ..Higher education has 
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been radically reorganised and savagely cut. The universities have been 
"rationalised" so that the curricula meet the approval of the regime. Military 
officers have been installed as rectors and deans to ensure "purity of direction"... 
Ironically the Pinochet government's policy of restricting access to education has 
spawned dozens of unofficial community groups - often church-backed. Working 
with those the junta has effectively pushed to the wall, these groups are trying 
to keep alive the idea that education should be used not for repression but 
liberation' (M. Rose, 1983: 21-2). 
[35] Analysing the formal conditions of demilitarisation in Costa Rica, Hoivik & 
Aas (1981) stress the importance of the 1948 post-civil war public statement by 
victorious junta leader Jose Figueres (beginning with the declaration that lilt is 
time for Costa Rica to return to her traditional position of having more teachers 
than soldiers...', 1981: 334, emphasis added), and Article 12 of the 1949 
constitution replacing the army as a permanent institution with necessary 
internal police forces and ad hoc military units organised for national defence 
under the auspices of 'continental agreement' with neighbouring states in "if-and-
when" emergency situations. In terms of 'cultural health' indicator figures for 
1976, both education (a school-age population per teacher ratio of 54) and 
literacy rates (89%) compare favourably with adjacent regional entities: this, 
together with the mooted 1979 establishment of a UN University of Peace - 'an 
international centre of superior education for post-university teaching, research 
and publication of knowledge specifically oriented to training for peace' (1981: 
350) - is held to be an important part of the demilitarisation dividend. Yet in the 
final analysis, Floivik & Aas hold the Costa Rican demilitarisation strategy to 
be more rhetorical than real. They point to the country's military heritage, 
noting the importance of the 19th-century 'war against the North American 
filibuster William Walker', which 'led to a political-military mobilisation of 
the population in defence of the nation's sovereignty, and resulted in military 
governmental rule between 1871 and 1889': these 'military governments 
contributed to the further centralization and modernisation of the country' (1981: 
339). Such military-initiated modernisation continued through the Tinoco-led 
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coup of 1917, declined in the face of US armed intervention in the Coto War 
against Panama in 1921, and reasserted itself as a key strikebreaking force 
against communist union action in the Banana Strike of 1934. Moreover, the 
paramilitary alternatives to the army - the Costa Rican Public Security Forces, 
which are 'strong, well organized, and have a clear military significance', and 
the Civil Guard, more than 1,600 of whom were trained at US military 
institutions between 1949 and 1964 (1981: 347) - operated in regional military 
struggles (particularly in Nicaragua in the 1960s and 70s) as well as domestic 
activities such as the suppression of the 1970 demonstrations against bauxite 
contracts negotiated between ALCOA and the ruling government. The defence 
allocation of the "demilitarised" state showed only slight declines over a 10- 
year period (1981: 348) despite the "absence" of armed forces (military 
expenditures as %age of GNP standing at 0.9% in 1965, 0.9% in 1970, and 0.6% in 
1975); and according to the co-authors, "demilitarisation" is perhaps less 
accurate and realistic a description of the Costa Rican situation than 'what 
Alfred Stepan has called "the new professionalism" ', where a national guard 
model 'responds primarily to problems of internal security; its military skills are 
police-like and managerial, and there are political restrictions on the scope of its 
actions. This is a concept derived from the larger South American armies in the 
1960's and '70's...' (1981: 349, emphasis added). 
[36] Analysing the national literacy campaign in Cuba in the late 1950s, Morales 
begins with antecedents, describing how in 1896 'the Cuban patriot Daniel 
Fajardo Ortiz, codirector of the newspaper El Cubano Libre, published a Primer 
for Learning in the Public Schools of the State that consisted of lessons with 
patriotic content. This primer was used in the fields of Free Cuba during the war 
of 1895. During the Ten Years War (1868-1878) Rafael Morales y Gonzalez 
(Moralitos) also put together a primer and used it to teach children in the 
liberated territories and the soldiers of the mambi army to read and write'. This 
heritage was reasserted less than 100 years later in the revolution against 
Batista, when 'the rebel army organized schools for children and soldiers in the 
liberated zones. In 1958, in the "Frank Pais" Second Front, under the juridstiction 
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of that zone's Rebel Army leadership, the Department of Education was created 
to organize and operate a network of schools for children and adults. That 
experience was a basis for the subsequent 1959 literacy campaign among the rebel 
soldiers...[U]nder the Directorate of Culture of the Rebel Army, which later 
became the Department of Education of the Ministry of Armed Forces, each 
headquarters, camp, and police station was turned into a literacy centre. The 
collaboration among the teachers was magnificent, and the literacy effort began 
for many military units in February 1959' (1981: 32-33). As to the outcome of the 
official campaign by December 1961, Morales concludes that the 'results indicated 
that 707,212 people had achieved literacy, while 271,995 remained illiterate. 
This left 3.9 percent illiterates in the total population of Cuba, which was then 
estimated at 6,938,700 inhabitants' (1981: 38 - as an aside, the effectiveness of 
this campaign will later prompt Margaret Archer [1985] to use it as an empirical 
example of the explanatory superiority of a morphogenetic over a stucturationist 
approach in sociological theory). A retrospective assessment of this top-down 
effort by Kozol (1978) brands it as the 'untold education story of our generation'; 
and in answering his self-imposed question[s] as to 'why, under what political 
pressure or for what material, ethical, or intellectual reward, did so many people 
answer the government's appeal? What, if not terror, could have made this 
program work?', he notes that the 'question cannot be addressed without an 
awareness of the ongoing military revolution taking place at the same time as the 
literacy campaign' (1978: 344). In the section of his monograph entitled "War 
Footing", he affirms that the 'military parallel unquestionably was in many 
people's mind in 1961. There is also no question that a certain military fervour, 
openly avowed by Fidel [Castro], helped to fire the passion of the literacy 
struggle from the start' (1978: 354). Yet he brands the notion that this conjunction 
aimed at the creation of 'future soldiers for bloodthirsty leaders' as 'absurd', 
proffering instead as explanations the Cuban campaign's progress against the 
backcloth of a 'formidable military and economic threat from the United States'; 
continuity with the revolutionary army leadership; the effectiveness of teachers 
organised into brigadista units/detachments; the cathectic impact of propaganda 
[according to Kozol, 'a word used quite openly in Cuba, where it bears none of the 
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connotations it carries in the United States'(1978: 345)1; the background influence 
of Paolo Freire's equation of literacy with freedom, and the tenet of freedom as 
"acquired by conquest, not by gift"; and the experience of widespread failure in 
preceding (typically Third-World, typically UNESCO-financed) literacy 
campaigns undertaken without heavy and overt military involvement at either 
the practical or symbolic level (Kozol, 1978: 354-366). 
[37]Febvre & Martin relate the rise of print industries in early-modem 
mesoAmerica to the progress of Spanish colonialism (c/f [93]), and note within 
this context that in 1626-1627 'a press was working in Cuenca, Ecuador, and 
another at Santiago in Guatemala from 1660 on. Very little thus appeared outside 
Mexico City and Lima before the 18th century, which indicates that the 
Spaniards had not yet subdued and developed the vast regions they had 
conquered' (1976: 209; emphases added). 
[38]According to the FAS Area Handbook for Guatemala (DA Pam 550-78), at the 
time of independence from Spain in 1821, 'most people were illiterate except for 
the few doctors, lawyers and priests in the country. After independence, and 
particularly during the liberal governments of the 19th century, steps were taken 
—to provide a broader education for more people. President Mario Galvez (1831-38) 
built new schools and added new courses.. .He founded the first normal school in 
Guatemala City, which prospective teachers from the rest of Central America 
were invited to attend. Army Officers were required to attend the normal school, 
and possession of a primary school teachers' certificate was a prerequisite to 
promotion. In addition, soldiers received instruction in the rights and duties of 
citizens, as well as military training. Galvez' successor, however, the illiterate 
President Rafael Carrera (1838-65) was little interested in promoting the 
educational establishment, and it was not until the Presidency of Justo Ruffino 
Barrios (1873-85) that education was once again given impetus' (Dombrowski et 
al, 1970: 190-91). 
[39] Charting the progress of a flawed literacy initiative, John Bevan reported 
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how on April 24, 1980, 'the Honduras Literacy Coordinating Committee met for 
the first [and last] time to oversee a campaign which had already begun 
officially 17 days earlier', but that the 'Ministry of Education had already taken 
key decisions that made the Coordinating Committee redundant'; 'The Literacy 
Campaign was to take place between May 2 and October 21', however 'the 
literacy instructors received only three days training'; a "methodology of 
dialogue" was envisaged, but 'under no circumstances were [the extant teaching 
materials] to be altered or supplemented'; and 'the reading texts for the learners 
were produced in far too small a print size'. But in Bevan's opinion, this 
campaign's mistakes were not just 'technical and organisational. They were 
directly related to the whole political and economic climate of the country. The 
content of the teaching text should have drawn from the experience and needs of 
the learners', but 'were, in many respects far from such experience. For example, 
one of the pamphlets published by "the Government of the Armed Forces" 
devoted a section to electoral procedure and the civic duty of voting - even though 
Honduras had not held elections for eight years'. In summation, Bevan ascribes 
this string of errors to the fact that 'the Honduran Literacy Campaign was 
launched by a rigid and authoritarian military dictatorship [ie, one unconcerned 
with serious social, economic and political reform]...The failure of the campaign 
had as much to do with this as with its chaotic organisation and lack of planning' 
(Bevan, 1983: 19-20). 
[40] In Mexico, Fuller, Edwards & Gorman state that succeeding 'Mexico's war of 
independence in the 1820s and again after the social revolution (1911-1917), 
strong steps were taken to deliver literacy (in Spanish) to indigenous Indians - 
with the explicit goal of building a national consciousness ...the function of 
literacy emphasized social goals, not material development' (1981: 323); and 
Schryer, comparing the relative importance of literacy in Mexico in the '20s and 
the '30s, maintains that the increase in the former period 'corresponded to a time 
when military authorities, who came to power during the revolution, were more 
likely to put greater emphasis on such universalistic criteria as literacy in 
appointing local military commanders or approving elected authorities... 
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literacy became less important after the 1930s when an increasing number of 
poorer rancheros or tenant farmers, many illiterate, became incorporated into the 
local political process'(1984: 422). 
[41] Cardenal & Miller (1981) provide a detailed insider's account of the literacy 
campaign in Nicaragua, beginning as an adjunct to the political struggles of the 
1920s and '30s between General Augusto Sandino (assassinated 1934) and US-
backed head of the National Guard Anastasio Somoza. In the aftermath of the 
internecine warfare in the 1960s between the Somosa government and the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front [FSLN] and the latter's victory in 1979, 
'the nation was transformed from a violent war zone into one enormous school. The 
spirit and commitment of hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans forged in combat 
became the moving force behind a massive literacy program. Young men and 
women who had taken up arms and gone to the hills took up pencils and primers 
and returned to the mountains' (1981: 2). As an example of the blending of 
militarism and alphanumeracy, the Nicaraguan National Literacy Crusade of 
1980 was nearly paradigmatic, operating simultaneously at the levels of praxis, 
metaphor and national memory: 'The specific strategy depended on the network 
of citizens and labour associations that originally had been organized 
clandestinely for the war. The actual operation of the literacy struggle followed 
the same general lines as the liberation struggle...The metaphors and 
terminology of the campaign were purposefully military.. .The literacy warriors, 
or brigadistas, of the Popular Literacy Army were divided into brigades, columns, 
and squadrons and were located along six battlefronts identical to those of the 
war. They joined forces with the Peasant and Workers' Militias and the Urban 
Literacy Guerrillas. Each battle unit chose the name of a fallen combatant as a 
means of honouring his or her memory.... the choice of military metaphors was 
designed to help young volunteers integrate the memories of the past, 
transforming terms related to the war into positive associations with teaching 
and sharing...A spiritual bond joined the living with the dead' (Cardenal & 
Miller, 1981: 8-9). 
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[42]Discussing diglossia in Paraguay, Engelbrecht & Ortiz note that the 'period 
starting at independence from Spain (1811) through the aftermath of the war of 
the Triple Alliance (1854-1870) against Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina, which 
Paraguay lost, was characterised by massive hispanization and preference for 
the non-Paraguayan... It was not until the late 19th century that works about the 
Guarani language and culture began to appear in Spanish. A new sense of 
nationalism emerged, particularly during the Chaco war against Bolivia (1932- 
1935), which Paraguay won. Guarani was then associated with the new 
nationalism. This change of attitudes and the victory of the nationalist Colorado 
party in 1948 brought about the recognition of Guarani as a national language in 
the constitution of 1967. At the present time written Guarani is found in signs 
marking the geography of the nation... and in the names of groups such as 
military regiments' (1983: 57). 
[43]For Ortega & Romero, it is no coincidence that 'the first significant progress in 
the field of journalism in Peru (despite an illiteracy rate between 75 and 80%) 
should have taken place precisely during the period between the invasion of 
Spain by Joseph Bonaparte in 1808, and the battles of Junin and Ayacucho in 
America which confirmed the independence of Peru in 1821...(t)his independence 
was not only the culmination of a far-ranging process of liberation, but also and 
simultaneously, the culmination of a slow but continuous trend of overcoming the 
barriers imposed by pure direct oral communication' (1976: 221). 
[44] In the United States, Kirsch & Guthrie report that 'during World War II, the 
Army used the term functional illiteracy to categorise individuals who could not 
use written information to adequately perform military tasks', and that this 
usage was subsequently extended to encompass the social capacity of adult 
populations in civil society (1978: 488); Sullivan notes how 'in a spectacular 
fashion the [First] World War focused attention on the problem of illiteracy', 
tracing US movements against the problem directly 'to the discovery that 24.9 
percent of the American soldiers were functionally illiterate' (1948: 520); Hoskin 
& MacVe address the issue of the application of military education to industry, 
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both in terms of organizational structure and what Ball (1990: 153-166) refers to as 
a 'moral technology of management', and proceed to 'explore the suggestion that 
the preeminence of the USA in the development of cost and management 
accounting might be traced to the influence of the engineering graduates of the 
military academy at West Point, where a meticulous pedagogic system was 
devised by Sylvanus Thayer in the years after 1817, a "grammatocentric" system 
based on ubiquitous written archives and examinations utilising mathematical 
grading...(W)e re-examine the published histories of two industrial institutions 
well known to have been instrumental in the early development of managerialism 
in the USA...We aim to identify how the West Point influence may have spread 
to them through the social network of its graduates'(1988: 37-38); Wigley's 
discussion of the establishment of architecture as a tertiary academic discipline 
describes how 'the first American university to efface the distinction between the 
architectonic condition of theory and its technological application, MIT, whose 
original course of study included military training in the basic program [ie, the 
Programme of 1865/66] would, of course, go on to become a major developer of 
military technology, and effectively a producer of weapons, through its 
increasingly close ties to a growing network of new intermediate institutions, 
known as the "military-industrial complex", that has disrupted every one of the 
traditional limits of the university... [This] effacement of the limits of the 
university, and its complicity with the military, does not occur in the applied 
sciences alone' (1991: 23); and Costa, in a chronology of 'events, legislation and 
influences' in US literacy education, cites 1777 (the first educational expenditure 
of federal funds, aimed at imparting textual skills to soldiers of the Continental 
Army), 1914, 1945, 1949 and 1950 (identification of national 'literacy crises', 
when significant numbers of draftees are designated "illiterate" and ineligible 
for induction) as particularly significant in terms of later educational 
developments (1988: 3-22; in her acknowledgements, Costa expresses her gratitude 
for the 'numerous letters and conversations exchanged with individuals around 
the country - people who are in the trenches, so to speak, working to understand, 
to explain, to teach, to encourage literacy' [1988: xi, emphasis added]). 
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5.3.3: ASIA 
[45] In Burma, the Burmese Army undertook a 'successful action in respect of 
literacy. A survey of illiteracy in the army in 1954 led to a campaign against 
illiteracy in 1955 when the Army Education Corps taught its soldiers to "sharpen 
the bayonet with alphabets" ' (Bhola, 1984: 109). 
[46]Tracking the emergence of separatist consciousness in Cambodia to its roots, 
Benedict Anderson takes note of factors such as the legacy of French colonial 
occupation, the wartime conditions of the 1930s and '40s, and the germane 
elements in the biographies of the earliest Cambodian nationalists: 'The man 
who can reasonably be regarded as the "father" of Khmer nationalism, Son Ngoc 
Thanh,...was educated in Saigon...Prince Sisowath Youtevong attended secondary 
school in Saigon before leaving for France for further study. When he returned to 
Phnom Penh fifteen years later, after World War II, he helped to found the 
(Khmer) Democratic Party and served as Prime Minister in 1946-1947. His 
Defence Minister Sonn Voeuruisai, undertook virtually the same 
journeys...Perhaps most exemplary of all is the figure of Ieu Koeus, first of a 
melancholy line of assassinated Khmer political leaders.. .After the Japanese 
collapse in August 1945, he reappeared in "Cambodge" as a Democratic 
parliamentarian. It is notable that he was in his way a lineal descendant of the 
illustrious philologers of an earlier Europe, insofar as he designed a typewriter 
keyboard for the Khmer script and published a weighty two-volume Pheasa 
Khmer [The Khmer Language]...But this text made its first appearance - volume 1 
only - in 1947, when its author was Chairman of the Constituent Assembly in 
Phnom Penh, not in 1937, when he was vegetating in Battambang, when as yet no 
Khmer-speaking lyceens had been produced by the Lycee Sisowath, and when 
Indochina still had an ephemeral reality. By 1947, Khmer speakers - at least 
those from "Cambodge" - were no longer attending classes in Saigon or Hanoi. A 
new generation was coining on the scene for whom "Indochine" was history and 
"Vietnam" now a real and foreign country...brutal invasions and occupations 
during the nineteenth century, ordered by the Nguyen dynasts in Hue, left bitter 
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folk-memories among the Khmer.] (Anderson, 1991: 130-31). 
[47]As instance of his more general position that 'writing materials are 
themselves graphemes, which shape how we understand communication, record 
keeping, facts, knowledge, and government', Foss focusses his attention on ancient 
China, noting that the 'Chinese word for book was written with an ideogram of a 
folio, bamboo strips bound with rings, which looks like it had a rectangular page. 
Though none of these survived. One form of text became ceremonial, so we have it 
on long, narrow bamboo strips found in grave goods. Another ceremonial form was 
the silk roll. What was used for everyday written text is still unknown. The first 
written text in Chinese found on paper was a dispatch sent by the junior officer in 
command of a fort in North China, surrounded by the enemy. He is badly in need 
of reinforcements, supplies, ammunition; he is surrounded; the enemy is closing in. 
The text did not make it to headquarters' (1998: 1-2, emphasis in the original). 
Lending empirical support to the contention that 'revolutionary regimes have 
been the only ones capable of organizing successful mass literacy campaigns.. .all 
revolutionary governments have given high priority to the war on illiteracy' (Le 
Thanh Khoi, in Arnove & Graff, 1987: 1), in modern China, '[t]he communists had 
started their educational work as early as the 1920s, concurrently with their 
military effort...[t]here are numerous descriptions of educational work carried out 
among the peasants by soldiers of the Red Army during the Long March of 1934- 
35...Literacy became the core of the four modernisations: modernisation of 
agriculture, modernisation of industry, modernisation of national defence, and 
modernisation of science and technology' (Bhola, 1984: 77-83, emphasis added). 
[48]In India, there 'had been a time when a recruit was looked on with disfavour 
if he could read or write': But by the 1930s, the projected demands in terms of both 
morale and technology called up by impending total war meant that henceforth 
the soldier 'had to have some education - indeed, from the beginning of the 
decade the army deliberately set about educating him - and sooner or later he was 
bound to read newspapers and open his mind to a wide variety of influences' 
(Mason, 1974: 466). 
[49]Writing of the period prior to independence in Indonesia in the late 1940s, 
Salim Said discusses features of the shift from Dutch colonialism to Japanese 
occupation: 'At the beginning, the Japanese mobilised people, including those in 
the bureaucracy for their own war efforts, both economic and military. For these 
purposes they created a myriad of organizations to tap the potential war 
capability in society...It is not an exaggeration to compare this policy of 
mobilisation by the Japanese with the opening of schools for a select number of 
Indonesians by the Dutch early in the century as a result of their so-called 
Ethical Policy. Both policies were the main causes of the two most important 
social movements in Indonesia this century. If the product of Dutch education was 
the leadership of the nationalist movement, the product of the Japanese 
mobilisation effort was a cadre of military participants in the revolution.. .What 
was most important to the Japanese was not that all Indonesians should be 
professionally able to fight a war but that the "spirit" of the Indonesians should 
be directed. The best way to do this, according to them, was through military 
discipline. Thus even elementary school students had to undergo some 
rudimentary training. Because of this policy, by 1945, when the Japanese 
surrendered, the Indonesian youths, especially in Java, provided a reservoir of 
trained personnel for the army. Some of them later joined the military but many 
more fought in emerging partisan groups known as laskyar ' (1991: 8-9). 
[50]According to Cleary, '[t]he legend of the imperial house of Japan emerged 
from two stages of armed conquest. The first stage involved the Japanese 
domination and destruction of other races of people inhabiting the islands that 
were to become Japan. The second stage, which was partially concurrent with the 
first, was marked by the ascendancy of some Japanese clans over others [...] When 
the prolonged Warring States era ended around the year 1600, a movement began 
to recollect and systematise the scattered arts and sciences of that turbulent yet 
strangely brilliant era. Modem knowledge of the traditional arts and sciences, 
including Zen and the way of the warrior, is largely based on elaborations of 
those reconstructed and systematised versions of ancient knowledge' (1991: 3, 39). 
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Considering cultural factors in rapid Japanese socioeconomic development since 
the US naval gunboat diplomacy of Perry's "black ships" in 1853, Dore says that 
traditionally 'the two professions of the samurai, fighting and governing, 
remained the most honoured professions.. .They were the chief goals of youthful 
ambition; the examination course which led into the First High School and 
thence into the Law Department of Tokyo University and thence into the civil 
service was the hurdle race that schoolboys were most likely to be coached for' 
(1976: 44). Stone (in Musgrave, 1970), drawing largely from Dore in his own 
comparative analysis between Japanese and English education over three 
centuries, elaborates: 'At a fairly early stage both societies freed education from 
the monopoly of priests, England in the sixteenth century, Japan in the 
seventeenth. Both developed schools for their elite in which their children could 
be taught firstly - and most importantly - the virtue of obedience to superiors in 
order to preserve social stability; secondly, the art of war, which was the 
original justification of their privileged status ...in late eighteenth-century Japan 
the Bakufu set an example by endowing, supporting and operating a school for 
samurai, the Shoheiko...Just as Machiavelli drew his examples of statecraft 
from antiquity, so did the Japanese go back to the Chinese classics to learn about 
military tactics' (1970: 102-3, emphasis added). The shift from elite to universal 
education in the 1870s is attributed to four factors: 'the belief in the efficacy of 
the educational process in inculcating obedience'; the absence of class war; the 
'intense desire for national power'; and 'to a Confucian sense of paternal 
responsibility. The most compelling reason was surely the third.. .The questions 
put to the prominent American educational experts in 1872 by the Japanese 
Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, and the replies he received, show beyond 
doubt that it was the overwhelming desire for economic and military 
predominance which was the driving force behind the educational reforms of the 
time [...] nationalism, the lust for imperial military greatness, was the driving 
force for educational change' (Stone, in Musgrave, 1970: 108-9, 110). Almost as a 
reprise to the 20th century result of this "lust", Crump, writing of 'the problem of 
representing the Japanese language on the basis of the Chinese ideographs' 
leading to logographic inconsistency in the rules for writing Japanese, notes that 
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the 'last of the expedients adopted to reform the written language was the 
introduction of the so-called Toyo Kanji in 1946, as a part of the educational 
reforms which the American occupying power imposed upon the Japanese' (1988: 
138). 
[51] Writing from a point of view that sees a US-style educated military as a 
force for modernisation in the general political evolution of the Less Developed 
Countries, Gutteridge notes that lolutside the American continent US military 
education is less in evidence. But the [South] Korean Military Academy, first 
planned in 1946, provides an excellent example. This academy, according to the 
annual yearbook, "was patterned after the US Military Academy, West Point" 
and provides a four-year curriculum for two hundred cadets admitted annually. 
The object is a carefully balanced education up to the standard of that of graduate 
of leading American universities. Qualifications for entry are necessarily 
somewhat varied in a developing country, but they are determined by an 
academic board, and, like the cadet command, organization, and uniform, owe 
much to the example of West Point. The range of subjects extends from 
mathematics, English, and the pure sciences to military history, culture, 
economics, and, whenever possible, a foreign language. Classes are small and 
there is daily recitation and grading, as well as a minimum of two hours of 
private study. The daily instructional system adopted from West Point has 
apparently no parallel at any school elsewhere in Korea or the Orient' 
(Gutteridge, 1965: 448-49). 
[52]The following is excerpted from the anonymous memoirs of a recipient of 
colonial education in Laos: 'Lao teachers and technicians numbered less than one's 
own fingers, just enough to help the Europeans rule over the Lao.. .There is one 
European who had sympathy toward the Lao. No Lao teachers, students, or 
farmers will ever forget the name of Charles Rochet. We cannot ever forget this 
man, who was very different from other French. We will never forget that in 
1945, during our studies at the teachers' training school, beneath the shady trees 
along the Mekong River and near the airfield, every student had to get up early 
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in the morning, salute the flag, and do drilling exercises. And every Sunday we 
went to the Lao Association lawn to drill...M. Rochet gave a start to the young 
Lao who are now helping their country. He also gave birth to Lao dramatic plays, 
the Lao Club, and the Lao Yai bulletin...The good deeds M. Rochet showed to the 
Lao, though only for a short period, we Lao appreciate and feel gratitude for. His 
name has been written in the history of Laos, and there were many schools and 
streets which were named after him' ('A Young Lao Official', trans. Chaichana, 
in Tilman, 1969: 278-9). In the Free Lao Movement of the late 1940s, the 
autobiographer recalls that the 'soldiers who came to Vientiane were from many 
nations. There were Thai, Kha, Meo, Vietnamese and Lao. The ranks were 
shifted rapidly during two months, and although everything was in chaos, I 
always thought of school. I could not read French books because others might 
think I was with the French. I had to read and study secretly. When the French 
took over and a college was opened at Luang Prabang, they also taught English. I 
had learned a little English during the Japanese occupation, so I knew some of the 
words, but the pronunciation was too difficult for me. The King let his son, Prince 
Vong Savang, come and study with us. We played soccer together... Later there 
was news that the Lycee Pavie was reopening. There were five or six foreign 
teachers, who were all soldiers, and three or four Lao teachers. The head teacher 
of the Luang Prabang school called us and told us that peace was restored and 
that "the government has ordered you to continue your studies at the Lycee. The 
government needs you! We will all rejoice!" '(1969: 283). 
[53] Misra, writing in early 1972, details the problems attending the 
establishment of Pakistan in 1947: aside from the politico-religious break with 
India and the 'geographical absurdity' of a state split into 2 segments separated 
from each other by 1,200 miles, the new nation - conceptualised first in 1930 as the 
brainchild of poet-philosopher Sir Mohammed Iqbal and furthered by 'a group of 
Muslim students studying at Emanual College, Cambridge' who 'developed 
Iqbal's idea in a pamphlet issued in 1934' - the author stresses the cultural gulf 
between the Western and Eastern subcontinental divide, wherein 'there was a 
considerable chasm between them; their heritage was vastly different; they 
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spoke different languages, and wrote different scripts' (1972: 28). Misra underlines 
this gap by citing Sulzberger's observation of 1969, that the 'disorderly, plump, 
fish-and-rice-eating Easterners. ..love politics, prefer conspiracy to soldiering, 
speak Bengali and build houses of bamboo...[t]he martial, well-built westerners 
eat meat and grain, mostly speak Urdu, make their homes of clay, are 
unaccustomed to political subtleties but familiar with the art of war. They are 
less literary than the Easterners but have shown more knack for governing' (cited 
in Misra, 1972; 38). With the military coup of 1958 and the establishment of 
armed forces dominance in the ensuing 22 years, these claimed divides became 
more starkly apparent, evinced by the severe under-representation of East 
Pakistanis in the governing armed services (Misra, Tables I, II and III). This 
factor combined with disparately-favourable West Pakistan involvement in 
education and the de facto adoption of Urdu (over Bengali) as the official 
language (1972: 35-6) is cited by Misra as an instance of 'intra-state imperialism', 
a source of discontent and a lead-in to the bloody birth of a further splitting-off to 
an independent Bangla Desh [54] later in 1972. 
[55]Constantino's work on schooling in the Philippines is premised on an 
assumption that education 'serves as a weapon in the wars of colonial conquest. 
This singular fact was well appreciated by the American military commander in 
the Philippines during the Filipino-American war. According to the census of 
1903, "General Otis urged and furthered the re-opening of schools, himself 
selecting and ordering the text-books. Many officers, among them chaplains, were 
detailed as superintendents of schools, and many enlisted men, as teachers"... The 
primary reason for the rapid introduction, on a large scale, of the American public 
school system in the Philippines was the conviction of the military leaders that 
no measure could so quickly promote the pacification of the island as education' 
(Constantino, 1970: 213). 
[56]From a 1967 paper prepared by Charles Henry Ley, Sabah Border Scouts, and 
Assistant Protector of Aborigines, Department of Aborigine Affairs, Malaysia: 'In 
1963 North Borneo gained self-government and was renamed Sabah. Also in 1963 
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Sabah joined the Federation of Malaysia [57], an act which was directly 
followed by protests from the Philippines and Indonesia and their attempts to 
reassert claims to this territory. Indonesia's subsequent Confrontation policy 
(with actual armed incursions) has necessitated the strengthening of border 
control. It should be noted that while recruiting, training and administering the 
Sabah Border Scouts, we have been greatly hampered by the fact that there are 
very few natural leaders to be found who are sufficiently educated to be able to 
carry out elementary administrative duties [...] This area requires facilities for 
additional training in the following fields: (a) Local leadership courses such as 
obtained at an Outward Bound School...(b) Special civic courses for established 
local leaders, to encourage their understanding of similar adjacent societies in 
direct relationship to bolstering nationalism; (c) Facilities to train central 
government officers in dealing with minority-group problems, with the object of 
their working into the administrative network at local government level' (Ley, in 
Kunstadter, 1967: 355-6, 365). 
[58] In Thailand, preceding the coup d'etat of 1932, 'the military, along with 
other Thai bureaucrats, had been subject to a variety of forces that were 
influential in the formulation of the decision to strike against the government. 
Military officers regularly, from the late nineteenth century on, had been sent 
abroad for study in Europe, and were infused there with a taste for "progress" and 
the "up-to-date", if not for democracy. But when they returned home, any 
expertise or sense of self-importance they had acquired abroad was frustrated by 
the high princes and their intimates, who held a monopoly of the top posts and 
the making of important decisions' (Wilson, 1969: 329; emphasis added). 
Outlining the durable organisational basis of Thai military power, Wilson 
further states that 'the recruitment and training of its own personnel make up 
perhaps the most important aspect of the autonomy of the armed services. These 
activities are particularly important in regard to the officer corps. The army, as 
well as other services, maintains cadet academies that receive large numbers of 
applicants because of the prestige of the military officer's role. The staff, 
consequently, can be quite selective in choosing personnel, a process that in itself 
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helps to create the image of the officer corps as an elite group...Control over 
education permits the army to mould the mind of the officer candidate, including 
his attitude towards politics' (1969: 336). In a conference paper on interactions 
between the Thai military, the civilian inhabitants in Thailand's remote border 
regions, and the US government, Dr. Lee W. Huff (in 1966 Director for 
Behavioural Sciences, [D]ARPA) reports on the M[obile] D[evelopment] U[nit] 
experiment, a 'development program motivated by the RTG's [Royal Thai 
Government] concern for a potential security problem. Americans call it 
preventive counter-insurgency. Clearly it does not involve combat, and it goes 
well beyond normally understood versions of short-term military civic action [sic]. 
The RTG simply discerned the close connection between underdevelopment and 
national security and defined the work of helping the people to develop 
themselves...' (1967: 426). Logistically, lelach mobile team is led by a young 
military officer, many of whom have been trained in American military schools. 
His deputy is frequently the deputy district officer or local education officer' 
(1967: 437). A cornerstone of the MDU program concerned education because, as an 
earlier (1961) commentator had concluded, lilt is our strong impression that in 
areas... where officials are estranged, the draft widely scattered, official radio 
broadcasts largely irrelevant to village life, and government services almost non-
existent, the local elementary school is overwhelmingly the main source of 
national consciousness and loyalty. Lessons in the national language, in Thai 
history, religion, and geography - however superficial and imperfectly 
remembered - have a profound effect on village life.. .11 is one of the foundations 
of national consciousness and thus of national security' (Moerman, cited in Huff, 
1967: 433). 
[59] In Viet Nam between 1945 and 1977, the government 'conducted a campaign 
which involved the parallel development of a script for the unwritten languages 
and dispatch of "shock brigades for the fight against ignorance" to the 
mountains...[i]ndeed, the conditions of war strengthened the resolve of the people 
to become literate' (Bhola, 1984: 64, 71). 
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5.3.4: AUSTRALASIA/PACIFIC [Oceania' 
[60] Bigum & Green, generalising from a case study on computer-assisted schooling 
in Australia, observe in that country, despite the absence of a tightly-structured 
US-type military-industrial complex, the 'strong military-industrial influence in 
the history of literacy, and in particular in the construction of the notion of 
"functional literacy"...in much software that is designed to develop literacy in its 
user we can find strong traces of its military heritage' (1991: 6). More recently, in 
Fate of a Free People (1995a), revisionist historian Henry Reynolds recasts the 
role of Tasmanian Aboriginals in the 1824-31 'Black War' - a legitimating 
misnomer for a policy of genocide and physical relocation of the survivors carried 
out by the European colonising power against the indigenous population (c/f 
Turnbull, 1948; Grassby & Hill, 1988). Aside from the necessarily exegetical 
construction of the work itself, textuality is factored into Reynolds' polemical 
account of the "war", its aftermath and the longer-term implications for 
Australian race relations in three ways: Firstly, as one of the book's reviewers 
recaps, at the conclusion of hostilities, what resulted 'was the decimated 
Aboriginal population of about 210 going with [government negotiator George 
Augustus] Robinson to the "Friendly Mission" on Flinders Island. Disease 
relentlessly killed the race and by 1876 Truganini - the last tribally-born member 
of her race - was dead. Unfortunately the treaty made between the aborigines and 
Robinson, with the imprimatur of Governor Arthur, was never written down, 
although Reynolds says that had the Aborigines sought a written document they 
almost certainly would have been given one' (Crawford, 1995a: 22, emphasis 
added); secondly, another commentator, in highlighting the 'linchpin of 
Professor Reynolds's book', notes that '[i]t was from Flinders Island that in 1846 
eight Aborigines signed an extraordinary petition to Queen Victoria...and it 
makes some telling points: that the Aborigines had not been taken captive and 
were free, that the move to Flinders Island was the result of a negotiated 
settlement, that the agreement was still fresh in Aboriginal minds and that 
Aborigines had fulfilled their part of the agreement and expected the 
government to do the same...Reynolds concludes that the sense of injustice that 
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engendered the 1846 petition survives today' (Cox, 1995; 26); finally, in 2 
subsequent newspaper articles, Reynolds is cited (in Crawford, 1995b: 6) as arguing 
for war reparation in the form of broader recognition of native title, the 
establishment of a major Tasmanian Aboriginal museum 'as a monument to the 
original Tasmanians who fought against what they viewed as the invasion of 
their country', and that 'Aborigines who died in the seven-year Black War 
between 1824-31 should be recognised as patriots in the ANZAC tradition and 
their descendants invited to lead ANZAC marches' [on the place of the ANZAC 
tradition in Australian national culture see, eg, Thomson, 1994]. This latter 
recommendation is reiterated elsewhere, and combined with a strident plea for 
the native combatants to be enshrined in the Australian National War Memorial 
under the terms of the regulations governing inclusion - 'If the wording is 
considered to be too narrow to admit the Aboriginal dead, the War Memorial Act 
will have to be amended. Otherwise the implication will be that the memorial 
discriminates against Aborigines as a matter of policy' (Reynolds, 1995b: 3). 
Expressed differently, this view argues that the Aboriginals best hedge against 
discrimination, best guarantee of historical material entitlements, and best 
chance at full(er) participation in the dominant culture will come via their 
literary re-characterisation as national heroes and patriotic guerrillas - soldiers, 
rather than earlier racial stereotypes as 'ignorant savages' (Crawford, 1995a: 
21), 'an "injured people" or "murderers" '(Reynolds, 1995b: 3) and/or 'a 
degenerate, barbarous race' (Cox, 1995: 26). The alternative depiction is not-so-
mute testimony to integrating a marginalised group into a wider Australian 
society by mobilising elements of that country's ingrained post-1778 military 
heritage. 
[61] Worsley's landmark work on the cargo cults of Melanesia (1970, orig. 1957) 
provides the reader with some of the most direct (not to mention some of the more 
bizarre) apprehensions of the linkage between militarism and textuality. 
Looking initially at the Tuka movement, 'one of the earliest reported cult 
movements, one which took place before the turn of the century in [62] Fiji'(1970: 
26), he describes the following features: 'Native unrest, stimulated by a religious 
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cult, had been noted in Ra Province as early as 1877. But it was not until 1885 that 
the administration became really disturbed: then they heard that parties of men 
with blackened faces, and clothed in robes of native cloth, were carrying out 
military drill on the upper reaches of the Rewa River. ..They were well 
organized, though they had few guns and were mainly armed with clubs and 
spears. The rank-and-file, known as "soldiers", were commanded by "sergeants", 
rokos and mbulis, and "scribes" - titles which were taken from those of native 
officials, from Armed Constabulary ranks, and from the Bible...' (1970: 29-30). In 
the Taro cult in New Guinea [63], disciplinary control 'was exerted over the 
people by various methods. When going to and from the gardens, the people had 
to "fall in". In the gardens, [movement leader] Bia's right-hand man, Yavevi, 
gave various commands, e.g. "A shun man!" - the words shun, shen, sha and som 
occur frequently in the polyglot lyrics invented by Bia...Every day a service, 
called "school" was held at Manau. In one "service" Bia placed an empty box in 
the centre of the village ground, and Dasiga incanted with a stick in his hand, 
looking towards Heaven and turning round and round as he walked about. Bia 
then repeated the incantations, kneeling with his head on the box as if 
reading...Both [Dasiga] and Bia were illiterate, but Dasiga expressed his desire 
to go to school to learn reading and writing so that he might lead the people' 
(1970: 80); On Papua [64], one aspect of the Vailala Madness that 'coincided with 
the end of the 1914-1919 war' and drew a significant proportion of its leadership 
from ex-members of the Papuan Armed Constabulary (1970: 90) was that 'an 
aeroplane was prophesied as the means of transport for the Cargo, though no 
aeroplanes had yet appeared in this part of Papua. The mystery was solved 
when [cult originator] Evara was found to possess a cheap English novel called 
Love and the Aeroplane with a crude cover-drawing of a man and woman 
precariously suspended by a rope from an aeroplane. But ideas of Heaven rather 
than aeroplanes were the probable source of rumours that "papers had fluttered 
down to Evara from the sky, and of the theme of inspiration from above in the 
form of a White ancestor or God striking the affected person on the head, and 
then communicating a message or delivering a gift [...] "Reading" by wholly 
illiterate natives was common in this movement [...] Other European elements 
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included "about turns", the stopping and starting of dances by whistle-blasts, 
books carried under the arm, and especially the use of pidgin English...This 
"language" was said to be "all-a-same Djarnan", which natives knew of both from 
visits to Rabaul, before 1914 German territory, and through rumours of the War 
itself. "German" was favoured as an anti-government tongue' (1970: 92, 97, 98). 
Referring to the structure of the Buka cults in the Solomon Islands [65] at mid-
century, Worsley notes that by December 1942 'each village had its own military 
organization with wooden guns or spears, and organized bodies of soldiers, 
messengers and police. Chiefs were provided with guards of honour, and were 
greeted with special ceremonial, including the Japanese bow. The native found 
the Japanese ancestor cult particularly congenial' (1970: 130); and on the island of 
Malaita, an Australian crackdown on the Marching Rule cult in the late 1940s 
concentrated on stopping 'illegal drilling...raids were made on villages in the 
Koio area where "ambitious palisades... with lookout towers" were destroyed, 
together with a Marching Rule gaol and barracks for the "duties" '(1970: 189-90). 
The 1946 movement on Great Admiralty Island [66] established by Paliau - a 
'former sergeant in the New guinea police, he was also an orator possessed of 
great dynamism, organizing ability, and literacy in Melanesian pidgin' - was also 
attacked 'by White opponents, who accused him of establishing a totalitarian 
regime, including "customs' - passes to permit the movement of people - marching, 
drilling, curfews, etc' (1970; 197-8). In the New Hebrides [67], with the Naked 
Cult which emerged on the island of Espiritu Santo in the 1920s, Ipllantation 
workers were convinced by [movement head] Runvoro's ability to write 
meaningless marks, and the prophet was credited with having raised from the 
dead not only human beings, including one of his followers who "died" in the 
excitement of a dance, but also a dead cow' (1970: 159); and on the southern island 
of Tanna, the John Frum movement became an integrated force during WW II '[a]s 
the Americans moved in to meet the Japanese threat' and 'news of their arrival 
swept the islands. A man was arrested for saying that Mount Tukosmeru was "full 
of soldiers"; it would be open on the Day, and the soldiers would fight for John 
Frum. But the most astounding piece of information was the news that many of 
these US troops were black! It was prophesied that large numbers of black 
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Americans were coming to rule over the natives': this prophecy was transmitted 
to his followers by cult founder Neloaig/John Frum, a leader who, though 
illiterate, 'had pretended to read and had started his own schools' (1970: 168-69). 
[68] In a seminal paper on the impact of literacy and print technology in early 
19th century New Zealand, culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi 
which established British sovereignty over that territory in February 1840, Don 
McKenzie is concerned not only with the motivations of assorted missionaries and 
civil and military colonial administrators attempting to transmit reading and 
writing skills to the indigenous population, but how these skills were received 
and perceived: 'The main use of literacy to the Maori was not reading books for 
their ideas, much less for the access they gave to divine truths, but letter writing. 
For them, the really miraculous point about writing was its portability; by 
annihilating distance, a letter allowed the person who wrote it to be in two 
places at once, his body in one, his thoughts in another. It was the spatial 
extension of writing, not its temporal permanence, that became politically potent 
in gathering the tribes and planning a war a decade and more [ie, in the 1830s] 
later.. .The effective use of letters for political purposes was many years away. 
Nor did printing of itself become a re-expressive tool for the Maori until the late 
1850s. When it did so - in Maori newspapers - the essential motives, the effective 
contextual forces, were economic, political and military, not religious' (1987: 170- 
1, emphases added). Indeed, just as the Maori responded to the ephemerality of 
text, as against an English view of the printed word as legally-binding fixity, so 
they took a novel approach to religious tracts in the battles over Aotearoan land 
in the period between 1821 and 1840, when the book 'was given a totemic power of 
warding off not only evil spirits: in 1836 it was said that a Maori fighting party 
had refused to storm a pa (a fortified village) because of a printed Bible inside it 
and contented themselves with a blockade. In 1839 Taylor recorded seeing Maori 
with mission books (or at least odd leaves from them) rolled up and thrust 
through holes in the lobes of their ears. Books were also useful for making roll- 
your-own cartridges. One book so used was Miler's Church History, thus giving a 
slightly different sense to the phrase "the church militant". Colenso picked up 
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such a cartridge in which the paper came from II Samuel and bore the words from 
Chapter 19, v. 34: "How long have I to live?" Markham said his servants melted 
down his pewter spoons in 1834 to make musket balls of them, "and the first 
Volume of my Voltaires, Louis 14. et 15., torn up and made Cartridges of them" 
'(1987: 178). Updating and personalising his account, the author concludes as 
follows: 'Print is still too recent for the Maori...During a Russian scare in the 1880s 
the Government of the day pre-empted the purchase of Maori land at Bastion 
Point, a fine site overlooking Auckland harbour. When a more recent Government 
proposed to resell it for luxury housing, it was occupied for several months by 
Maori protesters. In my mind's eye, I can still read the vivid television news 
pictures of police and military vehicles as they moved in on 25 May 1978 to evict 
the squatters. At such moments literacy defines itself for many as a concordat 
between sword and pen, of politics and script - to the dismay and frustration of 
those whose modes are oral' (McKenzie, 1987: 188-9; emphasis added). 
5.3.5: EUROPE 
[69] In explaining the articulation of emergent modern European nationhood, Mann 
tempers "hard" class-based explanations with an account focussed on the 
combined political impacts of militarism and ideology driving regional-national 
struggles. In this regard, Austria provides a type-case in as much as '[a]cross the 
Austrian lands, civil disturbances peppered the mid-nineteenth century - in 1821, 
1830, 1848-9, 1859, 1866 and 1908 - usually abetted by foreign Powers...Yet 
Austrian nationalism also uniquely. ..involved linguistic issues, especially 
through office spoils. Two issues arose: What should be the language of the public 
sphere, especially government, and what languages should be taught in public 
schools? As Gellner (1983) argues, literacy was cultural capital, realisable in 
employment in army, civil administration, law courts, and capitalist economy. As 
capitalism and states expanded, they were staffed by more non-German speakers. 
More nobles, bourgeois, and petit bourgeois had a vested interest in the local 
language's being the state's. The Habsburgs were not unsympathetic, encouraging 
bilingualism in the army. Yet to extract taxes they turned intermittently to 
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repression, pushing them to depend on the mainly Austro-German officer corps 
and central administration. Other linguistic communities were blocked from 
administration and law courts, so the revolutionaries of 1848 protested...' (1993: 
245-6). Elsewhere, discussing issues of (de)mobilisation and civil employment of 
reservists, he notes that in Prussia from 1820 and following, 'all noncommissioned 
officers with nine years service could claim preferment in clerical and accounting 
jobs in the administration, provided they were literate and could count. Austria 
later guaranteed this for twelve-year noncommissioned officers...' (Mann, 1993: 
451). 
[70] The monograph on "Varieties of nation-building in the Balkans and among 
the Southern Slays" by Najdan Pasic affirms that historically 'kill the Balkan 
countries, those which had been under Turkish occupation, those which had 
belonged to Austria-Hungary, and those once dominated by Venice, represented a 
backward periphery and agrarian appendix to the great feudal-military and 
mercantile empires of Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and Venice' (1973: 131); but that 
over time and peaking in the 20th century, the 'idea of creating a federated or 
confederated community of Yugoslav nations' effervesced: 'At its early congresses 
in 1919 and 1920, the Communist Party practically adopted the idea of 
Yugoslavia [71] as the common state of a nation with three names. Later, when 
the Great Serbian hegemony provoked widespread unrest and national 
dissatisfaction in the country, the Communist Party, under the influence of the 
Third International, adopted in 1928 another extremist conception to the effect 
that Yugoslavia should be broken up into separate and independent national 
states. Only in the thirties did the communist Party arrive at a clear position on 
the subject of the national problem in Yugoslavia and seek to reject the unitarian 
state order while advocating the formation of Yugoslavia as a federated 
community of equal peoples. This idea was realised in the National Liberation 
War and Revolution. It was expressed for the first time...in November 1943, when 
a resolution was passed to constitute Yugoslavia as a federated state community 
of Serbs, Croat, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians. The National 
Liberation War and Revolution demonstrated that the desire of the people for 
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equality and freedom and for winning independence through a common struggle 
under a single political leadership had generated a tremendous revolutionary 
force. Had this situation not been the case, it would have been unthinkable to 
mobilise on a broad basis the progressive forces of all the Yugoslav nations and to 
engage them in the National Liberation War under the leadership of the 
Communist Party, the only party with a clear and developed conception of how 
the national question in Yugoslavia had to be solved' (1973:123-24). Yet within 
this coalition, elements of strain were evident amidst the new unity, elements 
tied to the "literary" origins of the Balkan/Slavic "imagined communities" as 
self-preserving cultural and ideological mechanisms in the face of 
denationalising foreign hegemonies. Pasic notes in Serbia [72] 'the role of heroic 
folk poetry..., nurtured for centuries among the people by the guslars - the folk 
singers with their one-string instruments - preserved in advanced artistic form the 
Serbian national myth that was a constructive element in Serbian nationalism. 
Among the Southern Slav peoples, national awakening and national renaissance 
were linked with the struggle for a national literary language and the creation of 
a literature in the vernacular. [In Slovenia,[73] n]ational awakening among the 
Slovenes was produced by the reform headed by the prominent figure, Primoz 
Trubar, an ardent fighter for the Slovene tongue and Slovene school. The major 
Slovene writers, from the poet Franc Presern to Ivan Cankar, were also leading 
national ideologues. [In Croatia, [74] a]mong the Croats, vernacular literature by 
Avgust Senoa and other prominent writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and particularly medieval literature developed in Dalmatia [75], also 
had their "national mission". [In Montenegro, [76] o]f the Montenegrins, the 
greatest national poet, Negos, was simultaneously the most influential standard-
bearer of Serbian and Montenegrin national consciousness' (Pasic, 124-25). 
[77] In Belgium, the 'Belgian army had always run literacy classes, and in 1978 
BRT (Flemish radio) devoted a series of broadcasts to the subject. At this time 
students could learn through the radio or the army...' (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1985: 70) 
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[78]Writing in 1970, Stegenga states that '[s]ix years have passed since the 
United Nations first intervened in the other Middle East crisis situation, the 
communal conflict on the little Mediterranean island of Cyprus. The United 
Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been helping to maintain 
a fragile truce on the island since March 1964 [...] In pursuance of its mandate, the 
United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus has engaged in a broad array of 
activities which very generally divide into two categories. First, UNFICYP has 
performed a number of kinds of activities designed to "prevent a recurrence of 
fighting" [pacification] ...Second, UNFICYP has promoted a "return to normal 
conditions" by lending its good offices and troops to a variety of what might be 
called civic-action projects [normalization]... Largely through UNFICYP's good 
offices, telephone, electrical, water, and mail services have returned to normal 
throughout most of the island. UNFICYP assistance has made the reopening of 
most of the public schools of Cyprus possible...and UNFICYP carpenters and 
engineers have built schoolrooms for the refugee children complete with "sun-
shaded bamboo roofs" and "open air showers.. .where water can be sprayed over 
the children at certain times during the day". From all accounts it would appear 
that the peace-keeping soldiers (plus civilian staffers) perform admirably at 
these quite non-martial tasks' (1970: 1, 8-10). 
[79] While maintaining that in the Slav countries of the 14th and 15th centuries 
'the first printed books were invariably religious', Febvre & Martin take 
Czechoslovakia as an exceptional case: here, Jp]rinting in Bohemia began with 
the work of an anonymou. s printer who produced a translation from the Italian of 
Guido di Colonna, called Kronika Trojanska (History of Troy). This was the first 
book to be published in Czech. The fact that a secular and not a liturgical text was 
chosen by this printer to be the first text published in Bohemia is significant (the 
work had already had a great vogue in Western Europe and it attained 
permanent popularity after it was printed)' (1976: 199). Subsequent to this, in his 
study of an alternative version of the ancient Greek legacies ('Greek Fire') 
bequeathed to 20th-century societies, in early 1989 Taplin writes that Thucydides 
observed 'what happens to language under political stress, especially the stress 
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of conflict. "The meaning of words have no longer the same relation to things but 
are changed. Reckless daring is held to be loyal courage; prudent delay is the 
excuse of a coward; moderation is the disguise of weakness; to know everything is 
to do nothing. Frantic energy is the true quality of a man; the lover of violence is 
always trusted and his opponent suspected". This is a forerunner of George 
Orwell's "Newspeak", and of contemporary "Nukespeak". This passage is 
regarded as so subversive, even now, in Czechoslovakia, that it is circulated in 
samizdat form by the dissidents' (1989: 247). 
[80]Speaking of national identity in Finland, Davies (1997: 818) refers to the 
'Kalevala or "Land of Heroes" [which] is generally regarded as the national epic 
of the Finns. It is a poem of some 50 cantos or 22,795 lines, published first in 1835 
and in its second, definitive edition in 1849. It is a semi-literary epic compiled 
largely from authentic folklore. In fact, it is in large measure the product of its 
main compiler, Elias Lonnrot (1802-84), who used classical models to transform 
and embellish the raw oral materials which he had collected among the 
peasants of eastern Finland and Russian Karelia. As such, it illustrates not only 
the legacy of Europe's pagan folklore but also the process whereby nineteenth-
century activists drew on neglected popular sources to create a national 
consciousness... the Kalevala was a Herderian exercise par excellence. In Lonnrot's 
time the Finns passed from rule by Sweden to that of Tsarist Russia, and were 
feeling the urge to dissociate themselves from the culture of their Swedish and 
Russian masters... [such n]ational epics...held special significance for those 
nations whose drive towards a separate cultural identity was inhibited by 
political dependence. It is not surprising to find that both [Longfellow's 1855] 
Hiawatha and the Kalevala had been translated into Polish by the 1860s'. 
[81]Foucault's contention: 'Historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a 
perfect society to the philosophers and jurists of the eighteenth century; but there 
was also a military dream of society; its fundamental reference was not to the 
state of nature, but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine, not to the 
primal social contract, but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights, but 
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to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to 
automatic docility' (1977: 169). Adding some weight to this more hellishly 
rational underbelly of what Carl Becker has evocatively termed the 'Heavenly 
City' of the 18th Century philosophes, in tracing the development of literacy in 
France, Resnick & Resnick observe that when the 'Revolutionary government 
introduced the first plan for national education in France in 1795, its major interest 
was military: the preservation of schools and training routes for those entering 
technical and military careers was considered essential' (1977: 375-376); Eugen 
Weber (1976: 298) notes the way that 'the law of 1818 linked promotion within 
and from the ranks to literacy, and led to the creation of regimental schools 
where soldiers could learn how to read, write and count - and what it meant to be 
a French citizen'; Aries (1973: 255-257) moves the imposition of a 'semi-military 
condition on the school population' to an earlier point in time, the second half of 
the 18th century, when 'one can trace the rise of the military idea, at the same 
time as the liberal idea, inside school life. ..long before the Napoleonic lycee, 
the French school, or at least that which corresponded to the present-day 
secondary school, took on a military character'; and Furet & Ozouf, discussing 
literacy sites in France in the 19th century, compare reading acquisition of army 
personnel and the populace in general - their largely quantitative analysis shows 
that loiver 1,150,000 young men are supposed to have undergone elementary 
instruction in the army between 1844 and 1869, and are supposed to have learnt at 
least to read. Now, the 1872 census returns tell us that scarcely more than 8 
million men aged over 20 were able at least to read. So the regimental schools 
account for a considerable portion of this educated cohort' (1982: 256). The 
qualifications in their assessment concern a finer-grained study of inflations of 
these 'impressive figures' in terms of both rank breakdowns, and the 19th century 
definition of literacy as underplaying or ignoring writing. But their overall 
conclusion still avers that by 'turning out a relatively high proportion of men able 
to read only, among its "pupils", the army may therefore be considered an 
essential agent of male literacy in the 19th century' (1982: 257). 
[82] Challenging received wisdom as to the link between the "first" Lutheran 
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Reformation of the 16th century and the spread of literacy via bible-reading in 
early modern Germany, Strauss & Gawthrop (1984) claim that such a linkage can 
be asserted between literacy and the "second" Pietist Reformation of the 17th 
century. They locate the origins of Pietism in the failure of German territorial 
rulers to deal with either economic or social and moral reconstruction in the 
periods following the Thirty Years war and the Franco-Dutch war of the 1670s, 
which actively involved most German states (1984: 44). Moreover, as Pietism 
continued to attract state sponsorship in the 18th century, the politico-military 
utility of its educational program became increasingly obvious, until Frederick 
III's successor, 'Frederick William I (1713-40), the "drillmaster-king", aspired to 
transform his realm into nothing less than a "Sparta of the North", in which the 
state would harness, to an unprecedented extent, the energies of its people for 
military purposes. Realising that the Pietists' form of education tended to 
produce obedient and productive subjects, Frederick William I worked to extend 
the Halle system to his entire kingdom, and to this end he actively recruited the 
Pietists to assist him. The Halle schools supplied the models and - in many cases 
- the teachers for the cadet academy in Berlin, the schools of the military 
orphanage at Potsdam, workhouse schools in numerous other cities, garrison 
schools, and schools built with school funds on royal domain lands' (1984: 48). The 
upshot of these practices, in Germany and beyond, was that this version of 
hegemonic literacy producing drilled/docile populations meant that 'the 
privileged orders now enjoyed the protection of a much stronger state apparatus 
than had their predecessors. Absolutist states had powerful means at their 
disposal for restraining social unrest: workhouses, hospitals, above all standing 
armies ' (Strauss & Gawthrop, 1984: 55). In an 1872 commentary, M. Breal 'noted 
that the Prussian [83] educational reforms of 1807-13 were the result of King 
William III's determination that his country should "regagner en force spirituelle 
ce qu'il a perdu en force physique"' (cited in Stone, 1969: 87). Such a conjunction of 
forces and their sequence is congenial to Mann's (1986, 1993) broader IEMP model 
of western European societal development, and in the German instance he notes 
that after 1872, 'the Kaiserreich spent as much on education as on the military. It 
did not see the two as a "guns versus butter" alternative. Literacy among German 
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army recruits was the highest in Europe, a proudly publicized fact. ..Prussian 
education was statist, reinforced by the other carrier of literacy in the North, the 
pietistic Lutheran (Evangelical) church' (1993: 305). Elsewhere, he recites an 
archetypal instance of this German pedagogico-military tradition and its 
survival into the early 20th century, claiming that in the period prior to World 
War I state education was still 'officially nationalistic. Schools were supposed to 
encourage a rather military sense of nationhood. As the kaiser told a conference of 
educators: "I am looking for soldiers. We want a robust generation who can serve 
as the intellectual leaders and officials of the nation" (1993: 586). 
[84] A collection of readings edited by Clogg & Yannopoulos (1972) on the military 
coup d'etat of 21 April 1967 in Greece foregrounds the varied attempts by the 
subsequently-established Colonels' junta to gain control of Greek education, the 
media (particularly the press) and cultural life in general. Providing background 
to the coup, Zaharopolous notes the heavy involvement of army officers in 
politics in Greece since 1909, and the impact of the 1944 Athens uprising and the 
divisive 1946-49 civil war on tendencies to direct intervention by a 'messianic' 
nationalist fraction of the officer class (1972: 21) - more specifically, he stresses 
the shared military academy experiences of the twelve colonels, and their 
mutual exposure to the 'bitter-sweet sensation of mutiny and insubordination as 
young cadets in April 1941' under the German occupation (1972: 30-34). Clogg 
(1972: xi) notes the innovatory 'creation of a network of commissars (most of them 
former officers) to act as the arbiters of the regime's policies and as sources of 
information to the security services. Commissars were appointed to a number of 
organizations, to public bodies such as universities as well as private enterprises'; 
elsewhere he cites the views of Colonel Ladas on the moralising influence of 
patriotic poetry, and that Ic[orrectly deployed, arts and letters can "mould 
civilized characters with such a national and patriotic conscience that the 
criminal acts of the past should not be repeated, as happened with the foreign-
led Red Satans - the communists - during the war and subsequent rebellion" ', and 
the junta's ideology stating that '[e[clucation is to be based on "the ideals of 
Helleno-Christian civilization", which are also, it is held, the ideals of the 
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Western World' (1972: 42-3, 44). An anonymous contributor ("N.N.") highlights 
the junta's unparalleled commitment to pedagogical reform by stating that 'since 
1823, Greek constitutions have included clauses on education. With the exception, 
perhaps, of the 1827 text, they have always established a tight governmental 
control over some level or another of education. But never before 1968 has there 
been a constitution which is more precise, and more thorough, in imposing the 
government's authority on all aspects of education' (1972: 129) - the remainder of 
the chapter details the deleterious effects of this authority on teaching and 
learning at primary, secondary and tertiary education levels (1972: 130- 
145).Vlachos describes the ways in which the Greek press was controlled through 
a combination of censorship, standardisation, intimidation and the impost of a 
prohibitive import duty on newsprint correlated with average daily circulation, 
effectively penalising the anti-junta newspapers with the widest readerships 
(1972: 59-74). Finally, Roufos portrays the impact of the Colonels' regime on the 
arts in toto and literature particularly: 'The chief weapon.. .was pre-censorship. 
No book or magazine could be printed, no lecture delivered, without previous 
scrutiny and permission of the censors. ..Existing books were taken care of by means 
of an "Index" drawn up by the authorities and containing several hundred titles of 
books that could not be sold, bought, displayed, discussed or consulted in public 
libraries...The Soviet Union and the Slavic countries of Eastern Europe being 
communist, everything that had to do with them came automatically under 
suspicion. On one occasion, a newspaper was not allowed to publish an essay on 
Tolstoy. The list of forbidden books included such items as a Teach Yourself 
Russian textbook, a Greek-Bulgarian dictionary, and a biography of Peter the 
Great...The censor forbade the editor of a world atlas to mention the predominant 
religions of China as being Confucianism, Taoism and so on (which the editor had 
thought of as being a prudent anachronism) on the grounds that "Taoism and all 
those philosophies lead to anarchy"... [but a]n ideological drive cannot confine 
itself to mere prohibitions. It has to foster the right kind of artistic production. 
An attempt in this direction was made in 1969: under the suggestive title "The 
Popular Muse", the Government published a selection of verse written in its praise 
by supporters from all over the country. These amateur poets, who ranged from 
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greengrocers to schoolchildren, certainly did their best to compensate for any 
literary deficiencies of their output with sheer enthusiasm; the net result, 
however, can hardly be said to justify the considerable amount of taxpayers' 
money involved in the process' (Roufos, 1972: 149, 153). 
[85]With regard to the origins and earliest phase of an independent Hungary, 
'[o]f the birth of Hungarian nationalism Ignotus writes that it is an event "recent 
enough to be dated: 1772, the year of publication of some unreadable works by the 
versatile Hungarian author Gyorgy Bessenyei, then a resident in Vienna and 
serving in Maria Theresa's bodyguard"...Further stimulus was provided by the 
extensive publications of Ferenc Kazinczy (1759-1831), the "father of Hungarian 
literature"...' (Anderson, 1991: 73). In the ensuing century, 'popular nationalism, 
symbolized for later generations by the figure of Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894), had 
its hour of glory in the Revolution of 1848...After the suppression of the 
revolutionary regime by czarist armies in August 1849, Kossuth went into life-long 
exile' (1991: 103); later, 11 -dumiliatingly defeated by Prussian armies on the field 
of Koniggratz in 1866, Vienna was forced to accede to the institution of the Dual 
Monarchy in the Ausgleich (Compromise) of 1867. From then on, the Kingdom of 
Hungary enjoyed a considerable autonomy in the running of its internal affairs. 
The initial beneficiaries of the Ausgleich were a group of liberal-minded high 
Magyar aristocrats and educated professionals...' (1991: 104). 
[86]Peter Burke's essay on "The Uses of Literacy in Early Modern Italy" is a 
middle-range approach (ie, undertaken as an 'ethnography of writing' located 
between 'grand theories' of textuality and empirical studies of literacy 
rates/levels) considering scribal practice within four social domains - business, 
family, church and state - across an assortment of (independent, prior-to-1861- 
unification) Italian city-states. His discussion of the last of these domains, the 
governmental, both uncovers prime early examples of future commonly-adopted 
bureaucratic instruments, and links them to pre- and post-Renaissance military 
imperatives in polities suffused by virtually permanent war-readiness: thus, as a 
'defence against the breaches of security which the spread of literacy made more 
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likely, cipher was invented. A historian of diplomacy has pointed out that "The 
first extant ciphered document in the archives of Venice [87] dates from 1411, at 
Florence [88] from 1414, at Milan [89] from 1454 and at Genoa [90] from 
1481"...Cipher was a field in which the Italians were pioneers. The same goes for 
a special kind of official report, the relazione ...required to be particularly 
thorough and to follow a fixed form, dealing with the geography, history and 
political structure of the state visited, the personality of the ruler, his foreign 
policy, and so on... The precocity of Italian censuses of the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries [also] deserves particular emphasis...A census [catasto I was no 
small enterprise. In the case of the famous catasto of 1427, which listed every 
household in Tuscany under Florentine rule - some 60,000 of them - the services of 
at least twenty-three clerks were required, not counting the specialists who 
estimated the value of each householder's property...The 1427 catasto ...was part 
of the war effort...Passes [sing. = bolleta, bolletino] or licences were issued 
allowing certain people to carry arms in a certain city, or to be out in the streets 
after curfew...Armies were already producing a mass of paper including billetting 
regulations, paysheets, and muster rolls, which described the horses more 
carefully than the men because it was particularly important to ensure that they 
were not counted twice. In the navy, too, literacy and numeracy had its uses. 
Clerks sailed with Venetian galleys, and a writer on naval matters in the early 
seventeenth century argued that gunners needed to be numerate (ii bombardiero 
dovrebbe essere abachista)' (Burke, 1987: 34-36. c/f Wiethoff's monograph on 
Machiavelli's 'single style or mode of activity' common to 'both political 
eloquence and martial wisdom' in the Renaissance at note 13 in 1.3 of Chapter 1). 
[91] In 1979 James Aho drew attention to the importance of textual exegesis in the 
military innovations of the Protestant commanders in three countries - England, 
Sweden and the Netherlands - in the bellicose 16th and 17th centuries. In a 
capsule biography of one of these key figures, Keegan & Wheatcroft (1987) 
outline the career of 'Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange (1567-1625), Dutch 
soldier, stadtholder and military innovator. ..Together with his cousins, William 
Louis of Nassau and John of Nassau, he secured the effective independence of the 
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Netherlands from Spain, but also created a uniquely efficient army.. .The 
mainspring of the Mauritian reforms was an intellectual approach to the art of 
war. Intense interest had already been shown in the military practice of the 
Romans, and it was a Dutchman, Justus Lipsius, who produced the definitive 
treatise on the topic in 1595: Maurice learnt much from him...In his passion for 
system and order, he developed a style of war which eschewed pitched battles: it 
was said that he waged war as though he was playing chess...Maurice's 
contribution extends far beyond the Netherlands, for his reforms revolutionized 
the whole face of war.. .In the well-paid, well-drilled and well-disciplined 
Dutch army lay the pointer to the professional forces of the future' (1987: 207-8). 
Geoffrey Parker's analysis (1988) endorses this view and details more facets of 
the reforms: 'In 1599, Maurice of Nassau secured funds from the States-General to 
equip the entire field army of the Republic with weapons of the same size and 
calibre and, at about the same time, his cousin John began work on a new method 
of advanced military training: the illustrated drill manual.. .The book rapidly 
went through numerous editions in Dutch, and was soon translated into Danish, 
German, French and English.. .The fame of Maurice's drill had spread beyond the 
Dutch Republic...Meanwhile in 1616 Count John of Nassau opened a military 
academy at his capital, Siegen, to educate young gentlemen in the art of war: 
training took six months, and arms, armour, maps and models for instruction were 
provided by the school. The first director of the Schola militaris, Johan Jakob von 
Wallhausen, published several manuals of warfare, all of them explicitly based 
on Dutch practice (the only system taught at Siegen)'(1988: 20-21). In a footnote 
providing a fascinating insight into early modern international communications 
networks, Parker further considers the 'many other literary ways in which the 
new techniques might be propagated. Numerous newspaper reports circulated 
from 1618 onwards - by the 1630s some papers even had a regular "war 
correspondent" - and some armies published annual campaign reports...The 
victorious Spanish siege of Breda was celebrated in plays, books, paintings.. .as 
well as in the vast map prepared by Jacques Callot on the orders of the Brussels 
government, which was sent (together with a description and "index" in four 
languages) to some 200 distinguished personages.. .There were also letters and 
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memoranda written by various ambassadors and other government officials 
which discussed the new ways in warfare - even when fought by others - and, 
since many of these have survived in multiple copies, it is clear that they too 
circulated widely. Finally, there were even plays which popularised the 
military techniques of the Dutch. Thus London theatre-goers in 1599 could watch 
a play "full of quips" called "The overthrow of Turnholt"...the Spaniards also 
wrote plays about the Low Countries' Wars.. .but, understandably, these had 
little to say about Dutch military superiority' (1988: 162-63). 
[92]Scott (1990: 72) notes that national 'censuses and civil registration developed 
hand-in-hand from the middle of the eighteenth century, with official 
population censuses generally preceding the transfer of vital registration from 
Church to State. The earliest known censuses were in Scandinavia.. .1n1662, for 
example, a census of adult males was carried out in Norway as an aid to military 
recruitment'. 
[93] In the course of his succinct historical overview of the Black Sea region, 
Ascherson notes that the 'contemporary states of Greece, Ireland, Israel, Hungary 
and Poland are all restorations of lost polities. As restorations, they are all 
highly inaccurate; none of them has the frontiers of its "original". But those 
originals all had in common the fact that they were obliterated from the 
political atlas by imperial violence' (1996: 190). Drawing from Anderson's work 
on imagined communities fuelled by the 'print revolution' and presenting an 
alternative to the idea of Poland as a Baltic state peopled foundationally by 
proto-Slav farmers, the author details 'a time when Poland looked towards the 
Black Sea as its native coast, and when Poles claimed ancestry in a race of Indo-
Iranian nomads - the Sarmatians. In the sixteenth century, Polish writers began to 
assert that Poles were the descendants of the Sarmatians [...] in the next hundred 
years, the Sarmatian myth took an extraordinary, freakish twist of its own. From 
being the official myth of a court, "Samartism" became the mass faith of a class 
[ie the szclachta, or Polish nobility]...This enormous social group came to number 
something like 10 per cent of the population...Its obscure origins lay in a clan 
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system, recruited by military allegiance and adoption as much as by hereditary 
connection 	Sarmatism also repositioned Poland's sense of geography - or of 
"geopolitical destiny".. .For the "descendants" of noble barbarians from the Pontic 
Steppe, the Black Sea coasts and the plains between the Danube and the Don 
seemed to be their ancestral home and heritage. In this way, the Sarmatian idea 
was used to authenticate an aggressive foreign policy towards the East. The word 
"Sarmatia" was restored as a description of all Slav populations and their 
territories. To the Polish nobility, convinced that they were the chosen race, this 
implied not only that the szclachta was the aristocracy of all Slavdom, but that 
Poland - in a period of almost continuous war against Russians, Tatars and Turks - 
had an historical claim to old Sarmatian realms in Russia itself, in the Cossack 
lands of Ukraine, in Moldavia and Bessarabia [...] At the end of the eighteenth 
century, Sarmatism collapsed under the weight of its own stupidity. But in its 
fall, it also destroyed Poland itself, and the independence for which the nobility 
had fought so fiercely for so many centuries' (Ascherson, 1996: 230, 231, 232, 234). 
[94] A monograph by actor-network theorist John Law undertaken as an exercise in 
the sociology of knowledge deals with 'an important turning point in the balance 
of power between Europe and the rest of the world' (1986: 234) - the emergence of 
Portugal as a leading mercantile and maritime nation in the late fifteenth 
century, and the means employed to consolidate this hegemonic position over the 
next 100 years. The author notes that prior historical treaments of the Portugese 
expansion, while considering socio-economic factors, have tended to overprivilege 
technological advances - primarily in navigational aids, shipbuilding and heavy 
artillery - as central to this outcome. For Law such accounts are typically either 
too loose or too narrow: He casts technology as one element in a tripartite scheme 
involving a specific blend of factors, seeing 'documents, devices and drilled 
people' as the key to the establishment of long-distance control over its 
territories by an imperialist nation-state. Moving from the particular to the 
general, Law implies that this same formula may operate in wider contexts of 
social order: the correlation between innovations in the organisation of the armed 
forces and the dispersal of texts is especially stressed in the author's wondering 
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'whether the west has been able to exert particularly effective long-distance 
control via people as a result of an innovation analogous to that of the printing 
press'. Answering affirmatively, he establishes the sought-after connection 
between print technology, and 'the invention and diffusion of military drill', 
noting that the latter's importance 'for social control both on and off the 
battlefield has been immense' (Law, 1986: 256; c/f Wallerstein, 1974: 50-53, 326- 
344). 
[95] Two studies of twentieth-century Romania - one a three-generational age-
cohort analysis (Hoivik, 1974), the other a cross-national/cross-temporal 
comparison with the less-developed nations of Asia and Latin America (Guha, 
1974) - independently stress two factors as central to both Romania's position as 
an instance of European "poor relation" and its chances of eventual socioeconomic 
development: one is the impact of major wars - Romania's declaration of war on 
Austria-Hungary in 1916,its impact on demographics and the rural economy 
during the struggle, the inheritance of new and depressed provinces as a result of 
the eventual allied victory in WW I, and the political upheaval of Romania's 
support for the Axis powers under Antonescu in 1940 with subsequent cession to the 
Soviet Union under post-Second World War IR-arrangements which imposed 
ongoing semi-military occupied territory status on the country. The other is the 
impetus this set of bellicosity-derived conditions provided for substantial 
increases, through successive regimes, in literacy rates and educational 
participation such that, in Heivik's study, after WW II 'great efforts were made 
to eradicate illiteracy and to train personnel for industry and administration. In 
the 1900 cohort, only 10% of the men and 5% of the women went beyond primary 
school; in the [1930-birth cohort] the percentages were twice as high'; the 
educational imperative had reached a point where, relative to the life-chances 
of the 1960 cohort, by the late '70s the 'introduction of compulsory ten years' 
schooling placed Romania ahead of all Scandinavian countries' (Hoivik, 1974: 
291, 294) and Guha's correlation of literacy and secondary/tertiary education 
rates places Romania (in Guha's spelling, "Rumania") only slightly below 
Argentina and Uruguay - frontrunners in Third World development with 
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literacy/education rates of 'above 80%, ie comparable to that of the developed 
countries' (Guha, 1974: 313, 315). 
[96] 'In the course of three decades, from 1689 to 1725, Peter [the Great] ruled and 
created a modern Russia. It was Peter's military reforms, however, together with 
the foundation of the Navy, which influenced, where they did not motivate, all 
fundamental innovations : modernisation of government and administration; the 
relocation of the new capital - Saint Petersburg; reform of the tax system; and the 
creation of the outlines of a modern education system along practical lines 
adapted to the needs of a modern state.... In 1714, along with the compulsory 
enlistment of all noblemen into the Army at 15, Peter also decreed that younger 
brothers were to enrol in school at the age of ten, and for the next five years learn 
to read and write, to do elementary arithmetic and geometry, prior to entering the 
Army' (Woff, 1989: 117-119, emphases added). Stone notes in passing that la]fter 
the humiliations of the Crimean War, public pressure in Russia persuaded Czar 
Alexander II to relax controls on university expansion as a way to restore national 
military power' (1969: 87-88). In that nation's later incarnation as the (now 
former) Soviet Union [97], the 'Red Army was asked to play its part in the 
eradication of illiteracy...[1]iteracy education was made compulsory for all 
soldiers...the Komsomol's [All Union Leninist Communist League of Youth] 
campaign lasted three years during which time some 21 million people learned to 
read and write, thanks to more than 1,200,000 "soldiers of culture" (Bhola, 1984: 
45-46). 
[98] The foundations of the naval colonial thrust by Spain in the early modern era 
are re-examined by Illich & Sanders, who describe how on August 18, 1492, a 
landmark in the 'alphabetization of the popular mind' and the establishment of 
the modern bureaucratic state was achieved when 'a Spaniard named El Antonio 
de Nebrija published the first grammar in any modern European language, the 
Grammatica Castellana, which attempted to reduce a vernacular tongue to rules 
of grammar [...] Nebrija addresses this new secular balance.. .a new pact between 
sword and book...Very astutely, Nebrija reminds the queen that a new union of 
armas y lettras , complementary to that of Church and State, was essential for 
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gathering and joining the scattered pieces of Spain into a single absolute kingdom: 
"This unified sovereign body will be of such shape and inner cohesion that 
centuries will be unable to undo it. Now that the Church has been purified, 
and we are thus reconciled to God, now that the enemies of the faith have 
been subdued by our arms, now that just laws are being enforced, enabling us all 
to live as equals, what else remains but the flowering of the peaceful arts. And 
among the arts, foremost are those of language, which sets us apart from the 
wild animals; language, which is the unique distinction of man, the means for 
the kind of understanding which can be surpassed only by contemplation" [...] 
He intended the creation of the sphere of a taught mother tongue - the first 
invented part of a universal education. Columbus was to open the way to the New 
World; Nebrija devised a way to control Spanish subjects by providing a way to 
standardize their language' (1988: 65-70). 
[99] In Sweden, '[t]he basis of a national army was laid by Gustavus I of Vasa in 
1544...With Gustavus II Adolphus (1611-32) the organisation of the armed forces 
developed rapidly... Charles XI, father of Charles XII, the Warrior King, 
carried through the organisation, which was formally established in 1682. Every 
province was to set up an infantry regiment of 1200 men (in eight companies). All 
villages were "divided" into districts of two or three farms that were responsible 
for keeping one soldier and giving him a croft. Often it was the younger peasant 
sons, who were not to inherit the farm, who became soldiers. This set-up had 
positive social consequences and explains the long-standing unity of the people 
and the army of Sweden. Very seldom was the army used against the people, as 
happened very frequently in Europe at the time. The soldier was a son of the 
village, where he lived in peacetime, and was trained by his regimental 
commander for about a month every year. During periods of war he was the one 
who saw the world and had something to tell when he came home. Later on he 
quite often became an important person as he was one of the very few who could 
read and write and served also a "schoolteacher" together with the vicar and the 
church bellringer several hundred years before the national school system was 
introduced. Thus the army has also played an important cultural role in Sweden' 
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(Swardenheim, in Stephens, 1989: 90-92, emphases added). Taking an alternative 
approach, Sunesson (1984) examines the decline of Swedish military 
effectiveness in the 18th century, specifically in the defeats in 1743 of the 
Swedish expeditionary force in Finland by Russia in the so-called "War of the 
Hats", again at the hands of the Prussians between 1757 and 1762, and in 
succeeding wars up to the last Swedish military engagements in 1808-1809 (1984: 
203-205). What interests Sunesson here is the connection between a theory of 
control - the much-vaunted 17th-century Swedish Discipline - and its outcomes in 
practice. He notes that in the examples cited, scientifically-rational military 
discipline did not avert defeat; yet this had seemingly little effect on the 
subsequent dissemination and acceptance of the theory. The suggestion is that the 
broader value of the Swedish Discipline lies in its adoption as a valid doctrine in 
military education 'that spread into other fields', primarily industrial 
organisation (Sunesson, 1984: 199); and the medium through which this value was 
transmitted was textual, initially via military training manuals and eventually 
to a wider readership (the influence and popularity of Watts' The Swedish 
Intelligencer of 1633 is cited as a prominent case in point; Sunesson, 1984: 200). 
[100] In his magisterial comparative study of Literacy and Development in the 
West, Cipolla finds that, in 1850, Switzerland ranks in 10 'Group a : countries 
with low adult illiteracy (less than 30 per cent)' out of a total of 32 European 
nations (1969: 113-4; it is further noteworthy that Switzerland also has the 
fourth-highest population of the group of ten). Of particular significance within 
these figures is that, although Swiss learning was remarkable enough to attract 
the attention and praise of as geographically remote an area as China in the 
mid-eighteenth century, this cultural achievement was not accompanied by high 
levels of industrialisation or urbanisation (1969: 64), nor by any inordinately high 
standard of living or national wealth (1969: 18). Moreover, despite Cipolla's 
inclusion of Switzerland as one of nine countries undergoing a "population 
explosion" of children attending elementary schools between c.1840 and 1895, the 
Swiss school-pupil population figure is singularly stagnant (estimated at 0.4 
million) between 1840 and 1873, and shows the lowest rate of increase (to half a 
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million by 1895) of the selected group (1969: 88-9). An alternative prominent 
reason for Switzerland's preeminent position with regard to alphanumeric 
capacity, is the attention lavished on elementary education by the Swiss army 
throughout its history: Cipolla states early (1969: 12-13) that in the 19th century 
'the military authorities examined the recruits not merely with regard to their 
ability to read and write, but with typical Swiss meticulousness subjected them to 
a rigid examination in penmanship, composition, arithmetic, Swiss history and 
geography. For each test the recruits received a well-defined grade ranging from 
1 to 5. Grade 1 denoted excellency. Grade 5 denoted total insufficiency. Over the 
period 1891-1900 more than 265,000 recruits were thoroughly examined, and the 
results were as follows: 
reading composition arithmetic civic education 
g 1... 48% 1... 28% 1... 34% 1... 21% 
r 2... 34% 2... 31% 2... 31% 2... 28% 
a 3... 15% 3... 33% 3... 26% 3... 34% 
d 4... 3% 4... 7% 4... 9% 4... 15% 
e 5... 0% 5,,.1/0 5... 0% 5... 2% 
100 100 100 1 0 0' 
and, at a later point, the author notes that in terms of illiteracy rates amongst 
army recruits in late 19th century Europe, li]n Switzerland in 1880 seven per cent 
could not read and write but only three per cent could not read. In 1885 the 
corresponding figures were four per cent and two per cent; in 1890, three and one 
per cent' (1969: 120). Tabulating these figures on a yearly basis between 1832 and 
1900, Cipolla finds that for this period illiteracy rates in the Swiss army are the 
fourth-lowest on the continent, surpassed only by Sweden, Prussia and the German 
Empire (1969:117-8). 
[101] In her analysis of the founding of a republican Turkey under the auspices of 
the military government led by rebel general Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, Prasad 
credits much of the new regime's subsequent success to the territory-ceding 
conditions of the post-World War I Allies-imposed Treaty of Sevres: 'in 1920 and 
1921, the signing of th[is] treaty caused public opinion to turn against the Sultan, 
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and the Kemalists took advantage of this, as well as their victories in the Greco-
Turkish war, to appeal to the international stage as the rightful government of 
Turkey' (1997-98: 61). In the host of reforms ushered in by Kemal's government to 
break the customary-based grip of his theocratic successors and consolidate the 
secular republic, estimated as 'the most effective of Atahirk's attacks on Islam 
were his replacement of the Arabic by the Latin script and his reform of the 
Turkish language.. .the young generation was at one stroke cut off from its whole 
religious and literary heritage [and by] the same stroke Atatiirk had made [the 
older generation] all officially illiterate' (Muller, 1958, cited in Prasad, 1997-98: 
56). An earlier study by Lerner & Robinson [1960] encases these moves within 
precedents and successive policy. They not only credit the military corps with 
having 'taken a large hand in modernisation of knowledge' through its major part 
in the establishment of the printing press in 1728 under the Ottoman Empire 
(cited in Bienen, 1971: 125), but note also the way that more recently 'general 
education may be identified with the military in the public mind, by reason of 
the large-scale program of basic education now being instituted by the Turkish 
army. ..There is reason to expect that this army program may give general 
education in the villages and small towns a very healthy shot in the arm by 
raising public acceptance, and even demand, for secular education' (1971: 135-136). 
Anecdotally, the co-authors also record a journalist's reaction to his visit to the 
first pilot class in April 1959: 
'Visitors to a classroom were welcomed by this rehearsed teacher-pupil 
exchange in Turkish: 
"What will you be if you do not learn to read and write?" asked the teacher. 
"Privates", chorused the class. 
"And what will you become if you study hard and learn your lessons?" pursued 
the teacher. 
"Corporals and sergeants", the class answered enthusiastically' (cited in 
Bienen, 1971: 136). 
Approaching a different aspect of the Turkish armed forces-educational nexus 
from a less laudatory standpoint, a later report by Gray (1987: 26) notes that the 
'Turkish military...have, since August, taken over the running of nearly half the 
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secondary schools in Turkish Kurdistan [102].. .Kurds in army-run schools are 
educated in an alien tongue, Turkish. It is forbidden to teach in Kurmanchi, the 
Kurdish dialect used by local people. Education in the language of an alien 
regime does not encourage learning at school. As a result of the Turks' control of 
schooling, more than half the Kurdish population, mainly women, cannot speak 
Turkish. It is hardly surprising that the Kurds have a 70 per cent illiteracy rate'. 
5.3.6: UNITED KINGDOM/EIRE 
[103] In England, Laqueur underlines his picture of one of the originary modern 
nation-states 'that functioned through an elaborate administrative machinery 
predicated on literacy' by noting that the 'office of Printer to the Crown was 
created during the late fifteenth century to facilitate the widespread 
dissemination of orders, proclamations or other official pronouncements; when 
Charles I proceeded against the Scots and afterwards against the parliamentary 
armies, his printing press followed him' (1976: 267). In the 18th century, and at a 
less exalted level, literacy 'aided promotion even among the lowest non-
commissioned ranks of the army' (1976: 265). Stone sees a militarist thrust in the 
mixed bag of motives underlying 19th-century mass schooling debates, claiming 
that '[t]hose who pushed through the English Education Act of 1870 were helped 
by the fact that in the 1860s the North beat the South in the American Civil 
War, and Prussia beat Austria, the conclusion being that better educated societies 
tend to win wars' (1969: 88). In Ryan's (1989) potted history, the 'earliest 
recorded instance [of English army education] was a school established for the 
British garrison in Tangier in 1675 and by the end of the eighteenth century such 
schools seem to have been fairly common, providing an education which was 
basically utilitarian (that is, reading, writing and the basic rules of arithmetic) 
for both soldiers and their children. During this same period the need for a 
system for the education of officers was recognised. The Royal Military Academy 
was founded at Woolwich in 1741 for artillery and engineer officers and the 
Royal Military College was founded at Marlow in 1802 (and moved to Sandhurst 
in 1812) for cavalry and infantry officers (these two institutions combined in 1947 
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to form the The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst - the present officer training 
establishment for the British Army). Early in the nineteenth century the 
Commander-in Chief, the Duke of York, recommended the establishment of a 
school in every regiment for the education of soldiers and their children, with 
each school being run by a schoolmaster sergeant. From 1812 onwards the costs of 
running these regimental schools were included in the Army financial estimates, 
many years before the introduction of free schooling for children in the United 
Kingdom' (Ryan, in Stephens 1989: 75, emphasis added). According to Hearl, 
when 'asked by Lady Shelley in 1825 for advice on the education of her son for a 
military career, the Duke of Wellington replied: 
He must be master of languages, of the mathematics, of history and 
geography, and the laws of his country and of nations, of military tactics and 
of all the duties of an officer...He will not be able to converse or write like a 
gentleman...unless he understands the classics, and by neglecting them, 
moreover, he will lose much gratification.. .and a great deal of professional 
information and instruction' (1976: 251). 
Hearl further summarises: 'The creation and expansion of cadet colleges.. .is one of 
the most remarkable developments in the history of English education.. .Colleges, 
curriculum, examinations: these three scholastic factors thereafter combined to 
produce a force, based on military needs, powerful enough to generate, in Professor 
Simon's words, "an educational revolution in this country during the 1820s and 
1830s", and to establish, as Professor Armytage has indicated, "the military 
ancestry of the Meritocracy"' (1976: 254-55). Finally, considering armed forces 
influence on civic education, Best (1975) examines militarist elements in the 
English public schools during the Victorian era: the institution of cadet and rifle 
corps, the tendency 'from some quite early date, for public schools to appoint ex-
army sergeants as porters, janitors, and gymnastics teachers' (1975: 133), and the 
sporadic but ongoing lecture tours 'by visiting grandees from the Navy League and 
the National Service League, the big pressure groups campaigning for 
conscription' around the time of the Boer War (1975: 136). He further notes the 
importance - and potential application - of sport (c/f Orwell, 1968 [orig. 1945]: 
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41), and the pre-1914 British upper-class school emphasis on a militarist mid-
Victorian construction of the value of loyalty: 'The loyalty syndrome which was 
such a prodigious part of the public school ethos began with loyalty to your house 
(which in some cases seems to have been as great as loyalty to your school) and 
rose through loyalty to your school (a paradigm of the nation) to loyalty to your 
country, faith and leaders. Public school boys, expressing in their letters and 
diaries their sense of purpose or obligation in the Boer War and Great War 
tended to say that they were glad to be bringing credit to the school, they 
wouldn't let the school down or forget "the loyalty to the Queen and country 
which I first learned at school" '(Best, 1975: 143). 
[104] In Philip Smith's sociological account of the Falklands/Malvinas War of 
1982, he eschews both Marxist (economic) and Weberish (political) explanatory 
modes in favour of a Durkheimian view of the war as a ritual event, an exercise in 
collective solidarity mediated through nationalist tropes. He notes that, by and 
large, English support for the war was garnered not through governmental and 
popular press appeals to jingoistic sentiment, but was built on a structural code 
embodying the following dichotomous features: 
Sacred 
British 
Moral 
Democracy 
Free 
Liberators 
Law Abiding 
Law Enforcing 
Rational 
Strategic 
Profane 
Argentineans 
Immoral 
Dictatorship 
Unfree 
Aggressors 
Law Breaking 
Criminals 
Irrational 
Emotive 	(P. Smith, 1991: 17) 
In the author's view, the stability of this code accounted in large part for British 
macro-consensual backing for Thatcherite war aims, and the form the conflict 
assumed. Thus, evoking the principle of the rational use of minimum force in a 
"legitimate" endeavour meant that neither use of British nuclear capability nor 
deployment of the English advanced hunter-killer submarines were serious 
options, as 'not only would such threats have brought about international 
condemnation - they would also have constituted a semiotic absurdity...The 
semiotic grammar underlying.conflict stressed the importance of justice over the 
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use of force' (1991: 119). Similarly, opponents of the war were forced into fallback 
positions involving 'deflation, re-classification, and deconstruction' of the 
overarching narratives - these tactics themselves evidence of the dominant 
discursive code. In a related approach, Foster (1993) works primarily through a 
series of first-hand participant accounts from both sides of the conflict, and shows 
how combatants 'made sense' of the episode by filtering their perceptions 
through a variety of literary "sieves": '[T]he course of [BBC journalist Robert] 
Fox's Journey to War [on board the troop carrier SS Canberra] is plotted not only 
through the pitching seas of the South Atlantic but also through a literary 
landscape [here, that of Coleridge's Rime of the Ancient Mariner ] whose 
controlling narratives reassure him of his personal well-being and in the process 
promote the campaign's political success' (1993: 43); Tumbledown, the 
autobiography of wounded Scots Guards lieutenant Robert Lawrence, wherein 
'the archetypes of heroic action become a passive descent into nightmare. The 
clean, symmetrical lines of the Boy's Own narrative dissolve into the ongoing, 
uncertain progress of the hospital drama, where the pain is real and the 
prognosis uncertain' (1993: 45); and Lawrence's MIA-presumed-dead Scots Guard 
compatriot Philip Williams' Summer Soldier, which dispenses 'with the journey 
motif and its sequential narrative, tainted by its use in the Falklands and in 
countless countries beforehand, as a tool of political promotion and personal 
reassurance. Instead, Williams employs short, impressionistic paragraphs 
detailing his hunger, fear and uncertainty. ..It is a narrative choice which makes 
a political and cultural point' (1993: 46). From the perspective of the Argentinean 
soldiery, the ideological framework supplied to los chicos de la guerra rested on 
the war (Operacion Rosario ) as an exercise in Hispano-Christian evangelical 
zeal and the reconquista, a restoration of sovereign territory ceded to the United 
Provinces of the Rio de la Plata in 1823 but forcibly seized by Britain in 1832: in 
Foster's terms, this 'fatal union between political and religious interest was 
consummated in the sacramental rhetoric which portrayed the military's last 
grasp at power as a latter day crusade' (1993: 46). For the author, the inadequacy 
of this interpretation of the "Cause" became rapidly apparent at the level of 
tactics, logistics and morale: 'shrouding [the conscripts] departure for the islands 
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in secrecy not only confused their geographical bearings, but also deprived them 
of the opportunity to locate themselves and their cause within a specific 
narrative framework, as the British had been able to do during their long voyage 
south. The connection between ignorance of one's geographical and narrative 
places is vital. Lacking maps, the conscripts were, both figuratively and 
literally, lost, without the sense of place and role central to their functions both 
as soldiers of an occupying army and as Catholic conquistadors in the popularly 
proffered evangelical narrative' (1993: 48). The outcome of this failure on the 
Argentine polity? 'The shaping narrative underlying many conscripts' accounts of 
their experiences in the Malvinas...[t]his narrative of death and resurrection 
which grew up out of the combatants' despair at how they had been let down by 
their officers and their superiors in the Casa Rosada ultimately played its part 
in removing the junta from office and setting Argentina back on the road to 
democracy' (1993: 49). 
[105] In Jane Stevenson's monograph on literacy in mediaeval Ireland, the 
militarist-textual affinity is expressed in the negative, specifically attributing 
much of Ireland's peripheral position in the mediaeval European world to 'the 
fact that Ireland was never conquered by Rome. ' This resulted in 'radically 
different social and political developments of which literacy is both an example 
and a symptom'; and the author goes on to state more generally, that 'one would 
have to assume that a completely townless society, operating as a set of small 
units classically defined as "tribal, rural, hierarchical and familiar", and 
without any form of centralised government, was peacefully illiterate' 
(Stevenson, in McKitterick, 1992: 11, emphases added). Cahill embroiders this 
theme: while characterising the early Irish as pathologically violent (and 
subject to the "warp-spasm" when fighting - 1995: 82-86), he similarly maintains 
that 'as the Roman Empire fell, as all through Europe matted, unwashed 
barbarians descended on the Roman cities, looting artifacts and burning books, the 
Irish, who were just learning to read and write, took up the great labour of 
copying all of western literature - everything they could lay their hands on. 
These scribes then served as conduits through which the Greco-Roman and Judeo- 
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Christian cultures were transmitted to the tribes of Europe, newly settled amid 
the rubble and ruined vineyards of the civilization they had overwhelmed. 
Without this Service of the Scribes, everything that happened subsequently 
would have been unthinkable. Without the Mission of the Irish Monks, who 
single-handedly refounded European civilization throughout the continent in the 
bays and valleys of their exile, the world that came after them would have been 
an entirely different one - a world without books. And our own world would never 
have come to be' (1995: 3-4). The 'Monks' on their early "literacy campaign" in 
this description 'were warrior-monks, of course, and certainly not afraid of any 
monsters they may meet.. .Many of the exiles found their way to continental 
Europe, where they were more than a match for the barbarians they met. They, 
whom the Romans had never conquered... fearlessly brought the ancient 
civilization back to its ancient home' (Cahill, 1995: 187-88). 
[106]'In Scotland, the demand for public education set out in the First Book of 
Discipline of 1560 was made at at time of religious crisis, and was designed to 
advance the cause of Presbyterianism and to convert the masses from Popery. Two 
centuries later, when a determined effort was made to introduce Charity Schools 
into the Highlands, sectarian rivalry was again the driving force. "This society 
seems to have been indebted for its institution to a zealous aversion from Popery", 
and its objective was finally to purge the Clans of Catholicism. Its efforts were 
the "pacification programme", complement to the military repression of Butcher 
Cumberland and his troops, as is evidenced by the proposal in 1753 that Catholic 
children should not be taught writing and arithmetic unless they attended church 
service conducted by a Presbyterian minister' (Stone, 1969: 82-83). 
[107]In the section of his essay subheaded "Birth and Death of a Nation", Gwynn 
A. Williams outlines war/textuality conjunctions in the emergence of an 18th-
century radical independent Welsh national identity: 'politics in Wales began 
with the American Revolution. The first purely political publication in the 
Welsh language was a translation of an English pamphlet on the dispute in the 
American colonies. For a few years even the homespun ballad-mongers were 
disturbed. Temporarily unhinged by what they saw as a civil war, they were able 
to relapse with relief into their customary John Bull jingoism only with the entry of 
France and Spain into the conflict. So visible were the Welsh-Americans in the 
struggle that the people at home firmly believed that most of the signatures to the 
Declaration of Independence were Welsh. Five certainly were.. .The war turned 
most Welsh Dissenters and whole ranges of people who espoused the liberties being 
fought for into spiritual Americans within British society. From that point, 
politics thrust its snout into the book production of the Welsh-speaking Welsh. In 
the 1760s, there were some 230 publications in Welsh; by the 1790s the total had 
climbed to nearly 500 and among them the number of political texts multiplied six-
fold. Over a hundred appeared, mostly in the 1790s, and their message echoed 
through the larger numbers of historical studies, biographies, verse, left its 
impress even on the serried ranks of volumes (600 and more out of the total of 1,300 
printed between 1760 and 1799) devoted to theology, sermons and hymns...David 
Williams, a celebrated Welsh Deist, dated the birth of Jacobinism from 1782 and 
located that birth not in France but in Britain...Out of that post-colonial crisis grew 
the first serious reform movements in Britain, calling for the political 
emancipation of Dissent, the end of British slavery, the creation of a 
representative parliament, finally for political democracy, a thrust which, after 
the French Revolution, debouched into the first systematic popular politics. 
Welshmen, mostly Dissenters, who were enmeshed in this movement were 
relatively few in number but strategically placed. One striking centre was 
Glamorgan, which emerges as a nursery of the democratic intellect' (1982: 269-70). 
5.4: Dynamics of the Twentieth-Century War/Text Axis 
Section 5.3 provided a sketch of a multi-dimensional war/text axis operating in 
particular regions - primarily nation-states - under long-run conditions of 
modernity. It was largely descriptive, macro-qualitative, and centrally 
thematised by the part a combination of reading/writing and war played in the 
formation and definition of states (and would-be/eventual states or statelike 
entities), and the constitution of these states in the contemporary 20th-Century. 
The 107 regions in the catalogue were treated, in the main, as analytically 
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independent 'free-standing' units existing and operating inside larger territorial 
categories (continental and sub-continental areas). The cases in the survey were 
limited to a consideration of the ways in which the war/text axis delineated and 
internally ordered these entities. They outline the operation of the axis within 
countries: but it also affect relations between countries, and determines their 
placement within, and the shaping and operant conditions of, an interactive current 
world-system. 
This section reconfigures a smaller sample of these entities, and lifts the levels of 
generality and abstraction. From the 107 regions considered in 5.3, I take 82 cases - 
those yielding requisite degrees of valid data - and subject them to quantitative 
analysis. The chosen countries are ranked and assessed according to their respective 
Years at War in the post-World War II period, between 1945 and 1982; Literacy 
Rates,' as officially estimated at the conclusion of the Experimental World 
Literacy Program of 1975; Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower, also for 
1975; and the country's Education Expenditure for the same year. These are 
correlated with Gastil's 1975 indices (see 5.3, pp. 176-77 above) of Political and 
Civil Rights, which are tied to the form of government - each country's Political 
Regime - as of mid-1982. Finally, the Major Conflicts undertaken by each country 
over the course of the 20th-Century are listed, and the human costs of these 
conflicts - the Estimated Number of Deaths expressed as an aggregate of military 
and civilian casualties - are presented. 
Appendix H displays this data in its rawest form. In Appendix I, the raw figures 
are placed within a matrix for comparative analysis. The principal findings 
'Regarding this particular data-set it needs emphasising that there are no 1975 rates recorded 
for 21 countries within the sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the 2 
Germanies, Fiji, Finland, France, Hungary, Japan, Lebanon, Norway, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, The UK, USA, and Vietnam. This is because the majority of these 
nations were contributors rather than recipients of EWLP programs, and I follow the assumption 
that rates pertaining within the majority of these countries - the cases of Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Fiji, the Lebanon and Viet Nam obviously excepted - are so high (First-World 
standard) as to render precise global-scale measurement unnecessary. Where possible, I have 
nevertheless provided indicative supplementary figures; and further indicators of relatively high 
literacy levels in these nations can be obtained by referring to the qualitative samples for each 
country - ie, cases 60, 69, 77, 33, 79, 82, 62, 80, 81, 85, 50, 15, 92, 91, 68, 99, 100, 103,44 & 59 
respectively - in section 5.3. 
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resulting from the analysis, elaborated in statistical detail at pp. 280-83, situate 
the effects of the war/text axis and the conditions of conflict under modernity: war-
involvement between entities increases throughout the period, peaking in the two 
World Wars (1914-18; 1939-45); high literacy rates [column C] do not correlate (or 
are negatively correlated) to a country's post-1945 record of war-involvement 
[column B] - nor are they indicators of either regime-type [column G], or degree of 
political and civil rights [columns H & I; c/f section 5.2.4 above]; education 
expenditure [column E] is a more reliable indicator of war involvement (in all bar 
two disparate cases, Israel's disproportionately high defence budget, and Cuba's 
relatively excessive investment in education) than the proportion of GNP allotted 
to defence [column D]; and high casualty rates, expressed as whole figure 
aggregates [column L], do not (with the exceptions of Russia, Germany and Poland in 
the Second World War) correspond to the 1900-90 periods of war-involvement - 
moreover, regarding the ratio of civilian to military fatalities [column L] in the 66 
cases where data is available, 7 nations (11% of the sample) have approximately 
the same mortality rates, but in the majority of cases (58%) civilian casualties 
exceed military losses. 
Of particular interest is the light the findings throw on the arguments of the 
"peaceful democracies" thesis (1.2.2, pp. 14-16 above) and the 'pacific 
transnational sociology' paradigm (in Chapter 2, p. 38 and ff). Chan's figures (1984 
- column N) show that the countries with the highest involvement on a war-per-
year basis between 1816 and 1980 - ie Israel, India, France and Britain -are 
nominally democratic. This tallies with my own figures in column B, which show 
that in ranking national years at war from 1945 to 1982, France "shares the lead" 
(with Burma) at 38 years, England is next with 37 years, the United States ranks in 
the 11th position (25 years) followed by India's 24 years of bellicosity - all well 
above the arithmetic average of 11.2 war-years in the other 77 cases in the sample. 
The inescapable conclusion appears to be that, while the 'freer' nation-states do 
not engage in war with each other, they are far from averse to warring with other 
non-, anti- (or speciously-) democratic states. Combining column B with the coded 
regime-types [in column G] reinforces this finding: of the 3 main types represented, 
multi-party parliamentary (29 cases) and one-party (22 cases) states display the 
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highest degrees of war-involvement - military polities (20 cases), against 
expectations, considerably less than either. 
This is consonant with Latey's explanation for the 'something paradoxically 
peaceful in the nature of military dictatorships' (1972: 269). Contrasting the 
propensity of civilian led governments to go to war with the reluctance of their 
military-governing counterparts, Latey claims that the latter already represents - 
hence does not need to pursue - the nation's military glory; that the governing body 
already has - therefore does not need to seek through military adventurism - the 
support of the armed services; and will not risk its power base - the soldiery - nor 
potentially throw up rivals, by engaging in interstate armed confrontation. Hence 
it is unsurprising that regions such as Turkey under Atattirk and the Kemalists, 
Franco's Spain post-1939, or most of Latin America in the past 150 years 'under a 
series of military dictators' have 'been among the most internationally peaceful 
areas of the world' (1972: 271). 
This Chapter and its immediate predecessors suggest that a further reason for such 
paradoxical outcomes are centrally the status and dissemination, among ever-
wider populations, of reading and writing across time and space. The combination 
of authorised documentary personal and national identity, mass and functional 
literacy, 'print-capitalism' as primary valid information source, forges the 
'imagined communities' of the democratic polity's dominant form in the modern 
era. Not the least of the body politic's 'imaginings' concerns the irrationality of 
war, and, by a re-invention of its own traditions, that the textual underpinnings of 
its constitution (figurative and literal) owe little or nothing to either the military 
or the warring processes that combined to bring it into being. 
The next Chapter deals with a range of perspectives claiming that the Modern - 
and ipso facto the war/text axis that both created and maintains it - has itself 
been superseded or redefined by a new era of 'post'modernity. 
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APPENDIX H:  254. 
I. AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST 
AFGHANISTAN  
Years at War '45-'82: 10* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 12 
* Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Afghanistan (1996: 
187-88): # of wars - 3; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.5; years of war per century - 5.2. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.8 	 Education Expenditure '75: 1.3 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 12.7 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
2000 
8,000 
1 300 000* 
805,000 [c] 	506,000 [m] 	1,311,000 [t] 
*According to Knightley, 'published casualty figures for Soviet forces in Afghanistan.. .varied from a low of 
1,200 to a high of 10,000. Yet it was difficult to find a Western correspondent who had seen for himself a 
single Russian body' (1989: 432). For Brogan the c. 1 million killed in Afghanistan has 'become accepted in 
most news reports, but should be treated with great suspicion...the Mujaheddin have not issued casualty 
figures ([but] claim an immense slaughter of their enemies)' (1992: 621-22). 
ALGERIA 
Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 35 
Education Expenditure '75: 5.7 
Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 6 
popn] '75: 9.7 
Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
Years at War '45-'82: 15 
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.5 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age 
Major Conflicts 
1945 - France intervenes in civil war 2,000 	0 	 2,000 
1954-62 - France intervenes in civil war 82,000 18,000 100,000* 
1962-63 - Rebel leaders vs Govt 1.000 1.000 2 000 
85,000 [c] 19,000 [m] 104,000 [t] 
* corroborated by Brogan (1992: 622) 
CHAD 
Years at War '45-'82: 18 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 15 
Defence Expenditure '75: 5.6 Education Expenditure '75: 2.1 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 7 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 18.1 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1980-87 - Reb vs Govt; France, Libya interv 2,000 [c] 	5,000 [m] 	7,000 [t] 
EGYPT  
Years at War '45-'82: 19 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 44* 
Defence Expenditure '75: 11.7 	Education Expenditure* '75: 5.8 
* Other Estimates - 1962 World Ranking (n of countries = 136) in Literacy: 79; Primary School enrolments: 81; 
Post-Primary School enrolments: 33 (Coleman, in Coleman, 1965: 437). Earlier, Sullivan (1948: 522) cites an 
Egyptian illiteracy rate of 90.3 for the year 1921. 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: restricted parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 4 
1919 - Afghanistan vs UK 
1924-25 - anti-reform vs Govt, UK intervenes 
1928-29 - anti-reform vs Govt 
1978-89 - USSR intervenes in civil war 
1,000 
4,000 
800,000 
0 	 1,000 1,000 
1,000 
4,000 
500.000 
1978-79 - Islam vs Shah; dissidents 	70,000 	18,000 
1980-88 - Iraq vs Iran 
88,000* 
500 000* 50.00IL 450.000 
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Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 19 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1956-65 - Suez: Israel, France, UK invasion 1,000 	3,000 	4,000 
1967-70 - Six Day War; border conflicts 	50,000 25.000 75,000 
51,000 [c] 	28,000 [m] 	79,000 [t] 
ETHIOPIA 
Years at War '45-'82: 15 
	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 10 
Defence Expenditure '75: 3.8 Education Expenditure '75: 3 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 
	 CR: 5 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 3.4 
Major Conflicts* 
	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1935-36 - Italy vs Ethiopia 	 n/a 
1941 - Second World War 5,000 
1974-90 - Eritrean revolt and famine 	 500,000 
1976-83 - Cuban and Somalian intervention 	15.000 
520,000 [c] 	119,000 [m] 	639,000 [t] 
Alternative estimate (Brogan, 1992: 624): Ethiopia's civil wars 1974 to 1991 - 2,000,000 casualties. 
GHANA  
Years at War '45-'82: 1 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 30 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.6 	 Education Expenditure '75: 6.1 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 5 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 4.1 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1981 - Konkomba vs Nanumba 	 1,000 [t] 
IRAN 
Years at War '45-'82: 13* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 50 
*Other Estimate - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
Iran/Persia (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 3; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.5; years of war per century - 9.3. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 14.9 	 Education Expenditure '75: 2.9 
Political Regime [mid- '821: non-military/despotic (to 1979); theocratic (post-'79) 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 22.9 
Major Conflicts* 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
	
20,000 
	20,000 
5,000 10,000 
70,000 
	570,000* 
24.000 39.000* 
120,000 [c] 	468,000 [m] 	588, 000 [t1 
*Alternative estimates (Brogan, 1992: 624): Iranian Revolution - 20,000 casualties; Iran-Iraq War - 600,000 
casualties. 
IRA() 
Years at War '45-'82: 11* 
	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 24 
Defence Expenditure '75: 14.8 
	 Education Expenditure '75: 2.8 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 7 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popr] '75: 27.5 
Major Conflicts* 	 Estimated Number of Deaths 
1920-21 - Arabs vs UK 
	 1,000 
	
1,000 
1933 - Kurds massacred Christians 	1,000 0 
1959 - Shammar Tribe vs Govt 	 1,000 
	1,000 
(civilian/military/total) 
2,000 
1,000 
2,000 
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1961-70 - Kurds vs Govt; Iran intervenes 100,000 	5,000 	105,000* 
1988 - Kurd civilians killed by army 	9,000 1 000 10.000* 
112,000 [c] 	8,000 [m] 	120, 000 RI 
*Alternative estimates (Brogan, 1992: 623, 624, 625): Kurdish Revolt, to 1970 - 50,000 casualties; renewed 
war with Kurds 1974 - 20,000 casualties; Shiite and Kurdish revolts, March to June 1991: 50,000 casualties. 
ISRAEL  
Years at War '45-'82: 14 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 88 
Defence Expenditure '75: 31.7 	 Education Expenditure '75: 6.1 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: restricted parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 2 	CR: 3 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 93.4 
Major Conflicts* 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
1948 - Arab League vs Israel 	 0 	8,000 	8,000* 
1973- Yom Kippur War, vs Egypt, Syria 	1 	16. 010 16.000* 
0 [c] 	24,000 [m] 	24,000 [t] 
*Alternative estimates (Brogan, 1992; 622, 623, 624): War of Independence (1947-49) - 20,000 casualties; Six 
Day war (1967) - 25,000 casualties; war of attrition with Egypt (to 1970) - 3,000 casualties; Yom Kippur war 
(1973) - 25,000 casualties. 
IVORY COAST  
Years at War '45-'82: 4 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 20 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.5 	 Education Expenditure '75: 6.1 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 2.7 
KENYA 
Years at War '45-'82: 9 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 40 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.7 	 Education Expenditure '75: 0.3 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 	CR: 4 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 1.3 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total') 
1952-63 - Independence from UK 	3,000 [c] 	12,000 [m] 	15,000 [t]* 
* Brogan's figure cites 15,000 dead in 'the Mau Mau uprising' between 1952 and 1956 (1992: 622). 
LEBANON 
Years at War '45-'82: 12 
	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a 
Defence Expenditure '75: 3.4 Education Expenditure '75: :2.3 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 2 	CR: 4 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 13.4 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military /total)  
1958 - US intervenes in civil war 	1,000 	1,000 	2,000 
1975-76 - Syria intervenes in civil war 	75,000 25,000 100,000* 
1982-90 - Israeli invasion and aftermath 	41.000 	22.000 	63.000* 
117,000 [c] 	48,000 [in] 	165,000 [t] 
*Alternative estimates: 1975 - civil war, continuing: 15,000 casualties; 1982 - Israeli invasion: 50,000 
casualties (Brogan, 1992: 624, 625). 
LIBERIA 
Years at War '45-'82: 0 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 9 
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Defence Expenditure '75: 0.7 	 Education Expenditure '75: 2.7 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 3 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 6.4 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1985 - reprisal for coup attempt 	5,000 	 5,000 
1990- Rebels vs Rebels vs Govt 9.000 1.000 	10,000*  
14,000 [c] 	1,000 [m] 	15,000 [t] 
*Altemative estimate (Brogan, 1992: 625): civil war, continuing - 30,000 casualties. 
MADAGASCAR 
Years at War '45-'82: 4 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 50 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.7 	 Education Expenditure '75: 4.1 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 	CR: 4 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 3.1 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1947-48 - Independence from France 	10,000 [c] 	5,000 [m]* 	15,000 [t] 
* Military casualties corroborated by Brogan (1992: 622). 
MALI  
Years at War '45-'82: 2 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 10 
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.5 	 Education Expenditure '75: 5.6 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 2.6 
MOROCCO 
Years at War '45-'82: 19 
	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 21 
Defence Expenditure '75: 3.1 Education Expenditure '75: 5.4 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: despotic (not military) 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 	CR: 5 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 8.7 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1916-17- France intervenes in civil war 1,000 	1,000 	2,000 
1921-26 - France and Spain intervene 11,000 29,000 40,000 
1953-56 - Indep. from France, Spain interv. 3.000 0 3.000 
15,000 [c] 30,000 [m] 45,000 [t] 
NIGERIA 
Years at War '45-'82: 4 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 15* 
Defence Expenditure '75: 4.6 Education* Expenditure '75: 1.6 
*Other Estimates - 1962 World Ranking (n of countries = 136) in Literacy: 104; Primary School enrolments: 
100; Post-Primary School enrolments: 114 (Coleman, in Coleman, 1965: 437). 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popri] '75: 8.2 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
1967-70 - Biafrans vs Govt; famines, massacre 	1,000,000 	1,000,000 	 2,000,000 
1980-84 - Fundamental Islam vs Govt 
	 6.000 [ti  
1,000,000 [c] 	1,000,000 [m] 	2,006,000 [t] 
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ZIMBABWE(former Rhodesia)  
Years at War '45-'82: 17 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 39 
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.3 Education Expenditure '75: 3.5 
Political Regime [mid- '821: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 5 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 4.7 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1972-79 - Patriotic Front vs Rhodesia 	 12,000* 
1983-84 - political and ethnic violence 	£Q2 	Q. 	 £Q00 
4,000 [c] O[m] 	16,000 [t] 
* corroborated by Brogan (1992: 622) 
SOMALIA 
Years at War '45-'82: 3 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 50 
Defence Expenditure '75: 6.7 	 Education Expenditure '75: 2.6 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 17.9 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1988-90 - civil war in north 	 50,000 [c] 	5,000 [m] 	55,000 [t]* 
*Alternative estimate (Brogan, 1992: 625): 1988 civil war, continuing - 75,000 casualties 
SUDAN 
Years at War '45-'82: 19 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 20 
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.6 Education Expenditure '75: 4.7 
Political Regime [mid- '821: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 5.3 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1963-72 - Black vs Govt; UK, Eg intervene 250,000 	250,000 	500,000 
1984-90 - Blacks vs Islamic Law 	500.000 6,000 506,000 
750,000 [c] 	256,000 [m] 	1,006,000 [t] 
SYRIA 
Years at War '45-'82: 15 
	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 40 
Defence Expenditure '75: 16.8 	 Education Expenditure '75: 4 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 7 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 62.8 
Major Conflicts Estimated Number of Deaths civilian militar 	total 
1920-20 - France vs Syria 5,000 
1925-27 - Druses vs France 4,000 4,000 8,000 
1986-87 - Govt massacres Conserv. Muslims 20.000 0 20.000 
24,000 [c] 4,000 [m] 33,000 [t] 
TUNISIA  
Years at War '45-'82: 9 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 55* 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.6 	 Education Expenditure '75: 5.6 
*Other Estimates - 1962 World Ranking (n of countries = 136) in Literacy: 97; Primary School enrolments: 91.5; 
Post-Primary School enrolments: 59 (Coleman, in Coleman, 1965: 437). 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 5 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 6.7 
APPENDIX H:  259. 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1952-54: Independence from France 	3,000 [c] 	0 [m] 	3,000 [t] 
TANZANIA 
Years at War '45-'82: 6 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 66 
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.6 	 Education Expenditure '75: 3.9 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 3.2 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1905-7 - Revolt against Germany; massacres150,000 [c] 	0 [m] 	 150,000 [t] 
UGANDA  
Years at War '45-'82: 9 
	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 35 
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.5 
	 Education Expenditure '75: n/a 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: restricted parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 7 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 4.2 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1966 - Buganda tribe vs Govt 	 1,000 	1,000 	2,000 
1971-78 - Idi Amin's massacres 300,000 0 300,000 
1978-79 - Tanzania vs Amin 	 3,000 	3,000 
1981-87 - Army vs people 300.000 	8.000 308.000 
601,000 [c] 	12,000 [m] 	613,000 [t] 
ZAIRE  
Years at War '45-'82: 10 
	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 31 
Defence Expenditure '75: 4 Education Expenditure '75: n/a 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: despotic (not military) 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 4.2 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1960-65 - UK, Belgian intervention, Katanga 	 100,000 [t] 
ZAMBIA 
Years at War '45-'82: 5 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 39 
Defence Expenditure '75: 3.3 	 Education Expenditure '75: 5 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 	CR: 4 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 6.3 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1964 - Civil strife 1,000 [t] 
AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST: Casualty Total Area-Wide: 5,037,000[c] 2,562,000[m] 	7,112,000[t] 
II. THE AMERICAS 
ARGENTINA  
Years at War '45-'82: 9* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 93* 
* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites an Argentinian illiteracy rate of 24.0 for the years 1913-24. * 
Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Argentina (1996: 187- 
88): # of wars - 6; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.0; years of war per century - 25.5. 
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Defence Expenditure '75: 2.3 	 Education Expenditure '75: 1.2 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 2 	CR: 4 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popri] '75: 9.9 
Major Conflicts Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1955-55 - Armed Forces vs Peron 2,000 	2,000 	4,000 
1976-79 - "Disappearances" 12,000 3,000 15,000 
1982-82 - Argentina vs UK in the Falklands 0 1.000 L000 
14,000 [c] 6,000 [m] 20,000 [t] 
BOLIVIA 
Years at War '45-'82: 23* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 63 
* Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Bolivia (1996: 187- 
88): # of wars - 5; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.9; years of war per century - 20.3. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.7 	 Education Expenditure '75: 6.3 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 5 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 6.8 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
1952 - revolution vs Govt 	1,000 [c] 	1,000 [m] 	2,000 [t] 
BRAZIL 
Years at War '45-'82: 3* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 66* 
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.2 Education Expenditure '75: 3.5 
* Other Estimates - 1962 World Ranking (n of countries = 136) in Literacy: 59; Primary School enrolments: 
68.5; Post-Primary School enrolments: 56 (Coleman, in Coleman, 1965: 437). Earlier, Sullivan (1948: 522) cites 
a Brazilian illiteracy rate of 71.2 for the year 1920. * Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare 
X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Brazil (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 5; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.9; years 
of war per century - 11.7. 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 4 
	CR: 4 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 7.6 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths civilian milita total 
1932-32 - State vs Federal Govt 
	 1,000 
1944-45 - World War II; troops in Italy 	0 
	 1,000 	1,000 
1980-80 - Rightist terrorism 	 z 1 Q0 
0 [c] 
	1,000 [m] 
	3,000 [t] 
CANADA 
Years at War '45-'82: 4 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a* 
* Other Estimate - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Canadian illiteracy rate of 5.1 for the year 1921. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 2 	 Education Expenditure '75: 7.6 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 	CR: 1 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popr] '75: 5.2 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/ total)  
1914-18 - World War I 	0 	 55,000 	55,000 
1939-45 - World War II 0 39.000 39.000 
0 [c] 	94,000 [m] 	94,000 [t] 
CHILE 
Years at War '45-'82: 6* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 88* 
* Other Estimates - * Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
Chile (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 5; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.9; years of war per century - 17.9.* 
Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Chilean illiteracy rate of 40.8 for the year 1920. 
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Defence Expenditure '75: 4.3 	 Education Expenditure '75: 4 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 5 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 18.1 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military /totall 
1973-74 - Military coup and executions 	20,000 	0 	20,000 
1987 - Minestrikers vs army 	 3,000 0 	3,000 
23,000 [c] 	0 [m] 	23,000 [t] 
COSTA RICA 
Years at War '45-'82: 8* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 88 
* Other Estimate - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
Costa Rica (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 8; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.4; years of war per century - 19.6. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 0 	 Education Expenditure '75: 5.8 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 	CR: 1 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 1.8 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/totall  
1948-48 - Natl UN vs Govt; US intervenes 1,000 [c] 	1,000 [m] 	2,000 [t] 
CUBA  
Years at War '45-'82: 17 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 96 
Defence Expenditure '75: 6.1 Education Expenditure '75: 11.2 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 7 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 22.7 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/totall 
1958-59 - Castro vs Batista;US interv 	2,000 [c] 	3,000 [m] 	5,000 [t] 
ECUADOR 
Years at War '45-'82: 3* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 74 
* Other Estimate - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
Ecuador (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 4; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.7; years of war per century - 12.1. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.9 	 Education Expenditure '75: 3.7 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 4 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 5.5 
GUATEMALA  
Years at War '45-'82: 4* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 46 
* Other Estimate - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
Guatemala (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 7; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.2; years of war per century - 24.5. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.3 	 Education Expenditure '75: 1.7 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 4 	CR: 3 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 4 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
1954-54 - Consery vs Govt; US interv 	 1,000 
1966-90 - Govt massacres Indians; US interv 	100.000 	40.000 	140.000 
100,000 [c] 
	40,000 [m] 	240,000 [t] 
HONDURAS  
Years at War '45-'82: 9* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 57 
* Other Estimate - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
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Honduras (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 9; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.6; years of war per century - 17.2. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.8 	 Education Expenditure '75: 3.2 
Political Regime [mid- '821: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 3 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 7.9 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/totall 
1924 - Conservatives vs Govt 	 1,000 
1969 - El Salvador vs H. (soccer war) 	3.000 	2 000 	5 000 
3,000 [c] 	2,000 [m] 	5,000 [t] 
MEXICO 
Years at War '45-'82: 1* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 71* 
* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Mexican illiteracy rate of 62.2 for the year 1921. *Keeley's 
figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Mexico (1996: 187-88): # of 
wars - 6; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.0; years of war per century - 24.1. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 0.9 	 Education Expenditure '75: 3.3 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: restricted parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 4 	CR: 3 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popri] '75: 3.2 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
1910-20 - Lib & Rad vs Govt; US interv 	125,000 	125,000 	250,000 
1926-30 - Con Cristeros vs Govt 	 z 	 10.000 
125,000 [c] 	125, 000 [m] 	260,000 [t] 
NICARAGUA  
Years at War '45-'82: 33* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 57 
* Other Estimate - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
Nicaragua (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 10; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.7; years of war per century - 18.3. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 2 	 Education Expenditure '75: 2.5 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: restricted parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 	CR: 4 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 4.4 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)** 
1978-79 - Sandinistas vs Somoza 	25,000 	25,000 	50,000 
1981-88 - Contras vs Sandinistas 15,000 15.000 30,000 
40,000 [c] 	40,000 [m] 	80,000 [t] 
** Brogan, in a more general discussion of the unreliability of casualty figures, takes Nicaragua as a type-case 
of the tendency 'to exaggerate casualties. Shirley Christian, in her book on the Nicaraguan revolution, wrote: 
"The question of how many people died in the insurrection has been tremendously manipulated and twisted in 
the years since 1979. Although roughly 10,000 was the estimate used by relief workers in the last month of the 
insurrection, just a month or two later the Sandinista Front began to raise the toll. It first claimed that 30,000 
had died, later saying 35,000, then 40,000, then 50,000, sometimes more. The figures were repeated by other 
organizations and government, and took on the aura of credibility. In fact, there is nothing to substantiate 
them... The Sandinista deaths, according to a man who kept what statistics were kept on the Southern Front, 
were at least 300 and not more than 600. A well-placed official of the Somoza government said that the 
National Guard deaths were likewise no more than a "few hundred"...Finally, Ismael Reyes, the Red Cross 
leader, thought the civilian deaths fell into the 7000 range, possibly fewer. This means the total could not have 
exceeded 10,000". Despite Christian's research, the figures 35,000 or 50,000 for deaths in the Nicaraguan 
revolt turn up all the time in books and newspapers. There are equally inflated figures for people killed in the 
Contra rebellion' (Brogan, 1992: 621). 
PARAGUAY  
Years at War '45-'82: 5* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 80 
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*Other Estimate - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
Paraguay (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 3; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.5; years of war per century - 13.1. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.5 	 Education Expenditure '75: 1.5 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 	CR: 5 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 11 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1911-12 - Liberals vs Govt 2,000 
1947 - Liberals vs Govt = L000 
- [c] 	- [m] 3,000 [t] 
PERU 
Years at War '45-'82: 8* Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 72 
* Other Estimate - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Peru 
(1996: 187-88): # of wars - 5; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.9; years of war per century - 13.8. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 4.8 	 Education Expenditure '75: 4.1 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 11.7 
Major Conflicts* 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)*  
*Brogan (1992: 625): 1983 - Communist Shining Path insurrection 	25,000 [undifferentiated t] 
UNITED STATES of AMERICA 
Years at War '45-'82: 25* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a* 
* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a United States illiteracy rate of 4.3 for the year 1930. Cipolla's 
figures (1969: 14) USA 1900: white pop'n 10 and over totally illiterate - 5%[Male], 5%[Female], 5%total; 
white pop'n 10 and over able to read but not write - 1%[M], 2%[F], 1%total. Coloured pop'n 10 and over 
totally illiterate - 38%[M], 42%[F], 40%total; coloured pop'n 10 and over able to read but not write - 5%[M], 
5%[F], 5%total. * Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for the 
US (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 11; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.9; years of war per century - 15.5. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 6 	 Education Expenditure '75: 6.4 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 	CR: 1 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 15.5 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
1917-18 - First World War 	0 	 126,000 	126,000 
1941-45 - Second World War 	0 408.000 408.000 
0 [c] 	 534,000 [m] 	534,000 [m] 
THE AMERICAS: Casualty Total Area-Wide: 309,000[c] 	847,000[m] 	1,296,000[t] 
III. ASIA 
BURMA  
Years at War '45-'82: 38 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 67* 
* Myrdal's (1968: 1674) literacy rates for Burma, 1901: 53% [Males], 6% [Females]; 1911: 53% [M], 8% [F]; 
1921: 61% [M], 12% [F]; 1931: 65% [M], 18% [F]. 1953-4: urban pop'n - 86%[M], 53% [F]; rural pop'n - 
83%[M], 34% [F]; 1962: total pop'n - 80% [M], 40%[F] (1968: 1672) 
Defence Expenditure '75: 4.3 	 Education Expenditure '75: 2.8 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 5 
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Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 12.1 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
Karens vs. Govt; China intervenes - 	 8,000 
Communists vs. Govt 	 - 
,000 	Ircl 
5,000 
6  Rebels vs. Govt 	 3.000 frni. 	9 000 
6,000 [c] 	3,000 Erri] 22,000 [t] 
CAMBODIA (Kampuchea)  
Years at War '45-'82 (Kampuchea): 29 	Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 36 (Kampuchea) 
Defence Expenditure '75(Kampuchea): 11 Education Expenditure '75 (Kampuchea): n/a 
Political Regime [mid- '84: one-party (Kampuchea). 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights (Kampuchea) - PR: 6 CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75 (Kampuchea): 14.7 
Major Conflicts Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1970-75 - Civil war, US and NV intervene 78,000 	78,000 	156,000* 
1975-78 - Pol Pot famine and Massacre 750,000 250,000 1,000,000* 
1978-79 - Vietnam vs Cambodia 14.000 51.000 65.000* 
842,000 [c] 379,000 [m] 1,121,000 [t] 
* Brogan's figures for Cambodia: Indochina war, 1970-75: 150,000; genocide, 1975-78: 1-2,000,000; 1978-79: 
Vietnamese invasion to 1989 and civil war continuing - 150,000. Additional commentary by Brogan on 
casualty rates: 'Occasionally, high estimates turn out to be far short of the mark. For instance, in June 1988, the 
Vietnamese announced that they had lost 55,000 men fighting in Cambodia since 1978. Assuming, most 
coservatively, that Cambodian losses were double that, it means that the Cambodians suffered the deaths of 
another 100,000 people on top of the horrors of 1970-78' (1992: 621). 
CHINA  
Years at War '45-'82: 26* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 82 
* Other Estimate - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
China (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 11; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.9; years of war per century - 38.6. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 11 	 Education Expenditure '75: n/a 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 7 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 8.4 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1900 - Boxer Rebellion, 5 nations invade 13,000 	3,000 	16,000 
1904 - UK expedition to Tibet 1,000 
1911 - Republicans vs Govt 1,000 1,000 2,0000 
1912-13 - Tibet vs China 2,000 
1913 - Republicans and bandits vs Govt 10,000 10,000 20,000 
1914 - Pai-Lings vs Govt 5,000 
1917-20 - Szechuanese vs others 3,000 3,000 6,000 
1918 - Tibet vs China; UK intervention 0 1,000 1,000 
1926-28 - Civil War; USSR, Japan interven 10,000 
1928 - Muslim rebellion vs Govt 200,000 
1929 - USSR vs China 0 3,000 3,000 
1929-30 - Warlords vs Govt 75,000 
1930-35 - Communists vs Govt 500,000 
1931-33 - Japan vs Manchuria 60,000 60,000 
1931-34 - USSR interven. Turkistan 20,000 
1937-41 - Japan vs China 1,150,000 650,000 1,800,000 
1941-45 - World War II 850,000 1,350,000 2,200,000 
1946-50 - Communists vs KMT; US interven.500,000 500,000 1,000,000* 
1950-51 - Govt executes landlords 1,000,000 1,000,000 
1950-51 - China vs Tibet 2,000 0 2,000 
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1956-59 - Tibetan revolt 60,000 40,000 100,000 
1967-68 - Cultural Revolution 450,000 50,000 500,000 
1983-84 - Govt executions 5,000 0 5,000 
1989 - Govt kills students 1,000 0 1,000 
1990 - Govt executions 2.000 0 2 000 
4,047,000 [c] 2,701,000 [m] 7,561,000 [t] 
* Brogan's figures (1992: 622-23): civil war to 1949: 2,000,000 [t]; 1969 USSR-China border fighting: 1,000 [t]. 
INDIA  
Years at War '45-'82: 24 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 36* 
* Other estimates: Sullivan (1948: 522) cites an Indian illiteracy rate of 90,5 for the year 1921. *Myrdal's 
(1968: 1674) literacy rates for India, 1901: 11% [Males], 1% [Females]; 1911: 13% [M], 1% [F]; 1921: 14% [M], 
2% [F]; 1931: 15% [M], 2% [F]. 1951: urban pop'n - 55%[M], 25% [F]; rural pop'n - 24%[M], 5% [F]; total 
pop'n - 29% [M], 8%[F]. 1961: urban pop'n - 68%[M], 37% [F]; rural pop'n - 35%[M], 8% [F]; total pop'n - 
41% [M], 19%[F](1968: 1672, reliability of the '61 figures 'very doubtful'). 
Defence Expenditure '75: 3.3 	 Education Expenditure '75: 2.7 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 2 	CR: 3 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 5 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1914-18 - World War I 25,000 	25,000 	50,000 
1918-19 - Amritsar massacre by UK 1,000 0 1,000 
1921-22 - UK intervenes in civil war 11,000 0 11,000 
1936-38 - UK intervenes in civil war 11,000 0 11,000 
1939-45 - World War II 25,000 24,000 49,000 
1946-48 - Muslim vs Hindu; UK intervenes 800,000 0 800,000* 
1947-49 - Muslims, Pak vs Kashmir (Ind.) 1,000 2,000 3,000 
1948 - India vs Hyderabad 1,000 1,000 2,000 
1962 - China vs India at border 1,000 1,000 2,000* 
1965 - Pakistan vs Kashmir (India interv) 13,000 7,000 20,000* 
1971 - Pakistan vs India; border war 11,000 11,000* 
1983-90 - ethnic and political violence 12,000 4 Q00 16,000* 
901,000 [c] 75,000 [m] 976,000 [t] 
* Brogan corroborates figures for 1948 partition, and the wars against Pakistan 1965/71; for the 'India-China 
border war' of 1962, casualties total 4,500, for '1984: Sikh and other insurrections, continuing', the death toll 
is estimated at 25,000 (1992: 622, 623, 624, 625). 
INDONESIA 
Years at War '45-'82: 30 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 62* 
Defence Expenditure '75: 4.2 Education Expenditure '75: 2.2* 
* Other Estimates - 1962 World Ranking (n of countries = 136) in Literacy: 90; Primary School enrolments: 91.5; 
Post-Primary School enrolments: 59 (Coleman, in Coleman, 1965: 437). *Myrdal's (1968: 1672) literacy rates 
for Indonesia, 1961: 57% [Males], 30% [Females]. 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 	CR: 5 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 3.6 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1945-46 - Independence from Neth, UK 4,000 	1,000 	5,000 
1950 - Moluccans vs Govt 5,000 
1953 - Darul Islam vs Govt 1,000 
1958-60 - Dissident Military vs Govt 30,000 
1965-66 - abortive coup; UK intervenes 500,000 500,000* 
1975-82 - annex E. Timor; fam & massacre 100.000 	50.000 150.000 
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604,000 [c] 	51,000 [m] 	691,000 [t] 
*Brogan's figure for '1966, Indonesia: insurrection and repression: 400,000' (1992: 623). 
JAPAN 
Years at War '45-'82: 0* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a* 
Defence Expenditure '75: 0.9 	 Education Expenditure '75: 5.8* 
* Other Estimates - 1962 World Ranking ( n of countries = 136) in Literacy: 17; Primary School enrolments: 34; 
Post-Primary School enrolments: 5 (Coleman, in Coleman, 1965: 437). Earlier, Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a 
Japanese illiteracy rate of 0.9 for the year 1925 (sample of 'conscripts unable to write and figure'). * Keeley's 
figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Japan (1996: 187-88): # of wars 
- 9; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.6; years of war per century - 17.2. 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 2 	CR: 1 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 3.2 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1923 - masacre of Koreans 10,000 	 0 	 10,000 
1938 - USSR vs Japan 2,000 2,000 
1941-45 - World War II 500.000 1.500.000 2,000.000 
510,000 [c] 1,502,000 [m] 2,012,000 [t] 
KOREA [Sthl. 
Years at War '45-'82: 12 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 88 
Defence Expenditure '75: 5.1 Education Expenditure '75: 4.3 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: restricted parlaimentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 	5 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 31 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/totall 
1948- Army vs Govt 	 0 	 1,000 	1,000 
1950-53 - Korean War; China, US intervene 1,500,000 	1,500,000 	3,000,000 
1980- Sth Korean Army killed people 	1.000 	0 	 L000 
1,501,000 [c] 	1,501,000 [m] 	3,002,000 [t] 
LAOS 
Years at War '45-'82: 30 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 28 
Defence Expenditure '75: 7,3 Education Expenditure '75: 2.7 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 	CR: 5 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 25.2 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1960-73 - Pathet Lao vs Govt; US bomb, NV invade 18,000 [c] 	12,000 [m] 	30,000 [t]* 
*Brogan's estimate '1960 Laos: 2nd Indochina war to 1973: 24,000' (1992: 623). 
PAKISTAN  
Years at War '45-'82: 13 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 21* 
*Myrdal's (1968: 1672) literacy rates for Pakistan, 1951: 21% [Males], 6% [Females]; 1961: 29% [M], 8% [F], 
33% urban pop'n/15°/0 rural pop'n. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 6.3 	 Education Expenditure '75: 2.3 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 3 	CR: 5 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 14.1 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
1973-77 - Baluchis vs Govt; Afghan interv 6,000 [c] 	3,000 [m] 	9,000 [t] 
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PHILIPPINES 
Years at War '45-'82: 26 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 83* 
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.3 Education Expenditure '75: 1.6 
* Other Estimates - 1962 World Ranking (n of countries = 136) in Literacy: 49; Primary School enrolments: 
37.5; Post-Primary School enrolments: 16 (Coleman, in Coleman, 1965: 437).* Myrdal's (1968: 1674) literacy 
rates for the Phillipines, 1903: 30% [Males], 11% [Females]; 1918: 53% [M], 45% [F]; 1939: 54% [M], 41% [F]; 
1948: 64% [M], 56% [F]. 1960: 74%[M], 70% [F] (1968: 1672). 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: restricted parliamentry 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 	CR: 5 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 5.3 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
1941-45 - World War II 	 91,000 	27,000 	118,000 
1950-52 - Huks vs Govt 5,000 4,000 9,000 
1972-89 - Muslims and Comm vs Govt; US interv 	40.000 	35.000 	75.000* 
136,000 [c] 	66,000 [m] 	202,000 [t] 
*Brogan's estimate for '1974: Phillipines: Muslim insurrection, continuing: 60,000' (1992: 624). 
MALAYSIA 
Years at War '45-'82: 22 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 59 
Defence Expenditure '75: 5.5 Education Expenditure '75: 6.2 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 3 	CR: 3 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 11.9 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1950-60 - UK intervened in civil war 	 13,000 [t]* 
* corroborated by Brogan (1992: 622) 
THAILAND  
Years at War '45-'82: 14* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 79* 
* Other Estimates - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
Thailand (Siam) (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 2; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.3; years of war per century - 4.1. 
*Myrdal's (1968: 1672) literacy rates for Thailand, 1947: 69% [Male], 36% [Female]; 1960: 79% [M], 56%[F]. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.6 Education Expenditure '75: 3.5 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 	CR: 3 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 10.5 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1940-41 - France vs Thailand 	2,000 [c] 	2,000 [m] 	4,000 [t] 
VIET NAM 
Years at War '45-'82: 34 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a* 
*Other estimate - Myrdal's (1968: 1672) literacy rates for South Viet Nam, 1962: 80% [M], 40% [F]. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 22.6 (Nth)/12.6 (Sth) Education Expenditure '75: n/ a 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party (as of mid-1982) 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 (Nth)/4 (Sth) CR: 7 (Nth)/5 (Sth) 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: n/a 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1945-54 - Independ. vs France; China, US interv 300,000 300,000 600,000 
1960-65 - US intervene in civil war 200,000 100,000 300,000* 
1966-75 - US and Sth VN vs Nth VN 1,000,000 1,058,000 2,058,000* 
1979 - China vs Viet Nam 9,000 26,000 35,000* 
1987- China vs Viet Nam, border conflict 0 1.000 1 000 
1,509,000 [c] 1,485,000 [m] 2,994,000 [t] 
* Brogan's figures for Viet Nam: 1st Indochina war, to 1954: 6000,000; 2nd Indochina war, (1960) to 1975: 
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2,000,000; 1979: China & Viet Nam, Chinese invasion - 20,000. Additional commentary by Brogan on casualty 
rates: '[Mostly, there] are very few cases. ..where an accurate running total can be kept. In others, a precise 
figure for one side may be added to a rough approximation for the other: for example, the 58,186 Americans 
killed in Indochina added to the estimate of Vietnamese deaths (2,000,000) gives the spuriously accurate figure 
of 2,058,516' (1992: 621). 
ASIA: Casualty Total Area-Wide: 10,082,000[c] 	7,780,000[m] 	18,637,000[t] 
IV. AUSTRALASIA/PACIFIC [Oceaniai 
AUSTRALIA 
Years at War '45-'82: 7 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a 
Defence Expenditure '75: 3.2 	 Education Expenditure '75: 9.3 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 	CR: 1 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 8 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total  
1914-18 - World War I 
1939-45 - Word War II 
0 	60,000 	60,000 
0 34.000 34.000 
0 [c] 	94,000 [m] 	94,000 [t] 
FIJI  
Years at War '45-'82: 0 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a 
Defence Expenditure '75: 0.2 	 Education Expenditure '75: 4.4 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 2 	CR: 2 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 0 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA  
Years at War '45-'82: 1 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 32 
Defence Expenditure '75: n/a 	 Education Expenditure '75: n/a 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: - 	CR: - 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: n/a 
NEW ZEALAND 
Years at War '45-'82: 4 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.8 	 Education Expenditure '75: 5.7 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 	CR: 1 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 7 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1914-18 - World War I 
1939-45 - World War II 
0 	 16,000 	16,000 
0 17.000 17.000 
0 [c] 	 33,000 [m] 	33,000 [t] 
AUSTRALASIA/PACIFIC (Ocania): Casualty Total Area-Wide: 0 [c] 127,000[m] 	127,000 [t] 
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V. EUROPE 
AUSTRIA 
Years at War '45-'82: 0* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a* 
* Other Estimates - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
Austria (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 12; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 2.1; years of war per century - 16.9. 
*Cipolla's (1969: 14, 113-20) literacy figures for Cl9th Austria: general population 1851, 40-45% illiterate; 
1890, pop'n totally illiterate aged 10 and over (Austrian Empire excluding the Kingdom of Hungary) 27% 
[Male] 30% [Female] 29%total/pop'n who could read but not write, 4% [M] 7% [F] 5%total. 1890 illiteracy 
rates among males 21-30: 26%, among recruits 21-30: 22%. 
Austrian Empire - Illiterates among army recruits (%age): 
1867 66 1868 57 1869 55 1870 49 1871 54 1872 49 
1873 43 1874 41 1875 42 1876 42 1877 44 1878 42 
1879 40 1880 39 1881 39 1885 30 1888 25 1890 22 
1894 22. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1* 	 Education Expenditure '75: 5.9 
*Other estimate - Austrian military expenditure as a percentage of state budget (Tilly, 1992: 124): 
1925: 7.7; 1975: 4.9. 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 	CR: 1 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 10.8* 
*Other estimate - Austrian military personnel as a percentage of the male population aged 20-44, 1850-1970 
(Tilly, 1992: 123): 1850: 14.5; 1875: 8.4; 1900: 6.9; 1925: 2.5; 1970: 4.2. 
Major Conflicts 	 Es im ed Number of Deat civilian militar total 
1914-18 - World War I (incl. Hungary) 
1934 - Socialist vs Fascist Govt 
1939-45 - World War II 
300,000 
1,000 
125.000  
426,000 [c] 
2,300,000 	2,600,000 
1,000 
	
2,000 
280,000 405.000 
2,581,000 [m] 	3,007,000[t] 
BALKANS (formerYUGOSLAVIA)  
Years at War '45-'82: 5 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 85 
Defence Expenditure '75: 4.5 	 Education Expenditure '75: 4.9 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 19.3 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1913 - 2nd Balkan war vs Bulgaria 	 61,000 	61,000 
1914-18 - World War I 	 650,000 	128,000 778,000 
1941-45 - World War II 1.000.000 	400.000 	1.400.000 
1,650,000 [c] 	589,000 [m] 	2,239,000 [t] 
* Brogan's figures for '1991 Yugoslavia: civil war, continuing - 10,000 (in 1991)' (1992: 625). 
BELGIUM 
Years at War '45-'82: 6* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a* 
* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Belgian illiteracy rate of 7.9 for the year 1920. * Keeley's 
figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Belgium (1996: 187-88): # of 
wars - 5; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.9; years of war per century - 15.9 ('includes Napoleonic wars as part 
of Netherlands'). *Cipolla's (1969: 113-20) literacy figures for Cl9th Belgium: general population 1856, 45- 
50% illiterate. 1880 illiteracy rates among males 21-30: 20%, among recruits 21-30: 22%. 
Belgium - Illiterates among army recruits (%age; data refers not to the young men actually enlisted but to all 
young men eligible for military service [ felines gens appeles an tirage an sort pour le service militaire]): 
1843 51 1850 44 1860 39 1870 29 1871 28 1872 27 
1873 26 1874 25 1875 23 1876 23 1877 24 1878 23 
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1879 23 1 880 22 1881 19 1882 19 1883 18 1884 19 
1885 18 1 886 17 1887 17 1888 16 1889 16 1890 16 
1 891 16 1 892 15 1893 15 1894 14 1895 14 1896 13 
1 897 13 1 898 13 1899 13 1900 12. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 3 Education Expenditure '75: 7.5 
Political Regime [mid- '821: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 	CR: 1 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 14 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/totall 
1914-18 - World War I 
1940-40 - World War II 
	
30,000 	88,000 	118,000 
90.000 110.000 200,000 
      
120,000 [c] 
	
198,000 [m] 	318,000 [t] 
CYPRUS  
Years at War '45-'82: 9 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 76 
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.8 	 Education Expenditure '75: 3.9 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: restricted parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 4 	CR: 4 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 48 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/ total)*  
1974 - National Guard; Turk. invasion 	3,000 [c] 	2,000 [m] 	5,000 [t] 
* Brogan's figures for '1955 Cyprus: colonial war, to 1960: 359'; 1974 figure of 5,000 casualties corroborated 
(1992: 622, 624). 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  
Years at War '45-'82: 4 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a* 
* Other Estimate - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Czech illiteracy rate of 7.0 for the year 1921. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 5.9 	 Education Expenditure '75: 3.3 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 7 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 22 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/totall 
1939-45 - World War II 	250,000 [c] 	30,000 [m] 	280,000 [t] 
FINLAND  
Years at War '45-'82: 0 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a* 
Other Estimate - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Finnish illiteracy rate of 30.1 for the year 1921. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.5 	 Education Expenditure '75: 6.7 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 2 	CR: 2 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 12.8 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/totall 
1918- Communists vs Govt 	 20,000 [t] 
1939-40 - USSR vs Finland 90,000 [m] 	90,000 [t] 
1941-44 - World War II 	15,000 [c] 	45,000 [m] 	60,000 [t] 
FRANCE  
Years at War '45-'82: 38* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a* 
* Other Estimates - * Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
France (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 29; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 5.0; years of war per century - 32.8. 
Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a French illiteracy rate of 8.2 for the year 1921. *Cipolla's (1969: 14, 77, 113-20) 
literacy figures for Cl9th France: general population 1851, 40-45% illiterate; 1872, pop'n totally illiterate 
aged 6 and over 27% [Male] 34% [Female] 31°/ototal/pop'n who could read but not write, 9% [M] 13% [F] 
11`)/ototal; c/f French recruits 1881-1900 totally illiterate 8%, those who could read but not write 2%. 
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'Illiteracy among the French adult population (10 years of age and above) by economic activity in 1901: 
Fishing - 28%; Agriculture - 21%; Industry - 11%; Domestic Service - 9%; Army - 4%; Civil Servants _ 30k; 
Liberal Professions - 1%'. 
France - Illiterates among army recruits (%age): 
1832 
1838 
1844 
1850 
1856 
1862 
1868 
1877 
1883 
1889 
1895 
1913 
53 
46 
43 
39 
36 
31 
22 
17 
15 
11 
7 
4. 
1833 
1839 
1845 
1851 
1857 
1863 
1872 
1878 
1884 
1890 
1896 
52 
47 
43 
39 
35 
30 
21 
15 
14 
10 
7 
1834 
1840 
1846 
1852 
1858 
1864 
1873 
1879 
1885 
1891 
1897 
5 1 
4 7 
4 2 
3 8 
3 4 
2 8 
2 0 
1 8 
1 4 
9 
6 
1835 
1841 
1847 
1853 
1859 
1865 
1874 
1880 
1886 
1892 
1898 
50 
46 
41 
38 
33 
27 
19 
17 
13 
9 
6 
1836 
1842 
1848 
1854 
1860 
1866 
1875 
1881 
1887 
1893 
1899 
49 
45 
40 
37 
33 
26 
18 
16 
12 
8 
6 
1837 
1843 
1849 
1855 
1861 
1867 
1876 
1882 
1888 
1894 
1900 
50 
44 
40 
36 
32 
24 
18 
15 
12 
7 
6 
Defence Expenditure '75: 4* 	 Education Expenditure '75: 4.9 
*Other estimate - French military expenditure as a percentage of state budget (Tilly, 1992: 124): 
1850: 27.4; 1875: 23.2; 1900: 37.7; 1925: 27.8; 1950: 20.7;1975: 17.9. 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 	CR: 2 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 17.2* 
*Other estimate - French military personnel as a percentage of the male population aged 20-44, 1850-1970 
(Tilly, 1992: 123): 1850: 6.5; 1875: 7.4; 1900: 8.8; 1925: 6.7; 1950: 8.4; 1970: 5.8. France: Thousands of troops 
under arms/Troops as percent of national population, 1500-1980 (Tilly, 1992: 79) - 
1500: 18,000 [0.3]; 1600: 80,000 [0.4]; 1700: 400,000 [2.1]; 1850: 439,000 [1.2]; 1980: 495,000 [0.9]. 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
1914-18 - World War I 40,000 1,630,000 1,670,000 
1939-45 - World War II (Allied '39-40, '44-45 450,000 200.000 650.000 
490,000 [c] 1,830,000 [m] 2,320,000 [t] 
GERMANY (incorporates as indicated Federal Republic of Germany; German Democratic Republic).  
Years at War '45-'82: FRG 0, GDR 1* 	Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a* 
* Other Estimates - * Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
Germany/Prussia (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 10; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.7; years of war per century - 
19.3. *Cipolla's (1969: 113-20) figures for 'German Empire Cl9th - Illiterates among army recruits (%ages)': 
1875 	2 1876 2 1877 2 1878 2 1879 2 1880 2 
1881 	2 1882 2 1883 1 1884 1 1885 1 1886 1 
1887 	1 1888 1 1889 1 1890 1. 
*Corresponding figures for 'Prussia Cl9th - Illiterates among army recruits (%ages)': 
1841 	9 1851 5 1865 6 1867 4 1868 4 1869 4 
1870 	3 1871 2 1872 3 1873 5 1874 4 1875 3 
1876 	3 1877 3 1878 2 1879 3 1880 2 1881 2 
1882 	2 1883 2 1884 2 1885 2 1886 2 1887 1 
1888 	1 1889 1 1890 1 1891 1 1892 1 1893 1. 
Defence Expenditure '75: FRG 3.6, GDR 6.4* 	Education Expenditure '75: FRG 5, GDR 4.7 
*Other estimate - "German" military expenditure as a percentage of state budget (Tilly, 1992: 124): 
1875: 34.0; 1900: 22.9; 1925: 4.0; 1950: 13.5; 1975: 6.4. 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: FRG multi-party parliamentary, GDR one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: FRG 1, GDR 7 CR: FRG 1, GDR 7 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: FRG 12.6, GDR 21* 
*Other estimate - "German" military personnel as a percentage of the male population aged 20-44, 1850-1970 
(Tilly, 1992: 123): 1850: 4.7; 1875: 5.9; 1900: 6.3; 1925: 1.0; 1970: 4.5. 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
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1914-18 - World War I 760,000 2,400,000 3,160,000 
1939-45 - World War II 1.471.000 4.750.000 6.221.000 
2,231,000 [c] 7,150,000 [m] 9,381,000 [t] 
GREECE  
Years at War '45-'82: 10* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 84 
*Other Estimate - Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
Greece (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 9; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.6; years of war per century - 16.2. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 6.3 	 Education Expenditure '75: 1.5 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 2 	CR: 2 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 33.4 
Major Conflicts Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1917-18 - World War I 132,000 	5,000 	137,000 
1940-41 - World War II 54,000 10,000 64,000 
1945-49 - civil war; UK intervenes = z 160.000* 
186,000 [c] 15,000 [m] 361,000 [t] 
* corroborated by Brogan (1992: 622) 
HUNGARY  
Years at War '45-'82: 3 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a 
* Other Estimate - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Hungarian illiteracy rate of 15.2 for the year 1920. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 5.6 	 Education Expenditure '75: 3.2 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 16.7 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total). 
1919- Czech and Rumania vs Hungary 	 11,000 	11,000 
1919-20 - Anti-communist vs Govt 	 11,000 
1941-45 - World War II 	 450,000 	400,000 	850,000 
1956 - USSR intervenes in civil war 	10.000 10.000 20 . 000* 
460,000 [c] 	421,000 [m] 	892,000 [t] 
*Brogan's (1992: 623) figure for '1956 Hungary: insurrection - 10,000'. 
ITALY 
Years at War '45-'82: 7* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 98* 
* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites an Italian illiteracy rate of 28.% for the year 1921 ('figures for 
Tuscany only, which may be deemed fairly representative of Italy as a whole'). * Keeley's figures on 
'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Italy (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 13; wars 
per generation (25 yrs) - 2.2; years of war per century - 19.3 ('includes wars fought by Sardinia, Naples and 
Venice'). *Cipolla's (1969: 113-20) literacy figures for Cl9th Italy: general population c. 1850, 75-80% 
illiterate; 1881, pop'n totally illiterate aged 6 and over 55% [Male] 69% [Female] 62%total/pop'n who could 
read but not write, 1% [M] 3% [F] 2%total. 1871 illiteracy rates among males 21-30: 57%, among recruits 21- 
30: 57%. 
Italy - Illiterates among army recruits (%ages): 
1870 59 1871 57 1872 57 1873 54 1874 53 1875 52 
1876 52 1877 51 1878 50 1879 49 1880 49 1881 48 
1882 47 1883 48 1884 47 1885 46 1886 44 1887 45 
1888 43 1889 42 1890 41 1891 40 1892 40 1893 40 
1894 39 1895 38 1896 37 1897 37 1898 36 1899 34 
1900 33 1913 10. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 2.8 Education Expenditure '75: 5.2 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 	CR: 2 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 14.1 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
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1915-18 - World War I 	 0 	 950,000 	950,000 
1940-45 - World War II (Allied 1943-45) 	70.000 150.000 220.000 
70,000 [c] 1,100,000 [m] 1,170,000 [t] 
NETHERLANDS 
Years at War '45-'82: 8* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a* 
* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites an illiteracy rate for the Netherlands of 0.3% for the year 1918. 
*Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for the Netherlands 
(1996: 187-88): # of wars - 4; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.7; years of war per century - 13.4. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 3•5* 	 Education Expenditure '75: 7.7 
*Other estimate - Netherlands military expenditure as a percentage of state budget (Tilly, 1992: 124): 
1900: 26.4; 1925: 15.1; 1950: 18.3;1975: 11.3. 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 	CR: 1 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 13* 
*Other estimate - Netherlands military personnel as a percentage of the male population aged 20-44, 1850-1970 
(Tilly, 1992: 123): 1850: 5.4; 1875: 6.4; 1900: 3.6; 1925: 1.2; 1950: 12.7; 1970: 5.3. Netherlands: Thousands of 
troops under arms/Troops as percent of national population, 1500-1980 (Tilly, 1992: 79) - 
1600: 20,000 [1.3]; 1700: 100,000 [5.3]; 1850: 30,000 [1.0]; 1980: 115,000 [0.8]. 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
1940-45 - World War II 	200,000 [c] 	6,000 [m] 	206,000 [t] 
NORWAY  
Years at War '45-'82: 0 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a 
Defence Expenditure '75: 3•3* 	 Education Expenditure '75: 7.7 
*Tilly's estimate (1993: 121): 'State expenditure as a %age of GDP in Norway, 1875-1975' - 1875: 1.1; 1900: 
1.6; 1925: 0.9; 1950: 3.3; 1975: 3.2. 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 	CR: 1 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 14 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
1940 - World War II 	 7,000 [c] 	2,000 [m] 	9,000 [t] 
POLAND 
Years at War '45-'82: 5 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 98* 
* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Polish illiteracy rate of 32.8% for the year 1921. * Keeley's 
figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Poland (1996: 187-88): # of 
wars - 6; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.0; years of war per century - 16.5 ('includes wars fought as an 
independent nation and insurrections'). 
Defence Expenditure '75: 6 	 Education Expenditure '75: 3.8 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 19.2 
Major Conflicts Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1914-18 - World War I 500,000 	 500,000 
1919-20 - USSR vs Poland; France interv. 100,000 100,000 
1939-45 - World War II 6.000.000 600,000 6.600.000 
6,500,000 [c] 700,000 [m] 7,200,000 [t] 
PORTUGAL 
Years at War '45-'82: 15* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 71 
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* Other Estimate - * Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for 
Portugal (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 6; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 1.0; years of war per century - 20.7. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 7.6 	 Education Expenditure '75:2.3 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 	CR: 3 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 39.7 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
1916-18 - World War I 	0 [c] 	 13,000 [m] 	 13,000 [t] 
ROMANIA 
Years at War '45-'82: 1 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 98* 
*Other estimate - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Rumanian illiteracy rate of 45.0% for 1920. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 4.8 	 Education Expenditure '75: 2.3 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 7 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 15.9 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
1916-17 - World War I 	 275,000 	375,000 	650,000 
1941-45 - World War II (Allied 1944-45) 300,000 340,000 640,000 
1989- Govt vs demonstrtaors 	 1.000 	0 	 1.000* 
576,000 [c] 	715,000 [m] 	1,291,000 [t] 
* Brogan, speaking of casualty figures in 'the Romanian revolution in 1989. In the course of the fighting, a 
figure of 4700 people killed in a massacre in Timisoara was broadcast around the world, and the number of 
those killed during the revolution was reported to be 10,000. A few days later, the new government put it at 
60,000. It turned out that the real total was 689, including 90 in Timisoara' (1992: 622) 
RUSSIA/USSR 
Years at War '45-'82: 19* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 100* 
*Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a USSR illiteracy rate of 43.3% for the year 1926. *1962 World 
Ranking (n of countries = 136) in Literacy: 25; Primary School enrolments: 20; Post-Primary School enrolments: 
11 (Coleman, in Coleman, 1965: 437). *Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 
1800-1945' for Russia/USSR (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 21; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 3.6; years of war 
per century - 49.3. *Cipolla's (1969: 113-20) literacy figures for Cl9th Russian Empire: general population c. 
1850, 90-95% illiterate; 1890 illiteracy rates among males 21-30: 55%, among recruits 21-30: 68%. 
Russian Empire - Illiterates among army recruits (%ages): 
1874 79 1875 79 1876 78 1877 79 1878 79 1879 79 
1880 78 1881 77 1882 76 1883 75 1884 74 1885 73 
1886 72 1887 71 1888 70 1889 69 1890 68 1891 68 
1892 65 1893 64 1894 62 1895 61 1896 60 1897 58 
1898 55 1899 53 1900 51 1913 32. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 13.7 Education Expenditure '75: 4.6 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: one-party 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 6 	CR: 6 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 27.7* 
*Other estimate - Russia: Thousands of troops under arms/Troops as percent of national population, 1500- 
1980 (Tilly, 1992: 79) - 1600: 35,000 [0.3]; 1700: 170,000 [1.2]; 1850: 850,000 [1.5]; 1980: 3,663,000 [1.4]. 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths(civilian/military/ total)  
1904-05 - Japan vs Russia 	 130,000 	130,000 
1905 - Pogrom, Russians vs Jews 	2,000 	0 	 2,000 
1905-6 - peasants & workers vs govt 	1,000 0 1,000 
1914-17 - World War I 	 3,000,000 	2,950,000 	5,950,000 
1917 - Kirghiz massacre Russians 	 9,000 
1917 - Bourgeois Rev'n vs Czar 1,000 	1,000 	2,000 
1918-20 - civil war; US, UK, Fr, Japan interv.500,000 	300,000 800,000 
APPENDIX H:  275. 
1939 - Japan vs USSR 
	
0 
	
13,000 
	13,000 
1941-45 - World War II 8,500,000 
	
8,500,000 17,000,000 
1969 - China attacks USSR border 	 1.000 
	
L000 
12,003,000 [c] 
	
11,895,000 [m] 
	
23,908,000 [t] 
SPAIN  
Years at War '45-'82: 3* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 90* 
* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Spanish illiteracy rate of 42.9% for the year 1920. *Keeley's 
figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Spain (1996: 187-88): # of wars 
- 16; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 2.8; years of war per century - 42.4. *Cipolla's (1969: 113-20) literacy 
figures for Cl9th Spain: general population 1857, 75% illiterate; 1877, total pop'n totally illiterate 63% 
[Male] 81% [Female] 72%total/pop'n who could read but not write, 3% [M] 4% [F] 3%total. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 3 	 Education Expenditure '75: 1.6 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 5 	CR: 5 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 17* 
*Other estimate - Spain: Thousands of troops under arms/Troops as percent of national population, 1500- 
1980 (Tilly, 1992: 79) - 1500: 20,000 [0.3]; 1600: 200,000 [2.5]; 1700: 50,000 [0.7]; 1850: 154,000 [1.0]; 1980: 
342,000 [0.9]. 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)  
1934 - Asturian miners vs Govt 	3,000 	 3,000 
1936-39 - civil war; USSR, Germany interv. 600.000 600.000 	1.200.000 
603,000 [c] 
	
600,000 [m] 	1, 203,000 [t] 
SWEDEN 
Years at War '45-'82: 0* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a* 
* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Swedish illiteracy rate of 0.2% for the years 1921-22 (data 
drawn from the population 'liable to military service, unable to read and write'). * Keeley's figures on 
'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Sweden (1996: 187-88): # of wars - 2; 
wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.3; years of war per century - 4.5 ). *Cipolla's (1969: 113-20) literacy figures 
for Cl9th Sweden: general population 1850, 10% illiterate. 
Sweden - Illiterates among army recruits (%ages): 
1874 2 	1875 	1 	1876 	1 	1877 	1 	1879 	1 	1880 	1. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 3.2 Education Expenditure '75: 7.2 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 	CR: 1 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 14.1* 
*Other estimate - Sweden: Thousands of troops under arms/Troops as percent of national population, 1500- 
1980 (Tilly, 1992: 79) - 1600: 15,000 [1.5]; 1700: 100,000 [7.1]; 1850: 63,000 [1.8]; 1980: 66,000 [0.8]. 
SWITZERLAND 
Years at War '45-'82: 0* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a* 
* Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites a Swiss illiteracy rate of 0.4.% for the years 1906-10. *Keeley's 
figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Switzerland (1996: 187-88): # 
of wars - 0; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 0.0; years of war per century - 0.0. (*Cipolla's (1969: 113-20) 
literacy figures for Cl9th Switzerland: 1891-1900, pop'n of recruits totally illiterate 0%/ who could read but 
not write, 1%. 
Switzerland - Illiterates among army recruits (%ages): 
1879 6 1880 7 1881 8 1882 7 1883 6 1884 5 
1885 4 1886 4 1887 4 1888 3 1889 2 1890 3 
1891 2 1892 2 1893 2 1894 2 1895 1 1896 1 
1897 1 1898 1 1899 1 1900 1. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.9 	 Education Expenditure '75: 4.9 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
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Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR:1 	CR: 1 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 5.8 
TURKEY  
Years at War '45-'82: 12 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 60 
Defence Expenditure '75: 4.5 Education Expenditure '75: n/a 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: military 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 2 	CR: 3 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 21.1 
Major Conflicts Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1911-12 - Italy vs Turkey 20,000 	20,000 
1912-13 - First Balkan War 82,000 82,000 
1914-18 - World War I 1,000,000 450,000 1,450,000 
1915-16 - Armenians deported 1,000,000 1,000,000 
1919-20 - France vs Turkey 40,000 
1919-22 - Greece vs Turkey 50,000 50,000 100,000 
1977-80 - terrorism; military coup 1980 = 5.000* 
2,050,000 [c] 602,000 [m] 2,597,000 [t] 
* corroborated by Brogan (1992: 624) 
EUROPE: Casualty Total Area-Wide: 27,840,000[c] 28,584,000[m] 	57,150,000[t] 
VI. UNITED KINGDOM/EIRE 
ENGLAND  
Years at War '45-'82: 37* 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): n/a* 
*Other Estimates - Sullivan (1948: 522) cites an illiteracy rate for England and Wales of 0.3% for the year 
1924. *Keeley's figures on 'Frequency & Duration of Warfare X Nation-States, 1800-1945' for Great Britain 
(1996: 187-88): # of wars - 34; wars per generation (25 yrs) - 5.9; years of war per century - 48.3. 
Defence Expenditure '75: 5* 	 Education Expenditure '75: 6.7 
*Other estimate - UK military expenditure as a percentage of state budget (Tilly, 1992: 124): 1900: 74.2; 1925: 
19.1; 1950: 24.0; 1975: 14.. 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 13* 
*Other estimate - UK military personnel as a percentage of the male population aged 20-44, 1850-1970 (Tilly, 
1992: 123): 1850: 4.3; 1875: 4.5; 1900: 6.6; 1925: 4.3; 1950: 7.6; 1970: 4.2. England/Wales: Thousands of troops 
under arms/Troops as percent of national population, 1500-1980 (Tilly, 1992: 79) - 1500: 25,000 [1.0]; 1600: 
30,000 [0.7]; 1700: 292,000 [5.4]; 1850: 201,000 [1.1]; 1980: 329,000 [0.6]. 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 	CR: 1 
Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 9.8 
Major Conflicts 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total) 
1914-18 - World War I 	31,000 	1,000,000 	1,031,000 
1939-45 - World War II 100.000 350.000 450.000 
131,000 [c] 	1,350,000 [m] 	1,481,000 [t] 
IRELAND  
Years at War '45-'82: 0 	 Literacy Rates ('75 %age): 98 
Defence Expenditure '75: 1.4 	 Education Expenditure '75: 6 
Political Regime [mid- '82]: multi-party parliamentary 
Gastil's (1975) index of Political and Civil Rights - PR: 1 	CR: 2 
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Military Manpower [per 1000 working age popn] '75: 6 
Major Conflicts* 	 Estimated Number of Deaths (civilian/military/total)*  
*Brogan's figure for '1969 Northern Ireland - IRA terrorism, continuing: 3,000 casualties' (1992: 623). 
UNITED KINGDOM/EIRE: Casualty Total Area-Wide: 131,000 [c] 1,350,000 [m] 	1,484,000 [t] 
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SAMPLES SPREADSHEET KEY: 
A=country (82/82): 
Afr/Mid-East=26; Nth/Sth Am=15; Asia=13; Aust/Pac (Oceania)=4; Eur=22; UK/Eire=2. 
B=Y[ears at]W[arl '45-'82 (82/82: c=# of cases): 7c<30; 8c=20-29; 21c=10-19; 36c>10; 10c=0. 
(maximum= 38; minimum4 mean=11.2; median=9; mode=0). 
SOURCES: (a) Primary: Kidron & Smith, 1983 (b) Secondary: Shaw, 1991; Brogan, 1992; Keeley, 1996. 
C=Literacy Rates '75 (61/82 - not recorded: AUSL; AUST; BLGM; CNDA; CZCH; FRG; FIJI; FNLD; 
FRNC; GDR; HNGR; WAN; LBNN; NRWY; NTHL; NZLD; SWDN; SWTZ; UK; USA; VNIVI; c=# of 
cases): 
1c=100; 7c=90-9; 9c=80-9; 6c=70-9; 6c=60-9; 7c=50-9; 4c=40-9; 9c=30-9; 6c=20-9; 5c=10-9; lc>10. 
(mwdmum=100; minimum=9; mean=58.5; median=59; mode-88). 
GENERATIVE DEFINITION:  'Literacy is the ability both to read and write. Hence, persons who can 
read but cannot write are ordinarily called illiterate. For the most part, data refer to the percentage of 
the population aged 15 and older...' 
SOURCES: (a) Primary: UNESCO Statistics of Education Attainment and Illiteracy [1945-74] and Statistical 
Yearbook [1977] (Paris, 1978); World Bank Development Report [1978] (Washington, 1979). aL 
Secondary/Supplementary: Sullivan, 1948; Coleman, 1965; Myrdal, 1968; Cipolla, 1969. 
D=Defence Expenditure '75 [%age GNP] (80/82 - not recorded: PPNG; VNM: c.# of cases): 
lc<30; lc<16; lc<15; 2c<13; 3c<11; 2c<7; 7c<6; 6c<5; 11c<4; 12c<3; 15c<2; 15c<1; 4c=0.1-0.9. 
(maximum-31.7; rninimum=0.2; mean=4.3; median=3.3; mode=2.5). 
GENERATIVE DEFINITION: 'For NATO countries, military expenditures are defined as current and 
capital expenditures to meet the needs of the armed forces. They cover all expenditures of national 
defence agencies other than for largely civilian purposes, as well as the distinguishable military 
component of such mixed activities as atomic energy, space, research & development, and paramilitary 
forces. Where possible, military assistance for foreign countries, retirement pensions of career 
personnel and military equipment stockpiling are included, while civil defence, civilian space and 
industrial stockpiling are excluded. For other non-communist countries, data are essentially 
expenditures for the ministries of defence. For the Soviet Union, estimates are made on what it would 
cost the United States to create a similar manpower and weapons force. For eastern Europe, data refer 
to officially announced state budget expenditures. For China, the estimates are less exact...Police 
expenditures are included for Mali [and] Nicaragua...' 
SOURCES: United States Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 
[1966-75] (Washington, 1976); World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers [1967-76] (Washington, 1978); 
Tilly, 1992. 
E=Education Expenditure '75 [%age GNP] (75/82 - not recorded: CHNA; KMPC; PPNG; TRKY; 
UGND; VNM; ZAIR; c.# of cases): 
lc<11; 1c<9; 5c<7; 9c<6; 12c<5; 12c<4; 12c<3; 14c<2; 7c<1; 1c=0.1-0.9. 
(maximum=11.2; minimum=0.3; mean=5.2; median=4.1; mode=23). 
GENERATIVE DEFINITION: 'These data refer to public expenditure on current and capital accounts 
for the four levels of education (pre-school, primary, secondary and higher levels). Wherever possible 
expenditures of all levels of government are included. Frequently, however, data refer only to 
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expenditures of the Ministry of Education or the central government. Note: Some or all of the public 
expenditures on private education are included for Argentina, ...Chad, Chile, Cyprus, ...Finland, India, 
Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, South Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, ...Sudan, Sweden, 
Switzerland,...[& the] United States. For Cyprus, the datum refers to the Office of Greek Education 
only. For France, Lebanon and the Phillipines, data refer to university expenditures only. For 
Madagascar and Nigeria, data refer to foreign aid only'. 
SOURCE: United States Arms Control SZ Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 
[1967-76] (Washington, 1978). 
F=Military Manpower '75 [per 1000 working -age pop'n] (80/82 - not recorded: PPNG; VNM: c=# 
of cases): lc<90; lc<60; lc<45; lc<35; 2c<30; 3c<25; 5c<20; 10c<15; 17c<10; 21c<5; 17c<1; 1c=0. 
(maximum=93.4; minimum=0; mean=12.9; median=11.7; mode=14.1). 
GENERATIVE DEFINITION:  'Armed Forces refer to military personnel actively on duty, including 
paramilitary forces where significant and where they resemble regular units in their organization, 
equipment, training or mission. Reserve force are not included. The denominator is defined as the 
population between the ages of 15 and 64 exclusively'. 
SOURCES: United States Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 
[1966-75] (Washington, 1976); World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers [1967-76] (Washington, 1978); 
ILO (International Labour Office) data tape used in the preparation of labour force estimates and projections 
1950-2000 (Geneva, 1977); United Nations Statistical Office Demographic Yearbook (1971; 1974; 1975; 1976); Tilly, 
1992. 
G=Political Regime mid-'82 r=coding]:(82/82: c=# of cases) 
*Military = 0 
*Multi-Party Parliamentary = I 
*Restricted Parliamentary = 2 
*One Party = 3 
*Non-Military Despotic = 4 
SOURCE: Kidron & Smith, 1983. 
20/82:1c<30yw; lc 20-29yw; 6c 10-19yw; 12c>10yw; lc Oyw. 
29/82: 2c<30yw; 3c 20-29yw; 4c 10-19yw; 11c>10yw; 9c Oyw. 
8/82: lc<30yw; lc 20-29yw; 3c 10-19yw; 3c>10yw; Oc Oyw. 
22/82: 3c<30yw; 2c 20-29yw; 6c 10-19yw; 11c>10yw; Oc Oyw 
3/82: Oc<30yw; Oc 20-29yw; 3c 10-19yw; Oc>10yw; Oc Oyw. 
H=Political Rights [Gastil Index 1975] (80/82 - not recorded: PPNG; VNM: c=# of cases): 
15c=7; 20c=6; 14c=5; 4c=4; 2c=3; 9c=2; 16c=1. 
(maximum=7; minimum=1; mean=6 [5.62]; median=5; mode=6). 
GENERATIVE DEFINITION: 'Political rights involve the right to play a part in determining who will 
govern one's country and what the laws will be. Countries are ranked from 1 to 7, ie from highest 
degree of liberty to lowest, as follows: 1. Refers to a political system in which the great majority of 
persons or families has both the right and the opportunity to participate in the electoral process. 
Political parties may be freely formed for the purpose of making fairly general the right to compete for 
public office; 2. Refers to a country with an open political process which does not always work well 
due to extreme poverty, a feudal social structure, violence or limitations on potential participants or 
results. As in countries coded "1", however, a leader or party can be voted out of office; 3. Refers to a 
political system in which the people may elect their leaders or representatives, but in which coups, 
large-scale interference with election results and other non-democratic procedures occur; 4. Refers to a 
country in which full democratic elections are blocked constitutionally or have little significance in 
determining power distribution; 5. Refers to a country in which elections are either closely controlled 
or limited or the results have little significance; 6. Refers to a political system without elections or with 
elections involving only a single list of candidates in which voting is largely a matter of demonstrating 
support for the system. Nevertheless, there is some distribution of power; 7. Refers to tyrannies without 
legitimacy either in tradition or in international party doctrine'. 
SOURCE: Gastil RD (1975) 'Comparative Survey of Freedom V', in Freedom at Issue, XXIX, 3-9. 
APPENDIX I: 282. 
I=Civil Rights [Gastil Index 19751 (80/82 - not recorded: PPNG; YNM: c=# of cases): 
8c=7; 17c=6; 14c=5; 10c=4; 10c=3; 7c=2; 14c=1. 
(maximum=7; minimum=1; mean-4 [3.91]; median=4; mode=6). 
GENERATIVE DEFINITION: 'Civil rights are defined as the rights of the individual vis-a-vis the 
state. Particularly important are the freedom of the press and the other mass media and the 
independence of the judiciary. Countries are ranked from 1 to 7, ie from those with the greatest amount 
of civil rights to those with the least: 1. Refers to a country in which the rule of law is unshakened [sic]. 
Freedom of expression is both possible and evident in a variety of news media; 2. Refers to a country 
that aspires to this level of civil rights but is unable to achieve it because of violence, ignorance or 
unavailability of the media or because it has restrictive laws that seem to be greater than are needed 
for maintaining order; 3. Refers to a country that has the trappings of civil liberty and whose 
government may be successfully opposed in the courts, but which may be threatened or may have 
unresolvable political deadlock and may have to rely often on martial law, jailing for sedition and 
suppression of publications; 4. Refers to a country in which there are broad areas of freedom but in 
which there are also broad areas of illegality. States recently emerging from a revolutionary situation 
or in transition from traditional society may easily fall into this category; 5. Refers to a country in 
which civil rights are often denied but there is no doctrine on which this denial is based. The media are 
often weak, controlled by the government and censored; 6. Refers to a country in which no civil rights 
are thought to take priority over the rights of the state, but criticism is allowed to be stated in limited 
ways; 7. Refers to a country from which the outside world never hears criticism except when it is 
condemned by the state. Citizens have no rights in relation to the state'. 
SOURCE: Gastil RD (1975) 'Comparative Survey of Freedom V', in Freedom at Issue, XXIX, 3-9. 
J=War Casualties 1900-90 [in '000s] - Civilian (76/82 - not recorded: ECDR; IVCT; MALI; PPNG; 
FRG/GDR - Civilian casualties for Germany in '000s, 1900-45: 2231)**: 
(maximum=12,003,000; minimum=1,000; meart=697.5; median=120,000; mode=3000). 
Civilian Casualties by Area:  
Afr/Mid-East=5,037,000; Nth/Sth Am=309,000; Asia=10,082,000; Aust/Pac (Oceania)= -; 
Eur=27,840,000; UK/Eire=131,000. 
K=War Casualties 1900-90 [in '000s] - Military (76/82 - not recorded: ECDR; IVCT; MALI; PPNG; 
FRG/GDR - Military casualties for Germany in '000s, 1900-45: 7150)**: 
(maximum=11,895,000; minimum=1,000; mean=548.9; median=45,000; mode=1,500). 
Military Casualties by Area:  
Afr/Mid-East=2,562,000; Nth/Sth Am=847,000; Asia=7,780,000; Aust/Pac(Oceania)=127,000; 
Eur=28,584,000; UK/Eire=1,350,000. 
L=War Casualties 1900-90 [in '000s] - Total (76/82 - not recorded: ECDR; IVCT; MALI; PPNG; 
FRG/GDR - Total casualties for Germany in '000s, 1900-45: 9381)**: 
(mmdmitm=23,908,000; minimum=1,000; mean=1444.8; median=24,000; mode=3,000). 
Total Casualties by Area:  
Afr/Mid-East=7,112,000; Nth/Sth Am=1,296,000; Asia=18,637,000; Aust/Pac(Oceania)=127,000; 
Eur=57,150,000; UK/Eire=1,484,000. 
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M=ratio of military to civilian casualties (66/82- not recorded: ECDR; FRG; FIJI; GHNA; GDR; 
IRLD; IVCT; MALI; MLYS; PERU; PPNG; PRGY; SWDN; SWTZ; ZAIR; ZMBA)**: 
0 (Same) = 7 (11%); 1 (Lower) = 39 (58%); 2 (Higher) = 20 (31%). 
* • t 	 it • 	•. 	: (a) Primary: World Military and Social Expenditures 1991, 
World Priorites, Box 25140 Washington DC 20007 USA (summarised in New Statesman & Society, 2/8/1991: 47-8). 
(b) Secondary:  Eliot, 1972; Kidron & Smith, 1983; Knightley, 1989; Shaw, 1991; Brogan, 1992; Keeley, 1996; Davies, 
1997. 
N=Involvement in Interstate and Extrasystemic Wars 1816-1980 (82/82 - War per Year as System 
Member: Global Average [of 176 System Members] = 0.032: c=# of cases): 
lc<0.15; lc<0.14; lc<0.13; 2c=0.115; 1c=0.109; 15c=.05-.099; 20c=.02-.049; 15c=.01-.019; 26c=0 
(maximum= 0.152; minimum=0; mean=0.332; median=0.018; mode=0). 
GENERATIVE DEFINITION: '[In Table 1] I have divided a country's number of involvements in war 
(both of the interstate and extrasystemic kinds) by the number of years it has been a member of the 
interstate system. The resulting figure can be compared with a global average. To calculate this global 
average, I have simply added the duration that the 176 members of the interstate system have existed at 
various times during the 1816-1980 period, and then have used this number (9343 years) to divide the 
total number of national participations in wars (there were 302 national participations in the 118 
international wars). The global average is 0.032 national war-participation per year. The reader can 
compare the figures for the individual countries [in Column N, Chan's Table 1] with this global 
average. The data in Table 1 do not give the impression that democracies are more pacific than 
nondemocracies. The four countries with the highest war-per-year scores are commonly considered 
politically free. They are Israel (0.152), India (0.147), France (0.135) and Britain (0.115, which ties this 
country with the USSR for fourth place...' 
SOURCE: Chan S(1984) 'Mirror, Mirror on the Wall....Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?', Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 28, [4], 626-29. 
CHAPTER 6: HERITAGE & HARBINGER: 'Post'modernity and the  
Gulf War 
This Chapter surveys aspects of late-20th century conflict in the light of theoretical 
approaches maintaining that we are moving, or have already moved, into a new and 
essentially different socio-historical era. Early intimations of such an approach come 
from C. Wright Mills, who in some prescient and typically feisty works of the 1950s 
labelled the mid-twentieth century as 'post-modern', a 'Fourth Epoch' succeeding 
Antiquity, the Dark Ages and the Modern Age. He maintained that the chief feature 
of this new era was a split between the liberal/humanist correlation of freedom and 
reason and the triumph of technical rationality. At the level of the subject, the 
"types" best equipped to function under such mechanical social arrangements were 
those at the top who, 'like Tolstoy's generals', employ or feign rationality to mask an 
absence of authentic ends-oriented reason; and at the bottom the soldier, who 
performs 'an entire series of functionally rational actions accurately without having 
any idea as to the ultimate end of this action or the function of each act within the 
whole' (1959: 168). Mills further suggests that this 'fourth epoch' is suffused with 
warfare, but that ironically changes in mass perception - a kind of sensory overload 
resulting in an overall 'psychic numbing' and critical disengagement - render this 
condition nearly invisible: 
'To say that war has become total is to say that the reach of modern weaponry 
now makes every soul on earth a quite possible victim of sudden hell. It is to say 
that weapons have become absolute, and that every calculation from on high 
now includes a military calculation...World War III is already so total that 
most of its causes are accepted as "necessity"; most of its meanings as "realism". 
In our world "necessity" and "realism" have become ways to hide lack of moral 
indignation...[a]nd in this expanded world of mechanically vivified 
communications, the capacity for experience is alienated, and the individual 
becomes the spectator of everything but the human witness of nothing' (Mills, 
[1958] 1966: 411-413). 
Mann similarly highlights an essential contradiction of 'nuclear age' militarism. 
Whereas in previous societies from ancient Persia through to early modern Prussia 
martial values were central, pervasive and overt, 'contemporary militarism is not up-
front' (1988: 166). Rather, in the post-1945 developed west, it is both more generally 
understated, and split into two forms: For elites, 'deterrence-science militarism'; 
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amongst the citizenry, 'spectator-sport militarism'. " More recently, Crook, Pakulski 
& Waters have claimed that the accounts of modernity in Weber and Marx 
'ultimately cannot be sustained' under contemporary conditions (1991: 1). How valid 
are such claims? 
6.1: Conceptualising a 'Post'modern' 
Along many dimensions and from several quarters, aspects of society since roughly 
mid-century m have been accompanied by the prefix "post". Over 20 years ago, 
Dennis Wrong (1976: 279) dismissively noted that there were 'enough posts in 
contemporary social thought to build a picket fence!', and since that time the trend he 
attacked has mushroomed. In the very different evaluations of Bell (1973) and 
Touraine (1974), the age is post-industrial; since 1989, citizens of the former Soviet 
Union and its ex-Warsaw Pact satellites dwell in a politically-actualised post-
Marxism and their counterparts in the developed West in a hypothesised post-
capitalism (Drucker, 1992); for literary analyst George Steiner (1972) we live in a 
hermetic, quasi-vivacious and malaise-ridden post-culture; and in the varied 
prognoses of a wide assortment of commentators (eg, Lash, 1990; Harvey, 1990), the 
present epoch is characterised by a 'condition of postmodernity'. 
Such contentions are highly debatable and regularly subject to attack. Wrong's 
skepticism is echoed in later opposition to the notion that any such 'transitions' to a 
new era have in fact occurred, as in Zukin's appraisal, that '(t)here is no coherent 
77 Mann also specifies a third category, "militarised socialism ", prevailing in the Soviet bloc and 
basically an amalgam of the other two forms. Events since 1988 have overtaken his analysis, and 
this type is not dealt with here. 
78  The matter of chronology - always difficult - is particularly problematic in current 'post'- 
periodising hypotheses. Consider this comparative estimate of the birthdate of a "new era" in the 
works of some representative adherents: [1] 1875 (Toynbee,1947, in Kellner,1990); [2] c. 1950s 
(Wright Mills,1959); [3] between Bismark's resignation in 1890 and Kennedy's inauguration in 
1961 (Barraclough,1964: 9); [4] post-WW II (Etzioni,1968, in Kellner,1990); [5] 'mid-nineteenth 
Century' (Asimov,1970: 18); [6] c. 1960s (Bel1,1976: 51); [7] 1955 (Toffler, 1981: 28); [8] 1967 
(Leitch,1983: 259-263); [9] 1956-57 (Naisbitt,1984: 112); [10] late 1960s (Ryan,1988: 599); [11] 
'the 1980s but prefiguratively from say 1975' (Cooke,1988: 482); [12] 3.32 pm, July 15th, 1972 
(Jencks, 1991: 23; Wolfe,1989: 80-83); [13] '60s the key transition period, but begins in the Late 
'40s/Early '50s in the US, and after 1958 in France (Jameson, in Foster,1989: 113); [14] 'post-
"Augustinian refusal" ', ie 4th century AD (Kroker & Cook, in Callinicos,1989: 26); [15] 
'somewhere between 1968 and 1972' (Harvey,1990: 38); [16] 1970 onwards (Koehler, in M. A. 
Rose, 1991: 173); [17] 'in 1945, at Hiroshima & Nagasaki' (Morris, in Milner, 1991: 110). 
285. 
definition of postmodernism to guide its appropriation by those social scientists who 
are so inclined' (1988: 431) or the airier assessment of postmodernism in the Modern-
day Dictionary of Received Ideas as a word that 'has no meaning... (u)se it as often as 
possible' (cited in Featherstone, 1988: 195). Other critics attack postmodernism from 
the perspectives of feminism (Brodribb, 1992) or Marxism (Callinicos, 1989), the 
latter holding that although rapid change is an endemic feature of late twentieth 
century life, such change constitutes an extension of the 'cultural logic of late 
capitalism' (Jameson, 1984) or at most a 'postmetaphysical modernity' (Wellmer, 
1991: vii) and an acceleration of the unfinished 'project of modernity' (Habermas, in 
Foster, 1989: 3-15). 
The hostility shown to postrnodernity by theorists of a different ideological bent is 
tame compared to the attitudes titular "postmodernists" - primarily the French social 
theorists Charles Taylor scathingly refers to as responsible for 'the fog emanating 
from Paris in recent decades' (1984: 172) - display toward the school of thought they 
supposedly represent. Foucault asserts that 'there is no sense at all to the proposition 
that reason is a long narrative that is now finished, and that another narrative is 
under way' (Raulet, 1983: 204-205; c/f Smart, 1990: 402). Derrida sees an age-old 
consistency in the purportedly "new" (Kearney, 1984: 112). Guattari passes the 
harshest of judgments on postmodernism's 'ethical and aesthetic' bankruptcy that 
leaves a 'black stain on history' (Guattari, 1986a: 40; 1986b: 460; Zurbrugg, 1991: 13); 
Virilio claims that "postmodernism is 'an expression which, in terms of architecture, 
has predominantly negative overtones.. .Moreover, the postmodern impulse in 
architecture has virtually disappeared and is now considered little more than a kind 
of distraction' (cited in Zurbrugg, 1996: 111); and Baudrillard condemns the 
postmodern as degenerate, artificial, eclectic and a process of cultural 'garbage 
disposal' championed by 'European Yuppies' (Francblin, 1986, Baudrillard, 1990: 20- 
21; Gane, 1991: 55). In Rajchman's crisp summation of internecine opposition to the 
concept, 'Foucault rejected the category; Guattari despises it, Derrida has no use for it; 
Lacan and Barthes did not live, and Althusser was in no state, to learn about it; and 
Lyotard found it in America' (cited in Brodribb, 1992: 10). 
Yet despite the ferocity of such disclaimers, "post"-perspectives of various stripes 
continue to attract adherents, and two - a culturally-based postmodernity and a 
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technologically-driven model of the Information Society - are at risk of achieving 
paradigm status. Each warrant examination, not least because the designation "post-" 
in \a general sense signifies an 'after', simultaneously a closure and an adventurous new 
beginning. As a corollary it also entails not just an emphasis on the present (conceived 
of as a situation of novelty) and an orientation towards the future, but a re-
interpretation of the past in the light of "new realities". 
Of more immediate concern within the context of this chapter is the part played by 
changes in aspects of militarism and textuality in mooted large-scale, long-run 
societal transformations. Concerning the latter, as noted previously changes in 
communicative technologies, in terms of either the introduction of a new form or the 
dominance of one kind of media at the expense of the disappearance (or displacement 
of the status) of another, have typically been used as an index of essential change 
within or differentiation between types of society retrospectively; and with the 
theorised advent of the postindustrial &/or postmodern, this concept of fundamental 
changes in reading and writing as either harbinger, cause, or symptom of a broader 
structural transformation is continued. Also retained is the ambivalence of the 
relationship between reading/writing and warfare, with the dominant tendency 
suggesting that the former stands in opposition to - or mitigates - the latter. 
Figure 6.1: "POST"- MODERNITY 
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6.2 War-Text: Postmodern Conjunctions 
Those typically included, however problematically, in the pantheon of postmodern 
thinkers have dealt with warfare in a variety of ways. Lyotard metaphorically 
exhorts his readers to be 'guerrillas of love' and 'to wage a war on totality' (cited in 
Pefanis, 1991: 84, 116). In Travels in Hyper-Reality, semiotician Umberto Eco 
maintains that today 'it is only in the most backward of countries that fascist 
generals...still use tanks... [t]oday a country belongs to the person who controls 
communications' (1987: 135). 	Barthes, in his essay Myth Today, illustrates his 
extension of semiology into a second-order regime of signification in concrete terms 
using a military example: the Paris-Match cover depicting a young Negro soldier 
saluting the French flag (Barthes, 1982: 93-159). According to Turner (1987b; Stauth & 
Turner, 1988), a pervasive nostalgia is the distinguishing feature of postmodernity; 
and Davis traces the origins of the term 'nostalgia' itself to Johannes Hofer's 17th 
Century dissertation based on diagnoses of Swiss mercenaries fighting abroad (1979: 1- 
7; c/f Starobinski, 1989). 
Staying within the realms of genealogy, the status of Nietzsche as a 
'godfather'/intellectual progenitor of continental postmodernism is well-attested to; 
and his penchant for the combative, bellicose turn of phrase is evident in his 
descriptions of 'the worst readers ...those that behave like plundering troops: they 
take away a few things they can use, dirty and confound the remainder, and revile 
the whole' (Nietzsche, ed. Hollingdale, 1979: 15-16, emphases added); and 
elsewhere "truth", characterised as 'a mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms' (cited in Sharpe, 1990: 184, emphases added). Deleuze & 
Guattari devote a long chapter of A Thousand Plateaus to relations between the State 
apparatus and the nomad war machine (1988: 351-423; c/f Guattari, 1984: 120-129), 
and their concept of the 'machinic phylum' provided a theoretical bedrock for De 
Landa's later work on War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (1991); and the 
writings of Paul Virilio are predicated on contemporaneity as wholly governed by the 
principles and practices of 'pure war' (Virilio & Lotringer, 1983). 
79 A lesson apparently only half absorbed by Boris Yeltsin in October 1993, who in putting down 
the parliamentary rebellion of Rutskoi and Khasbulatov, took care to control the mass media but 
also - perhaps in a "pre-postmodem" gesture, or perhaps because accustomed to travelling in 
reality - secured his position precisely by the resort to tanks. 
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Foucault's position in contemporary social theory is analogous to Weber's in classical 
sociological thought.' In the more specific terms of this project, peripherally, 
Foucault gave a brief course at the College de France on 'War in the Filigree of Peace' 
(1980a: 15-19) and proposed a study of 'the army as a matrix of organization and of 
knowledge' (1980b: 77). More central and elaborated is his version of the 'military 
dream of society' (Foucault, 1977: 169) accompanying the Enlightenment's liberal-
humanist vision of progressive societal perfectibility (see 5.3.5, case 81). Yet in his 
'Truth and Power' interview of 1977, Foucault makes a conceptual split between a 
linguistically and semiotically-informed analysis of society and one grounded in an 
analogue of formal conflict: 
'I believe one's point of reference should not be to the great model of language 
(langue ) and signs, but to that of war and battle. The history which bears and 
determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a language: relations of 
power, not relations of meaning' (Foucault, cited in Wolin, 1993: 272). 
A contention of this thesis is that such a division is ill-considered, a remark in an 
interview situation, possibly overdetermined by a hostility to - and an attempt to 
distance himself from - both older Saussurean structuralist approaches, and all 
aspects of textuality. " 
'In a general sense - the sense of conceptual convergence between iron cage and carceral 
archipelago - the strongest statements of the Weber/Foucault congruence of perspectives come from 
Hepworth &Turner (1982: 96, 99, 173); Poster (1984: 13-16; 1990: 88); Merquior (1985: 18-19); 
Habermas, in Hoy (1986: 104); J. O'Neill (1986); Rabinow, in Clifford & Marcus (1986); Gordon 
(1987); Turner (1987); Berman (1988: 34-35); Foucault (1989: 85); Harvey (1990: 45); Lash (1990: 
145-146); and Sayer (1991). 
81 Given the premise of the judgement of texts by use-value under prevailing configurations of 
power/knowledge and the reduction of writers to proper names signifying the totality of their 
literary enterprise, Foucault suggests that the notion of 'the author' be replaced by the way the 
author's name operates within discursive practices. The leading question within this frame of 
reference is not (in the relevant essay's ironic title) "what is an author?", nor 'who Is the author?', 
but rather, what is the'atithor-function?' (Foucault, 1988: 113-138). In this conception, the key 
aspect of the utility of attribution of 'authorship' resides in both capitalist notions of writer-as-
proprietor and adherence to previously-established truth statements legitimated through 
identifiable publication. As a thought experiment exemplifying this approach Foucault offers the 
intriguing notion of the potential effect of anonymity on the reception of texts. Since the author 
would in principle not be known the reader would be forced to confront the text directly, would 
come to the writing without the preconcepbons generated by knowing who wrote it, and would 
bring to the work entirely different standards of judgement (Foucault, 1989: 193-202). Nowhere in 
the interview where this notion is flown, however, and despite the widespread use of the double-
blind review process in the social sciences at the point of manuscript submission and 
acceptance/rejection, is Foucault naive enough to believe that the idea of the author as 'masked 
philosopher' is a real possibility under current publishing practice. 
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A suggestive integration of the "battle model" and structural linguistics, but with the 
latter taking the form of written rather than spoken language, comes from Derrida, 
and at the margins of and 'buried beneath' the (in)famous Derridean discourse are 
some hints particularly salient to the concerns of this thesis. The first and most 
peripheral of these is Derrida's translator's use of Proust to point up the notion of 
'difference' and displacement of a work's unity and sovereign identity: 
'I was not one man only, but the steady advance hour after hour of an army in  
close formation, in which there appeared, according to the moment, 
impassioned men, indifferent men, jealous men... In a composite mass, these 
elements may, one by one, without our noticing it, be replaced by others, which 
others again eliminate or reinforce, until in the end a change has been brought 
about which it would be impossible to conceive if we were a single person' 
(Proust, cited by Spivak in Derrida, 1976: xi; italics in the original, underlining 
added). 
Expressed more directly, this same undertone emerges in a paper contrasting 
Foucauldian and Derridean perspectives on textuality by Edward Said, where 
characterisations of deconstruction are under review: 
'The military and hunting metaphor is apt, I think, since Derrida has recently 
spoken in such terms of what he does ...The military operation involved in 
deconstruction therefore is in one respect an attack on a party of colonialists 
who have tried to make the land and its inhabitants over into a realization of 
their plans, an attack in turn partly to release prisoners and partly to free land 
held forcibly" (Said, 1977: 682-683; emphases added). 
The final, most practical and most potent correlation of grammatological concerns and 
militarism comes from the theorist himself in the text of a 1983 conference paper on 
nuclear deterrence, "No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, 
seven missives)", where a deconstructionist perspective is put to work exposing the 
illusory rationality and logical fallacies inherent in 'expertise'-based assessments of 
prevailing nuclear defence policies and the rhetorical dimension of diplomacy, the 
latter only made possible by writing (Derrida, 1984; discussion in Norris, 1987: 162- 
171; Ruthven, 1993: 66-78). Whereas Foucault suggests the war model as a more salient 
analytic metaphor than linguistic or textual models, Derridean grammatology posits 
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the immanence of writing as promoting a permanent state of deterrence/deferral, 
perpetually staving off the occurrence of "real" war. This resonates with the work of 
Baudrillard, who, in the estimation of the Panic Encyclopaedia 'is the postmodern 
commotion... acclaimed as the author of postmodern culture and society' (Kroker, 
Kroker & Cook, 1989: 265). His previous analyses touched lightly on army norms 
(1983: 7) and cataclysmic nuclear war, even if only to declare the latter an impossible 
option under the present terms of the 'disappearance of the social' (1987: 107-112), an 
'impossibility' dealt with in his notorious account of the "nonoccurrence" of the Gulf 
War. On these accounts, living in a "postmodern condition" with its plurality of 
"language games" seems to have led to the loss of any attempt to find words to 
delineate, let alone debate, the political (Ryan, 1988); similarly, living in an 
"information society", in Reinecke's estimation, 'appears to have bred a certain kind 
of torpor. On moral and political questions people have more information about events 
around the globe than any human beings before them, but are unable or unwilling to 
take a public stance. That contradiction is one of the most important of the age'. 
6.3 War: Information Society stances 
This same suggestive undercurrent recurs in the post-industrial perspective. 'Infotech'- 
driven social change is related to militarism in a variety of ways. Bell's post-
industrial society and Brzezinski's "technetronic era" both rested to a greater or lesser 
degree on a premise of universally harmonious relations rendering war obsolete. 
Masuda, in his 1981 'pattern comparison' of industrial society and the information 
society specifies war and Fascism as social problems located in the former, which 
disappear and are (in a worst-case scenario) replaced by 'future shock, terror, invasion 
of privacy' in the latter (Masuda, in Forrester, 1988: 623). Similarly, the work of E. T. 
Hall (1981) largely turns on a variant of information theory distinguishing between 
stable traditional cultures with 'High Context' (HC) communicative systems, and 
adaptable 'Low Context' (LC) contemporary social environments, wherein transmitted 
messages must be "spelled out". The sense is in the message, and coded information 
carries the load formerly borne by the receiver's preprogrammed knowledge acquired 
through embeddedness within an HC culture (1981: 85-103). Hall uses two examples to 
illustrate his thesis, first comparing the long-term uniformity of church architecture 
(HC) with a 'system of defence rocketry [which] can be out of date before it is in place 
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and is therefore very low-context' (1981: 101); and secondly outlining two instances of 
HC/LC cultural confrontation and the importance of contexting - the description taken 
from Weston La Barre describing how '(d)uring the last war [WW II] there appeared 
in the North African edition of Stars and Stripes a news picture, purporting to 
portray an American GI teaching an Arab the gentle art of dunking doughnuts', and, in 
another localised instance, the events surrounding the abortive trial of an American 
GI stationed in Japan (the Private Girard case) in the post-WW II occupation period 
(E. T. Hall, 1981: 109-116). 
The inherent optimism of IT perspectives is exemplified by Stonier's assurance that 
'Dying in a postindustrial world means that not only are we more affluent, more 
resourceful and less likely to go to war, but also more likely to democratise' (cited in 
Lyon, 1988: 5; emphasis added); and Christopher Evans endorsement that 'we can now 
be sure of one thing: human sacrifice by the millions at the behest of "inspired" 
generals will never occur again, and we can thank the computer for refusing to allow us 
to be our own worst enemy yet again' (1979: 212-213). 
Alternatives to these utopian assessments suggest that "we" should have known 
better. The 'information'/post-industrial society postulate has been hotly contested 
since its inception (J. Rose, 1974: 78-84). One set of grounds for opposition concerns its 
implied relationship to militarism. In terms of origins, the concept owes much to 
Saint-Simon's positivist vision of a new social order governed by the industrio-
scientific elite, an "avant-garde" technocracy (Manuel, 1965: 103-148); and, as Rose 
points out, 'Saint-Simon's 'avant-garde' (a term he took from military terminology as 
early as 1802 ) was also to live up to its name in looking to the future of society rather 
than to its past' (1991: 33; stress added). We have previously encountered McLuhan's 
contentions that changes in communicative modes - particularly moves from oral to 
literate media - are causal factors in social formation (section 4.1 at p. 133). He 
expands on this theme in his book-length study of War and Peace in the Global 
Village (McLuhan & Fiore, 1968); and the notion of electronic communications 
technology in civil society retaining traces of its combat-based origins also figures in 
Provenzo's heavily McLuhanite analysis, where it is noted that 'the fact that 
computers were originally developed for the military has determined to a certain 
extent the types of questions they have been able to address' (1986: 104). 
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What is an anecdotal footnote in Provenzo's monograph assumes central importance in 
Mark Poster's (1990) analysis of the origins of the latest wave of technocratic elitism 
grounded in computerisation and "information" as cybernetically defined, cybernetics 
itself being 
'tainted by military orientation and sensibility, born as it was during the 
struggle with Hitler's Germany...Cybernetics is a theory for an armed camp 
preparing for a final struggle. But the politico-military atmosphere that 
pervades Wiener's text, which was written in the early 1950s when the U.S. 
was in the grip of McCarthyite fever, is displaced from the contest with fascism 
and communism to the warfare with nature. ... The "law" of entropy legitimates 
the just cause of the technocratic domination of language and the bureaucratic 
reduction of meaning to "electronic engineering" '(Poster, 1990: 28-29). 
Roszak, who also utilises the work of Norbert Wiener and situates his own 
perspective within the framework of the U.S. as governed by a military-industrial 
complex (c/f Coffin, 1964; Mills, 1970; Lens,1970; Yarmolinsky, 1973), similarly claims 
that 'the (U.S.) government's continued heavy military investment in computers, 
electronics, and information theory following World War II was fully intended to 
alter the American industrial system rapidly' (1986: 178; general discussion of this 
issue at 177-181). These themes are also addressed but given an ideologically positive 
spin in the more recent work of Peter F. Drucker, who thinks of contemporaneity in 
terms of a 'new society of organizations', spearheaded by a managerial revolution 
with knowledge as its driving force. This transformation from modern industrial to 
'post-capitalist' society is, although corresponding to other phase shifts in western 
history, thorough and global, to the degree that 'there is no longer a "Western" 
history or a "Western" civilization. There is only world history and world 
civilization' (Drucker, 1992: 95). What brings the unprecedented change into being? 
The author's 'own candidate would be the GI Bill of Rights, which gave every 
American soldier returning from World War II the money to attend a university ... 
[this] signalled the shift to a knowledge society' (1992: 95). The U.S. armed forces 
therefore usher in post-industrial social change, in the same way that the Prussian 
Army served as a model for civil early capitalist organisation in 'the world of 1870' 
(1992: 102). Moreover, the armed services remain at the cutting edge of innovation: 
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' No organization in the 50 years since World War II has changed more than the 
U.S. military. Uniforms have remained the same. Titles of rank have remained 
the same. But weapons have changed completely, as the Gulf War of 1991 
dramatically demonstrated; military doctrines and concepts have changed even 
more drastically, as have the armed services' organizational structures, 
command structures, relationships, and responsibilities' (Drucker, 1992: 97). 
Clearly, in the foregoing commentary the connection between reading and writing and 
aspects of militarism are more or less tenuous, consisting mostly of hyperbole and 
trope, and are at most extensions of the concerns of the analysts surveyed; and, as 
Rapoport warns in another context, such extensions 'are no easy matter and cannot be 
achieved by "semantic suggestion", that is, a tendency to confuse nomenclature with 
discovery of principles' (cited in Buckley, 1968: 142). But the persistence of such 
"semantic suggestion" and its location in such a range of unexpected sources bears 
investigating in a more systematic manner - more especially given the unresolved 
status of textuality/literacy and the pervasive notion of militarism/warfare as a 
'dead letter' in the majority of both postmodern and post-industrial perspectives, and 
moreover given the practical unavoidability of semantic suggestion in discourses so 
singlemindedly devoted to prophecy," a point taken up in Etzioni-Halevy's critique: 
'Like other parts of the Knowledge Elite, the scholars converging on the idea of 
the post-industrial society, too, have been concerned with predicting the 
future... And indeed, what post-industrialists had to say about what they 
termed the Knowledge Class in post-industrial society and about that society 
itself was based partly on the analysis of the existent situation and partly on 
the projection of existent trends into the future. But unfortunately some of the 
predicted trends of ever-greater abundance, equality, liberty and general well-
being ...subsequently reversed themselves or took off in the most unexpected 
directions, playing havoc with their predictions. To be sure, knowledge has 
been increasing in importance. But by now it should be abundantly clear that 
this knowledge has not been working in the manner visualised by the post-
industrialists and recently has not helped increase the predicted prosperity, 
equity and freedom (or viability of democracy) in Western society' (1985: 66-67). 
82 As an early example, consider some selected features of Huber's (1971) annotated bibliography 
of "Studies of the Future": In a total number [N] of 257 predictive items in this table and a time-
spread of publications ranging between 1924 and 1970, consideration of weaponry, militarism 
and war occurs fully or in part in only 34 entries (i.e., 13% of the total); the likelihood of future [in 
this case, primarily post-1970] wars occurs as an issue in only 16 (47%) of these 34 cases, or 6% 
of N. Of these 16 cases that broach the possibility of war, 7 claim it as an avoidable option. 
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In addition to invalid projection of present indicators based on a reified view of 
technology, the "taint" of direct military applications in supposedly objective 
abstract methodological tools (see, eg, Martin, 1978, on game theory, or Visvanathan, 
1984, on the postwar career of atomic physics) render the overall utility of IT models 
highly suspect. Given an intimate linkage between the military as sponsor of 
technological innovations such as semi-conductors, silicon chips, microelectronics, 
robotics and computerisation (for an overview of these connections see Lyon, 1988: 26- 
30; De Landa, 1991), it is unsurprising that a "knowledge elite" of research scientists 
and security intellectuals would tend to distance themselves from the darker side of 
high tech and - rejigging technological determinism in the name of a decontextualised 
version of value-neutrality - overstress its peaceful civil applications." Under such 
views large-scale conflict seems to be as removed from the social agenda as it was in 
the majority of sociological analyses undertaken in the 'relatively peaceful' 19th 
century. Yet such a removal is equally unwarranted in the light of the subsequent 
empirical record. 
What makes investigation of the mooted war/text conjunction especially urgent in 
theoretical terms is this high-priority commitment of "post"-perspectives to futurity. 
Kitaigorodsky's observation (1990: 34), that 'a first-rate theory predicts; a second-
rate theory forbids; and a third-rate theory explains after the event', assumes 
particular salience within these perspectives, characterised as each is by blurred 
time-frames and poor forecasts, the uncertainty between actual and predictive events. 
Sober, less flagrant examples of this uncertainty date as far back as Barraclough's 
(1964: 1-35) early discussion of 'contemporary history' characterised as a distinct 
break with modernity, worthy of analysis as a transitional period but leading 'into a 
world whose outline we cannot plot' (1964: 13). This view is consonant with Poster's 
assertion that 'the solid institutional routines that have characterised modern 
society for some two hundred years are being shaken by the earthquake of 
electronically mediated communication and recomposed into new routines whose 
outlines are as yet by no means clear' (1990: 14), and is reiterated by Crook, Pakulski 
63  The strength of technological determinism in current information society models obscures the 
degree to which science, technology and warfare are socially interconnected: For a refresher 
course on the history of this interface, see R. K. Merton, [1935] 1970: 184-198; Kaempfert, 1941. 
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& Waters, who theorise the current societal transformation not as a surely-suffixed "- 
ism", but as 'postmodernization' - a process in train, the outcome of which is 
essentially unforeseeable (1992: 1-46; N.B. the typology [Fig. 1.2] at p. 34 of that 
volume). 
Yet acknowledgement of the urgency of a cogent analysis of contemporaneity, and 
frank recognition of the difficulties inherent in such a project, cannot compensate for 
serious shortcomings in both 'postmodern' and 'postindustrial'/ 'information society' 
paradigms, flaws that tend to render them less than suitable as models for serious 
analytical investigation. Floud's early attack on Bell's instigating post-
industrialism hypothesis - that the latter is Americocentric, theoretically invalid 
and empirically overextended (1971: 25-37) - may be added to the critiques based on 
imprecise definition (Wrong), originary premises (Poster) and lack of predictive 
capacity (Etzioni-Halevy) already cited. Lyon, who sees the "information society" 
notion as directly derived from the Bell paradigm, maintains that it is plagued by 
the same problems as its predecessor. While not prepared to abandon the concept 
outright, he notes that its utility is hindered by both dystopic 'Luddite' 
technophobia, and 'liberal' enthusiasm. The result of the latter in particular is 
especially fatal in this view, as 'the further one moves from grand national IT plans 
and from futuristic forecasts of conditions prevailing within the "informatizing" 
society, and the nearer one gets to actual social analysis in which technology is not 
perceived as a quasi-autonomous force acting upon society, the more questionable the 
information society concept appears' (1988: 7). 
Mann (1988:146) called sociology's neglect of war "shameful". This epithet may be 
read methodologically as well as morally. In a discipline which prides itself on an 
ability to see beyond legitimating ideologies to the realities underlying them, to 
ignore or marginalise such realities not just once, in "core" perspectives, but twice, to 
the degree that sociology uncritically accepts the slipperier tenets of portmanteau 
concepts like postmodernity or the Information Society, is both absurd and grotesque; 
particularly galling, in that, as argued in Chapter 2, alternatives are ready to hand, 
primarily in Weber's corpus. But does this analysis still hold in the late 20th 
century, on the portico of a new millennium? 
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James Der Derian has lately argued that in the field of international relations, and 
particularly in its central concern with global conflict, much explanatory mileage 
would be gained by subverting dominant paradigms of 'the geopolitics of realism, 
structural political economy of neorealism, and neoliberal institutionalism' (1990: 
295) with postmodemist approaches - specifically Baudrillard's notion of simulation, 
the Foucauldian theses on surveillance, and Virilio's conceptualisation of the 
chronopolitics of speed. Arguing stridently against any potential synthesis of 
rationalist "metatheory" and post-modern practices he asserts that the latter are 
more efficacious because they are 'more "real" in time than in space, their power is 
evidenced through the exchange of signs not goods, and their effects are transparent 
and pervasive rather than material and discrete' (1990: 297). Hence rationalist 
empirical methodology with its 'seemingly endless collection and correlation of data 
on war' (1990: 308) should be supplanted by 'historical investigation, intertextual 
interpretation, and open-ended speculation - not the prime methods and concerns of 
behaviourists and neo-realists, but prime material for a poststructuralist inquiry' 
(1990: 305). 
Der Derian (1990: 308) has 'no conclusions to offer, only a review of questions', shored 
fragments: against his analysis the argument presented here holds that coming to 
grips with the current realities of combat entails a shotgun wedding of "traditional" 
and post-structurally oriented approaches. The ingredients of Der Derian's analysis - 
surveillance, speed and simulation - certainly predate the theorising of Foucault, 
Virilio and Baudrillard, as they themselves acknowledge. Der Derian dates the 
earliest Kriegsspiel (war-play) to 1830s Prussia, but Wilson claims this was preceded 
in Europe by John Clerk's naval game of 1700 and Christopher Weildimanns' "Kings 
Game" of 1644, and that the likeliest ultimate origin of the format originates in the 
Chinese 'encirclement' game Wei-Hai dating from c. 3000 BC (1970: 13-29). In Sun-
Tzu's classic Art of War, the 29th principle of Book XI states that 'speed is the essence 
of war' (1963: 134). De Landa traces simulation and the military uses of imagery not to 
Baudrillard, nor his direct influences like early-'60s McLuhartism or the 
Situationists' late-'60s 'society of the spectacle', but to the anti-Protestant military 
response of the forces of the Holy Roman Empire in the Thirty Years war (1618-1648) 
and the paramilitary 'spiritual counteroffensive' of the Jesuits in its wake - in 
particular the combination of Loyola's spiritual exercises and Kircher's original slide 
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projector, the "magic lantern" of 1654, as tools in their miracle plays aimed at the 
production of both Catholic propaganda and 'soldiers for Christ' (1991: 186-192). In a 
similar vein, Myerly (1992) highlights the ongoing importance of spectacle to the 
military in a secular peacetime setting, in this case Victorian England. 
In wartime itself, Clausewitz in his 19th-century analysis described the responses of 
the rookie, seeing his first battle from afar, who 'for a moment still thinks he is at a 
show'; and more generally, that in combat lbjeyond a certain threshold...the light of 
reason moves in a different medium and is reflected in a different manner' (cited in 
Virilio, 1989: 47-48). Clausewitz's purchase on the unpredictability of war - its 
essential 'friction' and 'fog', for Beyerchen (1993) a precursor of later 20th-century 
scientific concerns with non-linearity and randomness - is as acute as his contempt for 
those who try to reduce war to abstract, hermetically-sealed 'laws' like his 
contemporaries von Billow, Jomini, and others he dismisses as 'scribblers of systems 
and compendia' (Brodie, cited in the introduction to Clausewitz, 1976: 58). But even 
those who, like Brodie, acknowledge Clausewitz's genius, crave a Jominian certitude 
in the conduct of warfare (De Lancia, 1991: 87-105), a certitude increasingly expressed 
in the attempted removal of the "human element" from the preparation for, 
participation in, perception of and protest against contemporary conflict. 
Coming to grips with the nature of late modern warfare resides in more than - but calls 
for a consideration of - the durability and extension of historically antecedent trends. 
Whereas in the past war was seen as a heightening of an essentially human 
experience - "reality" pitched at an extreme - war now relies on remoteness of both 
combatants and civilians from a sense of "reality". De Landa's wider study of 
contemporary warfare similarly concluded that computer and information-processing 
technology, although 'made hostage by military institutions' (1991: 229) is 
incomplete, nascent, inherently vulnerable to alternatives, and that 'in the period of 
time between the emergence of a new machinic paradigm and its incorporation into a 
tactical doctrine, new opportunities arise for experimentalists outside the war 
machine' (1991: 230). The possibility (or desirability) of replacing existing politico-
military control with that of visionaries and hackers, and what forms such 'new 
opportunities' may take, is controversial. The question facing contemporary social 
theory is where it stands relative to the the contemporary 'war machine'. 
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The theoretical perspectives critiqued throughout this chapter have too readily 
taken conceptions of a very-nearly seamless, consensual and irreal "New World 
Order" on board, ignoring or accepting not only the actual cost of ongoing warfare, but 
the collateral cost to their own validity. The alternative view advanced in this 
thesis suggests a greater concentration on "cracks" within, and shards of "reality" 
glimpsed through, the constructed images of globally-dominant states increasingly 
given over to "author ised" violent armed intervention bolstered by forms of social 
theorising which passively deny, or actively support, such activity. At the heart of 
the internecine and interstitial disputes pervading sociological, postmodern and info-
tech/postindustrial views of war are a series of gulfs - intensity/extent, 
barbarous /civilised, nature/culture, civil/military, structure/agency, 
(neo)realist/(post)structuralist - that the proxy principle is designed to initially 
bridge and eventually transcend. As indicated throughout, textual discourses on war, 
the writings produced by war, and the construction and setting in motion of war's 
participants are themselves foundational, not supplementary, to the very prosecution 
of war. The transmutation of skin-bounded bodies and physical territory into text-
artefactual states and citizens (outlined in Chapter 3) constitutes a reply to the 
several of the perspectives reviewed above, and a potential solution to the conundrum 
posed by Faris as to why lwlars come when no one seems to want them' (1937: 7), and 
why wars persist in the face of a widespread preference for peace. 
The following section aims at establishing a firmer foothold in the terra incognito of 
futurity through a selective deployment and combining of theoretical positions 
within mainstream and "post"-perspectives already considered, redesigned to 
foreground the militarism/textuality conjunction and map its progress in the West to 
this point in time. Deploying the elements of Figure 6.1, I take the Persian Gulf War 
of 1991 as both inheritor of older forms of the war/text axis and forerunner of new 
forms of proxifying in the realms of combat and communications. 
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6. 4 The Persian Gulf War [1991].  
'On 26 February, 1991, [at a map line called 73 Easting in the Southern Iraqi 
desert] the Eagle, Ghost, and Iron troops of the US 2nd Armored Cavalry 
Regiment attacked the Tawakalna Division of the Iraqi Republican Guard. 
These were untested US tank troops, without any previous combat experience, 
blundering forward in a sandstorm to confront entrenched Soviet-made heavy 
tanks manned by elite veterans of an eight-year war [i.e., against former 
enemy Iran - WS]. Thanks to the sandstorm, the Americans had no air support 
either; this was a straight-on tank-versus-tank scrap in the desert, right out of 
the Rommel and Patton strategic notebook. The Americans annihilated the 
Iraqis in 22 minutes' (Sterling, 1993: 95). 
In the Gulf War of 1991, '[w]ith some handy but basically political and cosmetic help 
from its Coalition allies, the US destroyed the fourth-largest army on the planet in 
four days at a cost of only 148 American lives' (ibid). Moreover, it is estimated that 
fully 25% of these combat casualties were victims of "friendly fire" from their own 
forces (Ziring, 1992: 326), officially - but not entirely - the result of error by on-board 
computer-controlled weapons-delivery systems. The first US fatality, Air Force 
S/Sgt. John Campisi, was hit by a truck on a darkened desert runway; Braybrook 
(1991: 10) notes that by February 17th, 10 out of the 14 dead American troops were 
friendly fire fatalities, and recounts an incident 9 days later, when 'nine British 
soldiers from the 4th Armored Brigade were killed when an A-10 attacked their 
Warrior AFVs... the whole of the Iraqi army had managed to kill only four British 
soldiers,... one USAF pilot killed over twice as many' (1991: 10). 
Leyden's (1992) compendium of American casualties are comprehensive, supplying 
wherever ascertainable details of name, rank, hometown and familial status of the 
dead. It also lists official cause of death for 124 of the 150 US casualties. These show 
that in Operation Desert Storm, 4 armed service personnel died undertaking rescue 
missions; 4 were victims of "friendly fire"; 8 were deaths by misadventure (adding to 
the roster of 26 accidental deaths in Operation Desert Shield before any direct 
encounter with the enemy); and 26 fell to ordnance, triggering land mines or 
unexploded shells. Of the remaining 87 casualties who died in actual combat, 6 are 
MIA presumed dead; 11 died in one battle at the Saudi bordertown of IChafji on Jan. 
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30th; 12 were killed in a Special Forces Operation when their gunship was shot down 
on Jan. 31st; and 20 died as a result of two Scud rocket attacks on their barracks, on Jan. 
31st and Feb. 25th. Discounting the Missing-in-Action figure, this left a possible 
maximum of 38 casualties - or slightly less than 4 per cent of the total US _ 
dead/presumed dead - who may have fallen victim to confrontation with a visible 
flesh-and-blood enemy. 
Contrarily, Greenpeace tallies of the enemy killed in action estimate 'between 5 and 
15,000...Iraqi civilians killed by the aerial bombardment... 4 to 16,000 Iraqis who 
have died of "disease or starvation" since the war ended. ..and up to 120,000 Iraqi 
troops - mostly conscripts - killed during the US-Allied offensive' (cited in Norris, 
1992: 203). The APDR [Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter] notes that one unit of surviving 
Iraqi troops registered a military first by surrendering to a "Drone" surveillance robot; 
with less levity, the same source reported that 'RPVs - small unmanned aircraft 
carrying video cameras - helped artillery crews on the Wisconsin and other US 
battleships hit target with pinpoint accuracy'(APDR, April 1991: 20). Even though 
later disclaimed, a popular belief held that prior to the Desert Storm land-based 
offensive, the US supposedly 'infected the Iraqi air defense system with a 
debilitating computer virus, and flew Cruise missiles equipped with warheads 
designed to uncoil carbon-fiber wire over Iraqi electrical lines in order to short out its 
power grid' (Black, 1993: 49) - and while the method deployed may have been 
somewhat romanticised, other reports indicate that a calculated media 
disinformation strategy combined with a take-out of the militarily-vital Iraqi _ 
communications infrastructure was a key factor in the subsequent allied victory: 
'By the morning of January 20, four days after a US Air Force Stealth bomber 
opened the war with a 2,000-pound laser-guided bomb targeted precisely on the 
microwave dishes atop Baghdad's international telecommunications building, 
the city was crippled. There was no mainline electricity, no running water, no 
working telephones' (Kelly, 1991: 21). 
By contrast, allied communicative networks, although subject to military control in 
the form of censorship, worked overtime and at peak capacity (Zelizer, 1992). TV 
audiences were treated to on-the-spot and round-the-clock CNN coverage of Stealth 
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aircraft attacks and laser fireworks over the Iraqi capital, pilotless Scud/Patriot 
missile-vs-missile duels in Israeli airspace and, courtesy of "weapon-cam", a 
projectile's eye-view of the passage of "smart bombs" through doorways and windows 
and down ventilator shafts. In the face of such saturation broadcasting, public 
response to the war was either overwhelmingly supportive or curiously muted. Lance 
Morrow characterised the general 'hallucinatory' and 'neurotic' mood of December 
1990 as follows: 
'In earlier wars, the soldiers went marching off, the battles got fought, then after 
a time the bodies - and the cost of it all - started coming home. Reality had its 
cause and effect, its dramatic pace. Now the natural rhythms of warmaking 
have gone electronic...Time gets dismantled somehow, slaughter gets projected 
into the hypothetical...' (1990: 22) 
This uneasy mass quiescence invited media comparison with the American public 
reaction to Vietnam." Weisberg, in the New Republic (25/2/91: 18) claimed that 
although initial protests gave one 'the sense of history being replayed as a game of 
speed chess', on closer inspection '[i]n contrast to the anti-war rallies in the 1960s anti-
Gulf demonstrators have been peaceful and well-ordered, with police assisting in 
choreographed mass arrests'. Gibbs, writing for Time (26/11/90: 43) stated that the 
'...peace movement of 1990 only faintly resembles that of the Vietnam era', seeing as 
a potent indicator of the change a notable lack of college student involvement. 
Professional academic response (in this instance that of sociologists) also differed 
from the '60s. In 1967, Sociological Abstracts (vol XV, no. VII; 1160-1170, 1267) 
published an open letter to the US President, Vice-President and Members of Congress 
from '1300 individual and active members of the American Sociological Association' 
calling for a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam, immediate peace negotiations, 
" Recent revisionist treatments of this conflict at the levels of academic analysis, political ideology 
and popular culture have suggested that the more cathartic effects of this war on the "American 
psyche" have been ameliorated. In a mid-1975 press conference, Republican President Gerald Ford 
responded to a question about the 'lessons learned' from Vietnam in terms of a 'focus on the future'. 
In Rabe's 1993 assessment, this effectively constituted a 'call for national amnesia. ..at the time, his 
answer seemed to strike a receptive chord among the public. One survey of US history textbooks 
used by secondary-school children found that the war in Vietnam merited on average about six 
paragraphs of description. I gave only one lecture on Vietnam in my undergraduate course on US 
foreign relations and was rarely asked any questions. I knew a revisionist thesis was arising 
about Vietnam, but, until the early 1980s, I did not think that anyone would take it seriously' 
(1993: 228-29). 
303. 
and the 'orderly, phased withdrawal of American forces'. Responding to the Gulf 
conflict in 1991, sociologist Peter Eglin reported that at his campus [WLU in Ontario], 
a War Symposium and ad hoc "open forums" were organised, '[b]ut the numbers 
involved in intellectual activities to do with the war outside their own classrooms, 
but inside the university, represents no more than 10% of the faculty body' (1991: 6). 
The broader reactions took another form: At the conclusion of hostilities, in June 1991 
massive victory parades were staged in Washington and New York, suggesting 
popular support for George Bush's posited "New World Order' and his claim that 
America had finally 'kicked the Vietnam syndrome'" ...or at least the pacifist anti-
war legacy of that conflict. Chomsky (1971: 72-3) cites Westmoreland's assessment of 
the Vietnam War as a 'technological success', Pike's boast that formerly successful 
Viet Minh tactics had been 'relegated by science to the military history textbook, and 
Leonard Sullivan - in 1969 US Director of R & D for SE Asian Matters - on Vietnam as 
the prototype of future warfare, the 
'beginning of instrumentation of the entire battlefield. Eventually, we will be 
able to tell when anybody shoots, what he is shooting at, and where he was 
shooting from. You begin to get a "Year 2000" vision of an electronic map with 
little lights that flash for different kinds of activity. This is what we require 
for this "porous" war, where the friendly and the enemy are all mixed together' 
Woolley notes that the subsequently-developed 'C 3' [command, control, 
communications] system was so sophisticated that '[f]or (Allied commander General 
Norman) Schwarzkopf, aspects of the Gulf War's conduct, at least while it was 
underway, could have been a simulation. So it could have been for many of its 
participants' (1993: 193). This resonates with Kroker's characterisation of Desert 
Storm as essentially a "war of disappearances" and a radical technological distancing 
between appearances, acts and material consequences - not only the the 'vanished' 
civilian population of Iraq, the effective shut-out of the mass media through military 
85 Commenting on this jubilant pronouncement, Stoessinger maintains that the US-led alliance 
'not only defeated Saddam's army; they also exorcised the demons of lingering self-doubt from 
the Vietnam era. One marine who helped liberate Kuwait City brought with him an old 
American flag that had been given to him twenty-three years earlier by a dying comrade in 
Vietnam. A circle had been closed. Or had it?' (1993: 202). The qualifier here is built on the 
fact of Saddam's political survival despite a decisive military defeat. In Damovsky, Kauffman 
& Robinson's assessment, in the Gulf War the cry of "no more Vietnams" was reversed 'from 
an antimilitaristic slogan to a rallying cry for rearmament, more weapons systems, and new 
strategies for fighting regional wars' (cited in Norri s, 1992: 131-32). 
control of the networks in the "first all-TV war", and the "seduction" of public opinion 
overwhelmed by 'rhetorical signs of American martial valour', but also 
'the mental dissociation of weapons from their virtual operators in the form of jet 
fighter pilots, who were reported flying into combat listening to heavy metal 
music, with Van Halen as the band of choice... [and] the dissociation of the dark 
and missing matter of the TV audience from the material history of the war' 
(Kroker, 1992: 49-50). 
Dissociation from the 'real', and downright weirdness, were the order of the day 
through all phases of the conflict. According to a BBC documentary on postmodern 
artist Jeff Koons, before the outbreak of hostilities his wife, ex-porn star and Italian 
MP Cicciolina, proposed a unique war deterrent by offering to sleep with (Iraqi 
President) Saddam Hussein if he complied with UN demands to withdraw from 
Kuwait by the Jan. 15th deadline. On a different political level, Mestrovic draws 
attention to the fact that President Bush masterminded many of the operations 
against Iraq while on vacation - a calculated gambit, in that his 'aides explain that 
by waging war from a fishing boat in the waters of Maine or the back of a golf cart, he 
is sending a "message" that he is relaxed' (1993: 9). During the conflict, Western 
journalists variously referred to Desert Storm as a 4th of July firework display, 'the 
Saddam soap opera...the biggest computer game of all time', and, in the words of 
selected allied combatants, 'I feel like a young athlete at his first football match', 
Jilt was exactly like the movies!' (Woolley, 1993: 190-191). 
After the allied victory, as reported by Sterling (1993: 95-98), the 14th 
Interservice/Industry Training Systems and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) of 
November '92, held in San Antonio and sponsored by the US National Security 
Industrial Association, paid particular attention to the lessons to be drawn from the 
Battle of 73 Easting by the "military-infotainment" complex in presentations that 
managed to both market and mythologise the "surgical" and simulational aspects of 
'the world's first purely designer war' (Kroker, 1992: 50). In as much as even the 
politically hostile New Internationalist (Oct. 1992: 12) cited opinion polls showing 
approval ratings for the War 'as high as 90 per cent in North America and Europe', 
these various attempts to depict the conflict as hi-tech entertainment spectacular 
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elicited the 'appropriate' response from the general public. Rosenblatt also opines 
that American responses were "rehearsed", prepared through pop-cultural 
developments: 'The movie Top Gun displayed the sense of speed; the video games, the 
sense of high-reflex accuracy. The rise of information technology in the 1980s, the 
development of lasers, sensors and microchips, it was all familiar stuff' (1991: 30). 
The selling and reception of the Gulf War as showpiece of the "New World Order" 
exhibits both Mann's tendencies of spectator-sport and deterrence-science militarism, 
albeit in a more "up-front fashion" than the coiner of these terms may have expected. 
But reliance on such attempts to insure militarily 'successful' outcomes in the future is 
far from a foregone conclusion. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault noted that the move 
from 'Classical Age' state power exercised in the form of publicly-attended torture 
and execution of the condemned to 'modem' state power as exclusion and incarceration, 
occurred in part because of the potential of the former to produce resentment against 
officialdom and revulsion at the 'spectacle', rather than the intended awe and 
respect for authority, amongst the spectators (1977: 57-69). In the Gulf conflict the 
same concerns - provoked largely by the mooted negative effect of media coverage of 
the Vietnam war - produced an official account of events packaged as a contemporary 
version of the 'spectacle': this reversion again opens up the possibility of the display 
backfiring. One such spoiling of image management occurs in the increasingly common 
practice of parading POWs on television, and in the Gulf War, this took the form of 
flaunting nine downed allied pilots, each looking 'beat-up and under the gun' 
(Rosenblatt, 1991: 79), mouthing forced confessions to alliance "war crimes". The 
interpretation accompanying such performances aimed at stressing Saddam's 
inhumanity and Iraqi contempt for the Geneva Convention; but it also both dinted the 
impression of allied invulnerability, and graphically depicted the consequences of 
battle on combatants, such as tabloid-frontpaged British Flight Lt. John Peters, who, 
like turtles stripped of their shells, had been denuded of their hi-tech armoury and 
brought face-to-face with an older wartime reality, a reality disturbingly 
transmitted to media audiences in TV-time - later in reading time, when Peters co-
authored his account of the experience in book form (Peters 8r Nichol, 1993). A more 
deliberate and practical effort to prise open cracks in the 'acceptable' face of the Gulf 
War was undertaken in 1991, when the steering committee of SCAWD (the Scottish 
Churches Action for World Development) established GulfWatch, an alternative 
electronic information service operating through established fax, telex and e-mail 
networks, so that 
Is]ome of the same satellites that bounced down bombing schedules also carried 
messages of love - unscrambled, freely open to the interception we know takes 
place. In such small ways, perhaps, the oppressor's tool can help dismantle his 
fortress' (Hulbert & McIntosh, 1992: 27). 
In the secular sphere, a similar tactic was deployed by the New York based anti-
media group, Paper Tiger. Rushkoff describes the group's effort to transmit anti-war 
documentaries on the Gulf conflict through local PBS satellite links in conjunction 
with a 'maverick' broadcasting conglomerate ('Deep Dish'); the plan was successful to 
the point where the PBS parent company threatened local affiliates with revocation 
of their licenses (1994: 219-23). Swank's study (1997) also finds evidence of a sizable 
dissenting movement in major US cities that faded over a short two-month period, 
primarily because of suppressed reportage of opposition to the Gulf War by a 
mainstream corporate audiovisual and print media. 
If the Gulf War is indicative of anything novel, let alone durable, in the history of 
international conflict, that novelty certainly does not reside in the establishment of a 
"New World Order". In both the formal political realm and the public sphere, what 
is most evident is a lack of control over events. Saddam Hussein's much-vaunted 
fighting force - spearheaded by the Republican Guard - and a purportedly frightening 
arsenal of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, are never deployed to effect: the 
pre-touted 'mother of all battles' does not eventuate. The Iraqi president is defeated, 
but retains his power. By way of contrast, his victorious counterpart loses the US 
presidency in the first election held after winning the war, in the wake of the 1989 
collapse of Communist rivalry within the world-system - and also shortly after being 
awarded the accolade of Time magazine's 'Man of the Year' in January 1991. The 
nature of this award in fact contributes to the defeat, the magazine's cover depicting 
(in a remarkable echo of the Kantorowicz thesis) the "Two George Bushes": 
contradictory personalities housed in one body. The accompanying lead-story 
extended the metaphor to account for Bush's 'visionary' international relations 
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policies running in tandem with a disastrous lack of leadership in US domestic 
affairs. The results of this "splitting image"problem were as electorally - if not as 
literally - fatal for Bush as they proved to be for his 17th- and 18th-Century English 
and French counterparts (see section 4.3, p. 152); and several media pundits saw this as 
an example of the power of the press, citing the Time treatment as a prime ingredient 
in Bush's plummeting popularity ratings which had plunged from an unprecedented 
high of 90 percent to a disastrous 37 percent between January and November of 1991. 
If control, or even full comprehension, of events was out of the hands of the political 
leadership of both contending parties - and if it rested neither in the hands of an 
American public reduced to merely approving or ineffectually protesting the war's 
reported progress, even less in the 'vanished' people of Iraq reduced to the level of 
victims and targets - where was it located? 
Various commentators and analysts, those not entranced by the wizardry of new 
weapons technology or a resurgent patriotism, attempted to order the events and 
address this question. In so doing, most relied on a form of explanation that drew from 
older models: thus Habermas (1994: 5-31) supported the allied effort in terms of a 'Just 
War' principle and the need to show solidarity with Israel, given Germany's past war 
record. In Berman's view, this position enabled him to 'reject the anti-war movement 
while applauding its anti-militarist values, just as he underscores his opposition to 
German national militarists, despite concurring in their support for the US' (1991: 
170). The widespread tendency to equate Saddam with Hitler - Kellner (1995: 227) 
cites 1,170 news articles making this fictional identification - would not have 
discouraged such support. McKenzie Wark's account of the war (1994: 2-6) stresses the 
incident of August 23rd 1990 when the Iraqi dictator, "entertaining" a captive western 
audience - television viewers in the 'global village' as well as the European "guests" 
physically in his company - placed his hand on the head of 7-year-old Stuart 
Lockwood, producing an outraged press response in the British tabloids. Wark 
interprets this reaction as based on an 'orientalist', colonialist view of the 
stereotypical Arab "other", and a vital step in the demonising construction of an 
implacable enemy. 
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Other authors wrung variants on this theme, Rick Atkinson's 1993 history of the war, 
itself titled Crusade, reaching as far back into the past as 401 BC and the Anabasis of 
Xenophon to make sense of the rout of the Iraqi army in the war's concluding stages. 
Writers on the Left characterised the conflict as motivated by capitalist politico-
economic imperatives, or the business-as-usual of Western imperialism (the Iraqgate 
chronicles of Bloom et al, 1994; Statement of the Workers League, 1991). 
But in the most notorious commentary of the war - that of Baudrillard - such 
contextualising and efforts at order are futile; because despite it's masquerade as a 
real-world event, la guerre du Golfe n'a pas eu lieu. Prior to the event (?) he asserted 
that such a war could not occur, because sabre-rattling war talk could stand in for a 
real-life engagement; after reality uncharitably called this prediction into question, 
Baudrillard responded in March 1991 by writing a further article, entitled The Gulf 
War Has Not Taken Place', that reiterated the essential validity of his previous 
position. The logic of this latter paper asserted that since the conflict was so 
thoroughly "mediated", no objective or non-ideological information as to what 
happened was attainable. "Reality" was out of reach, devoured by assorted 
simulations. This allowed one to accede to the triumph of 'virtuality' and 'simulation', 
and to respond appropriately, because under such conditions we 
'have neither need of nor taste for real drama or real war. What we require is 
the aphrodisiac spice of the multiplication of fakes and the hallucination of 
violence, for we have a hallucinogenic pleasure in all things, which, as in the 
case of drugs, is also the pleasure in our indifference and our irresponsibility and 
thus in our true liberty' (Baudrillard, 1995: 75). 
The obscurity and sheer prima facie perversity of this provoked an immediate book-
length response from Christopher Norris (1992), who attacked Baudrillard's 'absurd 
theses' in particular, and postmodern and neopragmatist theorists in general. Norris' 
prime claim stated that such views, by foreclosing any notion of an objective reality, 
produce an inherent quietism in the public sphere peculiarly amenable to the military 
activities of dominant nation-states within the "New World Order" of the 1990s. The 
only legitimate intellectual reactions within such perspectives are acknowledgement 
of the absorption of the "real" into the simulated "irreal", and/or proclamations of 
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the "end of history" - Fukuyama's approach - or "aesthetic" responses, celebrating 
diversity, relativity, irony and pastiche, abandoning futile attempts to discover 
nonexistent "truths" and avoiding burnout in the attempt to turn these into platforms 
of resistance. For Norris such mute acceptance of the 'postmodern condition' is 
untenable on both moral and logical grounds, and he clings to both the validity of 
Cartesian models of discernible truths, and the practical activism that motivates 
anti-establishment intellectuals like Chomsky. 
Despite their opposed positions, there are are elements of validity in all these 
opposed arguments as to the meaning of the Gulf War, so "impossible" [1] under a 
condition of post-modernity, yet hardly realisable in a previous period. Baudrillard's 
emphasis on the war as simulation [3] is not merely figurative; when combined with 
the logistical challenge of mobilising, transporting, supplying and maintaining sixty 
ships, over 1,000 aircraft and a quarter of a million troops, the military simulations - 
culminating in the feints (the 'Hail Mary' play) of a supposed amphibious assault at 
Wadi al Batin to cover the decisive actual ground offensive on Feb 24th - constitute an 
achievement. Virilio's concept of 'Pure War' [2] is based on speed and surprise as well 
as a blurring of the line between war and peacekeeping - all factors evident in the Gulf 
conflict. The actual locus of control in the episode rests on a newer, more direct and 
more technologically sophisticated configuration of the war/text axis: a conjunction 
between the forces determining battlefield outcomes - the military - and those 
reporting on and orchestrating public response to events - the media. Kellner is correct 
in claiming a politico-military control over public communication, where the 'war 
against Iraq can be read as a text produced by the Bush administration, the Pentagon, 
and the media [4], which utilised images and discourse of the crisis and then the war 
to mobilise consent and support for the US intervention' (1995: 199), but leaves out of 
account the vulnerability to public opinion of one of these key players - an elected 
government - relative to either the codes and practices of the 'fourth estate' or the 
armed forces. If attempts to "deconstruct" the war's meaning by dissenters were 
themselves literally contained and "deconstructed" by the media, the 
'schizopolitical' consequences of such subtle manipulation were felt by the incumbent 
President in November of the following year [6]: a hyperliterate populace [5] makes a 
mockery of political prediction. 
As maintained above, the military sponsors and initiates hyperliterate participation in 
this wired world, where the apparata of computerisation - a terminal connected to a 
network [7] - can constitute a quasi-knowledge base of "the world" in itself, as it 
simultaneously curtails activity beyond the screens that make up the virtual world's 
borders. As the Gulf War demonstrated, the capacities inherent in the new information 
technologies also function at the direct level of a weapon, and lead, as in the past, 
towards a further development of the incorporeal proxified subject. The multiplicity of 
proxies - texts - that act as guarantor of this subject's existence, that confirm it's status or 
deny it access to a body politic, that connect it to the textually-delineated world and it's 
similarly-proxified inhabitants, are more numerous, more ephemeral, cover greater 
distances and move more swiftly than their forerunners: but, and also as in the past, 
these technological enhancements of reading/writing practices and artefacts retain their 
capacity to reconfigure the world as a wider - and deadlier - war-zone. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION  
This thesis investigates 2 broad topic areas: the impact of reading and writing on 
diverse societies, with a particular focus on the sub-fields of literacy and textuality; 
and the causes, and persistence, of war. The first area constitutes a problematic, the 
second falls more clearly into the category of a social problem. The thesis argues 
that the two object-domains are linked. The claimed linkage works on three levels. 
The first, simplest and most transparent, is surface similarity - the evolution of both 
writing and war exhibit marked signs of 'jagged' but near-parallel development, are 
coterminous and co-locational, and tend to pass through similar stages of transition. 
This is more than merely coincidental, yet in itself no more than suggestive. A 
further contention is for a tighter linking at the level of system - changes in aspects 
of reading and writing affect and interact with changes in the ways that wars are 
initiated, fought and concluded to form a war/text axis. The third correspondence is 
on the dimension of structure. War and reading/writing share at base a mechanism 
of objectification, and a means of extending human capacities beyond the corporeal 
and the immediately-experienced environment. The operation of this mechanism is 
designated herein as the proxy principle: an enabling condition common to both 
textuality and war. The thesis contends that, beneath the surface coincidence of 
reading /writing and war, and beyond the systematic interplay of the two 
phenomena - at the level of deep structure - it is this principle that brings textuality 
and war into existence in the first instance. 
Proxies are products of human creativity, take a variety of forms, and can be 
fashioned from any material. The purpose of the proxy is manifold - it can be 
decorative or functional, a receptacle of strength or weakness, symbolise virtue or 
vice, attract good fortune or ward off evil spirits. In all cases it 'stands in' for the 
human agent (or agents) that brings it into existence. The proxy principle comes into 
play when the surrogate is endowed with more power and greater capacity than its 
creator(s), and is invested with a 'life of its own'. At that point, the fate of the skin-
bounded self - collective or individual - is determined by his/her (or their) 
relationship to what the proxy artificially embodies ('signifies'). 
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Writing and written artefacts are conceptualised throughout as the most powerful 
instance of a proxy, constituting a meeting-point between the abstract and the 
tangible, material and spiritual, interpretation and fixity of meaning. When 
symbolic mark-making evolves to the level of a recognisable script flexible enough to 
encapsulate more knowledge and information than can be received, transmitted or 
housed in the brain, then the operant conditions for a fully-developed proxy principle 
are in place, and a range of effects - social, political, economic and cultural - on the 
life of the group and the individuals that compose it are set in motion. 
One such effect - for which writing constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition - 
is the instantiation of, or the escalation of extant violent corporate fighting to the 
level of, war. For war to take place, at least (a part of) one of the contending forces 
must utilise, or at a minimum come into contact with, texts, because only in societies 
containing a requisite population level, and which engage in violent combat governed 
by ethical, organisational and juridical sets of rules, can war can be distinguished 
from other forms of lethal intergroup conflict - and with almost no exceptions, it is 
only in societies with writing that such criteria can be fully satisfied. 
The opening chapter laid the groundwork for an investigation of these issues, 
outlining the orienting proposition, providing a conceptual map - the war/text axis - 
expressed as a taxonomy, and a definition of the key terms used subsequently. The 
definitional issue was reprised in the following chapter, reviewing the sociological 
literature on war and various aspects of writing . A reluctance to engage with either 
phenomenon permeated the discipline, which, with regard to war and contrary to the 
long-run historical record, persistently invoked an image of its subject-matter - 
advanced industrial societies - as increasingly pacific. War was cast - with the 
notable exception of Weber's analysis, itself selectively "screened" in the interests of 
preserving the 'pacific transnational sociology' paradigm - as either marginal, 
moribund, or so "feral" and unpredictable as to be beyond the reach of sociological 
investigation. Similarly, approaching the topic of textuality was regarded with 
hostility, to the point where leading practitioners, in their writings, warned that 
'proper' sociological writing involved as thorough-as-possible a disengagement from 
the process of writing itself. Reasons were proffered for both antipathies: and the 
312. 
review concluded that despite these resistances, the world that the discipline took as 
its object of study was - and continued to be - significantly shaped by war; and that 
sociology itself was - and remained - always and ever textual. 
Chapter 3 set out the theoretical foundations for the proxy principle: how the 
operation of this principle, at the level of both structure and agency, transformed a 
universe of bodies and physical environments into an amalgam of documentary 
artefacts and a world-as-text. The proxy principle operates when factual or fictional 
narratives of the world and written records of those within it slip past the second-
order boundaries of description, inventiveness, or classification of an empirical world 
- and supplant, remodel, initiate activities in, or become - a 'real' world in 
themselves. The chapter in closing presented an instance of this process in the 
abstract - the world as warzone -, setting the agenda for the material constituting the 
remaining sections of the thesis. 
The fourth and fifth chapters detailed the operational development of the war/text 
axis, primarily in case-study form supplemented by quantitative analysis, across 5 
sociohistorical contexts: the "primitive", Grwco-Roman antiquity, the Middle Ages, 
modernity and the 'post'modern. Amongst the first cohort - the "primitive" - large-
scale intergroup conflict was either non-existent, or fulfilled few or none of the 
categories by which such conflict qualifies as "war". Moreover, (civilised) 
prohibitions against the normative violence that characterised the misnamed 
"primitive war" is in fact both the basis for prosecuting later forms of historical war, 
and a leading rationale for the marginalising, enslavement and/or disappearance of 
"primitive" peoples. In the cohort where large-scale combat does not exist or is 
sublimated into non-lethal mock-combat (76 cases), the sole commonality between the 
diverse cases is that all lack writing. Whether "savage" or "peaceful", the 
"primitive" as defined by the ethnographic record is non-warring and a-literate; on 
the evidence provided, the former because of the latter. 
The Ancient World shows evidence of both war and - in its Graeco-Roman incarnation - 
significant evidence of widespread literacy: protomodern civilisational entities and 
providers of a heritage for Western modernity. But a paradoxical heritage: the Greek 
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adaptation of earlier writing-systems into an alphabet is premised on contempt for 
writing as the invention of barbarians, and a privileging of rhetoric as fully human - 
the speaker-hearer relationship the basis for an unmediated Athenian 
direct/participatory democracy, to which writing (as Plato argued) represents a 
positive danger. As evidenced in Chapter 4, Greek warfare as a model for later forms 
is also more notable for what is rejected - the organisationally-fatal Achillean 
"heroics" and Alcibiadean privateering later punishable under military law - rather 
than what is inherited. Rome's governmental system shares the spirit of Greek 
disgust for the barbarism of writing, but not - because of the Imperium's 
intercontinental reach, size of the Legions and interaction with the barbarians at the 
peripheries - the letter: Rome's military is literate at all levels of the soldiery. In a 
subsequent consideration of medieval war and textuality, a further development of a 
war/text axis, where under the aegis of religions of the Book, the interests of the 
literati and the warrior caste merge. The former is provided with the military power 
to remodel the physical world into one that more closely accords with what has been 
read and written of, and the source material from which chronicles may be created; 
the latter is supplied with access to an elevated self-image (identified with 
mythical heroes or chivalric ideals) and a more effective organisational 
infrastructure. Eventually, in this mutually-reinforcing union of arms and letters, the 
'letters' part of the equation is fully integrated into military systems. The armed 
forces themselves become a promoter of 'this-worldly' literate praxis. 
This concept of a literate military and its place in the vanguard of literacy's 
dissemination into the sphere of civil society, is a feature of several of the 107 case 
studies that comprise the bulk of Chapter 5 - an analysis of the fully-elaborated 
war/text axis under conditions of modernity, focussing on the late-modern as inheritor 
of the proto-textualism of preceding Antiquity and the Feudal era. From a statistical 
analysis of 82 nation-states within the mid-to-late 20th Century world-system - and 
as predicted in earlier chapters of the thesis - war, relative to earlier eras analysed, 
increases throughout the period in terms of both extent (measured by frequency, 
duration, continuity of engagement and number of contending parties) and intensity 
(using casualty rates - military, civilian and total - as an index of intensity). This is 
because of- not despite - increasing (commitment to) mass and functional literacy, a 
high status allotted to the written word as authoritative, higher investments in 
314. 
(typically compulsory) education, and improved global flow of information. The 
findings indicate that the incidence of war increases, even as refinements in the laws 
of war governing conduct attempt to curtail its more overtly savage aspects. As 
supposed earlier motives for war - the manhunt, plunder, vengeance, aggrandisement - 
are rendered formally illegitimate; as peace is regarded as normative and war as 
aberrant; as in the dominant core-states within the world-system the military are 
subordinate to governments installed through free elections, and the power of the 
military is reduced in a practical sense (shrinking defence budgets, lowered personnel 
levels and other facets of a "de-militarisation" process); within and through all 
these phases, war both survives and thrives. 
War persists, moreover, at the epicentre of the civilising process - democracies 
committed in principle to peace. The analysis shows that, although - and in line with 
the Kantian proposal regarding republics - democratically-elected polities do not 
engage in wars against each other, they figure prominently in war-involvement 
against other regime-types. Notably, the findings show that military governments 
do not typically engage in national or international wars, whereas liberal 
democracies, from the 1700s on and peaking in the mid-to-late 20th Century, figure in 
all major (and a significant proportion of "minor") wars. Yet within and commonly 
beyond the borders of democratic states there exists a general perception - as 
demonstrated herein, at the academic as well as the popular and political level - of 
the more advanced of these democracies as 'peaceful'. 
The thesis explains such apparent anomalies by reference to the proxy principle in its 
most developed form. The rationale for states with the highest levels of 
mass/functional literacy, exposure to print and print-derived media, information 
access and commitment to highest-order knowledge residing in the written - all of 
these civilisational indicators premised on freedom - to engage in war, is to be found 
in a textual rather than an experiential apprehension of 'the world'. The acceptable 
motivation for warring by such states is constructed in the abstract, and limited to 
matters of principle. War in such states is always defensive: as the treatment of the 
'post'modern 1991 Gulf War in Chapter 6 demonstrated, offensive war is the province 
of "rogue states" governed by leaders represented in an assortment of media 
portrayals as degenerate, dictatorial and/or demonic. What must be defended is not - 
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or not ever principally - tangible: but a cause, the maintenance of world order, "our 
way of life". Contemporaneity is herein theorised as the apogee of a proxifying 
transformation of the corporeal world into a world-as-text, one of whose central 
narratives is imminent or actual war. 
In aiming at uncovering a link between two phenomena as complex and multifaceted 
as reading/writing and war, and in attempting to show the evolution of the link 
across vast tracts of time and space, the foregoing thesis is bound to be less than fully 
comprehensive. Nor can it hope to satisfy all practitioners within the various 
specialised fields from which it so freely draws.What has been attempted is 
necessarily limited in order to draw the clearest possible line under the central 
proposition - that reading and writing are causal factors in the construction of war. 
This has been demonstrated primarily with reference to one pattern of historical and 
sociopolitical development - the path taken by the West - and one mode of the 
textual, that of alphabetic literacy. Indications are provided that other 
civilisational complexes - chiefly the Islamic and the Oriental - are subject to the 
same broad processes, but this requires validation or disproof by experts in these 
fields, and the thesis can provide little more than a falsifiable entry into such an 
analysis. The category of 'the military' has also been abbreviated, treating only the 
army: there is clearly ample scope for an equivalent study of the effects of textuality 
on the air force and the navy - particularly fruitful fields for investigation of the 
proxy principle, in view of the fact that (a) the history of aerial combat is 
necessarily more limited in scope, allowing for finer-grained analysis within stricter 
time-frames; (b) objectification of the enemy is enhanced by the principals being 
enclosed within a fighting machine; and (c) both branches of the services proxify 
their personnel by removing them not only from the civil sphere, but from their 
natural (land-bound) environment. A final potential research area would be the 
effects of textuality on other social processes and institutions (such as work, the 
family, class, the law or any within the societal subsets that sociology takes as its 
subject-matter). 
Much remains to be accomplished in the way of further research. What has been 
attempted here - and hopefully, substantially achieved - is at once a clearing-
operation and a laying of the theoretical base from which to proceed. 
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